New Graphics: Are You On Team Epicurus? | Comparison Chart: Epicurus vs. Other Philosophies | Chart Of Key Epicurean Quotations | Accelerating Study Of Canonics Through Philodemus' "On Methods Of Inference" | Note to all users: If you have a problem posting in any forum, please message Cassius
. So I think I'm on firm ground in saying that further pains don't contribute to blessedness, i.e., don't increase pleasure beyond its maximum (the maximum which is noted in PD 3)
Max I presume the underline "pains" I underlined there is a typo?
Yes, that should read "pleasure."
Display MoreMax,
The twentieth-meal example is very useful.
Let me restate it to make sure I have it right: given a choice between 10 units of pleasure/0 pain and 30 units of pleasure/3 pain, "refer your actions to the goal of nature as tranquility" tells you to take the first option — forfeiting 17 units of net pleasure - solely to avoid the 3 units of pain.
Is that a fair restatement of your own answer?
So you're saying that on your view, no amount of net pleasure gained can outweigh even a modest amount of pain accepted to get it. That's the "even a small amount of pain is too much to pay for a large amount of pleasure" position I've been thinking your view amounts to. Is that correct?
As to what that would mean, Epicurus wrote on his last day, in real physical agony, that the joy of memory and friendship that day outweighed (or arrayed against in the military metaphor) the pain in his body. This is a direct claim that a great pleasure was worth to him a very great pain, in full net balance. Regardless about what we think of whether he changed his calculation as the pain got worse (which would be entirely reasonable to do), Epicurus did not avoid or forfeit those pleasures in advance just because great pain was involved.
Excellent point, this is really helpful.
No, I want to nuance my previous point: choose against pain if it'll interfere with enjoying katastematic pleasure. It's totally fine to accept some pain if it promotes katastematic pleasure. That's why we should run some risks for the sake of friendship (VS 28). And if there's a pain that won't interfere with enjoying katastematic pleasure (because anticipation/recollection allows us to manage it, and it doesn't prevent the fulfillment of our needs), it's fine to accept that pain. That's why junk food (which doesn't satisfy hunger) is a problem even if it's very pleasurable, but overeating a bit of something nutritious could be ok.
But in general, yes: don't take on risky kinetic pleasures, which might foreseeably prevent enjoying katastematic pleasure.
Your rule would have told Epicurus in advance never to have made the friendships at all, since every friendship carries the certainty of future grief — real pain — in exchange for something "merely additive" and therefore, on your account, not counting toward blessedness. Do you accept that consequence?
...
As to friendship, PD27 doesn't call friendship just a useful tool alongside the virtues — it calls it "far the greatest" of the things which "produce the blessedness of the complete life." If friendship is instrumental the way courage or prudence are instrumental, why does Epicurus single it out instead of listing it among them? I think Epicurus is telling us the pleasure of friendship is a major part of what a full life is made of, not that it's a mechanism that occasionally throws off some pleasant ("nice") side effects.
Friendship is important for blessedness. It's an extremely important instrumental good, so it's worth taking on pain (and risk of pain) for it, not because it's intrinsically valuable, but because it's the best way to achieve the highest pleasure.
What role does the pleasure of friendship play in constituting blessedness, in your view? (Your view might be a bit similar to Alex Gillham's in his 2018 dissertation; he thinks Epicurus's view of happiness isn't about well-being.) The problem for friendship is that if it's a kinetic pleasure, it's not clear how it can contribute to blessedness; and if it's a katastematic pleasure, it's not clear what it has to do with the absence of pain.
Display MoreAs to what that would mean, Epicurus wrote on his last day, in real physical agony, that the joy of memory and friendship that day outweighed (or arrayed against in the military metaphor) the pain in his body. This is a direct claim that a great pleasure was worth to him a very great pain, in full net balance. Regardless about what we think of whether he changed his calculation as the pain got worse (which would be entirely reasonable to do), Epicurus did not avoid or forfeit those pleasures in advance just because great pain was involved.
...
Second thing, maybe even more important. You've now stated at least twice that you don't know why Epicurus would be committed to the claim that a blessed life has to be complete or perfect in the Platonic sense. Everything you're saying after that , that additive pleasures can't confer blessedness, friendship is instrumental rather than itself a pleasure/good , seems built entirely on that starting point. If you can't explain that reasoning, why would we find it persuasive to overturn all the many statements commending Pleasure as the goal?
...
I don't think "tranquility as prime directive" survives contact with either the deathbed letter or PD27. I'd like to hear you take those two head-on., because that's what is of most benefit to the forum - providing understandable answers that are of practical use to the kind of normal people to whom Epicurus appealed in the ancient world. It can't have required a degree in philosophy to understand Epicurus in the ancient world, and it can't require that now.
[helpful material about Cassius Longinus and Cicero]
Yes, I've been really struggling with the deathbed letter recently (as I think I said upthread). But my basic response will be: it's because the pain doesn't get in the way of blessedness. The question is always whether pain interferes with blessedness, not simply whether pain is present. (I develop this sort of approach in my paper on self-sacrifice as well.) Thanks for the opportunity to clarify my approach to pain in the example I offered; I wasn't careful enough to indicate the question of whether foreseen pain is likely to interfere with blessedness. In cases where pain won't interfere with blessedness, I don't think the two decision standards are different. Epicurus does claim to have tranquility in the deathbed letter, so this isn't a case of tranquility conflicting with other goods (although it might still be hard to explain how he's able to maintain tranquility).
I think the evidence that Epicurus believed a complete life can't get any better is clear; I don't know how else to interpret KD 3, 18, and 20-21, and Men. 128 and 131. And again, we don't need to overturn any statements saying that pleasure is the good or the goal, because katastematic pleasure is a pleasure. Saying that pleasure is the good/goal doesn't give us any guidance, in itself, on which pleasures to pursue. And Epicurus certainly doesn't want us to pursue all pleasures equally (a Cyrenaic-style position). He thinks we should be discriminating when it comes to pleasures.
My short answer to the material about Cassius Longinus and Cicero is that tranquility is a pleasure, so it's always proper when someone speaks of pleasure as the good. We ranks goods, but what's the most important good is one of the goods.
So, to sum up, the "tranquility as prime directive" view is only a view about which pleasures to pursue; it's not to deny that Epicurus is a hedonist.
(Separately, I think Epicurus should've embraced value dualism rather than hedonism, arguing that the absence of pain and pleasure are both intrinsic goods; but my interpretation above stands even without this point.)
No, I want to nuance my previous point: choose against pain if it'll interfere with enjoying katastematic pleasure. It's totally fine to accept some pain if it promotes katastematic pleasure. That's why we should run some risks for the sake of friendship (VS 28). And if there's a pain that won't interfere with enjoying katastematic pleasure (because anticipation/recollection allows us to manage it, and it doesn't prevent the fulfillment of our needs), it's fine to accept that pain. That's why junk food (which doesn't satisfy hunger) is a problem even if it's very pleasurable, but overeating a bit of something nutritious could be ok.
But in general, yes: don't take on risky kinetic pleasures, which might foreseeably prevent enjoying katastematic pleasure.
I've been uneasy with this claim for a few years now. It seems to create a problem for lots of everyday activities, such as driving for a vacation (vacation is unnecessary fun, and driving is risky because accidents are common). I realize my interpretation is radical here. But I can't understand what else KD 3, 18, and 20-21 and Men. 128 and 131 might mean.
The vacation example is useful to discuss. You've told us that on your own reading that small ordinary statistically real risks taken for an "unnecessary" pleasure can't be justified. You admit that this troubles you, but that you can't find another way to read PD3/18/20-21 and Men.128/131.
I'd ask you to consider the possibility that this is the texts correcting themselves. When a sincere, careful interpretation produces a result even its author finds radical and troubling, that's usually evidence against one of his premises. We've already identified the likely origin of your problem - the completeness requirement that you've twice said you can't ground in Epicurus.
Epicurus taught people who drove no cars but rode roads and sailed seas that were, if anything, more dangerous than a modern highway, and nothing in the record suggests he told them not to travel to see a friend.
As to the deathbed letter - saying the pain "doesn't interfere with blessedness" because Epicurus reports being happy - that's a conclusion, not a test. This tells us the rule after the fact, but gives no way to predict a result before the fact. What would you have said in advance, not knowing the outcome, about whether that pain would interfere?
Is the position you're defending your account of what Epicurus's texts actually say, or is it your own preferred view? You say that Epicurus should have been something other than what he was.
People here on this thread need to understand clearly to what extent you yourself admit that your argument is not required by the texts themselves.
(Separately, I think Epicurus should've embraced value dualism rather than hedonism, arguing that the absence of pain and pleasure are both intrinsic goods; but my interpretation above stands even without this point.)
Thanks, Cassius--great points. I don't think the textual evidence supports the G&T/Nikolsky interpretation, but I grant that your arguments are quite plausible if they're right.
Pleasure and pain are mutually exclusive at the same time and in the same respect, but one can experience both in different respects. "Interfere" could mean distracting ourselves from pain, and/or it could mean being able to experience katastematic pleasure even though we're also experiencing pain. My (extremely controversial) view is that bodily katastematic pleasure is only the fulfillment of needs. And (less controversially) I'm sympathetic to Long and Sedley's distraction model of recollection/anticipation. To experience katastematic pleasure is just to sense the absence of pain and recognize it as good; it doesn't require a positive sensation beyond that.
I apologize if I'm not being clear, but let me try this again: the problem with "weigh total pleasure against total pain" is that it doesn't say anything about the absence of pain. But the absence of pain is really important, not just some general ideaof pleasure. The absence of pain is a pleasure, and our understanding of pleasure needs to give a large role to the absence of pain, as do our decision standards. "Weigh total pleasure against total pain" licenses a life with lots of pain, and it doesn't provide any way to criticize a raucous banqueter who has just a bit more pleasure than pain in their life, or someone who goes into politics because they think it'll be fun.
Your point about the variety of ways that friendship might contribute to blessedness is fair. My biggest point, throughout all of this, is that there's no way to "count up" katastematic pleasure. You can look at a whole life and the balance of pleasure or pain, but what that requires doing is basically ignoring katastematic pleasure. There are interpretations that make this move make sense; but when I read several of the core sources, the absence of pain plays such a crucial role, and it's really important to accommodate that role (or totally reinterpret those sources, but I'm not sure how one would do so).
I've really appreciated this discussion--your ideas are always keen.
Display MoreThe vacation example is useful to discuss. You've told us that on your own reading that small ordinary statistically real risks taken for an "unnecessary" pleasure can't be justified. You admit that this troubles you, but that you can't find another way to read PD3/18/20-21 and Men.128/131.
I'd ask you to consider the possibility that this is the texts correcting themselves. When a sincere, careful interpretation produces a result even its author finds radical and troubling, that's usually evidence against one of his premises. We've already identified the likely origin of your problem - the completeness requirement that you've twice said you can't ground in Epicurus.
Epicurus taught people who drove no cars but rode roads and sailed seas that were, if anything, more dangerous than a modern highway, and nothing in the record suggests he told them not to travel to see a friend.
As to the deathbed letter - saying the pain "doesn't interfere with blessedness" because Epicurus reports being happy - that's a conclusion, not a test. This tells us the rule after the fact, but gives no way to predict a result before the fact. What would you have said in advance, not knowing the outcome, about whether that pain would interfere?
Is the position you're defending your account of what Epicurus's texts actually say, or is it your own preferred view? You say that Epicurus should have been something other than what he was.
People here on this thread need to understand clearly to what extent you yourself admit that your argument is not required by the texts themselves.
(Separately, I think Epicurus should've embraced value dualism rather than hedonism, arguing that the absence of pain and pleasure are both intrinsic goods; but my interpretation above stands even without this point.)
As I said above, "I think the evidence that Epicurus believed a complete life can't get any better is clear; I don't know how else to interpret KD 3, 18, and 20-21, and Men. 128 and 131." To reiterate, I think there's strong evidence that Epicurus thought this; I personally don't know why he was so committed to it. But that doesn't change that, as far as we can tell, he was really committed to it. I don't necessarily disagree with your point about reaching an implausible interpretation; but, at least as things stand now, your approach seems to me to have more problems.
Well, Epicurus's deathbed letter gives evidence that, in other cases of extreme pain, that pain won't interfere with blessedness. (Ditto for the, perhaps implausible, claim in Diogenes Laertius that the sage will be happy under torture.) If I didn't have this evidence, I'd predict that that pain would interfere with blessedness; and I worry that it does despite the claim that it doesn't. But I really believe Epicurus thought the pain didn't interfere, and the challenge is explaining why.
For almost the entire thread, I've been saying my interpretation of Epicurus himself. The comment about what I think he should've said was my own position, different than Epicurus's. The rest of my points are all my interpretation of Epicurus.
