Sunday November 2, 2025 - Zoom Discussion 12:30 PM EST - Continuation of Discussion of Nature of Pleasure

Quote from DaveT

Does Epicurus’ ancient Greek word have a singular meaning or multiple meanings within the context of mental vs physical?

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἡδονή

Also...

FWIW Headwords for ἡδονή (hēdonē) "pleasure"

Woodhouse, S. C. (1910), English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎[1], London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.

allurement idem, page 25.

amusement idem, page 28.

caprice idem, page 112.

cheer idem, page 128.

complacency idem, page 151.

dalliance idem, page 193.

delectation idem, page 207.

delight idem, page 208.

ecstasy idem, page 261.

elation idem, page 265.

enchantment idem, page 270.

enjoyment idem, page 275.

entrancement idem, page 278.

exhilaration idem, page 291.

fascination idem, page 308.

gaiety idem, page 351.

gladness idem, page 361.

glee idem, page 361.

gratification idem, page 370.

hilarity idem, page 400.

idiosyncrasy idem, page 413.

intoxication idem, page 454.

jollity idem, page 464.

joy idem, page 464.

light-heartedness idem, page 491.

merriment idem, page 526.

mirth idem, page 532.

pleasure idem, page 620.

rapture idem, page 672.

ravishment idem, page 674.

rejoicing idem, page 689.

satisfaction idem, page 734.

transport idem, page 889.

treat idem, page 892.

zest idem, page 997.

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Quote from Cassius

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I wonder how the most highly regarded English translations render Epicurus’s use of the word Pleasure. Are they agreed? Is any one of them considered above the others?

Though language is fluid (and I do think it's helpful to paraphrase), so far as I have found, "pleasure" is the universal, English translation for ἡδονή (hēdonḗ) found in the academic world of Epicurean scholars. For example, in the (x15) translations of the Kuriai Doxai that I compiled, a declension of hēdonḗ is used in Key Doctrines 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 18, 19, and 20, and all of the translators (including Yonge, Wallace, Hicks, Bailey, de Witt, Geer, Long, Sedley, O’ Connor, Inwood, Gerson, Anderson, Makridis, Saint-Andre, Strodach, Mensch, and White) use "pleasure" as their preferred term. This is one of only a few Greek words for which all translators (of the Epicurean works) seem to agree.

Quote from Cassius

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Does Epicurus’ ancient Greek word have a singular meaning or multiple meanings within the context of mental vs physical?

Is his use of the word always consistent without his explaining the distinction between mental and physical meanings?

Hēdonḗ always means "pleasure" as I have seen, and includes physical pleasures, mental pleasures, lasting pleasures, fleeting pleasures, red pleasures, blue pleasures, "me" pleasures, and "you" pleasures. All pleasures are implied by and included in the definition ἡδονή (hēdonḗ).All pleasure is pleasure: "If every pleasure were compressed, and eventually existed throughout the whole atomic assembly of the human form or even just the most important parts of one’s nature, it would never be possible to distinguish one pleasure from another” (Key Doctrine 9).

For the sake of coherence, I maintain that same conventions in my own translations. As Epíkouros further writes, "no pleasure by itself is evil" (KD 8 ) because "wherever pleasure is, for the time that it is, there is neither discomfort, nor distress, nor both" (KD 3). Since pleasure is not an evil, I feel right defending the word against those who might consider it "tainted".

Now, given that conceptual treatment of pleasure, there are different varieties of hēdonḗ. Principally, he discusses ἀταραξία (ataraxía), "impassiveness", which might be seen to correspond with the pure pleasures δῐᾰνοίᾱς (dianoías) "of the mind", and ἀπονία (aponía), which might be seen to correspond with the pure pleasure σᾰρκός (sarkós) "of the flesh". Unlike the Kyrenaics, ancient Epicureans maintained that both pleasures and pains of the mind were worse than both pleasures and pains of the flesh. Still, all pleasures are pleasurable.

He provides us (as I see it) with at least 2-4 other qualities of sorts of pleasures: on one axis, pleasures are characterized as being "of the mind" and "of the body", and on another, they are characterized as being either kinetic (or "active") or katastematic, “stable” or “static”:

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He differs from the Kyrēnaícs regarding the [definition of] pleasure; for they do not accept the katastēmatic⁵⁴ [balanced state] but only the [pleasure] in activity; but he [accepts] both, [pleasure] of mind and of body, as he affirms in the [book] On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the End, and in the first [book] On the Conduct of Life and in the Epistle to the Philosophers in Mytilḗnē. So also Diogénēs [the Epicurean] in the seventeenth book of his Epilekta, and Mētródōros in the [book] Timokrátēs, they say thus: “We then conceive of pleasure both as [kinetic] activity and [katastematic] equilibrium.” (Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.136)

Her further says, "in the [book] On Choice, simply says: “Tranquility [ataraxía]⁵⁵ and painlessness [aponía]⁵⁶ are centered⁵⁷pleasures; but the [pleasures of] joy [kharà]⁵⁸ and cheerfulness [euphronsýnē]⁵⁹ are seen to [include] action [and] activity", so we are provided with words to further characterize the [1] "active pleasures of the mind", [2] "stable pleasures of the mind", [3] "active pleasures of the flesh", and [4] "stables pleasures of the flesh". As I see it:

1. ἈTAPAΞIA or ἀταραξία (ataraxía), the katastamatic state of painlessness of the mind. ↩︎
2. ἈΠONIA or ἀπονία (aponía), the katastamatic state of painlessness of the flesh. ↩︎
3. XAPA or χαρὰ (kharà), the kinetic act of pleasuring the flesh, meaning “joy”. ↩︎
4. EYΦPOΣYNH or εὐφροσύνη (euphronsýnē) the kinetic act of pleasuring the mind, “cheer“. ↩︎

And, of course, we may also see some correspondence between the various pleasures and the types of desires. Natural, and necessary desires usually correspond with pleasures like eating, drinking, and socializing. Natural, but unnecessary desires might correspond with pleasures like sex. Vain desires correspond with pleasures that include building a ballroom to preserve your legacy. While there are differences between pleasures and desires, these help shape our understanding.

Quote from Cassius

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...considering our discussion today about Pleasure and its connotation with shamefulness? [...]

For example, Pleasure is such a loaded word! When Joshua said it should not be associated with shame, it resonated with me a lot.

Epíkouros understood that "pleasure" had a bad rap, and he saw a need to add a nuance for those who might misunderstand. So, he explicitly explains to Menoikeus that,

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Then when we say the goal is Pleasure, we are not counting the pleasures of the debauched and those lying sick with enjoyment, and those who, not knowing and not acknowledging or having barely received [advantage] from considering, but rather [seeking] neither suffering throughout the body nor grieving throughout the soul." (Epíkouros, Epistle to Menoikeus 10.131).

Quote from Cassius

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I wonder if his followers in the varied parts of the eastern Mediterranean all deduced the same meaning(s) he intended with his usage of the Greek word for Pleasure?

In general, hēdonḗ was seen by Epicurean opponents as the root of all evil. They weren't shy about it. Everyone from Platonists, to Cynics, to Stoics, to Christians contextualized hēdonḗ as the dishonorable goal of shallow people with weak minds. Everyone rejected his categorization of "mental impassiveness" as a "pleasure", including his fellow hedonists, the Kyrenaics.

Quote from Cassius

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Robert wondered if “re-branding” our word choice would be useful.

I think the Hegemon gives us some attitude on this idea: "Frankly at least [as a] student-of-nature, I would prefer to deliver what is useful to all humanity, even if no one is likely to take notice, than profit from affirming the firm doctrines that fell from the side of widespread approval." (Vatican Saying 29). He also says, "Never did I reach to please the masses, for truly what pleases them, I did not understand, but what I understood was far away from their perception" (Usener 187).

TL;DR

If the masses don't find our words pleasing, that's their loss.

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Quote from DaveT

"Why must even a knowledgeable Epicurean always have to explain the pleasure-pain principle as limited by prudence as soon as that emotion-laden word Pleasure surfaces?

Robert wondered if “re-branding” our word choice would be useful. I think that is an important enough question for us to discuss collectively. Maybe we can discover a different way for both new and old followers to avoid the common ridicule that tends to shame not just the timid, but the courageous person who says, they follow Epicurus’ ethics about Pleasure."

DaveT Thanks for raising the question on 're-branding' when introducing Epicureanism to someone. Maybe before introducing the word 'pleasure' up front, the introduction of Epicureanism should highlight the benefits that accrue from following this framework for a life of wellbeing (eudaimonia).

I describe Epicureanism as the way of a life of wellbeing, which comes from wisdom, gained through prudent consideration of choices and avoidances. We acquire this wisdom through unceasing study of nature, through contemplation of the writings of the sage, Epikouros and his followers; through fellowships with like-minded friends; and by endeavoring to live practically, properly, peaceably and pleasantly. Our guide for pleasant living comes from Divine Nature, who teaches us to use our body's senses, feelings and apprehensions for right choices and avoidances. Only after describing the framework and benefits of Epicureanism, should we get into the details of describing how 'pleasure' is the absence of 'pain'. With an understanding of what the desired state of a pain-free body and tranquil mind that enables wellbeing, we can then describe how the absence of pain/disturbance (in body and mind) is achieved through both kinetic and static pleasures.

For example, Eikadistes takes 3-1/2 pages of the introduction in his Hedonicon, before the word 'pleasure' is even mentioned, and only then by introducing: "The Patron of Pleasure prescribes a practice for maximizing the serenity (aponia) of the flesh and for magnifying the tranquility (ataraxia) of the mind.

Does this approach provide a more acceptable method for discussing Epicureanism, without getting into the issue of shameful pleasures?

Quote from Eikadistes

XAPA or χαρὰ (kharà), the kinetic act of pleasuring the flesh, meaning “joy”. ↩︎

One interesting (to me) note is that ΧΑΡΑ does not seem to be exclusive to the body/flesh. Case in point:

"On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them ; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus."

"Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. σὺ δ᾽ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παίδων Μητροδώρου."

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gladness of mind

τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον (to kata psykhe khairon), lit. "the rejoicing throughout (my) mind"

χαῖρον is related to the "kinesis/energeia" pleasure χαρα "joy"

To enjoy [+dative = something] = μνήμῃ (dative) "remembrance, memory"

So, τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ ... μνήμῃ "the enjoying throughout (my) mind... of the memory"

So I don't think we can make a firm body (flesh)/mind dichotomy with ΧΑΡΑ/ΕΥΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ. There seem to be more nuances going on, at least in Epicurus' use of the terms.

Quote from Don

So, τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ ... μνήμῃ "the enjoying throughout (my) mind... of the memory"

So I don't think we can make a firm body (flesh)/mind dichotomy with ΧΑΡΑ/ΕΥΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ. There seem to be more nuances going on, at least in Epicurus' use of the terms.

Don  Eikadistes ,

Could this use of KAPA be describing a whole-body-mind feeling of pleasure that occurs when a vivid mental recollection of a past significant joyous event, causes the mind to trigger the brain/body to release of the pleasure chemicals (endorphins)? Is this one of those nuances?

Quote from Patrikios

Quote from Don

So, τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ ... μνήμῃ "the enjoying throughout (my) mind... of the memory"

So I don't think we can make a firm body (flesh)/mind dichotomy with ΧΑΡΑ/ΕΥΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ. There seem to be more nuances going on, at least in Epicurus' use of the terms.

Don  Eikadistes ,

Could this use of KAPA be describing a whole-body-mind feeling of pleasure that occurs when a vivid mental recollection of a past significant joyous event, causes the mind to trigger the brain/body to release of the pleasure chemicals (endorphins)? Is this one of those nuances?

Good thought! I agree with Don that there isn't a sharp, technical division, they're just expressions of different qualities and varieties of pleasure, which is ultimately seen as a single concept.

Eikadistes Thank you for taking the time to respond to the above questions. I think your explanations were instructive to me and also they solidified my instincts. Additionally, (and however) I think the point of this thread is not explaining Epicurus to the masses.

Quote from Eikadistes

He also says, "Never did I reach to please the masses, for truly what pleases them, I did not understand, but what I understood was far away from their perception" (Usener 187).

On the contrary, the focus at least for me, is to address the newcomer to EpicureanFriends, as well as when I'm explaining my beliefs to a friend in casual conversation.

The Pleasure/Pain focus, rather than the absolute truth of his belief, is not the most pressing issue for the modern day understanding of Epicurus’ brilliant analytic methods. And I thought when@Cassius was asking for feedback at the Zoom meeting for ways to give clear and concise explanations of Epicureanism to newcomers, it was an important topic.

I think understanding of Pleasure/Pain motivations for living happily should depend less on a reliance on defining Pleasure over and over with one caveat after another and which every reader may interpret in their own way depending on their life experiences and depend more on the overall truth Epicurus discovered.

De Witt, in Philosophy for the Millions, says: “In spite of this teaching it was not the doctrine of Epicurus that pleasure was the greatest good. To his thinking the greatest good was life itself. (Italics added) This was a logical deduction from the denial of immortality. Without the afterlife this present life becomes the concentration of all values...."

My guesstimate is that the newcomer to Epicureanism is seeking clarity of purpose. And therefore they may be best served by a response focused on an overall belief that the “greatest good” is “life itself”. Phrased that way, that avoiding suffering and finding happiness are the tools to the greatest good, seems a far better approach to me.

Final note: When you want to win an argument with detractors, and we understand there have been over two thousand years of detractors who (still) have won over the western world culture, you don't repeat the very word they demean when you respond to attack. The ingrained inference that pursuing pleasure is shameful in a world where sacrifice to attain the next life is simply too strong a current to swim against by giving deeper and deeper explanations of the meaning of the word. Sometimes you need to cede the battle of "well pleasure does not mean...." and move on to building a better understanding of Epicureanism with alternate words like Life Itself is the Greatest Good.

Quote from DaveT

"well pleasure does not mean...."

Quote from Epicurus

Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the goal (τέλος)," we do not say the pleasure of those who are prodigal and those stuck in delighting in pleasures arising from circumstances outside of ourselves like those who are ignorant, those who don't agree with us, or those who believe wrongly; but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind. [132] For it is not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals, and not taking advantage of slaves and women, nor does an extravagant table of fish and other things bring forth a sweet life but self-controlled reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble.

Don  Patrikios Well, what troubles me, is that quoting Epicurus, and his followers leaves the modern sensitivities at the mercy of modern language. For example: my point is that deep explanation of the word pleasure is a turn off to the newly exposed person. To have to point to Epicurus saying "we do not say" is taking up the language connotations of the "opposition" unnecessarily. The prevailing undercurrent of meaning, shamefulness, is fighting on the other side's home turf as it were. I like better Patrikios personal approach than the rote explanations for what Epicurean pleasure means and doesn't mean. And to repeat my intention in my earlier post; thinking that Epicurus celebrated life as a goal, per DeWitt, is the more satisfying explanation. As I was saying, my approach is not for the purpose of evangelizing this philosophy to the masses, it is for an alternate approach to answering the new inquirer's question of what's it all about, and explaining my own attraction, in casual conversation with friends, about of some of Epicurus's ethics that I try to adopt in my own life.

Quote from Patrikios

Could this use of KAPA be describing a whole-body-mind feeling of pleasure that occurs when a vivid mental recollection of a past significant joyous event, causes the mind to trigger the brain/body to release of the pleasure chemicals (endorphins)? Is this one of those nuances?

Sure. χαρα (khara) has a wide semantic spectrum it would appear from its LSJ entry: https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…057:entry=xara/

When you recollect something joyful from your past, you feel it throughout your body. I wouldn't get into the endorphins, etc., since that's anachronistic to Epicurus' time, but experiencing a remembered sunset or delicious meal gets "felt" throughout body and mind.

I found this citation interesting from Xenophon:

Quote from Xenophon

[25] οὕτω μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Ἱέρων, καὶ τῶν σίτων ὁ μὲν ἔχων παντοδαπὰ ἀεὶ οὐδὲν μετὰ πόθου αὐτῶν λαμβάνει: ὁ δὲ σπανίσας τινός, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μετὰ χαρᾶς πιμπλάμενος, ὅταν αὐτῷ προφανῇ τι.

“Quite so, and we may add that he who has all sorts of food at all times has no stomach for any sort. Offer a man a dish that he seldom tastes, and he eats a bellyful with gusto.”

Quote from Cassius

to accelerate their impending deaths

This is clearly a side issue for this thread, but I'm still not convinced the "leave the theatre" saying means "taking steps to accelerate." I much rather prefer to interpret that as not fighting against the inevitable, doing nothing to prolong life if the "end is in sight" so to speak and one is in pain. Life has a limit, and if one is in the throes of a terminal disease, one should take steps to be comfortable but avoid "extraordinary measures" to prolong suffering/pain. Granted, what we take as normal procedures (ex., CPR, vaccinations, organ transplant, etc.) would be seen as "extraordinary measures" in Ancient Greece so I am NOT, for example, advocating for foregoing CPR *unless* it is the clearly ellucidated wishes of the patient.

Quote from DaveT

De Witt, in Philosophy for the Millions, says: “In spite of this teaching it was not the doctrine of Epicurus that pleasure was the greatest good. To his thinking the greatest good was life itself.

De Witt is a phenomenal and reliable resource, and I think he is one of the best resources to new students of Epicurean Philosophy, overall, synoptically ... but he does take a few liberties. This is one example of a case where he makes a proposition that stands in contrast to the original texts.

Epíkouros writes in his Epistle to Menoikeus that "of all of these things, the original and the greatest good [is] prudence" or φρόνησις (phrónēsis,"practical wisdom" 132). Here, he uses the phrase τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν (tò mégiston ágathòn or "the greatest good"). Note, in this context, "a good" (lowercase "g") refers to an instrumental good, or a virtue, employed in the service of pleasure. We often distinguish "a good" (tò ágathòn) versus "The Good" (Tágathòn), a subtle, but important distinction, exemplifying the relationship between the τέλος (télos) or "goal" of life, and the means but which that goal is attained. Nonetheless, according to Epíkouros, "practical wisdom" is the greatest good, among other instrumental goods that support the goal of pleasure.

It's subtle, but, If you'll tolerate the play on words, I'd express it as follows: pleasure is The Good, and practical wisdom is the greatest good. The greatest good helps us achieve The Good.

Quote from DaveT

Well, what troubles me, is that quoting Epicurus, and his followers leaves the modern sensitivities at the mercy of modern language.

I find it interesting that this was exactly the same problem the ancient Epicureans were having. The ancient sensitivities were the reason that Cicero could rail against voluptas vs virtus (pleasure vs virtue). Ηδονή / voluptas / pleasure had the same negative connotations back then among segments of society as it does today. Plus çe change, and all that. And the "modern sensitivities" deriving (in my opinion) from Christian prejudices primarily, especially in the US, are directly in line with the Bible. Using Strong's Concordance for ἡδονή (The word doesn't appear too many times in the New Testament, and only twice in the Septuagint (Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible)) I freely admit this digression is primarily for my amusement in looking up the citations :

2 Peter 2:13: And shall receive the reward of unrighteousness, as they that count it pleasure to riot in the day time. Spots they are and blemishes, sporting themselves with their own deceivings while they feast with you;

Luke 8:13: And that which fell among thorns are they, which, when they have heard, go forth, and are choked with cares and riches and pleasures of this life, and bring no fruit to perfection.

Titus 3:3: For we ourselves also were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, and hating one another.

James 4:3: When you ask, you do not receive, because you ask with wrong motives, that you may spend what you get on your pleasures.

Proverbs 17:1 seems to be the only positive use but that gets buried in translations:
κρείσσων ψωμὸς μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἢ οἶκος πλήρης πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀδίκων θυμάτων μετὰ μάχης usually translated as "Better is a dry morsel with quiet than a house full of feasting with strife." (RSV) but more literally "Better is a morsel with pleasure in peace, than a house full of many good things and unjust sacrifices, with strife." (BES)

To paraphrase Horton (of Who-hearing fame): Epicurus meant what he said and said what he meant: Pleasure's the Good, 100%.

Epicurus had other words at his disposal, but he decided the feelings were cut into two parts: ηδονή ("pleasure") and ἀλγηδών/ἄλγος (he uses several words for "pain"). "Negative and positive feelings" doesn't have the same oomph. "Good and evil" without the context of pleasure and pain doesn't mean anything. There is no absolute ideal to point to. What is evil/bad? Epicurus says it is that which is painful. If you want modern neuroscience terminology, you have negative and positive affect with low and high activation: https://positivepsychology.com/positive-and-n…schedule-panas/ or the circumplex: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2367156/ but then you're going into the weeds in a different way.

I get the feeling Epicurus wanted to be provocative, to make people question their common wisdom, their acculturation, which is what using pleasure / ηδονη / voluptas obviously did.

DaveT I fear we may be talking past each other, and I got caught up in historical precedents and citations.

Let me see if I can summarize your position, and you let me know where I misinterpret or get it right before I dive headlong into another lengthy post. As I understand, you feel that:

• The word "pleasure" is seen by the majority of people nowadays as conveying a negative activity or at the very least a self-indulgent - maybe even destructive - activity.
• Explaining Epicurus' expansive re-definition of "pleasure" (ΗΔΟΝΗ) distracts from the deeper meaning and potential application of his philosophy to modern life.
• Trying to get people to accept/understand that Epicurean re-definition in light of their modern sensitivities to the word "pleasure" is counterproductive.
• It would be more productive to explain Epicureanism to newcomers without resorting to using the word "pleasure" or using phrases like "The goal of life is pleasure."
• You would advocate for using terms more in line with "Life Itself is the Greatest Good" and avoiding using "pleasure" until, maybe, much further down the road when it is encountered in the ancient texts.

Would that be a fair summary?

All living beings by nature move toward pleasure and away from pain. The word pleasure, understood as a broad category rather than as any one specific object of feeling, is the telos that arises out of nature.

We call the greatest pleasure that which is without pain - when pleasure can't be increased to any higher level.

Virtues and practical wisdom are tools that help us to move toward pleasure and to live a pleasant life.

Because we humans are social animals and can reason through choices to find that which brings the best outcome, we must have social contracts to neither harm nor be harmed - all humans equally recoil from pain.

And PD17: "The just man is most free from trouble; the unjust most full of trouble." And so it is for the sake of pleasure that we act justly.