Stoic view of passions / patheia vs the Epicurean view

That is an excellent question Matt and I like that you posted the link that Joshua mentioned in the podcast.

It's a deep subject that I suspect others are better equipped than me to deep dive on, but in the last analysis it seems to me that the Stoics have decided that "reason" and "logic" are the hill that they are going to die on, and just as with Mr. Spock no emotion of any kind is going to be approved of as all emotion is illogical if logic itself is the highest good.

They can dance all they like around phrasing that arguably indicates that they are ok with some types of emotions, but for someone who thinks that the summit of virtue is the only part that counts, and focused on how you can down even just below the surface of the water, the implications of the bottom line are clear - there is no kind of pleasure that that are going to consider as good, and no kinds of pain that they are going to consider go be evil.

Quote from Matteng

When I understood Philodemus right, I think the Epicurean view would only match with the Stoic view when the Emotion

1) has harmful consequences ( pleasure then is not choiceworthy for example )
2) is irrational, based on empty believe
3) is based on unnecessary desire

In short when the Emotions lead to more pain than pleasure.

Thank you Matteng for pointing this out.

Perhaps there is a way to fine-tune the differences, however, and especially because both feelings and emotions are important for making sense of the world, and so we need them as valid input for making good choices. Feelings and emotions have important input and shouldn't just be brushed aside in a "stoic" fashion. If something is actually "irrational" you would want to take the time to fully understand why, and that means you need to be able to tolerate the discomfort of seeing and understanding the big picture.

Here is a modern psychology article that is a must-read for anyone interested in the role of feelings and emotions in well-being:

The Key Skill We Rarely Learn: How to Feel Your Feelings

I feel my feelings! Probably not. But with courage and practice, we can cultivate the skill to deeply connect to ourselves and our values, opening up a world…

www.psychologytoday.com

Quote

When I understood Philodemus right, I think the Epicurean view would only match with the Stoic view when the Emotion

1) has harmful consequences ( pleasure then is not choiceworthy for example )
2) is irrational, based on empty believe
3) is based on unnecessary desire

There seems to be a mix-up of two different usages of "irrational":
The usage in the quote seems to indicate that "irrational" is something "bad", against reason, to be avoided.
The other usage is neutral and refers to sensations, emotions, feelings being fundamentally, by definition, irrational, in contrast to something we have obtained with reasoning.

In cases 1) and 3) from the quote, the hedonic calculus may justify pursuing the concerned desire:
1) We sometimes willfully risk pain/harm to obtain greater pleasure or less pain in the future.
3) Epicurus' philosophy does not make us reject all unnecessary desires. Instead, we pursue some of the unnecessary desires when they are natural.

It seems that the Stoic and Epicurean views match far less than what the quote indicates. The Stoic vocabulary in the Wikipedia article is misleading from an Epicurean perspective.

Quote from Matteng

Hi,

How do you see the Stoic theory/ view of the passions/ pathei/apatheia/ eupathei and hoe differ it in the Epicurean view ? I know Philodemus did there much.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stoic_passions

As far as I know, each tradition's evaluation of "desire" and "passion" contradict.

For Epicureans, "feeling", itself, is one of the principle criteria of knowledge. We accept that the "affective sympathies" we feel are as informative as the colors we see. As Epíkouros writes, wise people will feel anger at injustice, and will experience pain upon being tortured. In each case, the lack of anger, or pain would make us numb and passive. We would feel apathy and indifference.

Meanwhile, "apathy" and "indifference" are preferred by those who see emotions, themselves, as deviant ripples the disrupt the pure, unblemished surface of the clear pond that is the mind. I think we'll find other parallels to many contemplative traditions that view pleasant emotions with suspicion, and privilege a sort of pure, neutral state to fun and laughter.

Quote from Matteng

When I understood Philodemus right, I think the Epicurean view would only match with the Stoic view when the Emotion

1) has harmful consequences ( pleasure then is not choiceworthy for example )
2) is irrational, based on empty believe
3) is based on unnecessary desire

I think you're on-point, there. Anger with harmful consequences, irrational anger, or anger based on unnecessary desires marks the line over which we are recommended not the cross, in which anger metastasizes into wrath or rage, as Philódēmos reinforces in On Anger.

Quote from Martin

There seems to be a mix-up of two different usages of "irrational":
The usage in the quote seems to indicate that "irrational" is something "bad", against reason, to be avoided.
The other usage is neutral and refers to sensations, emotions, feelings being fundamentally, by definition, irrational, in contrast to something we have obtained with reasoning.

This is a great point, and just to demonstrate the fluidity of the usage, Diogénēs' records Epíkouros as having employed the word ἄλογός (alogós), or "irrational" to refer to sensation:

“'For every' [Epíkouros] affirms 'sensation is irrational and moved by no single memory...'" (10.31)

In the Epistle to Herodotos, the Hegemon uses another declension of that same word ἀλόγῳ (alógoi) to refer to the veracity beliefs that are incoherent, foolish, or absurd:

"...[the study of nature] will banish anything irrational..." (10.81)