Can Determinism Be Reconciled With Epicureanism? (Admin Edit - No, But Let's Talk About Why Not)

Quote from Pacatus

I guess I would not call that “choice” but the illusion of choice.

Yes the linguistic leapfrogs being used by the professional determinists is a very big red flag to me.

Quote from Onenski

But, again, this is a metaphysical question.

Following TauPhi , I would suggest that any "answers" to that question would, perforce, remain thoroughly speculative, even if intellectually interesting. Empiricism, always subject to evidentiary change (even Kuhnian paradigm shifts), cannot address such metaphysical questions.

I will go to dinner tonight (our weekly dinner out) with the (possibly erroneous) assumption that I will make a choice of what to eat – constrained, surely, by the menu, my wallet, my personal tastes and preferences of the moment, etc. – but, nevertheless what seems like a choice, considering all such factors. Whether those factors are rooted in determinism or indeterminism. If that is an illusion, it is a deeply embedded one (and very pervasive across centuries and different cultures of humanity – some survival function?). I will still act as if I am actually doing some intentional hedonic choice and avoidance decision-making.

Nor does it matter if I am a compatibilist in the sense described by Dennett. That makes more sense to me in terms of my day-to-day engagement with circumstantial reality – but if it’s incorrect, it’s incorrect.

I want to add that I do not think of “justice” in any metaphysical sense. If someone wants to torture children (to take a deliberately harsh example), I will act to prevent that – without considering their motivations, or even the practical Epicurean social compact to “neither harm nor be harmed” (it does not matter that the child, or her parents, may not be signatory to that compact). In that sense, whilst I affirm the Epicurean idea of social justice, I am – at bottom – more of a moral non-cognitivist (let’s say that Epicurean philosophy here might provide some cognitive “fencing” around that).

Since I obviously have been interested in this discussion, thank you Onenski for bringing it to us.

Quote from Onenski

Those who defend that every event has prior causes are determinists.

1. I'd like to suggest a question: why the burden of proof is on the side of skeptics of free will and not the other way.

4. DavidN, your reconstructions are straw-man fallacies. The Victimhood argument particularly, besides being more ironic than descriptive, goes into revictimization. Addictions, for example, are public health problems, not a mere matter of choice.
The chapter dedicated to Quantum Mechanics in Determined I think is very reasonable. Do you think was simplistic?
5. I highly recommend to read Sapolsky's Behave, even more than Determined in order to understand his point. Sapolsky offers a reconstruction of the causes of behaviour. The evidence he finds obvioulsy is not conclusive, but he adds to the debate the picture some people need to see how strongly, using Pacatus terms, our decisions are constrained.

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The fact that Causes exist does not necessitate determinism, this is a False Dichotomy fallacy. A cause could lead to multiple outcomes and in reverse any given event can have multiple causes, as Epicurus already theorizes. In reality A does not necessitate B. This is one of the reasons root cause analysis is difficult and most people are not successful at it.

The reason determinism requires proof rather than the other way around, atleast on this thread, is because the question at hand is not whether or not the universe is deterministic but is epicureanism deterministic or even compatible with determinism. Which is Not part of my argument you addressed. And because I loath the practice of applying theoretical science outside of it's intended field. When Quantum gravity becomes hard science Sapolsky can republish his book and not be a jerk in my eyes.

As for Sapolsky's science, his version of quantum mechanics requires that we eliminate singularities, alter the currently accepted notion of the big bang and accept new theories in there place, of quantum gravity, and of multiple quantum universes that removes variables rather than adding variables. In all of this I find his math to be at the very least overly convenient if not simplistic. Like Planck's Blackbody, instead of dealing with the variables he simply finds ways to eliminate them. Which is what I had suspected in my previous comment before even diving into his work.

Back to the matter at hand, Epicurus. I don't believe hard determinism can be reconciled with Epicureanism, but to be fair lets say it can. You would need to tackle the swerve, because as long as the swerve exists a cause or set of causes can lead to a number of effects or none at all, thus determinism cannot exist. Without the swerve you effectively render epicurean physics Democritean. You would then have to go through all the material and reconcile every instance were choice is required, because concept of choice would require a non-deterministic universe. In deterministic terms choice simply becomes effect. Effectively rendering the philosophy pointless, IMHO.

Quote from Onenski

The idea of Free Will Skepticism it's not that people don't make choices. The idea is that those choices are not independent of prior causes (in fact, that they are constrained totally, even if we don't see it). People will keep making choices, the difference will be how independent they think they are.

Two fallacies here, one Persuasive definition, choice is improperly used or defined here. If a choice is completely constrained, as your trying to prove, it's not a choice it becomes effect following cause. Secondly affirming the consequent fallacy, again just because B does not mean A. Free will is choice, prior cause does not negate choice but informs choice, it is the very reason for choice. In fact without prior cause what choice would we have, there would be nothing to choose. If your hung up on the word free lets examine freedom. Some people think freedom can only exist in a vacuum, but in reality freedom cannot exist in a vacuum, it is a concept devoid of meaning in a vacuum. Freedom can only have meaning in the face of tyranny, choice can only have meaning when cause and effect exist. Prior causes create our environment, the situation, the consequences, that inform, but do not necessitate our actions. The fact that my choice could be for any hundreds of reasons, is essential to free will not the antecedent of it.

Your argument also makes choice into machina by turning it into simple cause and effect. For this to be true machina and sentience must be closer than they actually are in reality. Which I find to be even more of an oversimplification on the part of determinists in behavior than in physics. Having a background in AI I can assure you this is not the case. It makes my blood boil every time someone comepares the glorified word processors that are the current generation of large language transformer modules to true AI. They aren't even good language models yet. Yet even some scientists make the mistake of granting them the mantle of sentience. This simply isn't the case even though they have the capacity to learn they don't have the capacity to deviate from they're programming, only the ability to add to there library. This is the crux of the argument. Machina have to be right, even if its only within there limited understanding of what that is. It cannot deviate from that, any deviation is in error. I on the other hand, have on occasion, chosen to be wrong, just to be a dick rather than in error. I am sentient, I have that choice, I get to sit in jail for a nite just to feel free. You could say that I have some internal drive towards that outcome created by some prior cause, but this does not necessitate the outcome. In fact prior cause gives me a greater range of outcomes not less, thus where you see constraint I see tools of expression, of freedom. In that instance I know and understand what I'm doing, I have the choice to do the right thing and not be a dick, to simply walk away, an easier choice to be honest. I know and understand that in the moment, but because I have the freedom to choose in that instance I decide to take the road less traveled. A decision, a choice.

Quote from Onenski

Quote from Cassius

how does believing that everything you do is predetermined enhance a person's happiness?

It's a belief about how the world is. It is what it is. Besides, Sapolsky believes, for example, that many people can feel liberated from regrets and guilts (I guess specially the belief that their circumstance it's their fault).

I find this view to simply be escapism, a desire to no longer be responsible for ones own life, which to me strips life of all it's meaning.

Quote from Onenski

Quote from Cassius

how does believing that everything you do is predetermined enhance a person's happiness?

I think it can contribute to certain amount of individual serenity, and if more people agree with it, it can lead to a society more just. Imagine how happily can people live if the practical political, social and economic problems are solved in their roots instead of just blaming and punishing.

Being that I am professionally trained in root cause analysis I can tell you that the first rule is that if you get the root cause wrong all attempts to fix the problem will fail at best and more likely spider out into new problems confusing the original issue.

So onto root cause, in your deterministic world were is root cause. If there is never any choice only a endless stream of cause and effect to follow back infinitum, can there even be root cause? There can be no guilt because there can be no choice, no error, only necessity. There is infact nothing in this world to fix. Criminals will be criminals without any choice because of prior cause. Authorities will continue to punish criminals because the criminal behavior is a prior cause. etc Ad infinitum.

However when we add in choice, we have a conceptual break in the chain of cause and effect. To which we can contribute root cause and into which we can insert change.

Quote from DavidN

Secondly affirming the consequent fallacy, again just because B does not mean A.

An oldy but goody:

1. If all swans are white, only white swans are observed;
2. Only white swans are observed;
3. Therefore, all swans are white.

—Until black swans were discovered in Australia.

Hi, Pacatus, thanks for comment.

Quote from Pacatus

Following TauPhi , I would suggest that any "answers" to that question would, perforce, remain thoroughly speculative, even if intellectually interesting.

That's correct, it's a speculative issue. However, behind our practical life there are a bunch of metaphysical assumptions: there are people who, for example, believe in God and their behaviours and beliefs take certain direction. The same happen with belief in free will.

I hope it's evident that I don't pretend to have the last word, and of course I don't intend to change the viewpoints of anybody. I just think that I could add something to this thread with my understanding of this debate in order to make it richer.

Quote from DavidN

I don't believe hard determinism can be reconciled with Epicureanism, but to be fair lets say it can. You would need to tackle the swerve, because as long as the swerve exists a cause or set of causes can lead to a number of effects or none at all, thus determinism cannot exist. Without the swerve you effectively render epicurean physics Democritean.

The Epicurean swerve is an event in an otherwise causal universe (and one in which, as you pointed out, there can be multiple causes for any identifiable effect, and multiple effects from any identifiable cause). Therefore, it seems to me, it does not entail a universe of total indeterminism either.

Quote from Onenski

I hope it's evident that I don't pretend to have the last word, and of course I don't intend to change the viewpoints of anybody. I just think that I could add something to this thread with my understanding of this debate in order to make it richer.

Totally!

Quote from Onenski

The same happen with belief in free will.

The word “belief” has become increasingly suspect for me over the years. If someone means what appears to me to be the case, or makes sense, based on my experience and observation and study, then fine (emphasis on “appears”). But that is all I will ever mean by it.

I just found this, which brings up more ideas (have not fully read it yet, plus I am behind on reading the newest posts above).

Author Kevin J. Mitchell makes a neuroscientific case against determinism

And a review of his book "Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will"

Did evolution give us free will?

Author Kevin J. Mitchell makes a neuroscientific case against determinism.

reason.com

And this:

Robert Sapolsky vs Kevin Mitchell: The Biology of Free Will | Philosophical Trials #15

Hi, DavidN. Thanks for taking the time to comment.

Quote from DavidN

The fact that Causes exist does not necessitate determinism, this is a False Dichotomy fallacy. A cause could lead to multiple outcomes and in reverse any given event can have multiple causes, as Epicurus already theorizes. In reality A does not necessitate B.

I gave the characterisation of determinist. They believe that the common assumption that "every event in the universe is caused by prior events" is true and the belief in free will is false. Determinism is false if there is at least one event that wasn't caused by any prior event: an uncaused cause. The majority of philosophers prefer to admit that although determinism can be true, free will it's compatible with it.
Metaphysical determinism is independent of epistemological determinism (the idea that we can predict deterministically any o some events). Epistemological determinism is, effectively falsified thanks to chaos theory. Sapolsky agrees with it.

Quote from DavidN

The reason determinism requires proof rather than the other way around, atleast on this thread, is because the question at hand is not whether or not the universe is deterministic but is epicureanism deterministic or even compatible with determinism.

Conceded.

Quote

As for Sapolsky's science, his version of quantum mechanics requires that we eliminate singularities, alter the currently accepted notion of the big bang and accept new theories in there place, of quantum gravity, and of multiple quantum universes that removes variables rather than adding variables. In all of this I find his math to be at the very least overly convenient if not simplistic. Like Planck's Blackbody, instead of dealing with the variables he simply finds ways to eliminate them. Which is what I had suspected in my previous comment before even diving into his work.

Did you read the chapter of the book or you're speculating about he implications of his determinism? He doesn't talk about any of those things.

Quote from DavidN

Back to the matter at hand, Epicurus. I don't believe hard determinism can be reconciled with Epicureanism, but to be fair lets say it can. You would need to tackle the swerve, because as long as the swerve exists a cause or set of causes can lead to a number of effects or none at all, thus determinism cannot exist. Without the swerve you effectively render epicurean physics Democritean. You would then have to go through all the material and reconcile every instance were choice is required, because concept of choice would require a non-deterministic universe. In deterministic terms choice simply becomes effect. Effectively rendering the philosophy pointless, IMHO.

In strict sense, you're right. I used a flexible notion of reconciliation. My opinion is that the swerve has only one function in epicurean theory: sustaining free will. But it's not clear if it can be defended independently of the reason of defend that we feel we are free. In the case of the atoms, we have the inferences by analogy. How he arrives to the swerve and which phenomena help to explain besides our feeling?

I think the scientific spirit, the hedonism and the materialism can be reconciled with Free Will Skepticism.

Quote from DavidN

Two fallacies here, one Persuasive definition, choice is improperly used or defined here. If a choice is completely constrained, as your trying to prove, it's not a choice it becomes effect following cause.

The notion of agency, as I said up, is consistent with determinism. An agent can choose intentionally in a deterministic scenario without contradiction. If choice requires necessarily free will (leeway freedom), then you're right and, probably, I'm not using the language competently.

I'd agree with the fact that choices are events following causes, why not? Human beings are natural beings like other animals and other living beings.
I take the opportuniy to ask you something. In your point of view, who has free will and where is its origin? Do non-human animals, or other beings, have free will? Can they be morally responsible?
I didn't understand the last paragraph, I'm sorry.

Quote from DavidN

Being that I am professionally trained in root cause analysis I can tell you that the first rule is that if you get the root cause wrong all attempts to fix the problem will fail at best and more likely spider out into new problems confusing the original issue.

You're right. We can't know all the prior causes nor the future event caused by them. But we can do the best we can. Think about addictions. We don't have complete information of its causes, but there are information that psychology, neurochemistry, social work, and so on, that can be used to design a better strategy and public policies to help people in addiction, and to reduce new cases. That sounds like a better strategy than trying to deter people with higher sentences or blaming people for their choices ("choice" taking in the source freedom/agency sense).
One can do that without discarding free will (I hope more governments do it), but it makes so more sense from Free Will Skepticism.

Again, David, thanks for taking the time to comment.

I think it's time for an Administrative comment targeted mainly at those who might lurk and be reading this thread without knowing anything about the major participants.

Those who know Onenski know that he is a highly valued participant of long standing who has piled up tremendous amounts of credibility points for his general support and interest in Epicurean philosophy over many months, even years. He is a regular in our meetings and he is always constructive and helpful.

Onenski's posts in favor of determinism certainly contradict a key aspect of Epicurean philosophy, and a long series of pro-determinist arguments would violate our forum policies, as we are not here to invite in people who are dedicated to anti-Epicurean positions. We don't have to all agree on every issue, but we do need to respect that this is a pro-Epicurean forum, and those who conclude that their beliefs require them to be a constant thorn in the side of those who support Epicurus will eventually be shown the door. More to the point, there are many "outsiders" who - if they came into the forum and pursued determinist arguments strongly - would have their posting privileges restricted or removed.

We just don't have the time to patronize the many Stoics and other anti-Epicureans who are determinists and would be happy to monopolize our time. We also don't need to expose our sincere lurkers and newer participants to the demoralizing aspects of determinism any more than is necessary.

However this is a topic that will never go away, and people who study Epicurus will be regularly confronted by it, just as was Epicurus and the ancient Epicureans. It's important for people to have at least a basic understanding of the arguments and to have a basic understanding of where Epicurus stood on the issue, and that's why this thread is continuing and why the posters here aren't violating the letter or the spirit of our forum rules.

We should thank Onenski and others for their respectful postings on this topic, as the thread is becoming an excellent resource for the future.

Since Epicurus strongly opposed determinism, and held that praise and blame can be attached to actions regardless of what the determinists argue, we can simply remind anyone who might be tempted by the leeway we offer to established members that we will happily wield the ban hammer when necessary for the protection of the purposes of the forum.

No one at this point is anywhere near needing this warning, but given that the related issues of determinism and skepticism have proven in the past to be two of the best indicators of the division between those who stay with Epicurean philosophy and those who are just "passing through" on their way somewhere else, this can serve as a marker to assist in future moderating decisions.

Kalosyni thanks for your post #51! I've had both of those guy's books on my list, but this may save me from reading them Not my preferred method of delving into a subject, but in this case, for me, it seems to be just right.

So much to read, so little time....

Carry on.

Quote from Onenski

I take the opportuniy to ask you something. In your point of view, who has free will and where is its origin? Do non-human animals, or other beings, have free will? Can they be morally responsible?
I didn't understand the last paragraph, I'm sorry.

Thanks for asking this question, I've actually spent some time debating and contemplating this topic, I even went so far as to write to one of my favorite authors David Brin who wrote a series based around this question and who is an advocate of animal rights. In my opinion it is a spectrum of intelligence leading to sentience, with the cutoff being defined quite correctly by Epicurus as the covenant to not harm one another. And as such I believe he correctly reached the conclusion that those creatures and people who cannot or will not abide by this covenant are outside of justice and morality. As Pacatus stated earlier about harming a child, such an act would place you outside the realm of justice and morality as you are unable to abide by the covenant and I don't believe Pacatus would be in violation of epicurean justice or morality in acting to stop such an event.

As to who has free will, as I said earlier free will would be measured by an entities capacity to recognize and conceptually break from cause and effect, and it's capacity to act contrary to it's own nature. As to its origin I could only speculate. I know when I was a younger philosopher I was quite enamored with the Holonomic Brain Theory, If you accept conventional theories of the indeterminates in wave theory then the Holonomic brain allows for indeterminates in its function, the level of complexity of which could explain free will. But again I'll fully admit to this being entirely speculative.

Quote from Cassius

I think it's time for an Administrative comment targeted mainly at those who might lurk and be reading this thread without knowing anything about the major participants.

Those who know Onenski know that he is a highly valued participant of long standing who has piled up tremendous amounts of credibility points for his general support and interest in Epicurean philosophy over many months, even years. He is a regular in our meetings and he is always constructive and helpful.

Onenski's posts in favor of determinism certainly contradict a key aspect of Epicurean philosophy, and a long series of pro-determinist arguments would violate our forum policies, as we are not here to invite in people who are dedicated to anti-Epicurean positions. We don't have to all agree on every issue, but we do need to respect that this is a pro-Epicurean forum, and those who conclude that their beliefs require them to be a constant thorn in the side of those who support Epicurus will eventually be shown the door. More to the point, there are many "outsiders" who - if they came into the forum and pursued determinist arguments strongly - would have their posting privileges restricted or removed.

We just don't have the time to patronize the many Stoics and other anti-Epicureans who are determinists and would be happy to monopolize our time. We also don't need to expose our sincere lurkers and newer participants to the demoralizing aspects of determinism any more than is necessary.

However this is a topic that will never go away, and people who study Epicurus will be regularly confronted by it, just as was Epicurus and the ancient Epicureans. It's important for people to have at least a basic understanding of the arguments and to have a basic understanding of where Epicurus stood on the issue, and that's why this thread is continuing and why the posters here aren't violating the letter or the spirit of our forum rules.

We should thank Onenski and others for their respectful postings on this topic, as the thread is becoming an excellent resource for the future.

Since Epicurus strongly opposed determinism, and held that praise and blame can be attached to actions regardless of what the determinists argue, we can simply remind anyone who might be tempted by the leeway we offer to established members that we will happily wield the ban hammer when necessary for the protection of the purposes of the forum.

No one at this point is anywhere near needing this warning, but given that the related issues of determinism and skepticism have proven in the past to be two of the best indicators of the division between those who stay with Epicurean philosophy and those who are just "passing through" on their way somewhere else, this can serve as a marker to assist in future moderating decisions.

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I agree with Cassius I definitely appreciate Onenski and his questions and participation, even if I don't share his opinion, without it I wouldn't be able to delve so deeply into my own.

I noticed waay back on post #34, Cassius called me out for re-initiating this thread and then stepping back, grabbing popcorn, and watching it all unfold. In deference to him, I feel I should weigh in BUT I have greatly enjoyed the erudite and in-depth discussion taking place!! You all have *obviously* given this topic a great deal of thought. And I *fully* concur and applaud Cassius's "administrative note" to keep everything in context. My nudge just.. yesterday?...way back on post @20 has generated...I'd even say "caused" ... some wonderful and thought-provoking posts and far exceeded what I had anticipated. Thank you all!

And, thank you to Kalosyni for posting the info about Kevin J. Mitchell. I was completely unaware of him, but I'll have to put his book Free Agents on my list now!

I'm afraid my contribution is going to be woefully inadequate to this conversation, but I'll lay my cards on the table...first general, then specifically Epicurean...

There is nothing that doesn't have a cause. There is no uncaused caused or an effect that comes into being sui generis with no antecedent cause. That just seems simple physical reality to me. However, everything has numerous - if not infinite - causes. All those lines of causation collide and contribute to any physical, material phenomenon... from the toppling of a particular tree in a particular forest to the decisions I make. I like the words used earlier (by Pacatus ?) that the "choices" (and I'll use "scare quotes" for now) we make are constrained choices. Theoretically, I have an infinite or at least innumerable options to choose from at any given moment. As I write this, I could decide:

• just to randomly punch the keys and produce gibberish
• or to stop typing and to not hit send
• or to throw my laptop across the room
• or to attempt to chew the corner off my screen or...

but I feel I am a rational being with something to relate to my Epicurean friends on the forum, and so I continue to type and relay my thoughts. My choices are, in practice, not infinite or innumerable but constrained to a finite selection of realistic choices I could be predicted to take. Does that make them "determined"? Can they be predicted? Maybe, within a statistical margin of error...but does that mean they're determined? I guess it depends on your definition of "determined."

I feel there was discussion on the difference between deterministic and fatalistic. I think that remains significant. Even Sapolsky allows for change...although I admit I'm not sure I followed his argument. Change seems to go against his other parts of his argument. If by determined, we mean causes with effects, that's true to some extent. If by fated, we mean the outcome could have been no other than it was... that one I have problems with... but I can't necessarily articulate (at this point) why.

Take the view from the other end of my choices or the effects... looking back over my own life and those of my relatives and ancestors, I can see the effects of individual choices on the future lives of myself and those others. But those past decisions, even now, don't feel determined. Some feel random. But others feel like there was a "decision" that was weighed and made. Again, causes leading to effects becoming causes of future events leading to... you get the idea.

So... that all didn't get us anywhere... "Thanks, Don."

But I also promised some Epicurean thoughts...

We've seen Epicurus's message to Menoikeus: "Remember that what will be is not completely within our control nor completely outside our control, so that we will not completely expect it to happen nor be completely disappointed if it does not happen." (127, Saint-Andre) This, to me, recognizes the element of indeterminacy of our lives. Somethings are going to happen to us that we have no control over; and somethings will not happen for us regardless of whether want it or not.

We also read in verses 134-135 about Fate not being a god because Fate does things haphazardly and randomly. Epicurus also clearly states that we can assign praise and blame to people's actions, directly opposite of the direction Sapolsky wants to go. BUT Sapolsky and Epicurus both agree that bad actors - people who do things against the social contract - need to be removed from society for the good of the other members of society. Sapolsky just thinks there shouldn't be blame assigned to the actions.

The character of Torquatus in On Ends also has a pertinent quote (emphasis added): "In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures (i.e., chooses) pains to avoid worse pains." The Epicurean position is clearly that we are not constrained in our ability to make choices... but it seems to me that those choices are predicated on the character of the individual, the taking into account the future effects of those choices which will, in turn, be the *causes* of those future pleasures or pains. The choices we make are *still* constrained by taking into account what we desire weighed against the future states those choices will engender.

I've prattled on long enough for now... Satisfied, Cassius

Quote from Don

I've prattled on long enough for now... Satisfied, Cassius

Yes, very satisfied, thank you!