Welcome to Episode 202 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.
Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.
This week we continue in Section X, moving past the first passage to the next main thought:
X .....
What no one ever called pleasure, he calls so; he rolls two things into one. This active form of pleasure (for thus he describes these sweet and sugared pleasures, so to call them) he sometimes so refines away, that you think Manius Curius is the speaker, while he sometimes so extols it, that he declares himself to be without even an idea of what good is over and above this. When we get to this kind of language, it should be put down, not by some philosopher, but by the censor, for its fault is not a matter of; language only but of morality as well. He finds nothing to blame in sybaritism, if only it be free from unbounded passion and fear.
Today's episode contains some very challenging material, but the final result should be worthwhile. We're covering a section where Cicero lays out various options on what the goal of life could be (1 - pleasure, 2- virtue, 3 - absence of pain) and how those options might be chosen singly or combined with one or more of the others. Cicero also brings up Epicurus' argument that we should look to young living things for help in making this decision, and whether pleasure is a "primary natural endowment." Once we release the episode we'll see the need to bring more clarity to some of these issues, and we'll want to discuss here in the thread what we think Cicero really means. We'll be appreciative of your comments - I will get this edited and posted over the next several days and we'll have lots to talk about.
As background material on one of the issues raised today, the following is a collection of material from Cicero that gives background to the "animality" objection he is raising against Epicurus. This is a handout I received many years ago, and I gather that it was written by someone not supportive of Epicurus, and I don't endorse the commentary in it. For example: "Cicero portrays the Epicurean account of pleasure as a dialectically unsatisfying and empirically problematic muddle. Cicero thinks that Epicureanism is fully committed to denying intrinsic value to everything other than painlessness, and he objects to this in two ways. In both respects, Cicero's critique seems entirely fair and plausible.") Saying that I don't endorse the commentary is an understatement!
But it's an excellent collection of quotes and does a good job of bringing together Cicero's argument against looking to the infants, which will help us as we do our own analysis.
Where are they getting that "Epicurean response"? That doesn't look textual, merely commentary from the author's perspective.
Yes, that's exactly my read and reaction too Don. The writer of the handout was taking the position that the Epicurean response to attacks on "pleasure" was to redefine pleasure as painlessness/tranquility/ataraxia. That's the prevailing view, which we have seen many places, that the only purpose of kinetic pleasure is to achieve katastematic pleasure, because of course it is, because painlessness can't mean ordinary pleasure, can it? That would fly in the face of our stoic-friendly view of Epicurus that all we want in life is tranquility!
Something else that will play into this episode is that Cicero introduces Carneades as having a significant position on the relationship of pleasure and virtue.
Carneades' name has been mentioned here on the forum superficially for a long time, because Boris Nikolsky argues that Carneades' division of types of pleasure likely influenced Cicero's argument. We don't get into it too far here, but Cicero mentions that Carneades opposed the Stoics. Here Cicero seems to say that Carneades argued in favor of a dual good of both pleasure and virtue, but when you read the Wikipedia article and see how much of a skeptic Carneades was, it seems unlikely that he ultimately took a position on anything. If we can presume that Cicero was taking cues from Carneades, and it seems so after comparing this Wikipedia article to what Cicero says his own position is, then this is additional reason to go back and pick up Nikolsky's commentary on exactly what Cicero might have picked up.
For the moment I will just cite the Wikipedia article but if anyone has any insight into Carneades that might be helpful for us unwinding some of the material in this episode.
Carneades (/kɑːrˈniːədiːz/; Greek: Καρνεάδης, Karneadēs, "of Carnea"; 214/3–129/8 BC[2]) was a Greek philosopher,[3] perhaps the most prominent head of the Skeptical Academy in ancient Greece.[3] He was born in Cyrene.[4] By the year 159 BC,[citation needed] he had begun to attack many previous dogmatic doctrines, especially Stoicism and even the Epicureans,[5] whom previous skeptics had spared.[citation needed]
As scholarch (leader) of the Academy, he was one of three philosophers sent to Rome in 155 BC where his lectures on the uncertainty of justice caused consternation among leading politicians.[6][7][8] He left no writings.[9] Many of his opinions are known only via his successor Clitomachus. [10] He seems to have doubted the ability not just of the senses but of reason too in acquiring truth. His skepticism was, however, moderated by the belief that we can, nevertheless, ascertain probabilities (not in the sense of statistical probability, but in the sense of persuasiveness)[11] of truth, to enable us to act.[12]
Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philokomus, was born at Cyrene, North Africa in 214/213 BC. He migrated early to Athens. There he attended the lectures of the Stoics, learning their logic from Diogenes of Babylon and studying the works of Chrysippus. He subsequently focused his efforts on refuting the Stoics, attaching himself to the Platonic Academy, which had suffered from the attacks of the Stoics. On the death of Hegesinus of Pergamon, he was chosen scholarch (head) of the Academy. His great eloquence and skill in argument revived the glories of the Academic Skeptics. He asserted nothing (not even that nothing can be asserted), and carried on a vigorous argument against every dogma maintained by other sects.
In the year 155 BC, when he was fifty-eight years old, he was chosen with the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and the Peripatetic Critolaus to go as ambassadors to Rome to deprecate the fine of 500 talents which had been imposed on the Athenians for the destruction of Oropus. During his stay at Rome, he attracted great notice from his eloquent speeches on philosophical subjects. It was here that, in the presence of Cato the Elder, he delivered his several orations on justice. The first oration was in commendation of the virtue of Roman justice. The next day he delivered the second oration, in which he refuted all the arguments he had made the day before. He persuasively attempted to prove that justice was inevitably problematic, and not a given when it came to virtue, but merely a compact device deemed necessary for the maintenance of a well-ordered society. This oration shocked Cato. Recognizing the potential danger of Carneades' arguments, Cato moved the Roman Senate to send Carneades back to Athens to prevent Roman youth from being exposed to a re-examining of Roman doctrines. Carneades lived twenty-seven years after this at Athens.
Carneades is known as an Academic Skeptic. Academic Skeptics (so called because this was the type of skepticism taught in Plato's Academy in Athens) hold that all knowledge is impossible, except for the knowledge that all other knowledge is impossible.
Carneades left no writings, and all that is known of his lectures is derived from his intimate friend and pupil, Clitomachus; but so true was he to his own principles of withholding assent, that Clitomachus confesses he never could ascertain what his master really thought on any subject.[citation needed] In ethics, which more particularly were the subject of his long and laborious study, he seems to have denied the conformity of the moral ideas with nature. This he particularly insisted on in the second oration on Justice, in which he manifestly wished to convey his own notions on the subject; and he there maintains that ideas of justice are not derived from nature, but that they are purely artificial for purposes of expediency.[citation needed]
All this, however, was nothing but the special application of his general theory, that people did not possess, and never could possess, any criterion of truth.
Carneades argued that, if there were a criterion, it must exist either in reason (logos), or sensation (aisthêsis), or conception (phantasia). But then reason itself depends on conception, and this again on sensation; and we have no means of judging whether our sensations are true or false, whether they correspond to the objects that produce them, or carry wrong impressions to the mind, producing false conceptions and ideas, and leading reason also into error. Therefore, sensation, conception, and reason, are alike disqualified for being the criterion of truth.[citation needed]
But after all, people must live and act, and must have some rule of practical life; therefore, although it is impossible to pronounce anything as absolutely true, we may yet establish probabilities of various degrees. For, although we cannot say that any given conception or sensation is in itself true, yet some sensations appear to us more true than others, and we must be guided by that which seems the most true. Again, sensations are not single, but generally combined with others, which either confirm or contradict them; and the greater this combination the greater is the probability of that being true which the rest combine to confirm; and the case in which the greatest number of conceptions, each in themselves apparently most true, should combine to affirm that which also in itself appears most true, would present to Carneades the highest probability, and his nearest approach to truth.[17]
Here's Diogenes Laertius on Carneades
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, BOOK IV, Chapter 9. CARNEADES (c. 213-129 B C.)
Can't wait to get to the arguments for friendship, my translation says the Wiseman should love friends as himself (paraphrasing) interesting to hear the discussion.
In case you're interested:
In case you're interested:
Thanks for sharing this Don, it's your own blog?
Interesting on the sexual relationships
Quote
epicureans generally think that the sage will never succumb to lustful desire or be overwhelmed by sexual passions
Is this to say that they will not give into an urge but will carefully use their practical reason to weigh whether having sex will amount to more pleasure or pain? (obvious mention the act itself will be pleasurable) or is it saying the Epicurean Sage will forgo sex all together?
I interpret the saying as:
they will not give into an urge but will carefully use their practical reason to weigh whether having sex will amount to more pleasure or pain?
Yep. That's all my own stuff.
Can't wait to get to the arguments for friendship, my translation says the Wiseman should love friends as himself (paraphrasing) interesting to hear the discussion.
Eoghan I wonder if you are referring to the Torquatus section in Book 1 where we got into the main discussion of friendship.
If so, that was perhaps Episode 109?
Episode One Hundred Nine - The Epicurean View of Friendship
This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself,…
Thanks Cassius
Episode 202 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is Now Available!
Cassius November 22, 2023 at 7:14 AM
In this episode our podcasters had apparently been away from the intermundia for too long, and so they had to express some doubt -- not about Epicurus, but about what Cicero was arguing in his animality objection.
As discussed in the episode we particularly invite comment on this one to help us unwind some of the subtlety of Cicero's objection to Epicurus' looking to the young for the best mirror of nature and therefore source for the ultimate good.
The citations in post 3 above should help in untangling some of this.
Happy Thanksgiving, and let us know your thoughts!
In the end I think this unwinds quite neatly. Working through it isn't obvious on first glance, but once it begins to dawn how Epicurus is folding *every non-painful experience in life" under the umbrella of pleasure, a lot of clarity begins to dawn on the subject.
Thanks again for the great episode.
I know this is may be the last place to bring in mathematics, but it does help me to clear up the key confusion:
"If you remove all pain, that's pleasure."
In all his observations Epicurus is almost "mechanistic" or in this case - biological. 1. We experience the world with our senses (memories are a special case
2. Any stimulus provides us with a set of quantities of pain and pleasure: (pa, pl)
3. At any given point in time we experience a combined sum of those (sum(pa), sum(pl)).
4. Now if you remove all pain, all we are left is pleasure. And since most of stimuli provide us with non-zero amount of pleasure, there is definitely pleasure even if you are at rest, with no excessive stimulation (sex, drugs etc.)
This also explains the statement that pleasure and pain cannot be mixed. Additionally, this removes the uneasy breakdown of "types of pleasure". There are no types of pleasure, there are different activities and stimuli, each contributing "atomic units" of pleasure and pain.
And of course, having come to Epicurus through Cicero, I should be thankful to him, for his outright open hostility and not very well disguised mental gymnastics were the triggers for me. He understands quite well, but finds these thoughts too dangerous for the perfect state he dreams of.
Any references to such an understanding in sources or do I misunderstand?
Waterholic I am not sure about the impact of the "all."
When the Epicureans reference removal of "all" pain don't they immediately equate that with "the height of pleasure"?
You raise the issue we are discussing: does "all" pain have to be removed before any pleasure is experienced? I presume the answer is "no."
Waterholic going further with your comment, are you speculating that pleasure and pain can indeed be reduced to fungible units?
I sometimes got that impression from DeWitt's "unity of pleasure" chapter but not sure he stated that explicitly.
Waterholic I am not sure about the impact of the "all."
When the Epicureans reference removal of "all" paon don't they immediately equate that with "the height of pleasure"?
You raise the issue we are discussing: does "all" pain have to be removed before any pleasure is experienced? I presume the answer is "no."
Cassius this part is also quite intuitive. I totally agree, you don't need to remove all pain to experience pleasure, in fact that is practially impossible to achieve.
But you do have a relative proportion of pain and pleasure buckets, and it is this relative proportion that defines how you feel. The height of pleasure can be undestood as an asymptot: removing all pain gets you to the state where the proportion of pleasure (no matter how little) is maximum and that's as best as one can feel.
Perhaps not worth it, but for clarity, such a mathematical model could be derived (not to confuse with the perfect form of mathematics, it's just a language).
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