Posts by Onenski

Quote from Cassius

Cicero and others seem to infer that all true Epicureans will choose to spend their lives laying on the beach without a thought to (for example) a life as an artist or a scientist or a policeman or fireman.

What's his argument?

Quote from Cassius

how do you explain the Epicurean analysis of choosing some pleasures over others in Epicurean terms without reference to nobility or other outside standards?

Which possible epicurean standards (or procedure) do you have in mind?

Are you looking for a foundation or justification of the standard(s) in question?

Quote from Cassius

But would Epicureans agree that there are no "preferable" people, activities, or ways to live, that we we ourselves can decide to be preferable?

I'll try to answer. Have you considered that maybe the "what" is less important than the "how"? I mean, possibly there's not a specific and universal activity or object to pursue that brings pleasure in general, but there's a way to do it or to get it: the virtuous one.
So far as we know, the virtous life is the best way to live a pleasurable life: prudently, safely, friendly, painlessly, etc. Virtue is sensible to context: it tells that you'll get a lot of pleasure with food if you're hungry, thay you'll get pleasure with water if you're thirsty, that you'll enjoy a videogame if you're bored, or that you'll enjoy reading a book if you're in the mood to do it.
Not everybody enjoys the same things evidently, but it's also true that not everyone is in the same circumstances or have the same background.

Maybe you will think that my answer is circular, because virtue is the instrument to maximize plesaure. So when I recommend a virtuous way to live I'm just saying that a pleasurable life is that with pleasure. My point is that Epicurus recommended a life with prudence, and I think now I understand why it's the source of pleasure: prudence indicates how you can maximize the pleasure (reduce pain) with any activity (even if you're in bed with kidney stones).

So my answer is: possibly that thing that can bring pleasure to everyone, no matter their context, age, education, etc., is virtue (specially prudence). A shepherd without prudence will waste his resources and time. The good news is that we don't need to be Epicurus, or Socrates, in order to have prudence.

I really hope this answer have some sense, because I'm not sure if I understood completely the question in dispute.

The hypothetical scenario reminded me a quote by John Stuart Mill that probably you know: "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."

For Mill there are special pleasures, like reading philosophy, listening to music, contemplate art, etc., that are superior to other pleasures (accesible only for animals). I understand his idea, but I reject it for similar reasons why I reject stoicism: I don't think there are intrinsically nobler people, nobler activities or nobler ways to live (or intrinsically pleasurable).

I do think there are standards to evaluate pleasures and pains among people but they're not necessary, but contingent. (After all, we are human beings, of course we share plasures and we share the absence of pain as a goal to achieve.) Cassius, I think you won't find an activity that brings pleasure in all contexts: human nature it's not about immovable truths but about change.

Finally, I know the Letter to Ideomeneus is beautiful and inspiring, but I really doubt Epicurus was really having pleasure in the previous moments of his death. So, if I had to give an answer, I'd prefer to live like the shepherd, but better I prefer to be me, in this place and this time.

See you tomorrow

I'll be there!

Quote from Cassius

HsiehKW I haven't had as chance to read up either but do you have a web link you recommend for the basics?

I found this:

A Brief Guide to Embodied Cognition: Why You Are Not Your Brain

blogs.scientificamerican.com

And a more detailer source is this:

Embodied Cognition (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Quote from Don

This exercise also brings to light a problem with just accepting "Oh, Vatican Saying X is just identical to Principal Doctrine Y. Nothing to see here." Yes, they may be *almost* identical, but if they're not entirely, how does that affect our reading of each? Vat.gr.1950 is dated to 1300-1350 CE, so not as early as some of the earliest manuscripts for Diogenes Laertius which go back to the 12th c, I believe. How do the VS/PD correlations look in reference to the earliest Laertius manuscripts? Vat.gr.1950 is getting its versions from somewhere!

From Enrique Alvarez' dissertation I found this comment:
"VS13 presents σοφίας in the Codex Vaticanus version, probably due, as Bollack (1974: 430) conjectures, to a confusion with σοφία that the copyist had just written in the previous line; the substitution by φιλίας, following the text of Diogenes Laertius (Dorandi 2013: 820), has been unanimously accepted. This modification having been made, the sentence agrees with PD27."
Hope this helps!

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*Admin. Edit by Kalosyni

Recently in both the podcast and in our Wednesday night meeting, some of Aristotle's views on virtue have come up, and it seems like it would be good to have a thread on it. I'm copying a post by Onenski over here (and if there are any others elsewhere to add in here, we can add them). The original post is here.

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(Copied Post)

Quote from Cassius

As a note while editing this week's podcast, in the first ten minutes Don gives and excellent quote from Aristotle about how one becomes just by doing such things. My attention was distracted until the middle and by the time I realized what a good quote it was I was no longer sure where it came from, and I didn't follow up on it like I should have - it's an excellent example of how circular the standard non-Epicurean view of virtue really is.

I have some comments (about aristotelian virtue) that I hope contribute something to discussion.
- Aristotle famously established a connection between habits (ἔθος) and character (ἦθος) [a, seemingly, fake ethimological connection, but philosophically fruitful]. That's why it seems circular: you can only become just (as a character trait) by acting justly continuosly (so that you get the habit to be just). In this way, it's established the way we have to take in order to be virtuous.
- When you ask what (kind of thing) a virtue is, in Aristotle's ethics it's a psychological trait. Aristotle thinks that there are three kind of psychological things: dispositions (ἕξις), passions (πάθη) and capacities (δύναμις), according to NE II.5, 1105b20-30. From them, virtue it's neither a passion nor a capacity, it's an excellent disposition about actions and feelings. (What is an excellent disposition? That which it's in the middle term between two extremes, as Don recalled).
- So, the point it's not only what actions you do, but how you do them. Two people can battle, but for one to be courageous or coward it's important which feelings or attitudes one has. As Don observed it, it matters: when we act, where, in what mood, with which people and so on. Excellence it's not easy, it's rare, but valious.

Now, did Epicurus have a conception similar to Aristotle's? I'd like to suggest (and see what happens) that for him virtue is, at least, a disposition too (about actions and about how we feel). So, someone temperate it's someone who usually, for example, doesn't eat or drink more than what she needs, and who feels reasonably good by restraining her desires.
While in Aristotle the virtuous reach excellence just because virtue it's noble, in epicureanism the person follows virtue according to a calculus of pleasures and pains ("I won't eat that cake because I have heart problems", "I won't smoke because I've felt lung pain", or whatever). Virtue is another way to talk about the most pleasant way to live.

Hope all this has some sense and it helps at least a little.
See you, guys!

Quote from Cassius

As a note while editing this week's podcast, in the first ten minutes Don gives and excellent quote from Aristotle about how one becomes just by doing such things. My attention was distracted until the middle and by the time I realized what a good quote it was I was no longer sure where it came from, and I didn't follow up on it like I should have - it's an excellent example of how circular the standard non-Epicurean view of virtue really is.

I have some comments (about aristotelian virtue) that I hope contribute something to discussion.
- Aristotle famously established a connection between habits (ἔθος) and character (ἦθος) [a, seemingly, fake ethimological connection, but philosophically fruitful]. That's why it seems circular: you can only become just (as a character trait) by acting justly continuosly (so that you get the habit to be just). In this way, it's established the way we have to take in order to be virtuous.
- When you ask what (kind of thing) a virtue is, in Aristotle's ethics it's a psychological trait. Aristotle thinks that there are three kind of psychological things: dispositions (ἕξις), passions (πάθη) and capacities (δύναμις), according to NE II.5, 1105b20-30. From them, virtue it's neither a passion nor a capacity, it's an excellent disposition about actions and feelings. (What is an excellent disposition? That which it's in the middle term between two extremes, as Don recalled).
- So, the point it's not only what actions you do, but how you do them. Two people can battle, but for one to be courageous or coward it's important which feelings or attitudes one has. As Don observed it, it matters: when we act, where, in what mood, with which people and so on. Excellence it's not easy, it's rare, but valious.

Now, did Epicurus have a conception similar to Aristotle's? I'd like to suggest (and see what happens) that for him virtue is, at least, a disposition too (about actions and about how we feel). So, someone temperate it's someone who usually, for example, doesn't eat or drink more than what she needs, and who feels reasonably good by restraining her desires.
While in Aristotle the virtuous reach excellence just because virtue it's noble, in epicureanism the person follows virtue according to a calculus of pleasures and pains ("I won't eat that cake because I have heart problems", "I won't smoke because I've felt lung pain", or whatever). Virtue is another way to talk about the most pleasant way to live.

Hope all this has some sense and it helps at least a little.
See you, guys!

It looks like the Vatican Sayings show simplified versions (or with a more common language in some cases) of some Principal Doctrines.
I share a comment that can be interesting from Enrique Álvarez' dissertation:
"In both cases [PD 5 and VS 5], we can see how the genre of the florilegium is effective in the transmission of doctrine at the price of rounding off and simplifying the contents. Thus, PD 5 has become an effective aphorism that is a reminder of the reciprocal implication of pleasure and virtue.

Indeed, we understand that "this" (τοῦτο) in the last sentence refers to the doctrine taught by both members of the biconditional: if there is no pleasure there is no virtue and if there is no virtue there is no pleasure. As for SV5, we interpret that the compiler's purpose has been to express the Epicurean doctrine in the form of a simple argument having the form of the modus ponens, in this case, with negative premises: if one does not live with virtue, one does not live with pleasure; one does not live with virtue, therefore, one does not live with pleasure. τοῦτο, at the end of SV5 takes up the protasis of the first premise of the modus ponens, that is, sentence P of the form of reasoning: P then Q, and P; therefore Q." (El Gnomologium Vaticanum y la filosofía de Epicuro, 2016, p. 212)

You're right, Don, there's not a Hartel manucript, I didn't read correctly.
Besides, the author, Alberto Enrique Álvarez from the Autonomous University of Madrid gives some reasons for the νοητὸν interpretation. One of them it's that at the end of the Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus points out that philosophy is an immortal good. I add part of the Enrique's commentary:

"Undoubtedly, the usual structure of parallelisms and oppositions that constitutes many of the sentences, and even the phonetic similarity νοητόν / θνητόν, impel to the correction, which makes it possible to obtain in the text the pairs philosophy-mortal / friendship-immortal. However, these are not sufficient reasons to modify a manuscript whose writing and sense are clear.

[...]

So there is no reason to attribute to philosophy the qualifier of mortal. Hartel's correction is not necessary. It imposes on the text a spirit of symmetry that neither the sense of the sentence nor the thought of Epicurus demand.

[...]

As Bailey says, this is perhaps the greatest exaltation of friendship in Epicurus' work that remains to us; and, in the same sense, Cicero expresses himself, who assures us that Epicurus carried friendship to heaven with his praises (eam [i. e.,

amicitiam] Epicurus in caelum efferat laudibus). The fact of extolling friendship is understandable, because, as we have seen on several occasions, it guarantees security among men, which is one of the conditions of ataraxia, in such a way that it allows the wise, within human limits, to live as a god.

Now, what is not necessary is that the praise of friendship should entail the corresponding degradation of philosophy, especially when the role of wisdom in the happiness of the wise man is as relevant as that of friendship. That is why we maintain the qualifier "intellectual" that SV78 assigns to wisdom, refusing its modification by "mortal"." ("EL GNOMOLOGIUM VATICANUM Y LA FILOSOFÍA DE EPICURO", p. 460-463)

Hi everybody,
A traditional translation of VS 78 is: "The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one." [Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.]
I just read a different translation (I found it in a PhD dissertation in Spanish). Probably, Don can say something about it. The author affirms that the original form of the Saying is:

Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι νοητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.

But, he says, there was a correction in Hartel manuscript which changed νοητὸν (intelectual) for θνητὸν (immortal) (there's a footnote which refers to "Wotke y Usener 1888: 197"). Apparently, Long & Sedley (and Bailey) took that correction as well as most of editors.

In brief, the translation would be: "The noble soul ocuppies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these the one [wisdom] is an intelectual good, the other [friendship] immortal".

I think this can enrich our understanding of this VS, or at least add something to discussion.

I'll be there, see you!

Hi, everybody!

I was reading Plautus' play Trinummus ("The Three Coins"). Though it's not epicurean and there aren't specific epicurean characters, I found an interesting quote. I think it can be the description of an epicurean person:

Hic homost omnium hominum praecipuos,
voluptatibus gaudiisque antepotens:
ita commoda quae cupio eveniunt,
quod ago adsequitur, subest, subsequitur,
ita gaudiis gaudium suppeditat.

According to Perseus Translation: This individual is the very first of all men; excelling all in pleasures and delights.

So truly do the blessings which I desire befal me, that whatever I undertake is brought about, and constantly succeeds: so does one delight succeed other delights.

This is another translation: Here's the man that tops mankind entire in joys and delights beyond comparement!

Ah, the glorious way my desires work out! The way the things I want troop up to me, stand by, troop after me, joy treading on the heels of joy!

I'm interested in learning some latin, and also I think that it can be great to memorize this kind of quotes in order to have a reminder of pleasure, joy and happiness.

So, hope you like it.

So far, in my understanding of EP, pleasure and pain are complementary. Whenever I talk about my pleasure I'm referring also to a reduction of my pain and vice versa (as the vessel picture of Lucretius suggests). So, "pleasure is the goal" might be a short way to say "reduction of pain and increasing of pleasure are the same thing, and that's the goal of life, e.g. the best way a human being can live. Pleasure and Pain as absolute concepts or things don't exist, these words refer to the feelings produced by the activities we do".

I know this answer refers to a technical understanding of pleasure and pain in EP, and I understand that you, Godfrey, are trying to emphasize the role of pain in practical calculations (or, using Epicurus' words, the "choices and avoidances" in daily life).

I agree that for someone who doesn't know these nuances it's simplistic (and a little misleading) just to say "pleasure is the goal". For new people it's better to explain in longer phrases what's the best way of life for Epicurus (e. g. "the goal of life").
But, for a settled epicurean it can be useful as a reminder. At least, I sometimes repeat to myself "pleasure is the beginning and end of a happy life", specially when I'm stressed or sad.

I hope this helps. (Or, if I'm wrong, I'd like you to tell me.)

For me, Epicureanism is about: trying to be free from superstitions, looking for and enjoying satisfaction, recognizing everyday joys as well as identifying the sources of memorable pleasures. It's also to see life as a chance of living as pleasantly as we can, and death as the natural end of that chance.

ThinkingCat, I hope you find motivation to deep in epicurean philosophy, and develop (with time) your own perspective, so that you can share with us your own conception of Epicureanism in (more or lees) 30 words. 🤗

Hi, Kalosyni .

In the case of Epicureanism I think that the goal can be reached with the help of these resources:

* Reflection on epicurean arguments (reading and remembering epicurean letters, for example). Especially, the fact that pleasure is the beginning and end of a happy life.

* Memorization of principal doctrines in order to have the arguments present in daily life.

* As a way of moral reminders: portraits, rings or cups with the picture of Epicurus. The idea is to remember the practice of pleasure. (In the case of the statue, the divine Epicurus remembers the divine character of those who live pleasantly).

* Friendship and frank criticism for the correction in the practice of Epicureanism.

* Remember good moments in life (as Austin recommends): every day, or whenever we are bored or we are suffering.

For Aristotle:

* Musical education (this is parte of an educational plan in Politics VII). My interpretation is that music reproduces passions, and if we get used to moderate passions, then we are prone to moderation in passions and actions.

* Habituation (a frequent and directed practice of every virtue with the help of a teacher or any guidence). (NE, II.9)

* Appreciation of tragic plays (this can increase moral understanding of human circumstances and decision making). (Poetics)

* Friendship: a virtuous friend can help in developing virtue or correcting vices. (NE VIII and IX)

In both cases (and I dare to say that in all cases) the most important it's a personal engagement in the conception of the goal of life.

Here's a Spanish version of the text cited by Ciceron (and supposedly found in Herculanum), the APOKARTERŌN:

This is from Frischer's Book The Sculpted Word, Cassius.

Quote from Don

Epicurus is saying "most people" don't know how to be at rest or how to be active. An Epicurean should be able to find pleasure in both stillness/rest and activity/motion.

I totally agree with this interpretation, Don .
Today I shared with Cassius, Kalosyni and Joshua that it's interesting that rest and motion in VS 11 are related to the two typical (mis)interpretations of epicureanism: in one hand, we have those who say that epicureanism is like cirenaicism, a constant and endless serch for pleasures (you know, sex, drugs and rock & roll) and, in the other hand, the ascetics who say that Epicurus was just following the tranquility, or calmness.
Evidently, those who (mis)interpret epicureanism in any of those ways commit a similar mistake that people in the case of rest and motion. Life contains both rest and motion and epicureanism understands that and gives tools to find pleasures in them.