PD 25 meaning? by Woolf (2004)

Hi all. Principal Doctrine 25 is a notoriously hard doctrine to understand. This is really only the Principal Doctrine i have trouble understanding and as a good Epicurean i want to understand it.

Cooper (1999) thinks it is evidence that Epicurus is not a psychologist hedonist, however there is Woolf's (2004) idea that this is actually an affirmation of psychological Hedonism, which i find convincing and wanted to share.

He translates it as follows: "If you shall not on every occasion ascribe [or: refer, ἐπανοίσεις] each of your actions to the goal (τέλος;) of nature, but tum prematurely (προκαταστρέψεις)29 when making pursuit or avoidance to some other [goal] (εἰς ἄλλο τι), your actions will not correspond with your words". (Pg.17)

He explains this by saying. "What Principal Doctrine XXV teaches is that, never mind what you say your goals are, and that your words indicate a turning away from nature's goal to some other: your actions will belie your words. You will still be acting in such a way as to maximise your freedom from pain and distress nonetheless. Reference to any other motive than this on a given occasion is premature. Of the agent who turns aside, Epicurus says literally "your deeds will not follow your words" (οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.). Your words, that is, may have switched allegiance; but your deeds will not accompany them. You will remain, in your actions, a seeker after nature's goal" (Pg. 19)

Basically it says that "no matter how much the Stoics like to talk about virtue in of itself", there actions are still ultimately motivated by a fear of pain and desire to remove mental disturbance, even if they don't admit it. Kind of like how the Skeptic says that nothing can be known and those who deny free will say all choices are predetermined but does not actually live like this, their actions do not follow their words. Curious if others agree with this.

Quote from Cassius

Do you have a link to what you are referring to here? I would like to see the argument he is advocating.

Sure this comes from Cooper's 1999 book called Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and is in the chapter on Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus.

Unfortunately i was able to access it only as a student through my school's library and can't share it. But i'll share a relevant portion.

"This Principal Doctrine (25) is warning Epicureans to beware of drifting off in their day-by-day practical thinking into the snares of these other—rationalist— philosophers' ethical doctrines. Epicurus is insisting strongly that the whole range of ideas about nobility of action and about the supreme value of simply having a mind constituted in a certain way which produces actions in accord with itself, which lie at the center of this philosophical tradition in ethics, is totally at odds with the "empiricist" approach to human life for which Epicureanism stands. And of course, in insisting on this, he is presupposing that it is psychologically possible for a human being, even an educated and committed Epicurean, to act in pursuit of other goals than pleasure as the ultimate object of their action—goals other than any pleasure, goals other than pleasure according to any construal of the form or circumstance of pleasure that is the right one to take as one's ultimate guide in life. This shows that Epicurus cannot, consistently with this Doctrine, at any rate, have been a hedonist in the psychological theory of human decision and action" Pg. 491

Woolf directly responds to these in his article "What kind of Hedonist was Epicurus" (2004), you can get a Jstor (i think free with 100 article a month) account to read it.

Quote from Don

PD25: If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.

The main with this translation (and interpretation) that Woolf points out, and i find convincing, is that the Greek apparently says "our words" (λόγοις), and under this interpretation why would "your thoughts and your actions will not be harmony. After all if we can choose to have a different principles aside from pleasure, like virtue, or sensual pleasure, why would their be a lack of harmony between actions and our words?

As Woolf says in Pg. 18.

"Certainly, there is something quite puzzling about what Epicurus seems to envisage here. Given that he is speaking of someone who turns aside from one goal to another, why should there be any issue at all about conflict between deeds and words?...

"A short answer will emphasize that it is indeed nature's goal that one is turning aside from. Under this description, it might seem more plausible that at some level it will continue to exert its grip even as one wrenches oneself away from it. Exert its grip on what, though? Surely not on what we say (our logoi). There is nothing to prevent us from averring, when asked, that our goal is now virtue, or maximisation of intense felt pleasure (or whatever it may be). But these will be mere words (so that it is somewhat misleading to translate logoi as "principles") (Commentary: Cooper does this). Given that Epicurus elsewhere (Letter to Herodotus, 37-8) shows an aversion to "empty words" and a preference for "the things that "underlie them", it would be very much in his spirit to be disparaging logoi here, and (in a case of conflict) taking what one actually does as the true measure of one's motivations"

Quote from Cassius

Yeah the very fact that you are fleeing/escaping or pursuing/chasing indicates to me that what you're doing is exercising free will, and I don't see how that is compatible with implying that everything everyone does is "necessarily' because they see it as leading to greater pleasure for them.

Epicurus does explicitly say that "some things happen by necessity", and i think a necessary aversion to pain or pursuit of pleasure might just be a necessary thing for Epicurus. This was part of his "cradle argument" is that we, by nature, delight in pleasure and hate pain, it is therefore something of necessity, like not controlling who our parents are.

I think this is overall compatible with Epicurus defense of free will. We can have free will to believe absurd things, like the mythic gods or death being an evil, we have freedom to make extreme miscalculations, but not maybe not in deciding that we like pleasure and dislike pain, and that this always play a role in our decisions.

Don just to be clear. Do you and i agree on this inerpreation. I thought you disagreed but now it seems like you and have the same idea. Just wanna be sure.

Quote from Don

Could you say one more time what is "this interpretation"?

The interpretation of PD25 is what I'm referring to.

I think it's an affirmation of psychological hedonism, that you will always pursue nature's end, freedom from pain and pleasure, and if you say your doing something different, your words and your actions will be in conflict, like the actions of the skeptic's daily life conflicting his words that he knows nothing.

You can say you are not turning to nature's goal of pleasure, but your actions say otherwise.

Don Good to know.

Hmm..It seems my senses were all true by interpretation was wrong and i thought we disagreed.

Someone should really make an epistemology about a distinction between senses and opinion.