Preuss - "Epicurean Ethics - Katastematic Hedonism"

Let me start off this thread by making clear that the inclusion of this book here is not an endorsement by me. It's clear that the book contains a lot of good reference material, but at the time I am posting this I am going to start off by citing several sections that indicate that the author disagrees strongly in his interpretations of katastematic pleasure with both David Sedley and AA Long (Hellenistic Philosophers) and Gosling and Taylor (The Greeks on Pleasure). Given her footnote as to her agreement with Gosling and Taylor, we can probably also consider Emily Austin as another in disagreement with Pruess.

However this is an important topic and it's always good to go through something as basic and important as the question of whether the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, and the elevation of katastematic pleasure as the true goal of Epicurean philosophy, is an accurate conclusion or a gross misreading.

Here are some clips to get us started:

First, it appears that regardless of his views on pleasure, Preuss holds a very unconventional view on Epicurus' view of death, apparently believing that Epicurus held open the possibility of life after death, and citing another article Preuss himself has written on reincarnation as containing potential evidence of which Epicurus was unaware.

Turning to the central issue, Preuss believes that katastematic pleasure is "the most important concept in Epicurean ethics."

Preuss is critical of Sedley and Long's interpretations of the same issue:

And he is critical of Gosling and Taylor's interpretations:

I haven't yet gotten into Preuss' own arguments but we can do that as time permits. Suffice it to say that he concludes as indicated above that "katatestematic pleasure" is what Epicurus is all about.

And for the time being I'll just repeat personally that I am solidly with Sedley & Long, Gosling & Taylor, Emily Austin, and Boris Nikolsky (which summarizes much of this debate in his "Epicurus on Pleasure" article here in our files section).

I find at least one more excerpt on which to comment: Preuss is construing the well known fragment of Plutarch as to the escape from a near-death experience, which he admits is translatable as "joy," as a reference to katastematic pleasure:

This excerpt from the conclusion probably goes to the heart of where Pruess ends up. It's interesting that one could almost take his "in the experience of katestematic pleasure life itself, the existence of the self, is seen to be good" and end up not all that far from DeWitt's argument that the greatest good is life itself.

But my core initial objection to this is that in calling katastematic pleasure an "evaluation." If I try to glean any specificity at all out of the word "katastematic," which I don't find Pruess to be able to do either, considering it to be an "evaluation" describes to me a process or movement of the mind, and as I read the evidence and argument in Gosling and Taylor and intuitively think about how "motion" implies "kinetic," I read all motion of the mind and therefore all evaluative processes to be of the nature of motion, not of the nature of "rest."

I started to include this clip earlier but will do so now. I agree with Preuss that Epicurus' position that the wise man is happy even under torture is extremely important. But i do not agree with him that the reason that the wise man remains happy under torture is that he is experiencing "katastematic pleasure" while under torture. Nor do I think that Epicurus was happy on his last day due to "katastematic pleasure."

I think that Epicurus considered himself happy even during kidney pain, and the wise man under torture can be considered happy even under torture, not because he is in fact experiencing some kind of indescribable state of feeling, but because in both cases we're making a mental evaluation of the entire scope of the life in question, and choosing to look at the good as outweighing the bad. That's a conscious mental evaluation and takes great effort to appreciate, and anything that takes great effort to understand and appreciate is a mental activity that requires a lot more than thinking that just as a matter of the blessedness of nature we can store up some kind of superhuman reservoir of "katastematic pleasure" to call on when we are under torture. Were that true, then Epicurus would have wanted to continue to live on indefinitely despite his kidney pain, and that's where it becomes important whether Epicurus in fact committed suicide or hastened his own death. "Katastematic pleasure" doesn't outweigh unrelenting extended interminable extreme kinetic pain.

Being alive and conscious means our minds having an ongoing evaluation of whether our lives have been and are worthwhile, the vast majority of which time has been spent in "kinetic" activities, and there's nothing mysterious about that or necessary to identify as some kind of special or higher or "katastematic" pleasure that is our "true goal."

A pleasure to engage with you in this....

Quote from DistantLaughter

Furthermore, the katastematic/kinetic distinction itself is a later philosophical construct imposed retrospectively on Epicurus’s

Now that is essentially the position taken by Nikolsky in concluding that Epicurus did NOT put a great deal of emphasis on the kinetic / katastematic position. Do you agree with that ?

Quote from DistantLaughter

Ironically, this very dispute over categorical precision—arguably a kinetic agitation of the mind—may itself undermine the Epicurean ideal of peace of mind (ataraxia) that these concepts aim to clarify.

This is why I reject the idea that "peace of mind" is the ultimate goal of Epicurean philosophy. I would say the goal is "pleasure" and that pleasure entails a great deal of mental and physical activity.

When Lucretius understood to explain the philosophy to Memmious, he did not say "give up all your possessions and goals, live asceticslly, eat simply, and just breathe - get out of the way and clear you mind and all will be sweetness and light."

Instead , he launched off on six books of highly polemical argument about what knowledge and training is needed to live the best life. Just like Epicurus devotee himself to 37 books on nature and Diogenes of Oinoanda built his wall.

What I object to most strenuously is the idea that Epicurus calls us to disengage with all normal activity of the mind and body, and to consider that at best to be a necessary requirement of some kind of ineffable mental state that no one can really explain other than as a kind of neostoic or neobuddhist mental detachment from the way the world and all other living things in it really operate.

Granted the conclusion of the book is not quite so stark, and draws back from such a conclusion as if we are not good enough to achieve it, but setting that kind of thing up as a goal seems to me to be much more appropriate for the aforementioned Stoics and Buddhists than for someone who is convinced that this life is the only one we have.

And that's why I was particularly surprised to see the expression of doubt as to death being nothing to us and an apparent favorable reference to reincarnation.

You have clearly thought of these things before so I look forward to your further thoughts.

But I am afraid our time zone issues will now slow us down.