Posts by Cassius

Quote from Robert

One thing that gives me pause: Arenson wants to include "active" pleasures in the katastematic category in part because she fears Epicureans would otherwise lead boring, passive lives. I don't quite get this. Even if all active pleasures (per Sedley) were to be defined as kinetic, that doesn't mean we're supposed to renounce them. An Epicurean's life can be as active as he or she wants it to be, as long as our choices are guided by prudence, courage, moderation, and justice. Contrast two situations

I think she is wrestling with the issues we have been discussing -- she's aware of the argument that katastematic pleasures are somehow superior, but she is not going to accept the definition of katastemtic that equates those pleasures with basically nothing except some kind of ambiguous appreciation, because that would lead to the conclusion that the Epicurean goal is really to DO nothing in life -- and she isn't going to accept that as what Epicurus tought any more than Gosling and Taylor or Nikolsky or Emily Austin did.

I'm not finished yet myself but it appears to me that she's come up with the idea that Katastematic pleasures cannot really be the sensation-free nothingness that some allege, and she's dividing up pleasures into (1) those that respond to some lack or pain or need, and she's calling those kinetic, and (2) those that she's calling "painless" because they do not arise from a pain or lack. That's where she places smelling roses or music or even having sex, I gather (!)

So I'm still processing too, but as far as i can tell she's locked on in the real issue, sees it as a problem, and isn't going to accept it. She's not going to accept the idea that the best pleasure and therefore the supreme good is "katastematic" if that implies something that cannot be sensed. So she's rejecting the common interpretation of katastematic for that reason.

One really significant aspect of her analysis is that she's focusing on constructing something without reference to Cicero because of a combination of his unreliability or the simple confusion he causes.

But I note Robert that you said that you've read chapters 5-8, and I suspect you'll get a different picture when you read her analysis of Plato and Aristotle in the earlier chapters.

After far too long we now have available a "dark mode" version of the "Inspire" theme - the default site style.

If you'd like to try it go to the bottom of any page and you'll see a "Change Style" link.

That will take you to a page that looks like this:

It is best to select either the "Inspire Dark" or "Inspire Light" options. Other options may be listed on your screen and you're welcome to try them out, but they may not work as well.

If you choose the Dark theme and find any popups or screens that look weird or fail to work, please let me know. We'll keep the site default set to Inspire Light, but I'm using the Inspire Dark version and working to stamp out remaining bugs.

Welcome to Episode 345 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective, which gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and helps us understand Epicurus' position on the same issues. This week will continue in Section 13 of Book Two.

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackham translation here: Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

As we proceed through the end of Academic Questions these are the topics we expect to cover:

24. Lucullus's Extended Rebuttal of the Academic Doctrine, and His Concluding Appeal to Cicero (2:XIII)
25. Cicero Begins His Reply (2:XX)
26. Cicero Lays Out the Syllogism About Assent and Opinion (2:XXI)
27. Cicero Turns to Antiochus's Own Inconsistency (2:XXII)
28. Cicero Defends His Citation of the Ancient Philosophers (2:XXIII)
29. Cicero Adds Chrysippus and the Cyrenaics, Then Returns to Arcesilas and Zeno (2:XXIV)
30. Cicero Returns to Attacking the Senses (2:XXV)
31. Cicero Presses the Sun's Size and the Limits of Trained Perception (2:XXVI)
32. Cicero Turns the "Art" Argument Back on Lucullus (2:XXVII)
33. Cicero Multiplies Examples From Madness (2:XXVIII)
34. Cicero Attacks Reason and Dialectics: The Sorites Paradox (2:XXIX)
35. Cicero Presses the Liar Paradox (2:XXX)
36. Cicero Presents Carneades's Own Positive Doctrine of Probability (2:XXXI)
37. Cicero Distinguishes the Academic Position From Epicurus's (2:XXXII)
38. Cicero Defends Probability Against the Charge That It Cannot Support Memory or Action (2:XXXIII)
39. Cicero Answers the "Self-Refuting" and "Two Incompatible Propositions" Objections (2:XXXIV)
40. Cicero Broadens the Argument Beyond the Stoics (2:XXXV)
41. Cicero Reflects on His Own Position Among the Competing Schools (2:XXXVI)
42. Cicero's Survey of Disagreement Among the Natural Philosophers (2:XXXVII)
43. Cicero Presses the Problem of Providence and the Limits of Physics (2:XXXVIII)
44. Cicero's Survey Continues: The Soul, the Antipodes, and the Motion of the Earth (2:XXXIX)
45. Cicero Asks Which Natural Philosopher He Would Even Choose to Follow (2:XL)
46. Cicero Turns to Ethics: Even the Gods Are Disputed (2:XLI)
47. Cicero's Roll Call of Rival Schools on the Chief Good, Part One (2:XLII)
48. Cicero's Roll Call of Rival Schools on the Chief Good, Part Two (2:XLIII)
49. Cicero Weighs Zeno Against Antiochus on Virtue and the Happy Life (2:XLIV)
50. Cicero Catalogs the Stoic Paradoxes About the Wise Man (2:XLV)
51. Cicero's Climactic Debate Between Pleasure and Honor (2:XLVI)
52. Cicero Turns to the Canon of Truth, and Zeno's Hand (2:XLVII)
53. The Dialogue's Close (2:XLVIII)

Quote from DaveT

Of course we never want to appear to be relying on a strawman argument to prove a point.

That's correct, but if there is anything i am sure about it is that the attitudes expressed in the world's worst video collection are indeed the majority view, both of laymen and of "experts."

For one of an unlimited number of examples that could be given:

What is the core definition of Epicureanism as established by Epicurus?

Philosophy teaching that modest pleasures lead to tranquility and freedom from fear

Epicureanism, founded by Epicurus, redefines pleasure not as wild hedonism but as the absence of pain and disturbance, achieved through modest living and intellectual pursuits. At its heart, the philosophy seeks ataraxia, a state of serene tranquility, by eliminating fears of death, gods, and the afterlife through rational understanding of the universe. Epicurus taught that simple pleasures like friendship and contemplation are sufficient for happiness, contrasting with more ascetic or duty-bound philosophies of the time. This approach empowers individuals to cultivate a peaceful life by focusing on what truly matters, making it a practical guide for enduring daily challenges with equanimity.

Also:

To which broader tradition does Epicurus belong in terms of ethical theory?

Hedonism

Learn More

Epicurus belongs to the hedonistic tradition in ethical theory, where pleasure is considered the ultimate good, but he refined it to advocate for prudent, long-term pleasures over fleeting ones. This places him in contrast to virtue ethicists like Aristotle, who emphasized eudaimonia through excellence, yet shares the goal of human flourishing. Hedonism in Epicurus's form integrates materialist physics to justify ethical choices, arguing that understanding nature frees us from superstitious fears. Recognizing this tradition helps learners appreciate how Epicureanism offers a sensory-based yet rational path to ethical living, influencing modern discussions on well-being.

>>>>>> Identifying the goal with LONG-TERM pleasure is specifically what Epicurus tells us NOT to do in the letter to Menoeceus: And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.

This thread is for discussion of the article linked below.

The issue of completeness and perfection was of great concern to the ancient Greeks, and we aren't going to understand what Epicurus had to say about pleasure as the supreme good unless we understand how Epicurus met the Platonic objection that pleasure is never complete. Here's an article with key citations from Plato, Seneca, and Cicero to illustrate what their objection was, and how Epicurus met it. In sum, the issue comes down to whether you think only "complete" things are good, or whether you acknowledge the goodness both of things that are complete and the things that make up complete things. Just as in physics both the atoms and the things made of atoms are real, in ethics both pleasure as a concept and pleasure as individual experiences are good.

Blog Article

The Completeness Argument, Cicero's Knowledge Of It, And The Epicurean Response

The Completeness Argument

One of the oldest objections to placing the highest good in anything other than virtue runs like this: the good must be complete — whole, finished, lacking nothing — and cannot be a process, a becoming, or anything that admits of growth or degree. A thing that is still developing toward some end is not yet that end; it is only on the way to it. Plato gives this argument its classic statement, distinguishing genesis (becoming, a process aimed at something beyond itself)…

Cassius

August 7, 2026 at 10:42 AM

In regard to this part I think you are part-way to answering your own question:

In the last two years especially, there has been more focus on the forum and in the podcast to gain a deeper context of Epicurean philosophy through study of other textual sources such as Cicero, etc. This newer material might be of interest for the more advanced student. However, for myself, I feel that at times it can begin to cloud up or muddy up the big picture with all the additional layers of contrast between Cicero, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, etc. Also, it seems clearer to me now that there are certain interpretive differences that keep occurring. These are due to some subtle contradictions between the Letter to Menoeceus and the Principal Doctrines/Vatican Sayings. This can bring in a feeling of a lack of clarity. The only way to deal with this is to “try it out” or test it.

------

I do not believe that there is any cloudiness or subtle contradictions or lack of clarity inherent in the text of the Letter to Menoeceus or the Principal Doctrines/Vatican sayings. That some people believe they are seeing such things is explainable by exactly what you mention. They do not have in their minds the context of the other textual sources and especially the debates about pleasure that were well known to the ancient Greek philosophers but not to us today. If you don't know the argument that pleasure cannot be the highest good because it is a "process" or "not complete" or is "becoming rather than being." then you're likely to misinterpret references to that issue, thinking that Epicurus has some totally different meaning in mind.

And unfortunately "trying it out" is impossible if you don't know what "it" is. If someone were to infer that "absence of pain" means meditation, for example, and they thought that by meditation they could "try out" Epicurean philosophy, they may find meditation pleasurable but they be not a step further in understanding Epicurus.

The average person living today who picks up the letter to Menoeceus or the Principal Doctrines cannot understand some of its more important aspects unless they take the time to learn why Epicurus was addressing "the limit of pleasure" or "absence of pain" in the first place.

This part of what you wrote is definitely true: Also, it seems clearer to me now that there are certain interpretive differences that keep occurring

There absolutely are many interpretative differences, and almost every commentator has a different take on the issues to which you are refer. From the very beginning you need to know that, as DeWitt says in the first paragraph of the first chapter of his book, Epicurus is at the same time one of the most loved and hated philosophers in history. Everyone needs to realize going in that they are going to have to make up their own minds about what Epicurus was really teaching, and that takes time and familiarity with the subject to achieve.

David given what you wrote about just starting your study of Epicurus, you might find this recent post by Kalosyni -- and the reply to her which I just posted -- to be of particular interest as you get started reading.

Blog Article

Reflections on Five Years on the EpicureanFriends Forum

Reflections on Five Years on the EpicureanFriends Forum

Today is my five year anniversary on the forum, and here are some thoughts and reflections.

My interest in Epicurean philosophy began five years ago during the summer of 2021, just as Covid was beginning to recede. I had come across a philosophy book by a UO professor friend, which briefly mentioned “The Garden”. Curiosity led me to look online to find out more about Epicurean philosophy. I found the EpicureanFriends forum, and was…

Kalosyni

August 6, 2026 at 11:33 AM

Welcome David - And yes you followed the instructions correctly. I particularly appreciate how you emailed us without being prompted, just on the basis of the registration instructions. We have a lot of spam registrations and you are proof that it is possible to read and follow the instructions, so thank you very much!

Enjoy your stay here and be sure to let us know if there are particular questions with which we can be of assistance.

If you are starting out by reading the letter to Menoeceus you will definitely have questions, so don't hesitate to ask.

EpicuriousDavid tells us:

Hi,

I recently signed up with username EpicuriousDavid

I was brought to the forum specifically by searching for 'Epicurus online class', your website showed up and looked very interesting. I was looking for a structured way to learn about Epicurus and his followers. I'm participating in an online 'Aristotle and his successors' course that will very briefly touch on Epicurus and I wanted more in depth resources.

My familiarity with Epicurus is pretty minimal, little more than the knowledge that the Epicureanism of Epicurus is pretty distinct from the Epicureanism of modern usage of the term. Once I complete this email I will read the Letter to Menoeceus for the first time in the Hackett Epicurus Reader.

Thanks,

David

P.s. I hope I followed the instructions correctly?

Welcome EpicuriousDavid

There is one last step to complete your registration: All new registrants must email Cassius so that this Welcome Thread can contain basic information about your background and interest in Epicurus. In that email, please tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism and which particular aspects of Epicureanism most interest you, and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. All posting here is subject to our Community Standards, Participation Levels, and Posting Policies -- please read that page; it explains our ground rules and will save everyone time and friction.

ALSO - the Forum has an editorial policy as to the advocacy of anything other than Pleasure as what Epicurus taught to be the supreme good. All prospective members must read this post before proceeding with an account at Epicureanfriends.coom:

Against Katastematic Supremacy - Pleasure Is A Unified Good, Not A House Divided Against Itself - INCLUDES FORUM EDITORIAL POLICY

If you have not done so already, please be sure you have read Torquatus' Presentation of Epicurean Ethics (also available in a more compact side-by-side format at EpicurusToday.com). That is the clearest, most complete statement of Epicurean ethics to survive from antiquity, and reading it early will save you -- and us -- a great deal of confusion. Most people arrive with a version of "Epicureanism" assembled from the Tetrapharmakon, the Letter to Menoeceus, or scattered quotations of questionable reliability -- and of the three, the Tetrapharmakon is the least reliable foundation of all. It is many times more compressed even than the Letter, and terse enough that it has been read in sharply different, sometimes incompatible ways by different interpreters; at best it serves as a reminder of Epicurus's four main topics for someone who already knows their content, not as a source of that content. The Letter to Menoeceus is a real summary, but it too is compressed and was written for students who already understood the foundations of Epicurean ethics. Torquatus is the best surviving example of how Epicurus's own well-educated students understood and presented that foundation themselves. It is the fastest and most reliable way to find out whether what you already believe about Epicurus matches what he and his school actually taught.

The moderators here are well aware that many fans of Epicurus hold sincerely-held views about what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with this forum's purpose. This forum exists specifically for people committed to classical Epicurean positions, not for reconciling those positions with modern "eclectic" reinterpretations that borrow Epicurus's name while rejecting his actual conclusions. Reading Torquatus first is the quickest way to see where that line falls, before investing time in posts that argue against the very foundations this forum exists to defend.

All of us here arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies. We don't demand of others what we weren't able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is different enough from most other philosophies that understanding how deep those differences run simply takes time. That's why we have participation levels that give new members room to learn, but it's also why we have standards that can mean arguments being limited, or participants removed, when the purpose of the community requires it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, isn't committed to unlimited free speech within its own meetings, and isn't organized around anything except the pursuit of truth and a happy life through pleasure as Epicurus explained it.

Please tell us a little about your background reading Epicurean texts, how you found this forum, and what particularly interests you -- that context helps us help you. Our Getting Started page also has ideas for using the site.

Beyond Torquatus, two books will do the most to deepen your understanding quickly. Norman DeWitt's Epicurus and His Philosophy is the single best book-length treatment available. DeWitt treats Epicurus as a coherent system rather than filtering him through later Stoic, Platonic, or modern secular assumptions. If you read one book beyond the ancient sources, make it this one.

Emily Austin's Living for Pleasure: An Epicurean Guide to Life is a clear, engaging modern introduction that many of our members have found a useful on-ramp. Read it, but read it alongside Torquatus and DeWitt rather than in their place, since like most modern treatments it makes no attempt to give the full picture that DeWitt provides.

From there, Epicurus's own surviving letters -- to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus -- and Lucretius's On The Nature of Things are also on the essential reading list. Our Recommended Reading page has a fuller list for when you're ready to go further. None of this is required before you participate, but the more of it you've read -- starting with Torquatus -- the more you'll get out of being here.

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Patrikios

So, I don’t see a wide difference in the basic thrust you are making. I see our differences as a result of different lived experiences

Yes, I would agree that different lived experiences are going to have a huge impact on what one views as the goal of living or the highest good. That's why I don't think we see Epicurus talking too much about the details of enjoyment of particular pleasures. As a philospher he's trying to set our a logical map for how to approach the entire topic of ethics that will apply generally to everyone, just as his approach to physics allows him to approach many different physical phenomena.

Episode 345 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "We Can't Find True and Complete Happiness Unless We Have True Knowledge Of What True and Complete Happiness Is"

Complete transcript:

This is from the wikipedia page:

Epistemology

Main article: Epistemology

According to the Stoics, knowledge can be attained through the application of reason to the impressions (phantasiai) received by the mind through the senses. The mind can judge (συγκατάθεσις, synkatathesis)—approve or reject—an impression, enabling it to distinguish a true representation of reality from one that is false. Some impressions can be assented to immediately, but others can achieve only varying degrees of hesitant approval, which can be labeled belief or opinion (doxa). It is only through reason that people gain clear comprehension and conviction (katalepsis). Certainty and true knowledge (episteme), achievable by the Stoic sage, can be attained only by verifying the conviction with the expertise of one's peers and the collective judgment of humankind.

Quote from Patrikios

Does this imply a conscious thought process to choose to accept the truth of a sense input; which animals do not have?

So i think the answer is yes - and it's more than just implication. This is the voluntary step in which a person evaluates whether to accept an impression or not.

I don't know that every statement made in that Wikipedia section is correct (especially, Certainty and true knowledge (episteme), achievable by the Stoic sage, can be attained only by verifying the conviction with the expertise of one's peers and the collective judgment of humankind. ) but that definitely seems to be the way they are going.

The section we're in right now is not by any means over so we hopefully will get a better understanding as we read further in what Cicero has to say, but I think the general outlines are becoming clear, including --

- to the Stoics certainty is possible but it is exceedingly hard to get, as true sages are "as rare as a phoenix"

- on the other hand there appear to be some impressions that they believed to be so strong that they could not possibly be false.

The Stoics are trapped in the dilemma that they refuse to accept Epicurus's view that all sensations are true, so they have to come up with some process that allows them to determine that some are true and some are false. Epicurus will revise his opinions at any point that they are contradicted by sufficient evidence from the sensations, anticipations, and feelings. The Stoics - believing in intelligent design - have to come up with something that they think is unchangeably true. ("It is only through reason that people gain clear comprehension and conviction" -- this implies reason alone is the arbiter, since the senses cannot be trusted to be honest )

And i think that problem - looking for unchangeability - is directly related to our parallel discussions about whether pleasure is a process of change and therefore inferior to a "state" that allegedly has an absolute aspect that never changes.

We've been debating whether to skip some of this in Academic Questions but currently we are seeing the sweep of arguments that Cicero is going to bring to the table about all sorts of topics that we'd better stay with it.

Quote from DaveT

It is like he might have said: "Once you deal with pain, I trust you to carry on using Prudence, to find more pleasures in this lifetime of yours."

On this point, I don't think there's a general Epicurean rule that says. "First, deal with pain." Certainly not "First, deal with all pain." Now there clearly is a hierarchy for teaching about the nature of the universe (no supernatural gods; true nature of divinity; no life after death; pain can be defeated). But what i want to be clear about is that after you have the framework in your mind you don't then go around on a search and destroy mission after pain - you look at it from the point of view of pursuing pleasure. Maybe that's "glass is half full or half empty" territory, but I think the positive perspective is essential.

Quote from DaveT

I can't agree with this "If--then" proposition. Pleasure and pain can exist in the same space, if you meant to say simultaneously. Is that even arguable?

And so say any particular pleasure can be called "absence of pain" is true on its face, but I don't know who would say such a thing. I don't know where ancient Epicureans would have said it.

A human being can experience many things at once, and so pleasure and pain can be felt in different parts of the experience at the same time. But in regard to the SAME part of the experience, your big toe either feels pleasure or pain, not both, and logically the two conditions are separate and distinct in the same way that body and space are logically distinct. This is a large part of the argument of Sedley's "inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics" and the many citations in that. As stated in PD03 "... Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."

Quote

Quote from Cassius

The point of PD04 is to emphasize the point that we should NOT obsess about pain

Quote from DaveT

Obsess? That is an emotionally charged word. Certainly PD04 can be read to infer that, but so what?

Here by reference to obsess is not aimed at you or anyone here, but it's importing my feelings about discussion of Epicurus outside this forum. Probably not necessary for me to name names in that regard other than pointing to my collection of "world's worst" Epicurus videos.

Quote from DaveT

Yes and no. You understand the part about eliminating pain. Except once you experience pleasure , you are mistaken in the second part of your restatement. I am in even inferring obliquely that whatever you find available after the pain is gone.

Dave I am the world's worst at dropping "nots." Was this suppose to be "I am not even inferring"..... Or Iam i just misreading that sentence?

NOTE: I spent a long time composing this so it does not reflect any posts by Dave or others made after #45. I'll come back to those.

Thank you Patrikios - that's what I get for writing at 2:00 AM.

Here's what i typed:

Quote

And given that what we are doing is trying to articulate a clear philosophy to help people live better, you are honestly comfortable telling people that their overriding objective in life should be "absence of pain?"

For anyone to answery "yes"to that question - remember: You would not be this case arguing that what some would variously describe as "meditation" or "mimicing a a corpse" is pleasurable or a pleasure. What the sources are saying is that absence of pain is the limit of pleasure, or the highest pleasure, or the greatest pleasure. Torquatus' thought experiment to imaging the man surrounded by numerous and vivid pleasures and the rest clearly to me meet that test. You are saying that your single "absence of pain" description exceeds what Torquatus described?

And here's the untangled version:

Quote

And given that what we are doing is trying to articulate a clear philosophy to help people live better, you are honestly comfortable telling people that their overriding objective in life should be "absence of pain?"

For anyone to answer "yes"to that question - remember: You would not be arguing that what some would variously describe as "meditation" or "mimicing a a corpse" is pleasurable or a pleasure. What the sources are saying is that absence of pain is the limit of pleasure, or the highest pleasure, or the greatest pleasure. Torquatus' thought experiment to imaging the man surrounded by numerous and vivid pleasures and the rest clearly to me meet that test. You are saying that your single "absence of pain" description exceeds what Torquatus described?

The point I was trying to make is that we're not debating whether meditation-like experiences are pleasurable. I'll grant for the sake of argument that they can be or are. What we are debating is what is the highest / greatest / best pleasure, meaning a target that is so great that it consistutes the goal towards which we aim everything in life. To understand meditation-like experiences in that way - as "the greatest pleasure" or "the supreme good" or "the goal toward which all our actions are aimed" is simply not a plausible argument.

And to carry the point further:

It's not a plausible argument to view the term "absence of pain" as meaning "a meditation like" or "sensory-deprived" experience. If it doesn't mean that, then it means something else. And that something else is not a particular "experience" at all. The reason the term is so abstract is that it was developed in the context of answering the the question "What is the good?" and the people who were debating that had accepted the premise that "the good" cannot be something that changes - fluctuates - at all. From their point of view, anything that is truly good has to be unchanging

If you're Epicurus, you have the option of saying "You're full of bull to say that the good has to be perfect and complete." And his entire physics is based on atoms constantly moving through the void and leading to constant change, so Epicurus' physics is in fact a rejection of that whole "perfection" viewpoint.

More importantly, as Epicurus argued it is not even appropriate to request a logical defense of pleasure. Torquatus starts off by repeating that Epicurus emphasized it is not necessary to look further than the senses to determine that pleasure is to be chosen and pain is to be avoided.

Here i think there is a parallel with Velleius as to gods. Velleius says that we can stop at the basics, but then he tells Cicero that the mind strives for more - to discover the "form of god":

Quote

“If we sought to attain nothing else beside piety in worshipping the gods and freedom from superstition, what has been said had sufficed; since the exalted nature of the gods, being both eternal and supremely blessed, would receive man's pious worship (for what is highest commands the reverence that is its due); and furthermore all fear of the divine Power or divine anger would have been banished (since it is understood that anger and favor alike are excluded from the nature of a being at once blessed and immortal, and that these being eliminated we are menaced by no fears in regard to the powers above). But the mind strives to strengthen this belief by trying to discover the form of god, the mode of his activity, and the operation of his intelligence.

So how do you address the Platonic argument about pleasure fits into the "form" of the good and whether the good has to be "complete" or in the category of unchangeable "being"?

You can't accept the Platonic argument that all pleasure is tied to lack or pain or weakness, and that pleasure is nothing more than a medicine for pain, because that obviously does place it in an inferior status. The highest possible life cannot possibly be identified with nothing more than scurrying around to address annoyances like playing a whac-a-mole game.

You tell Platonists that they are wrong to think that pleasure is always tied to lack or weakness. Yes, the pleasures that derive from relieving pain or lack, such as thirst, are subject to change and fluctuation. But many pleasures do not stem from pain or lack at all. Classic examples include smelling roses or listening to music, but there are many many more examples.

And BOTH types of pleasure are desirable - they are not enemies of each other. The pleasures which relieve pain or lack are not inferior to or the enemy of the pleasures which you were not motivated by pain to pursue. What is common about all types of pleasure is that we find them agreeable. Pleasures feel good. So the correct logical perspective about what is the supreme good is NOT going to be found in how long they last or whether they are immortal.

What I read the whole anti-tranquilist line of argument to be moving toward (from Gosling and Taylor to Nikolsky to Austin's footnote and now to Arenson) is that the whole discussion arises from Epicurus' decision to provide a logical argument as to whether Pleasure can qualify as the supreme good. If you're like an infant or an animal or you're otherwise uncorrupted - if you are like "Hedea" in "A Few Days In Athens" - then you don't need to know the intellectual underpinnings of Pleasure as the good at all. You know it just like you know that snow is white and honey is sweet.

But if you want to play on Plato's turf and debate the issue logically, then you have to discuss the many types of pleasure (including kinetic and katastematic) and that since there are only two feelings any experience or state in which pain is absent equals pleasure.

The hazard of debating the logic of gods is that you get into sidetracks about whether gods speak Greek or Latin. The hazard of debating the logic of pleasure is that you get sidetracked into thinking that "absence of pain" means something outside the logical context in which it was developed.

And that's exactly what has been used by Epicurean philosophy's enemies to discredit it. Epicurean views of gods has been reduced to laughing about whether the gods speak Greek. Epicurean views of pleasure have been reduced to smiling about "absence of pain" as if it meant anything other than pleasure.

Good survey of the available movie / tv versions of the Odyssey:

Quote from DaveT

... Now, take that short explanation and see how I don't care about any discussion of kinetic and katastematic pleasures. Epicurus is telling me quite clearly that absent pain, I have pleasure.

Dave, the further I read into Arenson's book the more i would encourage the part I underlined. I'm not disagreeing with what you are saying about your more practical approach - I am saying that i don't think you are going far enough.

Arenson is building the case (with many of the same cites as Nikolsky and Gosling & Taylor) that the kinetic/katastematic issue is focused on responding to arguments that health is not a pleasure, that replenishment pleasures have nothing to do with "the good," and that what Epicurus was doing was rejecting that argument and saying that indeed replenishment and active pleasures of any kind are definitely in the category of "good," regardless of whether they are "becoming" or "being."

I'm one of those people who find that entire argument singularly uninteresting and unpersuasive, and I am willing to dig into it only because I see that it has been use for what i consider to be very damaging purposes.

So I agree that not worrying too much about kinetic vs katastemtatic is exactly the right approach for most people.

But it's also exactly the right approach in regard to worrying about absence of pain.

It's total BS to build a theory on thinking that Epicurus did not know the difference between bread and water vs steak and wine, and that he would not prefer the latter absent some particular circumstance that would make choice of the latter lead eventually to more pain than pleasure.

And of course Epicurus would not suggest that the bare description of "absence of pain" would constitue the ultimate goal of life. Sensory deprivation may have some enjoyable short-term aspects in certain circumstances, but to assert that sensory depriivation is the ultimate best human experience is totally absurd -- and therefore I do not think he would have meant anything absurd.

"Absence of Pain" is every bit as tied to responding to the arguments about process vs state and being vs becoming that Plato and Aristotle were wrestling with as is the kinetic/katastematic distinction. "Absence of pain" supplies the "state of being" that can be thrown in the of the Platonists and others who insist that only the "complete" can be the highest good.

If you're into logic puzzles the kinetic and katastematic pleasure distinctions, and "total absence of pain" are great logical solutions to tricky questions. but they have only the most abstract of connections to real life decisions.

And the reason I am reacting against your formulations so far is that your suggestion that we should first eliminate pain and only afterwards concern ourselves with real-world mental and bodily pleasures turns the true priority on its head.

The point of PD04 is to emphasize the point that we should NOT obsess about pain or make it the focus of our lives, because pain is ultimately manageable - it can be terminated by death if it gets too severe, and when it is not so severe we can almost always find ways to experience offsetting pleasures that outweigh those pains.

All of which is to repeat that the common sense application of pleasure being the supreme good and always balancing pleasures against pain, with the goal of greatest net pleasure, are the key to be practical application of the philosophy. Ideas like kinetic and katastematic and "absence of pain" are fine for those who want to debate the logical formulas, but they absolutely should not be used to corrupt the common sense balancing of pleasures and pains that every infant or animal understands before they become corrupted through having to deal with Platonism and Stoicism and the rest.

I have returned to this project now that the audiobook generation technology continues to advance, and below is a link to my latest version of Lucretius. This is largely the Bailey version but with various edits to shorten sentences so as to prevent the TTS engine from choking. I should soon have a better one with better markings and navigation to make it easier to find sections, but this one is already good enough for casual use. Far fewer weird pronunciations than in the past.

The description section at Youtube contains links to the start of each book.

Getting this project to perfection is going to be too time-consuming for me to stay with constantly, but I am posting the raw text to the link below, and i will be revising it as time allows. Of course anyone who has the time to make specific suggestions for corrections is welcome to send in corrections. Not only do I want to eliminate the obvious errors, but there are many archaic English words in Bailey's version (e.g. - "desried") that there is no reason not to update to make this more useful to more people.

Let me expand and double down on this:

Quote from Cassius

Epicurus says all pleasures are desirable --- he never says all pleasures are EQUALLY desirable, and indeed it would be ridiculous to say so.

So yes as far as I can tell Epicurus never says that all pleasures are equally desirable, any more than he says that all pains are equally undesirable. It would be ludicrious to take those positions, but the improper interpretation of absence of pain is leading directly to that result.

People are talking as if Epicurus were defining a particular experience, rather than a particular context, as "the best pleasure" or "the highest pleasure" and so they are demoting all other analysis of how to rank pleasures and pains as if to do so were meaningless. When you imply that the single goal is "absence of pain" then you are start talking as if it makes no difference which pleaures take the place of the pain that they displace, which again I will say is so nonsensical that the important texts that survive make no mention of such a counterintuitive concept.

And yet today all you hear is that the most minimal pleasures are all we should care about, even though Epicurus specifically said something entirely different. We do not seek to be free to walk away from pleasures whenever we like not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that so that we won't feel painful longing if circumstances require that we go without them.

And again independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard

And this very kind of discussion shows that Epicurus was very well aware that all pleasures are not exactly the same and totally interchangeable.