Why Minimizing All Desire Is Incorrect (And What To Do Instead)

As for me in my current thinking, I am generally in agreement with most of post 20, but I would still say that the following excerpt from it ("unfulfilled desires are/cause pain") is overbroad.

Quote from Matteng

- Yes unfulfilled desires are/causes pain

I would be closer to agreeing that "unfulfillable" desires are or cause pain, but I suspect that too would be too overbroad. You might desire to recover from late-stage disease, and that desire would be pleasurable for you as long as you maintain it, even though it might be impossible to achieve. Heck - this even goes for Epicurus' statement in the letter to Menoeceus that it would be better to believe the myths of the gods than to give in to determinism. In that statement he couldn't be saying that the gods would in fact reward the worshiper, and he probably means that the thought of getting the reward would at least be pleasurable for so long as you could maintain the fiction.

Closer yet might be "intoxicating desires" are or cause pain, but even then for the duration of the intoxication that can often be pleasurable (or so I am told!).

Maybe there's no way around the conclusion that only rigorous way to state this is that "painful desires" are in fact the only desires properly labeled as painful.

But that's the question before the house.

Quote from Pacatus

But, I would read that as a caution that needs to be seen through the lens of (contextualized by) PD10:

Pacatusisn't the only one to bring up PD10 et al, but I'm just using his quote as a jumping off point.

I continue to advocate for seeing PD10, 11, and 12 as one body and not discrete "principal doctrines"(Saint-Andre translation, emphasis, bracketed additions, and re-arrangement mine)...

• ONE: IF the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and
• IF furthermore [the delights of those who are decadent] taught us the limits of our pains and desires,
• THEN we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that's what is bad).
• [Additionally] IF our suspicions about astronomical phenomena and about death were nothing to us and troubled us not at all, and
• IF this were also the case regarding our ignorance about the limits of our pains (of either mind or body) and desires,
• THEN we would have no need for studying what is natural.
• It is impossible for someone who is completely ignorant about nature to wash away his fears about the most important matters if he retains some suspicions about the myths. So it is impossible to experience undiluted enjoyment without studying what is natural.

LOTS of "if... then"'s in those statements. I know Cassius and I have had this discussion ad nauseum, but I'll give him this (if I understand his position):

IF the *pleasures* (NOT desires!) of the ἄσωτος (asotos: one having no hope of safety, one in a desperate case, one who is lost, a profligate/prodigal - same word used in reference to the Prodigal Son in the Bible) washed away fears, then there would be no cause to blame, censure, find fault: μεμψαίμεθα. Where we differ (I believe) is that, to me, that is merely hypothetical and not born out in reality. That's *why* we have cause to blame, censure, find fault with the prodigal not limiting the pleasures that they decide to experience. There are natural limits for a reason, one we discover by studying nature.

This follows right along with the next section, that IF we had no suspicions (derived from same word in the 2nd line of the Tetrapharmakos about death!) about death and were not ignorant of the limits of pains and desires, THEN we wouldn't have to study nature.

BUT we DO have to study nature and, to me, it then follows that we DO, in fact, have reason to find fault with the pleasures of the prodigal.

To reflect on the title of this thread: "Why Minimizing All Desire Is Incorrect (And What To Do Instead)" - I would agree that we aren't called to "minimize all desire" or, to rephrase that, minimize pleasures that we experience down to a bare minimal number of allowed ones.

Epicurus wrote that "all pleasure is good." If we equate "the pleasures of the profligate" at all times and all places with every experience of "the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms," and avoid every experience of these (and other pleasures I'm sure we can think of), that's not the point. I continue to contend that it's the unlimited indulgence of any one pleasure that becomes an issue for Epicurus. Although, it's easier to avoid some to begin with if one knows the likely outcome beforehand. Nevertheless, if you indulge in "sex, drugs, and rock and roll"; Epicurus is going to be there afterwards shaking his head, giving you some frank speech, but no doubt welcoming you back to the garden if you want to sincerely learn about the "limits of our pains (of either mind or body) and desires" and to "study nature." He wrote a treatise set as a discussion among attendees (including himself) at a drinking party (Symposium, Συμπόσιον, number 18 on Diogenes Laertius' list) where they discuss, among other things, whether wine has warming or cooling properties and getting omens from indigestion.

Epicureanism has always been to me a philosophy of personal responsibility (tempered with an understanding of chance and circumstance). It's the outcomes of the choices that are made, NOT (necessarily) the pleasures experienced in and of themselves. I will continue to think that PD10-12 provides a beginning framework of why and how to understand the limits that we should consider to be prudent choice-makers.

Quote from Don

Nevertheless, if you indulge in "sex, drugs, and rock and roll"; Epicurus is going to be there afterwards shaking his head, giving you some frank speech, but no doubt welcoming you back to the garden if you want to sincerely learn about the "limits of our pains (of either mind or body) and desires" and to "study nature."

Perhaps you equate "indulge" with "over-indulge," or perhaps that's a typo, but I would think that sentence definitely needs to read "OVER indulge" to be clear. That's because I am pretty sure we agree that "sex, drugs, and rocknroll" are definitely desirable pleasures, and completely proper ones, when not "overindulged in" - which means essentially "to excess." Correct?

Quote from Don

Epicureanism has always been to me a philosophy of personal responsibility (tempered with an understanding of chance and circumstance). It's the outcomes of the choices that are made, NOT (necessarily) the pleasures experienced in and of themselves.

I completely agree with the emphasis on personal responsibility, unless you mean that wording to indicate that personal responsibility is more important than pleasure itself. I don't think you mean that, but in the context of the discussion I could see someone casually reading the post thinking that is what you mean. We live for pleasure, and personal responsibility is essential to ensure that we do not overindulge and end up with too much pain, but personal responsibility itself is just a "virtue" and therefore a "tool" for living pleasurably, and it is living pleasurably ("pleasure") that is the goal.

The difference in our readings continues to be (I think) that you and I have a different view of the usefulness and meaning of hypotheticals. In itself that difference is not a bad thing, but it needs to be understood by people browsing through the threads. I would say you're more suspicious of the problem of the stating accurate premises to include in using hypotheticals than I am, and so you sometimes take the intent of the hypothetical somewhat differently. I am willing to embrace that problem and believe that the challenges in stating the premises are what helps the point of the hypothetical to sink in. Regardless of that, however, in the end, I think we arrive mostly at the same place.

Quote from Cassius

That's because I am pretty sure we agree that "sex, drugs, and rocknroll" are definitely desirable pleasures, and completely proper ones, when not "overindulged in" - which means essentially "to excess." Correct?

Correct, I think. "The pleasures of the prodigal" are, to my reading, by definition pleasures to excess. Luke 15:13 which uses ασωτως ( the adverb form of the word in PD10) is variously translated as:

• in wild living (NIV)
• with riotous living. (KJV)
• in dissolute living (NRSVue)
• in reckless and immoral living. (Amplified Bible)

To me, τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν "the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent" is very specific and carefully worded phrase. It doesn't say (and I'm guilty of implying it does) "the pleasures" themselves are the problem. The "the things that produce" the pleasures of the one who is overindulging are the main topic/subject of that phrase. So, we have two options to interpret that first part of PD10:

1. Are "the things that produce" the pleasures of the profligate referring to specific activities: possibly including drinking, gambling, dancing, sex, etc.,?
2. Are "the things that produce" the pleasures of the profligate referring to the overindulgnt , unlimited participation in those activities?

I think it has to be number two since Epicurus includes all activities that bring pleasure as defined as good. Therefore, if riotous, wild, reckless living and experiening every pleasure without limits did dispel fears and taught us about the limits of pain and desires, then we'd have no complaints against those who indulge in pleasure that way. But I believe he makes us ask the question: "Does riotous, wild, reckless living and experiening every pleasure without limits dispel fears and teach us about the limits of pain and desires?" The hypothetical (as you describe this PD) drives home the requirement to look at how we normally view pleasure. I think a large number of people today think "riotous, wild, reckless living" when they hear pleasure or hedonism. Epicurus, Philodemus, the whole Garden seem to have been confronting this same battle of both inadvertent and deliberate misunderstanding of their school. To me, it's both a philosophical point and practical advice, taken together with what has become PD11 and PD12.

Quote from Cassius

I completely agree with the emphasis on personal responsibility, unless you mean that wording to indicate that personal responsibility is more important than pleasure itself. I don't think you mean that, but in the context of the discussion I could see someone casually reading the post thinking that is what you mean. We live for pleasure, and personal responsibility is essential to ensure that we do not overindulge and end up with too much pain, but personal responsibility itself is just a "virtue" and therefore a "tool" for living pleasurably, and it is living pleasurably ("pleasure") that is the goal.

We definitely agree here.

It is unfortunate that we have to choose only one responsive Icon, because I wanted to use both the like and the smile face. Limited to only one choice, I chose the like!

As usual I think we are in almost total agreement, with the only possible exception being:

Quote from Don

I think it has to be number two since Epicurus includes all activities that bring pleasure as defined as good.

You mean there is doubt in your mind about that?

Smiling aside I do have something additional to contribute that this gives me the opportunity to say.

I focused several comments on the use of "hypothetical" constructs, but that may not be the primary issue that's going on (not between our two interpretations, but something that's causing widespread issues).

Rather than the issue being use of hypotheticals, maybe the word is the issue of the literalism that Epicurus seems to me to be using. (Mostly option one of the following definition.)

Quote

literalism [ lit-er-uh-liz-uhm ] noun

1. adherence to the exact letter or the literal sense, as in translation or interpretation:

   to interpret the law with uncompromising literalism.

2. a peculiarity of expression resulting from this:

   The work is studded with these obtuse literalisms.

3. exact representation or portrayal, without idealization, as in art or literature:

   a literalism more appropriate to journalism than to the novel.

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For example when he says things like "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain" or "death is nothing to us" or "The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once."

I think he means those statements to be taken absolutely literary, and not in any way metaphorically or allegorically or in any way that would undercut the takeaway that he means what he says and says what he means.

He's literally defining pleasure as absence of pain, which means pain is absence of pleasure, and the two options are to be taken as literally the same, at the very least for the purpose of logical analysis.

Joshua's been regularly suggesting that the statement about believing gods to be living beings blessed and imperishable is meant to be "definitional" about a god, and I think he's right, meaning that we should take Epicurus literally at his word. We can interpolate the implications of the statement all day, but the beginning of the analysis is that we should take him to be speaking very precisely.

That may be a better way of getting at the way PD10 and many other statements are worded. It's reasonable to take them as hypotheticals and think through the implications to come to practical applications, but at the same time they are intended to be taken literally. It's the literalness that gives them their clarity and logical order, and allows you to judge exactly what is consistent and inconsistent with them.

Yes, literally, Epicurus seems clearly to me to be affirming as an absolute that yes, all pleasures are desirable, because they feel pleasurable, but at the same time, and without violating that first phrase, not all pleasures are to be chosen, because choosing them will frequently bring more pain than pleasure when all consequences are considered.

It's literally true at one and the same time that all pleasures are pleasing, yet not all pleasures are to be chosen, because -- considering all consequences -- the pain that generally follows will outweigh the pleasure.

BUT - and this is a big point - the reason it's not proper to go further and say that choosing them will DEFINITELY bring more pain than pleasure is that there is no force of determinism in the universe that guarantees that result. Generally, even an overwhelming number of times, the result is predictable, but it's not always predictable, because there is no force of necessity which requires it to be so. When Epicurus wouldn't even admit it to be necessary that Metrodorus will necessarily be alive or dead tomorrow, he's not going to admit it to be necessary that any particular choice will necessarily lead to a precise result in terms of net pleasure or pain.

Quote from Cassius

I wanted to use both the like and the smile face.

Back at you...

Now we're getting somewhere.

Quote from Cassius

You mean there is doubt in your mind about that?

Yes, I suppose that's true. That could have been phrased better on my part.

Quote from Cassius

BUT - and this is a big point - the reason it's not proper to go further and say that choosing them will DEFINITELY bring more pain than pleasure is that there is no force of determinism in the universe that guarantees that result. Generally, even an overwhelming number of times, the result is predictable, but it's not always predictable, because there is no force of necessity which requires it to be so. When Epicurus wouldn't even admit it to be necessary that Metrodorus will necessarily be alive or dead tomorrow, he's not going to admit it to be necessary that any particular choice will necessarily lead to a precise result in terms of net pleasure or pain.

BUT - if one thinks they're going to be the exception to the general rule, they're usually disappointed. Does someone from time to time win the lottery? Sure, but how much money has been lost by innumerable people in getting to that win? This PD + 11 & 12 conveys to me the supreme importance of learning from nature, from what our senses tell us. We don't live a hypothetical existence. We live here and now in this material universe and in these mortal, physical bodies using our senses and our minds to make the most prudent decisions to live a life as imbued with pleasure as we are able.

I agree that Epicurus wouldn't entertain the Metrodorus question. He also didn't appear to like the paradox of the hooded father*. To me, Epicurus didn't like playing word games. He said what he meant and meant what he said. Our problem, often, is that he said it 2,300 years ago in ancient Greek.

*A person is presented with a person wearing a hood and is asked "Do you know this person?" Unbeknownst to the person being asked, it's his father under hood. This is supposed to show one can know and not know something at the same time.

Quote from Don

BUT - if one thinks they're going to be the exception to the general rule, they're usually disappointed.

I think you and I and probably all of us in this discussion are going to reach the same conclusions 99 out of 100 or maybe 100 out of 100 times.

But since one of our goals here is to be as clear as possible for ourselves and for others who are reading, we need to be clear: What really is the "general rule" that we are discussing?

As I see it, the most important general rule is that pleasure is desirable because it is pleasure. That's a flat assertion with no exceptions whatsoever.

Some pleasures are not sometimes undesirable or painful -- that never is the case, and thus there are no exceptions.

We shift the terminology when we talk about choice and avoidance. Many things - most things? - all things? can be either choiceworthy or non-choiceworthy depending on the circumstances. And we're probably in complete agreement about the probabilities of what is likely to bring more pain than pleasure.

Where Cicero and the majority of the rest of the world try to attack Epicurus is in conflating all these issues together and therefore asserting that "pleasure" is not the best term for the ultimate good. If we agree to that, then we invite in all sorts of logical problems that ultimately make it untenable to maintain that "pleasure" is the ultimate good or ultimate goal.

So I think there's very good reason for being an absolutist and a literalist on Epicurus' statements about pleasure. And that's why I am also very comfortable with "in-your-face" interpretations of PD10 and other aggressive assertions (pleasure IS the absence of pain; the sun IS the size it appears to be; all sensations ARE true; death IS nothing to us, gods ARE living beings blessed and imperishable; the virtues (including wisdom, justice, friendship, and the rest) ARE nothing more than tools for pleasure; etc.). That kind of assertiveness is necessary to get the point across because most people don't think that way, and with them you have to "philosophize with a hammer!"

(Credit goes to someone in the last Wednesday Zoom for bringing up that Nietzsche hammer allusion...)

Quote from Cassius

But since one of our goals here is to be as clear as possible for ourselves and for others who are reading, we need to be clear: What really is the "general rule" that we are discussing?

Hmmm... The general rule I see in play here is "Overindulgence leads to pain."

Quote from Cassius

general rule is that pleasure is desirable because it is pleasure. That's a flat assertion with no exceptions whatsoever.

Yeah, here we are with different interpretations of "rule." "Pleasure is desirable because it is pleasure" is just a tautology. Nothing is defined there, and it doesn't advance the argument. "Pleasure is the supreme good" at least hammers home a philosophical stance, and I see that as stating an observed fact, not as a general rule.

Quote from Cassius

we're probably in complete agreement about the probabilities of what is likely to bring more pain than pleasure.

Agreed.

Quote from Cassius

Where Cicero and the majority of the rest of the world try to attack Epicurus is in conflating all these issues together and therefore asserting that "pleasure" is not the best term for the ultimate good. If we agree to that, then we invite in all sorts of logical problems that ultimately make it untenable to maintain that "pleasure" is the ultimate good or ultimate goal.

Agreed. Part of Epicurus' genius was hammering down that there were two, and only two, feelings: pleasure and pain. What wasn't one was the other. Boom. Therefore, to decrease the sorrow, pain, grief, anxiety, and, yes, indigestion in one's life is the path to follow along with, obviously, choosing activities that provide pleasure. And those things that lead to pleasure are indispensable tools that allow us to make progress on that path.

Quote from Don

Hmmm... The general rule I see in play here is "Overindulgence leads to pain

While it is true that overindulgence does generally provide pain, I would see that as an uncontroversial point and therefore unlikely to be the reason for its inclusion , and especially for its inclusion in the manner it is written.

This exchange may seem pedantic but I think there is a lot more going on here than just the two of us talking shop so I think it's very useful!

My motivations are directed at what I perceived is a problem that I link to Martha Nussbaum's "Therapy of Desire." I think it helps to consider whether Epicurus was primarily a clinician or a revolutionary philosopher. In the end he is both, but the modern worlds excess emphasis on the clinical aspect has in my view led to under-appreciation of the revolutionary implications of the philosophy.

"Everyone" accepts that overindulgence leads to pain, but "pleasure is the highest good" and "even the pleasures that some deplore are acceptable if they bring happiness to the person we think deplorqble" are words that wars get fought over.

Quote from Cassius

This exchange may seem pedantic but I think there is a lot more going on here than just the two of us talking shop so I think it's very useful!

Oh, I can be guilty of being pedantic. Case in point: I'll disagree with people who don't see the need for the Oxford comma! But I digress...

Quote from Cassius

I would see that as an uncontroversial point and therefore unlikely to be the reason for its inclusion , and especially for its inclusion in the manner it is written.

See, here's a crux of our polite disagreement. And this goes waay back and I don't think either of us have budged I see PD10 as Epicurus planting a flag against the Cyrenaics specifically and other "pleasure seekers" of his day in general. I don't think it's an uncontroversial point. And the point I see him making in PD10/11/12 with all those If... Then's... is that if all these cases were, in fact, the case; we'd have no reason to study nature or learn the limits of pains and desires or even study philosophy. However, those if's, in fact, don't give us what we need to live a pleasurable life and so we then DO need to study nature and learn the limits of pain and desires.

I've always and continue to think you and others have tried to make this/these PDs do more philosophical heavy lifting than they need to.

Quote from Don

Case in point: I'll disagree with people who don't see the need for the Oxford comma!

Uh oh!

Quote from Pacatus

Quote from Don

Case in point: I'll disagree with people who don't see the need for the Oxford comma!

Uh oh!

LOL! Bring it on!

I won't derail this thread any more, but one example: https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/09/us/…trnd/index.html

It should cheer all our regulars to know that Don and I are in complete agreement on the Oxford Comma!