An article by Emily Austin that I don’t recall seeing on here:
That's a great catch Pacatus thank you! I do not recall that we have discussed this or in my case that I was aware of it at all.
I see the download watermark says 2013 so I presume it's at last that old but I can't really confirm the date of publication from the PDF.
At first glance and before reading the whole thing the parts I have skimmed strike me as very good. Her interpretations of Epicurus are reasonable here as they are in her book - she seems to be saying that Epicurus does not demand total absence of pain and that he realizes that some fear of death is inevitable and even useful.
If that's her position then this should prove to be a very useful addition to arguments that Epicurus should not be interpreted as setting up a neo-mystical state of "total elimination of all pain" as his goal.
Rather, as to death and everything else, he's focused on a practical view of happiness seen as a practical balance of pleasure over pain in which we are happy even as we inevitably, and sometimes voluntarily, experience some pain.
I have argued that Epicurus does not believe all forms of the fear of death
are irrational and eliminable. At least one fear – the fear of violent death
caused by others – is brute and must be managed politically. If I am right,
Epicurus’ beliefs would seem much more reasonable to many people who
recognize that we have a vested interest in controlling the fear of death,
but who are skeptical about our ability to eliminate it. Epicurus would no
longer believe that a person can study a set of arguments, believe them,
chant them regularly to herself or with friends, and thereby rid herself of
the many varieties of the fear of death. Others, however, might think my
thesis renders Epicurus’ beliefs about the fear of death much less exciting.
If one is primarily interested in Epicurus’ views on death because his extre-
mism makes him a useful foil, then he might no longer be the biggest
target. Likewise, if one looks to Epicurus to eliminate all varieties of one’ s
own fear of death, then one might need to seek extra assistance.
date of publication from the PDF.
Copyright citation at bottom:
apeiron,vol. 45, pp. 109–129 ©Walter de Gruyter 2012
I have to stand up and cheer at this paragraph and especially the first sentence. Many modern proponents of Epicurus (not just Warren) have boxed themselves into exactly the position that Austin describes as insufficient.
This first sentence is such an understatement! As I read further into the article it's beginning to occur to me that she's having to "waste time." Some of what Warren et al have suggested are positions that I would say no one but a Stoic or Buddhist would have found entertainable in the first place. But that's where much of modern Epicurean commentary has left us, having to go through and dismiss corruptions like she is attacking here in a very understated way.
This is an excellent article.
Occupying an argumentative space in which one lacks reason to avoid
easily and ethically avoidable deaths should, I think, be a last resort. An
Epicurean, then, should first search out something other than pain to ex-
plain her decision to seek her own safety and ensure the safety of others.
For instance, she might avoid the tyrant because death at the hands of the
tyrant is unpredictable and uncertain. She might claim that mental anxiety
arising from uncertainty justifies her escape rather than the prospect of
physical pain. The standard interpretation clearly prohibits this response,
however, since anxiety about uncertain death is a species of the fear of
death, and the standard interpretation insists that all fears of death are
irrational and eliminable. Fear about when one’ s death will occur is out-
right a fear of death.
OH NO! A great point but far too brief! I wish she had gone into this further but she stopped before elaborating.
I'd say she's definitely right in the point below, and this is one of the most important take-aways of the article that goes far beyond the issue of death. The Epicurean goal is not perfectionism of absolute elimination of all pain before you can consider yourself to be truly happy. This section too is very understated and diplomatic, but very very implicitly critical of "wikipedia Epicureanism:'
There remains one key objection: it seems that my interpretation threatens the possibility of ataraxia. Fear, like grief, is a negative emotion, so an argument that claims we are all motivated to act in light of an ineliminable (though generally controllable) fear might appear to undercut the Epicurean quest for an anxiety-free life. If my thesis requires that Epicurus jettison a fundamental psychological principle that guides his eudaemonist ethics, interpretive consistency is very much against me. One live option is to retreat to the idea that Epicureanism is a perfectiionist ethics, according to which even the best of us can only approximate ataraxia, if only because there are some psychological and bodily limitations imposed on natural creatures. Perfectionism is not a terribly uncommon feature of ancient ethical theories, and those who are perfect are of- ten judged divine rather than human.29 Another alternative is to reconceive ataraxia in light of evidence that even sages experience characteristically negative emotions. Some texts, for instance, indicate that the sage grieves the deaths of her friends and shares their suffering. On this front, Epicureans seek to differentiate themselves from the Stoics, whose resistance to grief seemed positively inhumane (VS 66, DL X, 120; Plutarch, A Pleasant Life, 1101ab: Us. 120). If the sage achieves and maintains ataraxia, yet grieves at the same time, then ataraxia might withstand some other natural, negative human emotions.
A more general takeaway here is how this article serves as a warning to the deep issues between Epicurean commentators. A lot of this article is a very diplomatic attack on the positions of people like James Warren. I haven't devoted a lot of time over the years to criticizing Warren directly, but it seems to me that his positions are often indicative of a sort of "British Epicureanism" that has a large of element of Stoicism baked in.
That's not to slam at everything he writes or on all British writers on Epicurus. I'd say that David Sedley and/or Martin Ferguson Smith are the greatest living interpreters of Epicurus. But after them, and already exceeding them in some ways, I'd say is Emily Austin. She seems to me to be free of almost all this British Stoic/Buddhist influence which has many Epicureans at the point where they don't seem able to articulate a strong position why they would have any care as to whether this day is their last.
But there are deep problems with the British Epicureanism that is often accepted as the orthodox way to interpret Epicurus. This article is a great example of pushing back against that.
Pacatus thank you again! Joshua was sick on Sunday and we missed our weekly recording session. I've been casting around for a topic to record something short so we wouldn't miss the week. This article is perfect for me to record a few excerpts and comments for this week's episode. So this was a very timely contribution!
This article conflates and equates two different concepts: the fear of death and the fear of dying. Emily Austin provides four varieties of the fear of death at the beginning of the article but only the first one is an actual fear of death. Remaining three are variations on fear of dying.
(1) the fear of being dead;
(2) the fear that one will die, that one’s life is going to end;
(3) the fear of premature death; and
(4) the fear of the process of dying.
She then proceeds with her article and continuously describes fear of dying as fear of death.
I find it quite misleading because to my understanding Epicurus tried to remove (1) the fear of being dead. He never tried to remove fear of dying (2), (3), (4) because process of dying and everything connected with it belongs to the living and is painful and human beings can't switch off pain at their will. If they could, the whole Epicurean philosophy would make no sense and pain and pleasure could no longer be considered canonical. People can, however, minimise the fear of dying by the means described in the article. People can also be unafraid of being dead. These two things shouldn't be put in the same basket under 'fear of death' label.
I find it quite misleading because to my understanding Epicurus tried to remove (1) the fear of being dead. He never tried to remove fear of dying (2), (3), (4) because process of dying and everything connected with it belongs to the living and is painful and human beings can't switch off pain at their will.
I read that statement (and everything you wrote after it) as exactly the point of her article, Tau Phi. And she is criticizing as misleading the position taken by Warren and others for doing what you too are criticizing.
So you are agreeing with her? Or are you saying that her article is what is misleading?
So you are agreeing with her? Or are you saying that her article is what is misleading?
What is misleading is calling fear of dying and fear of death the same - fear of death. This article should be called 'Epicurus on the Politics of Fearing of Dying'
Ok so you're focusing on the title rather than the content. The article itself seems clear enough to me, but I haven't had a lot of time to digest it and it's possible I'll reread and change my opinion letter.
On first reading of the article and your comment i'd say that the both of you are coming from the same perspective. There's nothing to be concerned about after death (incorrectly thought of a "being dead") but there's a lot to be concerned about in terms of how and when we die.
And I read the takeaways of her article to be that is is ridiculous to conclude that Epicurus taught the same attitude toward "being dead" as he did toward how long we live and the circumstances under which we stop living. But that's exactly what many seem to be doing, and it turns the philosophy on its head to take that position.
Ok so you're focusing on the title rather than the content.
I couldn't care less about the title. I'm trying to make people aware that calling fear of dying and fear of death the same thing is misleading. I'm not saying Emily Austin wrote a bad article - she didn't. It's a very interesting article but for people who are new to Epicurus' concepts it will not be as clear as it is to you, Cassius .
The conclusions like that:
I have argued that Epicurus does not believe all forms of the fear of death are irrational and eliminable. At least one fear – the fear of violent death caused by others – is brute and must be managed politically. [...]
or that:
In sum, I argue that Epicurus believes there is a fear of death that does not disappear, which we can control with due care and with close attention to the social environs. Though my thesis might render Epicurus less of a radical with regards the fear of death than heretofore believed, and though it may even make him seem a bit less than perfectly brave, I maintain that it is a good way to make sense of the text. [...]
are perfectly fine when you understand she's talking about fear of dying and not fear of death. There are no different forms of the fear of death in Epicurus' system. Epicurus was as radical about fear of death as it's humanly possible - we can't experience death so there's nothing to be afraid of. This radical claim is crucial to his system because it slams the door shut on supernaturalism, heaven, hell, eternal punishment, reward etc., and it leaves no backdoor option to get back to such concepts.
perfectly fine when you understand she's talking about fear of dying and not fear of death. There are no different forms of the fear of death in Epicurus' system. Epicurus was as radical about fear of death as it's humanly possible - we can't experience death so there's nothing to be afraid of. This radical claim is crucial to his system because it slams the door shut on supernaturalism, heaven, hell, eternal punishment, reward etc., and it leaves no backdoor option to get back to such concepts.
Well said TauPhi
The fact that "dying" is a physical process where we are STILL aware and sensations have not been dissolved is of paramount importance here, dying is NOT nothing to us because we are aware, sensing, and feeling. I agree with TauPhithat conflating "fear of (ways of) dying" and "fear of death (the end result of dying" are two very different things. We try to avoid certain ways of dying through our actions and decisions and taking care of our health. If we end up with a terminal diagnosis without recourse to therapy, medicine, surgery, etc., then we *could/should/can* focus on our coming death with the knowledge that "death is nothing to us." I can even see a bit/bite of grief for "leaving the stage" but, optimally, it should not overwhelm or deprive us of the pleasure left to us, rob us of pleasant memories.
I need to re-read Austin's paper and refresh my memory. I vaguely remember seeing it several years ago (I think)? Or maybe I bookmarked it in Academia.edu and didn't get back to it.
