

Welcome Max Duboff

Post by “Max DuBoff” of July 7, 2026 at 3:40 PM

[Quote from Cassius](#)

Your rule would have told Epicurus in advance never to have made the friendships at all, since every friendship carries the certainty of future grief — real pain — in exchange for something "merely additive" and therefore, on your account, not counting toward blessedness. Do you accept that consequence?

...

As to friendship, [PD27](#) doesn't call friendship just a useful tool alongside the virtues — it calls it "far the greatest" of the things which "produce the blessedness of the complete life." If friendship is instrumental the way courage or prudence are instrumental, why does Epicurus single it out instead of listing it among them? I think Epicurus is telling us the pleasure of friendship is a major part of what a full life is made of, not that it's a mechanism that occasionally throws off some pleasant ("nice") side effects.

Friendship *is* important for blessedness. It's an extremely important instrumental good, so it's worth taking on pain (and risk of pain) for it, not because it's intrinsically valuable, but because it's the best way to achieve the highest pleasure.

What role does the pleasure of friendship play in constituting blessedness, in your view? (Your view might be a bit similar to Alex Gillham's in his 2018 dissertation; he thinks Epicurus's view of happiness isn't about well-being.) The problem for friendship is that if it's a kinetic pleasure, it's not clear how it can contribute to blessedness; and if it's a katastematic pleasure, it's not clear what it has to do with the absence of pain.