Preuss - "Epicurean Ethics - Katastematic Hedonism"

Let me start off this thread by making clear that the inclusion of this book here is not an endorsement by me. It's clear that the book contains a lot of good reference material, but at the time I am posting this I am going to start off by citing several sections that indicate that the author disagrees strongly in his interpretations of katastematic pleasure with both David Sedley and AA Long (Hellenistic Philosophers) and Gosling and Taylor (The Greeks on Pleasure). Given her footnote as to her agreement with Gosling and Taylor, we can probably also consider Emily Austin as another in disagreement with Pruess.

However this is an important topic and it's always good to go through something as basic and important as the question of whether the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasure, and the elevation of katastematic pleasure as the true goal of Epicurean philosophy, is an accurate conclusion or a gross misreading or somewhere in between.

Here are some clips to get us started:

First, it appears that regardless of his views on pleasure, Preuss holds a very unconventional view on Epicurus' view of death. Preuss apparently believes that Epicurus held open the possibility of life after death, citing another article Preuss himself has written on reincarnation as containing potential evidence of which Epicurus was unaware.

Turning to the central issue, Preuss believes that katastematic pleasure is "the most important concept in Epicurean ethics."

Preuss is critical of Sedley and Long's interpretations of the same issue:

And he is critical of Gosling and Taylor's interpretations:

I haven't yet gotten into Preuss' own arguments but we can do that as time permits. Suffice it to say that he concludes as indicated above that "katatestematic pleasure" is what Epicurus is all about.

And for the time being I'll just repeat personally that I am solidly with Sedley & Long, Gosling & Taylor, Emily Austin, and Boris Nikolsky (which summarizes much of this debate in his "Epicurus on Pleasure" article here in our files section).

I find at least one more excerpt on which to comment: Preuss is construing the well known fragment of Plutarch as to the escape from a near-death experience, which he admits is translatable as "joy," as a reference to katastematic pleasure:

This excerpt from the conclusion probably goes to the heart of where Pruess ends up. It's interesting that one could almost take his "in the experience of katestematic pleasure life itself, the existence of the self, is seen to be good" and end up not all that far from DeWitt's argument that the greatest good is life itself.

But my core initial objection stems from the fact that I actually agree with him in calling katastematic pleasure an "evaluation." If I try to glean any specificity at all out of the word "katastematic," which I don't find Pruess to be able to do either, I come back to the conclusion that what people are thinking of as katastematic is itself an "activity." Considering katastematic pleasure to be an "evaluation" describes to me a process or movement of the mind, and as I read the evidence and argument in Gosling and Taylor, and intuitively think about how "motion" implies "kinetic," I read all motion of the mind, and therefore all evaluative processes, to be better described as motion, not something in the nature of "rest."

I started to include this following clip earlier but will do so now. I agree with Preuss that Epicurus' position that the wise man is happy even under torture is extremely important and pregnant with implications. But i do not agree with him that the reason that the wise man remains happy under torture is that he is experiencing "katastematic pleasure" while under torture. Nor do I think that Epicurus was happy on his last day due to "katastematic pleasure."

I think that Epicurus considered himself happy even during kidney pain, and the wise man under torture can be considered happy even under torture, not because he is in fact experiencing some kind of indescribable state of feeling, but because in both cases we're making a mental evaluation of the entire scope of the life in question, and choosing to look at the good as outweighing the bad. That's a conscious mental evaluation and takes great effort to appreciate, and anything that takes great effort to understand and appreciate is a mental activity that requires a lot more than thinking that just as a matter of the blessedness of nature we can store up some kind of superhuman reservoir of "katastematic pleasure" to call on when we are under torture. Were that true, then Epicurus would have wanted to continue to live on indefinitely despite his kidney pain, and that's where it becomes important whether Epicurus in fact committed suicide or hastened his own death. "Katastematic pleasure" doesn't outweigh unrelenting extended interminable extreme kinetic pain.

Being alive and conscious means our minds having an ongoing evaluation of whether our lives have been and are worthwhile, the vast majority of which time has been spent in "kinetic" activities, and there's nothing mysterious about that or necessary to identify as some kind of special or higher or "katastematic" pleasure that is our "true goal."

A pleasure to engage with you in this....

Quote from DistantLaughter

Furthermore, the katastematic/kinetic distinction itself is a later philosophical construct imposed retrospectively on Epicurus’s

Now that is essentially the position taken by Nikolsky in concluding that Epicurus did NOT put a great deal of emphasis on the kinetic / katastematic position. Do you agree with that ?

Quote from DistantLaughter

Ironically, this very dispute over categorical precision—arguably a kinetic agitation of the mind—may itself undermine the Epicurean ideal of peace of mind (ataraxia) that these concepts aim to clarify.

This is why I reject the idea that "peace of mind" is the ultimate goal of Epicurean philosophy. I would say the goal is "pleasure" and that pleasure entails a great deal of mental and physical activity.

When Lucretius understood to explain the philosophy to Memmious, he did not say "give up all your possessions and goals, live asceticslly, eat simply, and just breathe - get out of the way and clear you mind and all will be sweetness and light."

Instead , he launched off on six books of highly polemical argument about what knowledge and training is needed to live the best life. Just like Epicurus devotee himself to 37 books on nature and Diogenes of Oinoanda built his wall.

What I object to most strenuously is the idea that Epicurus calls us to disengage with all normal activity of the mind and body, and to consider that at best to be a necessary requirement of some kind of ineffable mental state that no one can really explain other than as a kind of neostoic or neobuddhist mental detachment from the way the world and all other living things in it really operate.

Granted the conclusion of the book is not quite so stark, and draws back from such a conclusion as if we are not good enough to achieve it, but setting that kind of thing up as a goal seems to me to be much more appropriate for the aforementioned Stoics and Buddhists than for someone who is convinced that this life is the only one we have.

And that's why I was particularly surprised to see the expression of doubt as to death being nothing to us and an apparent favorable reference to reincarnation.

You have clearly thought of these things before so I look forward to your further thoughts.

But I am afraid our time zone issues will now slow us down.

Sounds like you are correct and given your explanation we are not so far apart as might first appear.

However there may be one issue where we simply have a different diagnosis of the prevailing situation:

Quote from DistantLaughter

the pleasant turns out to be that which contributes to a tranquil and painless state of body and mind—a katastematic condition, even if he doesn’t use that term himself. So, when some people talk about "peace of mind" as the goal, they're typically using it as shorthand for that condition of ongoing, stable pleasure free from turmoil—rather than as a mystical or detached asceticism.

I note that in the underlined section you use the word "some" and so with that caveat I can certainly agree with you on even this statement.

However I would diagnose that the number of people at least in today's world, and I would probably carry this back even to Cicero's time, and certainly to the time when Stoicism and then Judeo-Christianity took over the West, are not seeing "tranqulity" or even "peace of mind" in that way.

Rather, my view is that there is strong tendency to see tranquility as detachment and indifference and apathy and eventually even to asceticism and nihilism.

By coincidence we are going through section 3 of Tusculan Disputations right now, and my observation is that the greater and now prevailing danger in the word is that people see it as Cicero describes the Stoics as seeing it as here in subsection X:

Quote

Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity, is also uneasy at another's prosperity: as Theophrastus while he laments the death of his companion Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of Alexander; and therefore he says, that Callisthenes met with a man of the greatest power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make use of his good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from the misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from the good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity, is capable of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently incapable of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also would be familiar to him; therefore to grieve, is a feeling which cannot affect a wise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and their conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and manly turn of thought and sentiment.

When one stresses tranquility or peace of mind as the goal, rather than a more normal understanding of pleasure as a wide variety of both physical and mental pleasures involving not only "rest" but also "activity," the logical result of such a stress for those who do not have an extensive background in reading Epicurus (or even for those who do) is going to conclude that nothing in life is worth being "disturbed" or losing one's "peace of mind." Even Cicero acknowledges that this is perverse reasoning, and yet he endorses it anyway as worthy of admiration.

That's the kind of conclusion I even see in Preuss' final chapter, as if it is a good argument that we can take comfort that the world would not fall apart if everyone were Epicurean because people would not actually be so extreme as to take katastematic pleasure to its logical conclusion.

To me that is an absolute loser of an argument and an analysis, and there is no way that Epicurus would have "taken the Roman world by storm" if he had been understood to be saying so.

But today, when there is much more evidence in people adopting views such as Buddhism or nihilism or modern Stoicism that people are in fact taking the desire for "calm" to such an extreme, it seems to me it is even more important than ever not to add more fuel to that fire through argument that the evidence indicates that Epicurus himself did not stress.

It's definitely become my view in recent years that the study of Epicureanism demands an initial grounding in explaining how Epicurus used critically important words in non-standard ways, and I would definitely add Tranquility / calmness / ataraxia to that list that needs explanation. But I also think that the opening explanation starts not at calmness and tranquility, which everyone including me sees as a desirable quality at least most of the time, but at "Pleasure," which is where Preuss is giving an example of how the problem is that Epicurus is alleged to have subtracted much of the normal and ordinary meaning of the word, rather than having added the additional observation that life itself is so valuable that every aspect of it needs to be treasured so long as that aspect is not explicitly painful.

As in reference the Chrysippus' challenge in On Ends Book One as to the hand in its normal state being in a state of pleasure, and even in highest pleasure, it is necessary to understand that immobility and detachment from all action is not the "normal state" of a hand, and it would be perverse to intrepret the logical sparring between Stoics and Epicureans in that way. The normal state of a hand or any other part of the body implies it is in good working condition, and setting out "calmness" as description of that working condition is an invitation to disastrous conclusions.

And to close this post that's exactly why I believe the consensus that "tranquility" is the goal rather than "pleasure" has become so strong -- because so many people (not the ancient Epicureans themselves, but their opponents -- are more than happy to use any argument available to them to divest "pleasure" of its full meaning. I recognize that there are many people in good faith who come to this conclusion for the most good-hearted of reasons, and I wouldn't doubt that Preuss is one of them. But to clearly entitle a book as he did that the true goal of Epicurean philosophy is not "Pleasure" but "Katastematic Hedonism" is to either subconsciously or consciously extend a trend which has doomed Epicurean Philosophy to being considered as an oddly-worded subset of Stoicism for many generations.

And that's a situation that needs to be changed.

I see that the next paragraph in Tusculan Disputations (which we by coincidence were planning to discuss today in our podcast recording) makes the issue even more clear: When you focus on "tranquilty" or "absence of disburbance" as one's ultimate goal, you are impelled to the conclusion that all strong emotions -- including joy -- are "perturbations" or "disorders" of the mind.
To what conclusion does this lead? That we should "exert our utmost efforts to oppose these perturbations—which are, as it were, so many furies let loose upon us, and urged on by folly—if we are desirous to pass this share of life that is allotted to us with ease and satisfaction."

Quote from Tusculan Disputations Part 3 Section XI

The whole cause, then, is in opinion; and this observation applies not to this grief alone, but to every other disorder of the mind, which are of four sorts, but consisting of many parts. For as every disorder or perturbation is a motion of the mind, either devoid of reason, or in despite of reason, or in disobedience to reason, and as that motion is excited by an opinion of either good or evil; these four perturbations are divided equally into two parts: for two of them proceed from an opinion of good, one of which is an exulting pleasure, that is to say, a joy elated beyond measure, arising from an opinion of some present great good; the other is a desire which may fairly be called even a lust, and is an immoderate inclination after some conceived great good, without any obedience to reason. Therefore these two kinds, the exulting pleasure, and the lust, have their rise from an opinion of good, as the other two, fear and grief, have from an opinion of evil. For fear is an opinion of some great evil impending over us, and grief is an opinion of some great evil present; and, indeed, it is a freshly conceived opinion of an evil so great, that to grieve at it seems right: it is of that kind, that he who is uneasy at it thinks he has good reason to be so. Now we should exert our utmost efforts to oppose these perturbations—which are, as it were, so many furies let loose upon us, and urged on by folly—if we are desirous to pass this share of life that is allotted to us with ease and satisfaction. But of the other feelings I shall speak elsewhere; our business at present is to drive away grief if we can, for that shall be the object of our present discussion, since you have said that it was your opinion that a wise man might be subject to grief, which I can by no means allow of; for it is a frightful, miserable, and detestable thing, which we should fly from with our utmost efforts—with all our sails and oars, as I may say.

I would argue that if that sort of conclusion had been what Epicurus taught his philosophy would never have become popular in the Roman world at all, and likewise it is deadly to Epicurean philosophy today. And that attitude is especially deadly to Epicurean Philosophy being embraced by younger people, who I believe are instinctively able to see the dangers involved.

I'm no longer young myself and so I am more tolerant of those who do begin to elevate "tranquility" in order of importance as they age and the pains of life increase, but I think we owe it to ourselves, to others, and to Epicurus not to allow our own personal problems to overshadow a very different perspective that it seems to me clearly entails a much more active and positive assessment of life.

On the same thing we have some excellent material coming up in future weeks on the podcast, including this from CIcero just a little further down than what is quoted above. Here Cucero is referring to Epicurus and quoting him directly to show how Epicurus hammered home the point that pleasure is a term that includes the normal active pleasures. This results in a view that is wider than generally understood, not narrower:

Quote from Tusculan Disputations Part 3 Section XVIII

Now, should any one, as the same author says, find his spirits sink with the loss of his fortune, he must apply to those grave philosophers of antiquity for relief, and not to these voluptuaries: for what great abundance of good do they promise? Suppose that we allow that to be without pain is the chief good? yet that is not called pleasure. But it is not necessary at present to go through the whole: the question is, to what point are we to advance in order to abate our grief? Grant that to be in pain is the greatest evil; whosoever, then, has proceeded so far as not to be in pain, is he, therefore, in immediate possession of the greatest good? Why, Epicurus, do we use any evasions, and not allow in our own words the same feeling to be pleasure, which you are used to boast of with such assurance? Are these your words or not? This is what you say in that book which contains all the doctrine of your school; for I will perform, on this occasion, the office of a translator, lest any one should imagine that I am inventing anything. Thus you speak: “Nor can I form any notion of the chief good, abstracted from those pleasures which are perceived by taste, or from what depends on hearing music, or abstracted from ideas raised by external objects visible to the eye, or by agreeable motions, or from those other pleasures which are perceived by the whole man by means of any of his senses; nor can it possibly be said that the pleasures of the mind are excited only by what is good; for I have perceived men's minds to be pleased with the hopes of enjoying those things which I mentioned above, and with the idea that it should enjoy them without any interruption from pain.” And these are his exact words, so that any one may understand what were the pleasures with which Epicurus was acquainted. Then he speaks thus, a little lower down: “I have often inquired of those who have been called wise men, what would be the remaining good if they should exclude from consideration all these pleasures, unless they meant to give us nothing but words? I could never learn anything from them; and unless they choose that all virtue and wisdom should vanish and come to nothing, they must say with me, that the only road to happiness lies through those pleasures which I mentioned above.” What follows is much the same, and his whole book on the chief good everywhere abounds with the same opinions.

Quote from Bryan

I am not sure it is possible to say that Epicurus did not use the term, or that it is a later construct, given that Diogenes Laertius' direct quote without the use of any indirect speech or an attribution to a secondary source.

I agree that DL clearly says that, so it would be unlikely that he "did not use the term." But the reasons for argument that the extreme focus on this distinction was introduced later is what was advanced by Gosling and Taylor and summarized in the Boris Nikolsky article (click on Nikosky's name and it will come up).

Yes all of those imply that Epicurus recognized a distinction, and we certainly know as well that Epicurus had a much more expansive definition of pleasure.

What those don't state or imply is that Epicurus held pleasures of rest to be more important than those of motion, or that pleasures of rest are the end goal of pleasures of motion. And in fact those very statements make the opposite point, that Epicurus recognized both.

And that is the ultimate dispute, which leads certain people to conclude that the real essence of Epicurean philosoph is "Katastematic Hedonism," rather than pleasure.

None of these authorities such as Gosling and Taylor or Nikolsky or the rest allege that the distinction was unknown to Epicurus, only that he did not place it at the center of his philosophy or consider it to be his most important ethical concept, which is the way that Pruess phrases it.

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/5730-image-png/