Book: "Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy" by Javier Aoiz & Marcelo Boeri

I think that Don is correct.

I also think that it is very tricky to analyze the full context of VS7m which Bailey translates as "VS07. It is hard for an evil-doer to escape detection, but to be confident that he will continue to escape detection indefinitely is impossible."

Don any comment on the "evil-doer"?

My general comment would be that PD35 repeats what Don has already quoted, but also it is very tricky to identify just exactly what an "injustice" is. It is tempting to say that "injustice" is "anything we disapprove of," but the Principal Doctrines make clear that justice is very circumstantial, and changes with conditions, so I would say that it's very easy to draw an overbroad interpretation of this entire issue. As you say, in the end it all comes down to a full evaluation of all consequences.

PD35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

PD36. In its general aspect, justice is the same for all, for it is a kind of mutual advantage in the dealings of men with one another; but with reference to the individual peculiarities of a country, or any other circumstances, the same thing does not turn out to be just for all.

PD37. Among actions which are sanctioned as just by law, that which is proved, on examination, to be of advantage, in the requirements of men's dealings with one another, has the guarantee of justice, whether it is the same for all or not. But if a man makes a law, and it does not turn out to lead to advantage in men's dealings with each other, then it no longer has the essential nature of justice. And even if the advantage in the matter of justice shifts from one side to the other, but for a while accords with the general concept, it is nonetheless just for that period, in the eyes of those who do not confound themselves with empty sounds, but look to the actual facts.

PD38. Where, provided the circumstances have not been altered, actions which were considered just have been shown not to accord with the general concept, in actual practice, then they are not just. But where, when circumstances have changed, the same actions which were sanctioned as just no longer lead to advantage, they were just at the time, when they were of advantage for the dealings of fellow-citizens with one another, but subsequently they are no longer just, when no longer of advantage.

Quote from Cassius

[...] it is very tricky to identify just exactly what an "injustice" is. [...]

In the book I'm currently reading - Bertrand Russell "A History of Western Philosophy" (1946) - I found an interesting passage about Greek notion of justice and injustice. When Mr. Russell discusses Anaximander, he provides his words that caught my attention:

Quote

'Into that from which things take their rise they pass away once more, as is ordained, for they make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice according to the ordering of time.'

Mr. Russell continues:

Quote

'The idea of justice, both cosmic and human, played a part in Greek religion and philosophy which is not altogether easy for a modern to understand; indeed our word 'justice' hardly expresses what is meant, but it is difficult to find any other word that would be preferable. [...] This conception of justice - of not overstepping eternally fixed bounds - was one of the most profound of Greek beliefs. The gods were subject to justice just as much as men were, but this supreme power was not itself personal, and was not a supreme God.'

[pages 45-46]

In the above passage 'cosmic justice' is discussed, but 'human justice' would probably be understood in antiquity as 'not overstepping fixed bounds'.

I'll throw this in as well, Plutarch, Non Posse, 1090C:

"Criminals and transgressors of the laws, says Epíkouros, pass their entire lives in misery and apprehension, since even though they may succeed in escaping detection, they can have no assurance of doing so. Consequently, fear of the next moment weighs heavy on them and precludes any delight or confidence in their present situation."

For a more positive answer to the problem of the invisibility cloak, I'll point out PD05:

It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously.

For the practicing Epicurean, this supercedes the negative reinforcement.

Quote from Matteng

Would someone who follows Epicurus' teachings commit injustices if they were never seen?

For sure, Epicurus warns against violating a mutual agreement. Though, when faced with unethical laws, living in violation of the law is inevitable, and we would expect sage to respond to such a situation with consideration: "Will the wise man do things that the laws forbid, knowing that he will not be found out? A simple answer is not easy to find." (Usener fragment 18).

I am thinking, for example, of abolitionists assisting runaway slaves.

Quote from Matteng

It is often said that injustice towards others is more likely to arise from non-necessary needs, which the Epicurean sage does not have.
But what about natural/necessary needs? But this also includes ataraxia. This is also important to the Stoics. Needs for the body or "life" are less important to Stoics than to Epicureans.

Epicurus sees friendship as a natural and necessary need; a violation of friendship will prevent a social need from being satisfied, so injustice towards others is incompatible with the pleasant life.

Quote from Godfrey

It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously.

Quote from Cassius

Don any comment on the "evil-doer"?

"Evil-doer" in the Greek is how Bailey is translating ἀδικοῦντα "one who is committing an injustice." Epicurus Wiki uses "wrongdoer." Saint-Andre simply uses " to commit an injustice." The word is from ἄδικος (ádikos, “wrong, unjust”) = ἄ "not" + δικος "just"

So, Bailey has "It is hard for an evil-doer to escape detection, but to be confident that he will continue to escape detection indefinitely is impossible."

Saint-Andre has "It is easy to commit an injustice undetected, but impossible to be sure that you have escaped detection."

Epicurus Wiki (EW) has "For a wrongdoer to be undetected is difficult; and for him to have confidence that his concealment will continue is impossible."

I do not know where Saint-Andre is getting it is easy! The word is δύσκολον which means difficult, troublesome, etc. Bailey and EW have it correct.

I have finally “bit the nickel,” and purchased this book. (I remember the great podcast with Dr. Boeri.) I have friends (albeit scattered geographically) who are under threat in the face of recent political developments – not because of anything they’ve done, but because of who they are. On the one hand, I have found it impossible to remain uninvolved (though in far, far less measure than involvement years ago); on the other, I have felt increasing anxiety – that is not relieved by trying to ignore the facts on the ground (even while avoiding dire projection of what may not, in the end, come about). ‘Nuff said about all that …

I have actually found some consolation in Marcus Aurelius (while disagreeing with the Stoic underpinning of his philosophical wrestling with himself: what the Meditations were really about). But I still want to better connect with what there might be of Epicurean political philosophy. To that end, I have been thus far searching the web. I did find this old essay by Cassius helpful and encouraging: https://newepicurean.com/the-example-of…ows-us-the-way/ .