Why Minimizing All Desire Is Incorrect (And What To Do Instead)

Quote from Kalosyni

I hope this shows that Epicureans are actually embracing many desires by fulfilling desires, and that we need not fear the feeling of desire, but instead turn towards the ones that nature gives us with joy.

Well said – and bears repeating! Thank you.

You mentioned PD08: “No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.” [Also VS50]

That also means, to me, that no desire is a bad thing in itself. Desire is what awakens and guides the pursuit of pleasure (from your Torquatus quote: "pleasure is matter for desire" ). It’s not the desires that are a problem, but – sometimes – how we act, or refrain from acting, in their pursuit; and the consequences of their fulfillment. That is the guardrail exception – not the rule. (As you once said so succinctly: “There are no rules, only choices.” My sage therapist, when I was going through a hard time, said much the same thing. I have not forgotten your reminder! )

People who gravitate toward an “ascetic Epicureanism” often cite Epicurus’ criticism of profligacy in the Letter to Menoceus: “ … When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.

“For it is not continuous drinkings and revelings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.” [131, in part, and 132]

But, I would read that as a caution that needs to be seen through the lens of (contextualized by) PD10: “If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), [then] we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.” [My emphasis and brackets]

Epicurus’ breakdown of desires into (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and unnecessary and (3) unnatural is a wise guide to healthful and beneficial choosing. But “No pleasure is a bad thing in itself.”

Yes the natural / necessary desires are of the highest value. Wirhout them life declines like in a depression

Often these desires are shortened as desires for the stomach, a prejudice from Cicero/Stoics/Platonists which say „ we desire perfect knowledge and harmony wirh the cosmos, you Epicureans only to get your stomach full…“

But the core embraced desires include

- Body / health (Aponia)

- Life/ Security (Life means more than having a healthy body, sometimes we have to sacrifice health or choose pain for living )

- Happiness /Eudaimonia/Ataraxia

( which means more than simply to live, you can live a miserable life with an troubled frustrated mind and sometimes we limit/ sacrifice our life or parts for our values, like in extremes dying for a friend/ love/community / or our dignity )

So natural/necessary desires include a whole set of personal values and Emotions imo and how I understand the letter of menoceus.

Quote from Matteng

Yes the natural / necessary desires are of the highest value.

Depending on the contextual meaning assigned to the word "value," I don't think that can be sustained as a foundational Epicurean rule.

Yes you need them to live, but that does not mean necessarily that they are "most pleasant." Epicurus clearly states in his letter that the wise man is not going to seek the longest life, but the most pleasant.

And he also states that sometimes we will choose to die, as for a friend, or when we are sure that the pain of our future life will make living on not worthwhile in terms of pleasure.

So I think more work needs to be done on stating that most accurately in Epicurean terms.

Quote from Cassius

Yes you need them to live, but that does not mean necessarily that they are "most pleasant." Epicurus clearly states in his letter that the wise man is not going to seek the longest life, but the most pleasant.

I’ve often wondered, in that context, if “necessary” is supposed to mean what is simply necessary for bare survival (as it sometimes seems taken to be – again, by proponents of the “bread-and-water” ascetic wing) or necessary for the most pleasant life. I think you’ve answered that question here. And (if I read you right) I agree: it has to be that.

I may be alone in this, but I continue to think that desire is a kind of pain. We feel it as pain because we feel it as dissatisfaction, and dissatisfaction is a kind of pain.

This is not an argument for asceticism; it is sometimes used as a premise in arguments for asceticism, but there is no reason to think that the one follows from the other.

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In order that Idomeneus may not be introduced free of charge into my letter, he shall make up the indebtedness from his own account. It was to him that Epicurus addressed the well-known saying urging him to make Pythocles rich, but not rich in the vulgar and equivocal way. "If you wish," said he, "to make Pythocles rich, do not add to his store of money, but subtract from his desires."

Event Date: 60 LA
§ 21.8 This idea is too clear to need explanation, and too clever to need reinforcement. There is, however, one point on which I would warn you, – not to consider that this statement applies only to riches; its value will be the same, no matter how you apply it. "If you wish to make Pythocles honourable, do not add to his honours, but subtract from his desires"; "if you wish Pythocles to have pleasure for ever, do not add to his pleasures, but subtract from his desires"; "if you wish to make Pythocles an old man, filling his life to the full, do not add to his years, but subtract from his desires."

Event Date: 60 LA
§ 21.9 There is no reason why you should hold that these words belong to Epicurus alone; they are public property. I think we ought to do in philosophy as they are wont to do in the Senate: when someone has made a motion, of which I approve to a certain extent, I ask him to make his motion in two parts, and I vote for the part which I approve. So I am all the more glad to repeat the distinguished words of Epicurus, in order that I may prove to those who have recourse to him through a bad motive, thinking that they will have in him a screen for their own vices, that they must live honourably, no matter what school they follow.

Event Date: 60 LA
§ 21.10 Go to his Garden and read the motto carved there: 'Stranger, here you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure.' The care-taker of that abode, a kindly host, will be ready for you; he will welcome you with barley-meal and serve you water also in abundance, with these words: "Have you not been well entertained?" "This garden," he says, "does not whet your appetite; it quenches it. Nor does it make you more thirsty with every drink; it slakes the thirst by a natural cure, a cure that demands no fee. This is the 'pleasure' in which I have grown old."

-Seneca, Letters to Lucilius

I'm quite happy to endorse Epicurus as quoted. Seneca will have to answer for his own additions in section 21.8: at any rate, I should say that 'if you wish Pythocles to have pleasure for ever, add to his pleasures AND subtract from his desires.'

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Have you not been well entertained?

Maybe Ridley Scott is a fan after all!

Yes Joshua has in my mind quoted the best citation that can be raised in support of the proposition that all desires should be limited: ""If you wish," said he, "to make Pythocles rich, do not add to his store of money, but subtract from his desires."

And you can add in the statement about how when we are in no pain we have no need of pleasure.

BUT in response to those there are very many good arguments that those statements are contextual, and that life and pleasure are desirable, and those those general principles override the contextual instances in which impossible desires necessarily lead to more pain than pleasure.

This is an excellent discussion to pursue in great detail.

I think Post 8 is the right direction, parsing the exact meaning of the word "desire" and examining the context in which the desire occurs. As with everything else, it's not like there's some ideal form labelled "desire" floating out there in the atmosphere somewhere with a "good" or "bad" label attached to it.

In fact I would ask this:

Is there anything that is ALWAYS Pleasurable except PLEASURE? I would say no.

Is there anything that is ALWAYS painful except PAIN? Again I would say no.

At this very high level it seems to me like *everything* else, including desire, is going to be contextual, and needs to be seen as a tool for achieving pleasure or avoiding pain.

And if that is the case then as Kalosyni says, any particular desire, and in fact desire in general, must be seen as something that has to be judged in context.

And that would also lead to the conclusion that too little desire can be every bit as bad a thing as too much desire.

And that's something that I strongly think is the case, and strongly think is a widespread problem with common modern discussion of Epicurean philosophy.

The tone of many generalist articles on Epicurus on the internet too often rings of suppression of desire that has more akin to Buddhism or Stoicism. It seems to me that what Epicurus taught was to look to what a particular desire brings, rather than viewing desire itself as bad or painful.

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Is there anything that is ALWAYS Pleasurable except PLEASURE? I would say no.

Is there anything that is ALWAYS painful except PAIN? Again I would say no.

At this very high level it seems to me like *everything* else, including desire, is going to be contextual, and needs to be seen as a tool for achieving pleasure or avoiding pain.

What I am suggesting is that 'desire' is a word that we use to describe one particular kind of pain, just as 'headache' is a word used to describe another particular kind of pain.

Quote from Joshua

What I am suggesting is that 'desire' is a word that we use to describe one particular kind of pain, just as 'headache' is a word used to describe another particular kind of pain.

Yep, I would definitely agree that it can be used that way.

But can it not ALSO be used in a way that is entirely positive and pleasurable, in which the pleasure of anticipation and preparation for the experience are every bit as enjoyable as the experience itself?

I think it can be used both ways. Where I see the Buddhists (or similar viewpoints) at fault is that they presume that the word desire can only be used to describe suffering, because at a very fundamental level they view life as inherently suffering.

Epicurus seems to me to be the opposite. Epicurus views life as inherently pleasurable, and it only ceases to be pleasurable when some specific pain intervenes.

From the Torquatus section of Book One of On Ends:

(4) But we do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn uneasiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere absence of pain.

(5) But just as we are elated by the anticipation of good things, so we are delighted by their recollection. Fools are tormented by the memory of former evils; wise men have the delight of renewing in grateful remembrance the blessings of the past. We have the power both to obliterate our misfortunes in an almost perpetual forgetfulness and to summon up pleasant and agreeable memories of our successes. But when we fix our mental vision closely on the events of the past, then sorrow or gladness ensues according as these were evil or good.

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Being elated by the anticipation of something seems to me to be part and parcel of "desiring" it.

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But can it not ALSO be used in a way that is entirely positive and pleasurable, in which the pleasure of anticipation and preparation for the experience are every bit as enjoyable as the experience itself?

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Being elated by the anticipation of something seems to me to be part and parcel of "desiring" it.

Anticipating the fulfillment of a desire can be pleasureable, in the same way that anticipating the removal of a pain can be pleasureable. You wouldn't call a headache pleasant simply because you know relief is at hand.

In the case of romantic desire, the one who feels that desire (the sting of Cupid's arrow, if you will) may indulge in fantasizing about getting the person they want. The fantasy might be pleasureable, but when that person comes down from that high they are left with the bare pain of desire.

The fantasy which brings pleasure might actually postpone their joy;

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VS18. If sight, association, and intercourse are all removed, the πάθος (pathos) of love is ended.

I am not willing to cede ground to the Buddhists who wish to demonstrate that life is bitter; they can make that argument themselves. My argument is that life is sweet, because the pain of desire has its happy resolution, not in renunciation, or in mortification, but in pleasure. Some desires we should satisfy. Some we should consider carefully before satisfying. Some we should recognize as unsatisfiable, and cast them off.

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Some men say to themselves:

“No more shall my house admit me with glad welcome, nor a virtuous wife and sweet children run to be the first to snatch kisses and touch my heart with joy. No more may I be prosperous in my doings, a safeguard to my own. One disastrous day has taken from me, luckless man, all the many prizes of life.”

But these men do not add:

“And now no longer does any craving for these things beset me either.”

-Lucretius, Book III

Quote from Cassius

But can it not ALSO be used in a way that is entirely positive and pleasurable, in which the pleasure of anticipation and preparation for the experience are every bit as enjoyable as the experience itself?

Cassius I agree that 'desire' is one of our important natural feelings that can help us achieve some of our most important goals or missions in life [telos] . My understanding of studying nature is that life is to create and re-create. Our body’s cells are being re-created all the time. Most people have a natural desire to make things (e.g. create something that improves their happiness) that didn’t exist, but now exists. Looking to nature shows how plants and animals are creating new life and contributing to other plants and animals.

I find in the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus states:
"We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live."

This is a very interesting discussion. I can't think of a lot more to add at the moment as I type this other than to emphasize that we need to explore it a lot further.

Perhaps too this is a place for discussion of the implication of some of what the Epicureans had to say about divinity. Even if (or especially if!) gods are considered to be thought constructs, what do our expectations of the life of a god tell us about what we should extrapolate to be the best life for ourselves. Would gods have no desires, or simply no "unmeetable" desires, or no lusts that intoxicate them, or what?

I am concerned that we may be mixing our monotheistic modern Judeo-Christian views of omnipotence into thinking that Epicurus would have thought that gods have no desires because they can magically create anything they want. I doubt that is something that Epicurus would have thought, so I think we need to be sure to steer clear of any implication that gos are supernaturally "above" things like desire.

So the germ of a thought here is that perhaps "desire" as a general category is something that is part and parcel of even our best extrapolation of the best life. If so, "desire" as a general category of human activity would by no means be inherently painful either in practice or in theory.

It is certainly tempting to take the position that if you have "desire" then that means you are "lacking" something, and that therefore all "lack" is felt as pain. However the implications of that position seem so far-reachingly negative (or are they?) as to be irreconcilable with Epicurus' approach that continuing to be alive is a fundamentally desirable thing.

But it's a position that we want to argue more confidently than our current discussion seems to allow. And I am not sure there is anything more important in Epicurean theory for us to address than the implications of this question. It wraps up a LOT of issues in a single package.

I suspect there is another analogy to pursue here too:'

The Religionist/ Virtue-ethics / anti-hedonists crowd has an inherent antipathy to pleasure. A major tactic that they use is to narrow the definition of pleasure to focus only the sensual pleasures, which they find easiest to disparage, and so they make arguments that imply that the term "pleasure" consists only of "sex, drugs, and rock'n'roll" which they believe are easily caricatured as leading to disastrous results.

The Buddhists (who are really part of the first crowd but who are more honest about their antipathy to pleasure) do the same thing with desire. Unlike the Stoics and western religions which aren't so willing to come right out and preach "life is suffering," the Buddhist team isn't satisfied with attacking pleasure, they want to attack life itself in the form of the desire to remain living. So they narrow the definition of desire so as to focus only on the desires that are most intoxicating and in many cases impossible, and that allows them to disparage *all* desire and make arguments that imply that the term "desire" consists only of those desires that frequently lead to disastrous results.

So I think that the key to resolution of this seeming paradox is to take a wider view of desire, just like Epicurus takes a wider view of pleasure, and to resist the manipulation of definitions of important terms so that a philosophy based on the desire to pursue pleasure and avoid pain becomes impossible.

That's not quite the Buddhist perspective. I think it's important if we're going to argue against their position (and I am more than fine with that, to be clear!), it should be clear what we're arguing against.

The first Noble Truth (NT) is usually translated "Life is suffering" but that's almost as misleading as just saying "pleasure is the good." The word translated suffering is dukkha.

The Pali Text Society's Pali-English dictionary

So, a better paraphrase of NT1 is "Life as most everyone lives it is unsatisfactory, filled with misery, pain, unfulfilled desire, etc." It's not wrong, life can be painful. But it tries to catch all things wrong with *how* people live in one word. That sounds familiar to the Epicureans problem with conveying the meaning of pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

Buddhist team isn't satisfied with attacking pleasure, they want to attack life itself in the form of the desire to remain living. So they narrow the definition of desire so as to focus only on the desires that are most intoxicating and in many cases impossible, and that allows them to disparage *all* desire and make arguments that imply that the term "desire" consists only of those desires that frequently lead to disastrous results.

Again, NT2 addresses why life is suffering: thirst, desire, craving. We want things to go a certain way, and when we don't get that, it's painful. The word is tanha. They don't go after "desires that are most intoxicating and in many cases impossible," they go after ALL desires. Anything that we thirst for or desire or crave, if we don't get it, that brings suffering. They say all desire, all craving, results in dukkha. Tanha is analogous in its comprehensive nature to pleasure for Epicureans. NOT philosophically!! Just semantically, tanha does a lot of heavy lifting, like the word hēdonē does for our school.

I'm not going to turn this into a Buddhist apologetic, but I think it's important to get details right when we're arguing against other schools - and we should argue! Just don't want to strawman any of them.

"Life as most everyone lives it is unsatisfactory, filled with misery, pain, unfulfilled desire, etc."

Thanks for that - yes I want to be accurate - and I think your description of the Buddhist position makes it worse from an Epicurean perspective than what i described. They do not offer a positive view of pleasure as the remedy to that problem, but essentially nothingness - the death of desire.

So don't let me go too easy on it!

The remedy to misery, pain, and unfulfilled desire is NOT to end desire, nor to minimize desire, nor to define desire out of existence, or to wish ourselves out of existence. A philosophy which values life, rather than seeks to extinguish it, will seek to intelligently pursue pleasure, which specifically includes those desires for the pleasures of the senses that these other philosophies focus their time on condemning.

I do agree that we don't want to turn this into an expose on Buddhism (we've gone through most of that already) but there's a reason why anyone who seeks to suppress desire and pleaure is relevant, and the issues have to be confronted head-on.

The Discussions focused on Buddhism are here:

Epicurus vs. Buddha and the Buddhists

Including particularly this thread:

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RE: 2022 Epicurus vs Buddhism Compare and Contrast Thread

Of the ancient Indian philosophies of Ājīvika, Ajñana, Buddhism, Chārvāka, Jainism, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya, Samkhya, Vaisheshika, Vedanta, and Yoga, we'll find the closest companion to Epicureanism in Chārvāka. Early Buddhism is most closely related to the Indian school of Ajñana, from which Pyrrhonism developed, so, in general, I don't think that comparisons between early Buddhism and Epicurean philosophy are helpful. They are dissimilar and historically unrelated.

In terms of physics, Epicureanism…

Eikadistes

January 27, 2022 at 10:02 PM

"A philosophy which values life, rather than seeks to extinguish it, will seek to intelligently pursue pleasure,"

---- writing that helps me focus on the time issue. I don't think you can value "life" without implying that you also value "the continuation of life over time." Since we only have "the now" and we don't have total control over the future, it seems to me that there is inherently going to be a "desire for time" element in valuing life that is not eliminated by saying "I'm satisfied with what I have already experienced. "

There's got to be a way to articulate a philosophically proper perspective in which you are both (1) satisfied that you have lived well so far, but you also (2) possess a desire for the continuance of that life without that desire for continuance being construed as pain or anything that is negative.

I think we've talked about in the past as well that the issue of "variation" in the sense of unlimited time producing no "greater" pleasure, but only variation, does not imply that variation itself is not valuable or desirable. All of us know by experience that variation IS valuable and desirable. So it's not that variation over time isn't desirable, because it is. The point has to be more the philosophical one that variation cannot make "pure pleasure" (in the sense of total absence of pain) "more pure," and variation cannot make "total absence of pain" more "total."

I thought a little further about desire and the natural/necessary desires.

- Yes unfulfilled desires are/causes pain

- The faculty of pain/pleasure is there to guide us to fulfill these desires and gives pleasure when it is followed

- Without desire and the pleasure in fulfilling and pain in not fulfilling, life would vanish.

=> Our whole body exists for that, we have arms, legs, stomachs, organs, brain etc. which we would not need if we have no need for searching for food/drink/security. Like a stork, often seen as a divine animal but all it organs are selected/adapted / evolved for efficient survival in swamps.

It would be like in Christianity the thoughts about "heaven". If you have no needs/desires/motives for what do you need a body ? A house ? A city ? What are you doing ?

We would be empty roboters but with no function because a function has only meaning and evolved when fulfilling a purpose, a telos.