Prolepsis of the gods

I am sure others will have suggestions but let me take a stab at it:

Quote from Rolf

How does prolepsis help defend against skepticism and allow us to be confident in our knowledge?

It provides a framework which points to both a starting point for knowledge and way of expressing how we get to the point of concluding that some things are right and some things are wrong. Epicurus is constantly looking back to the ultimate questions of the universe, such as whether the universe is eternal in time or infinite in size or has any supernatural elements. If you can't point to a mechanism through which conceptual thinking began to be accumulated by living beings, then you are left with the concern that all this - including our thought processes - have been supernaturally created. I would say that prolepsis does for human thought what atomism does for pure physics - it provides a non-supernatural framework of analysis, and then it's up to us to go from there to understand more about atoms and more about the brain. But if you don't have such a framework, then many people will decide just to go with the flow of the gods and never challenge the orthodoxy. When you have conceptual framework for the development of concepts and truth that makes sense, you can confidently dismiss radical skepticism and have confidence in those things that you can hold to be true, vs those that are false and those where you have to "wait" and accept alternative possibilities until you have more information.

Quote from Rolf

Additionally, why is prolepsis necessary for us to know certain things? Isn’t it possible that we simply learn them from experience? I get that Epicurus had to respond to Meno’s paradox, but why didn’t he simply disagree with the whole premise that we need to have some foreknowledge of something in order to know it?

Because there is a root of truth to the question being asked in Meno. How do you conclude that you are "Right" about something if you don't already know what "right" is? How much experience is enough in order to be confident about something? Ultinately there has to be a framework in which you take a position on how much experience, and what kind of experience, is enough.

Quote from Rolf

Something like prolepsis is an important concept within the overarching philosophy even if it doesn’t directly relate to happiness or maximising pleasure.

Well of course I would say that it is absolutely essential to both happiness and maximizing pleasure unless you are confident that pleasure and happiness should be your goal, and that you are pursuing them correctly, then you will be plagued with doubt and all the problems that doubt creates

Have I missed something? I tend to think that the prolepsis discussed by Epicurus was based on a limitation of his access to modern science 2,300 years ago. I think it is becoming clearer that a conception that you can know something before you apprehend it, or use your senses to learn it, is not how we know things.

Quote from Rolf

How does prolepsis help to disprove that “all this - including our thought processes - have been supernaturally created”? From what I understand, prolepsis just describes instances of in-built knowledge, right? But not where those preconceptions come from? Couldn’t a supernatural believer still just respond, “well those preconceptions come from god”?

It "disproves" a supernatural basis for thought processes by providing a rational non-supernatural basis for understanding what we observe to be the case in the way people think and make decisions, without resorting to pre--existence or other supernatural arguments. This is very parallel to atomism, which provides a non-supernatural basis for the way the world works. In both cases you're now asking how atomism or prolepsis/canonics "disprove" the supernatural, and the answer to that has to come down to your conclusions about what kind of proof is possible and what is required. If you fall into the belief that only god can provide certainty, then you can never meet that standard -- but there is no reason to accept that supernatural standard in the first place. This is an issue far beyond the prolepsis alone and falls under general canonics, but prolepsis is an important part.

Quote from DaveT

Have I missed something? I tend to think that the prolepsis discussed by Epicurus was based on a limitation of his access to modern science 2,300 years ago. I think it is becoming clearer that a conception that you can know something before you apprehend it, or use your senses to learn it, is not how we know things.

Others may agree with you DaveT, but speaking only for myself I don't think Epicurus would have cared any more what science today says than we should care about what science in 4500 AD will say. We can only live our lives with the information that we have. Epicurus knew that using the word "prolepsis" does not convey all the details of thought, just as he knew that talking about "atoms" doesn't explain all the workings of the human body.

It seems clear that prolepsis was considered to be an advanced topic, and that's why it is not explained at length in Epicurus' letters or in Lucretius.

As to "a conception that you can know something before you apprehend it, or use your senses to learn it, is not how we know things" I don't think that this gets to the heart of the issue. I think the best way to get to that is to read some of the material on the Meno paradox, as that sets out the logical dilemma that Plato was trying to throw in the way of any philosophy based on the senses. To me the prolepsis issue is geared toward that debate, and I suspect that it leads to a lot of spinning wheels to read something "clinical" into it that will improve day to day pleasure/pain decisionmaking.

Quote from Rolf

Actually, could somebody take a crack at explaining fundamentally what prolepsis is? Is it innate knowledge that we’re born it? I’m more confused than I thought!

The HUGE problem is that there are not a lot of surviving texts that speak specifically to prolepsis. That's one reason Bryan 's compiling uses of the word and related words is so helpful, seeing the word/s in context.

The are a VARIED number of interpretations of prolepsis, starting as far back as Cicero! I don't know whether we'll ever have the concept from an Epicurean perspective definitively described.

That said, with due respect to Cassius and others bringing in Meno and the theory of knowledge, I **personally** see prolepsis, ancient concepts of memory formation, the workings of the psykhē (mind/soul), to be of tangential importance to applying Epicurus' philosophy in the modern world to my way of living. I find the investigations that the ancients dealt in and how they arrived at their findings of fascinating intellectual curiosity. But eidola do not grind grooves into my psykhē to make subsequent similar eidola easier to intercept. Brains don't work that way.

What Epicurus does give me is a firm commitment to finding physical causes completely devoid of woo-woo. It might not be eidola and psykhē, but it is a physical, natural, material cause to my memories, thought, and other mental processes. The Letter to Pythocles is a testament to finding material, physical causes to phenomena.

So, I don't get hung up on the specific details taught in the ancient school; but I think there are principles that are directly applicable from then to now.

Rolf: Try this analogy:

What is an example of a sight? What is an example of a hearing? What is an example of a smell? You can describe a tree or a song or a flower at a conceptual level, but that is not the question. Trees and songs and flowers are complex conceptual conclusions.

Prolepsis is a faculty, not an idea or a conclusion.

The sense of smell is given to us by nature and we use it all the time without understanding or caring about its nature, so this is an example of a faculty that gives us input to knowledge, but not knowledge iteself.

Anytime you can state an idea as a proposition, such as "there is a god" you are already past the proleptic stage, in my opinion.

And so Velleius does not really reference, to my understanding, "a prolepsis of a god." Rather, he is saying that we have a proleptic faculty which disposes us to thoughts which leads to the idea of a god, just as we have a nose which functions in a way that gives us input into a final conception of a flower.

Now, if what you are really focusing on is the proof of the existence of a god, then it's my view that that proof goes far beyond just prolepsis. I think that's why Velleius then goes on to talk about isonomia, because the particular concept of a particular type of god is another issue for chain reasoning that incorporates other issues, such as the infinity and eternality of the universe and that nature never makes a single thing of a kind.

So the ground floor is back at the point of realizing that prolepsis is a faculty parallel with seeing or hearing or pleasure or pain. It reacts in particular predisposed ways, but it does not itself provide content.

Also, most of us think in terms of prolepsis being related to pattern recognition.

Think about if you were programming a computer to do pattern recognition. In addition to the camera and microphone (equivalents of eyes and ears) you would need some kind of software mechanism to take those inputs and detect recognizable patterns. Without that software mechanism the input of the camera and microphone would mean nothing. But the detection itself cannot be a set of pre-programmed patterns to match against - else those would be "innate ideas." We're talking something more akin to "AI" that can assemble patterns into ever-increasing layers of complexity.

But the faculty of prolepsis is the assembly process, not any particular pattern that is detected or assembled.

And in case we haven't mentioned this recently, a conclusion can be based in part on a prolepsis and still be wrong, Faculties are never true or false, but the conclusions we draw based on them can be. That's pat of the exaplanation for how people can come to so many incorrect conclusions about the gods, even though everyone has their own faculty of prolepsis.

I would say that the prolepseis are our 'mental sense.'

I agree we are talking about a faculty. But what is any sense or faculty without an object? Sight means little without reference to what one sees.

A pre-thought visual sense occurs when we visually focus on an external impression, and a pre-thought mental sense (a prolepsis) occurs when we mentally focus on an internal impression.

Quote from Cassius

A conclusion can be based in part on a prolepsis and still be wrong, Faculties are never true or false, but the conclusions we draw based on them can be.

Well said, and very important to keep in mind.

Quote from Don

That said, with due respect to Cassius and others bringing in Meno and the theory of knowledge, I **personally** see prolepsis, ancient concepts of memory formation, the workings of the psykhē (mind/soul), to be of tangential importance to applying Epicurus' philosophy in the modern world to my way of living. I find the investigations that the ancients dealt in and how they arrived at their findings of fascinating intellectual curiosity. But eidola do not grind grooves into my psykhē to make subsequent similar eidola easier to intercept. Brains don't work that way.

Yes Rolf, it's important to realize that not everyone here has the same focus and goals. Some of us are more interested in our own personal lives, and some of us are more interested in reconstructing the system for for longer-term societal applications. These goals can be complementary and there is no reason for them to be in conflict, but you don't want to let yourself get whipsawed between the two perspectives.

To date we have had a small enough group that most everyone who has posted regularly has participated in most every conversation. But it's not necessary for those who aren't worried about competition between the schools to worry about the competitive angles, nor do the "evangelicals" need to look down on the "therapists." Each person can decide for themselves which aspects they are interested in and pursue those. If you are anyone reading this doesn't feel that prolepsis is something that interests you, there's no need to force yourself down a path that doesn't seem to be leading anywhere to that person. On the other hand canonics is an example of a hotly-debated topic that Epicurus himself thought to be important.

Rolf to drop back to Don's comment in post 28 and his earlier comment about pleasures that you "get out of the way from," I've thought of another example of a type of pleasure that I think is applicable:

In addition to Epicurus saying that he found his own peace chiefly in the study of nature, which I would say clearly includes the philosophical debates about nature which we are discussing, there is another very good example in the opening of Book 2 of Lucretius:

Quote from Munro Version

2-01

It is sweet, when on the great sea the winds trouble its waters, to behold from land another’s deep distress; not that it is a pleasure and delight that any should be afflicted, but because it is sweet to see from what evils you are yourself exempt. It is sweet also to look upon the mighty struggles of war arrayed along the plains without sharing yourself in the danger. But nothing is more welcome than to hold the lofty and serene positions well fortified by the learning of the wise, from which you may look down upon others and see them wandering all abroad and going astray in their search for the path of life, see the contest among them of intellect, the rivalry of birth, the striving night and day with surpassing effort to struggle up to the summit of power and be masters of the world.

O wretched are the thoughts of men! How blind their souls! In what dark roads they grope their way, in what distress is this life spent, short as it is! Don't you see Nature requires no more than the body free from pain, that she may enjoy the mind easy and cheerful, removed from care and fear?

I would equate understanding the implication and the solution to radical skepticism in general, of which the Meno Paradox is part, to a good example of a part of what Lucretius is referring to as causing the wandering and going astray in the path of life. I say this from the point of view that you can't be confident that Nature does in fact no more than pleasure over pain, and you can't be removed from care and fear, if you don't think it is possible to be confident that these things are true, and that supernatural control and eternal punishment are false.

Now again - not everyone is bothered by the claims of philosophical skepticism or sees the immediate relevance to them. If they are not so bothered, then more power to them, but we likely would not have Epicurean philosophy to talk about in the first place if Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus and Lucretius and Diogenes of Oinoanda and Philodemus had not been bothered by them.

Quote from Cassius

Now again - not everyone is bothered by the claims of philosophical skepticism or sees the immediate relevance to them. If they are not so bothered, then more power to them, but we likely would not have Epicurean philosophy to talk about in the first place if Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus and Lucretius and Diogenes of Oinoanda and Philodemus had not been bothered by them.

In light of this excerpt above and others' reactions to my post, I feel I need to define my position a little more.

Do I feel that having a strong argument against radical skepticism (and superstition and religion and other anti-Epicurean positions) is important? Absolutely! This is one of the through-lines from the establishment of Epicurus' school down to the present day. Epicurus didn't wall himself away from the world. He vigorously engaged with the ideas circulating in his day, and modern Epicureans are called to the same.

Religion, skepticism, superstition, et. al. do a terrible amount of damage, both to individuals and to society in general. Am I bothered that many of the hoi polloi are in the grip of superstition, ignorance of natural science, etc.? Of course!!

And this little corner of the Internet - Our little boat of the SS EpicureanFriends - is one way to make authoritative material available "out there" in the market of ideas and to welcome passengers aboard.

What I don't want to get uptight about are the details of 2,000+ year old physics.

Is Epicurus onto something with his Canonics, his Theory of Knowledge? Absolutely! Otherwise, I wouldn't be on this forum or be thinking of myself as an "Epicurean." Is it necessary to have confidence in the truth of a REAL existing physical world with which we can interact in a meaningful way and not believe it is some pale reflection of a Realm of Ideal Forms or the "proving ground" for an after-death existence or some other lesser-than existence? Absolutely! And Epicurus' grounding the truth of our reality - our existence - in the use of our natural physical and mental senses/sensations and feelings provides a bedrock, fundamental ground on which to stand. There IS an external physical universe with which we interact. There are a number of modern philosophies dressed up as science that need to be counteracted today, including "we live in a simulation" "we are constantly hallucinating" etc. As modern Epicureans, I firmly believe we need to understand the workings of the mind to be able to counteract these philosophies. Do I have a good grasp of their arguments? No, no I do not. There aren't enough hours in the day for me to read everything I want to read and do everything i want to do. But should I get anxious and frustrated and be in pain? Nope. I'll do what I can do. That's one reason I like the accessible style of Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett's popular books and those of others.

Epicurus was brilliant in his devising possible causes for vision, for memory, for hearing, for constructing mental pictures in our minds, for applications of "atomic" theory, but he was a human being living 2,000+ years ago with a brilliant mind but limited access to information. Understanding HIS arguments against radical skepticism and superstition should fully inform the style of our own arguments and inspire modern Epicureans to combat ignorance and superstition and religious dogmatism in our own day as he did in his.

Along those lines, I offer my commentary on dogmatic vs skeptic:

Quote

With those two options available, being a dogmatist or being a skeptic, it seems to me that the significance is that one path leads to declaring that knowledge can be known, that it is possible to "take a stand" on what can be known about reality. The other path leaves one "puzzled," "in want of knowledge.," or simply letting problems remain without resolving them or at least proposing solutions. The second path implies that we can't really know anything. Epicurus was opposed to this idea wholeheartedly.

Quote from Rolf

Additionally, why is prolepsis necessary for us to know certain things? Isn’t it possible that we simply learn them from experience?

Rolf ,

I love the questions you bring to this topic of prolepsis. As I understand from Bryan list of English translations of the Greek prolepsis, included ‘comprehension’. Experience is essential to learning, but leaves out the other capabilities nature gives humans to achieve deeper levels of understanding & comprehension..

As a senior struggling through many years of experience, trying to become wise, I have come see prolepsis as enabling a ‘whole-body comprehension’ of whatever objects or concepts. The pattern recognition matching occurs across all sensory data that links together myriad related information. I first read of this type of learning in Robert Heinlein’s ‘Stranger in a Strange Land’ - where he learns to “grok” something or someone.

”To grok it, understand it so thoroughly that you merge with it and it merges with you. “

“Grok means to understand so thoroughly that the observer becomes a part of the observed — to merge, blend, intermarry, lose identity in group experience. It means almost everything that we mean by religion, philosophy, and science and it means as little to us as color does to a blind man.”
Grok - Wikipedia

So, it maybe Heinlein’s grok appears to describe some aspects of proleptic comprehension.