Give Us an Example of God!

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    Maybe this thread "Give Us An Example of A God!" should come after examination of "Give Us An Example of A Prolepsis!"

    And I think the straightest path to that is going to be to analogize to the eye and the other faculties. In the case of the eye, according to this article the eye receives and processes into a form the brain can handle - in a single word - "light":

    Visual system - Wikipedia
    en.wikipedia.org

    (Note: By quoting WIkipedia I am not suggesting that anything was required from modern science that wouldn't basically have occurred to Epicurus. It's an obvious question to ask what part of thinking takes place in the eye and what part takes place in the brain/soul/mind whatever. Also,I am following up on the prior comment that the eye probably doesn't even distinguish borders between separate "things." Picking out one "thing" from another presumably takes place in the brain too.)

    Presumably the ears receive and process "sound" into a form the brain can handle. (And it is the mind that can pick music out of background noise.)

    So what does the prolepsis faculty receive and process into a form the brain can handle?

    I would bet Epicurus would say that it does *not* receive and process "gods" or "justice" or "oxen" or any concrete "thing" or "concept." I suspect he would say that those words ("gods" Justice" and "oxen") are concepts that the mind has formed because the faculty of prolepsis has done some kind of work *beforehand* to allow the brain to think about these concepts. Had the prolepsis faculty not done it's work beforehand, the brain would never have been able to come up with "gods" or "justice" or "oxen" in the first place. Seeing an infinite number of copies of the Mona Lisa would never tell us to pick out the individual things that go into the Mona Lisa out from the background of the painting, unless some faculty of organization of relationships led us to first pick out "things" like hair and eyes and noses and mouths and trees in the first place. Even a gods could not create a world without something which would have allowed them to think of worlds in the first place. (Note that I am writing that carefully because maybe a "god" could take existing matter and refashion it into a "world," but no god could ever make something from nothing or make the universe as a whole.)

    It's going to be something more fundamental - like repetitive or repeated "relationships" or "arrangements" - or something else that describes why we should recognize that one body has a special relationship to another body. And the receipt of "images" over time, in which bodies repeatedly appear to us in repetitive relationships to each other, would be a prime candidate to consider as what it is that prolepses "receives and processes."

    No doubt someone else can do a lot better than that, but I think that's the direction, and so long as we continue to discuss "concepts" as what prolepsis is receiving and handing over, I don't think we make progress toward giving due credit to either the faculty of prolepsis or the theory of images.



    Diogenes Laertius - it seems like I have read commentators explain this word "apperception" in 32 below as a reference to the "repeatability" of the phenomena. Could it be that the "repeatability" of something makes the most difference in justifying us to consider something to be "real" or "true":

    [32] Nor is there anything which can refute the sensations. For a similar sensation cannot refute a similar because it is equivalent in validity, nor a dissimilar a dissimilar, for the objects of which they are the criteria are not the same; nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations; nor can one sensation refute another, for we attend to them all alike. Again, the fact of apperception confirms the truth of the sensations. And seeing and hearing are as much facts as feeling pain. From this it follows that as regards the imperceptible we must draw inferences from phenomena. For all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something. And the visions of the insane and those in dreams are true, for they cause movement, and that which does not exist cannot cause movement.

    [51] For the similarity between the things which exist, which we call real and the images received as a likeness of things and produced either in sleep or through some other acts of apprehension on the part of the mind or the other instruments of judgment, could never be, unless there were some effluences of this nature actually brought into contact with our senses.

    Quote from Cassius

    Maybe this thread "Give Us An Example of A God!" should come after examination of "Give Us An Example of A Prolepsis!"

    fyi...Don started this thread not too long ago:

    Post

    Prolepsis Citations from Long & Sedley

    This thread is an offshoot of this thread:

    epicureanfriends.com/thread/?postID=31229#post31229 In dealing with the prolepseis over there, I decided to turn to Long & Sedley's The Hellenistic Philosophers (which is available to borrow on Internet Archive with a free account) to see what they have to say. It turns out they cite a number of instances of mention of the prolepseis/preconceptions. Their numbering system (ex. 21A 4) uses their individual section, cited text, then their subsection of…
    Don
    July 2, 2024 at 11:04 PM
    Quote from Cassius

    Repeatability / regularity is a major aspect of something being "real."

    I agree, continuity is key.

    10.50a: "[Impressions] render the image of a single continuous object (and preserve the continuity at a distance from the original source) according to the proportional impingement [of the impressions] from that source – out of the deep vibration of the atoms in that solid object."

    Quote from Twentier

    example, what if I were to posit that I have experienced a prolepsis of a being "with a permanent lack of pleasure"

    Interesting! Just as we look to the blissful beings as models of the good life, we look to miserable beings to foster our gratitude (DRN book 2 opening, etc). To take this to the (speculative) extreme: Comparing myself to beings that do not die but are miserable -- would, even if I were also miserable, make me grateful at least to be mortal!

    "Apperception" is an intriguing word that I've not given much attention to. Here's an excerpt from Wikipedia:

    In psychology, apperception is "the process by which new experience is assimilated to and transformed by the residuum of past experience of an individual to form a new whole".[2] In short, it is to perceive new experience in relation to past experience. The term is found in the early psychologies of Herbert Spencer, Hermann Lotze, and Wilhelm Wundt. It originally means passing the threshold into consciousness, i.e., to perceive. But the percept is changed when reaching consciousness due to its entry into an already present interpretive context; thus it is not perceived but apperceived.

    According to Johann Friedrich Herbart, apperception is that process by which an aggregate or "mass" of presentations becomes systematized (apperceptions-system) by the accretion of new elements, either sense-given or as a product of the inner workings of the mind. He thus emphasizes in apperception the connection with the self as resulting from the sum of antecedent experience. Hence in education the teacher should fully acquaint himself with the mental development of the pupil, in order that he may make full use of what the pupil already knows.[1]

    Alfred Adler used the notion of apperception to explain certain principles of perception in child psychology. A child perceives different situations not as they actually exist, but by means of the biases prism of their personal interests, in other words, according to their personal apperception scheme.[5]

    Apperception is thus a general term for all mental processes in which a presentation is brought into connection with an already existent and systematized mental conception, and thereby is classified, explained or, in a word, understood; e.g. a new scientific phenomenon is explained in the light of phenomena already analysed and classified. The whole intelligent life of man is, consciously or unconsciously, a process of apperception, in as much as every act of attention involves the appercipient process.

    It seems to have some potential overlap with pattern recognition, although some (such as Wundt) think of it as a conscious process. I'm not sure if it's helpful or not to examine the word further, but it does seem to at least have some of the same issues as prolepsis in terms of pinning down a definition.

    Quote from Godfrey

    It seems to have some potential overlap with pattern recognition, although some (such as Wundt) think of it as a conscious process. I'm not sure if it's helpful or not to examine the word further, but it does seem to at least have some of the same issues as prolepsis in terms of pinning down a definition.

    Very good information, Godrey, so this is going to cry out for our Greek scholars to examine that word and help us figure out how it was used elsewhere, and potentially how it was translated into Latin.

    An off-point attempt at some humor, in terms of examples of "god":

    Sorry ... :P

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    What would be the closest term to describe Epicurean gods? Naturalistic deism?

    They are defined as higher beings relative to human beings that can live far longer or effectively forever with a way to replenish their bodies and who live pleasurably and virtuously, and that they live in the space between the worlds and are concerned with maintaining their own pleasure and avoid interfering with lesser beings as they are preoccupied with their own self-preservation and may suffer from pain if they do interfere. Humans, mortal beings, can experience an approximate"divinity" of the higher beings by living as Epicurean sages.

    The term "god" has a heavy connotation and I am inclined to use "higher being" to get away from that, but I feel like that is underwhelming the point of them.


    I found this term: ietsist -- "It is a Dutch term for a range of beliefs held by people who, on the one hand, inwardly suspect – or indeed believe – that "there must be something undefined beyond the mundane which can be known or proven", but on the other hand do not accept or subscribe to an established view of the nature of a deity offered by any particular religion." - From the Wikipedia article. But we are putting forth an idea of the gods rather than this weak agnostic theism.

    I would say that I think your post illustrates how two of the most important things to do at the very start is:

    1 - Get rid of every implication and every attribute we think we know about gods except that they are (1) living beings, (2) live totally happy lives, and (3) are deathless.

    2 - Then consider everything after that to be a matter of lesser importance, on which you can come up with some reasonable theories, but can't be sure about the details. That's just like the stars and other things in the sky where you don't have much evidence. You can come up with possibilities that are consistent with basic physics, and harmonize with point 1, but there you have to be satisfied with multiple possibilities rather than single certainties.

    As Velleius put it in the nature of the gods, it's Point 1 that is essential and the place where you can really stop. Point 2 may be helpful to some people, but not to others, and we don't have enough information to be totally sure how things really are. So if we go into Point 2 we really have to be careful about the limits of what we know and what we don't.

    Point 1 is the part we can be sure about based on the reasoning given:

    Quote

    XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: “That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail.” We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question.

    Going that far gets you to the point where you are certain that there is no need to live in dread of gods.

    Going further into Point 2 gets you more into matters of "curiosity" rather than what you really need to know, and takes you into areas where you are "directed partly by nature and party by reason" where the conclusions are less certain. And there you get into areas where "waiting" and multiple possibilities are going to be the best you can do, and you start talking then about "quasi-bodies" and "quasi-blood" because you just don't have any more detail.

    Quote

    For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.

    XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and partly by reason.

    Quote from Novem

    Naturalistic deism?

    I hestitate to apply "deism" to Epicurean theology because of the connotation of a creator. The deities in our case are products of nature, never masters. Though, "deism" does shoot closer to the mark when trying to convey a sense of distance between a worshipper and the object of their worship. Using contemporary jargon, I think Epicurean theology is compatible with terms like "polytheism" and "henotheism" (worship of a divine nature manifest as multiple deities), as well as, perhaps "kathenotheism" or "monolatrism" (worship of one deity at a time), or maybe even "inclusive monotheism", depending on the context in which Zeus might be invoked.

    Epicurus wrote about numerous (technically "infinite") individual deities (which qualifies the "poly-" part), and each of those deities shared the same divine nature (which might, arguably, justify adding the nuance of "mono-"). Also, we have evidence of ancient Epicureans who were both recognized pan-Hellenically as "Philosophers" and also as local priests; they would have made sacrifices or expressed piety to local deities while maintaining atomism. So, ancient Epicurean philosophy would have been seen as being compatible with Hellenic polytheism, so long as followers reject the Homeric interpretations of gods as being troublesome.

    We often return to this point: there is a struggle in trying to define organic expressions of piety while employing vocabulary that has been trademarked by "Big Religion".

    I think that part of this inquiry points back to Epicurus' exhortation to Menoikeus to maintain a consistent theology. The critique Epicurus made against the beliefs of the Athenian masses is just poignant and resonant as it is today: Why would and/or how could a divine being prescribe/facilitate/instigate harm? I think it is safe to say that the proposition by some that mass shootings (among other grotesque examples, like the holocaust, or sexual abuse of children) are "part of God's plan" is measurably disturbing (in that it produces anxiety). A pre-modern analogue to this was the inability by most people to provide a confident explanation for atmospheric electrical discharge. The prescription for either is theological consistency.

    At the end of the day, I think part of my feeling that some of these words are limited is a point cannot be made more digestible with a proverbial spoonful of sugar because it is one of the fundamental spiritual practices we have, in reciting the definitions of key concepts: if one is willing to use the term "god" in the first place, one must admit that "god" is perfect. The "god of rock" strums the best guitar solos, the "god of pop" is an peerless performer, the "Lord of the Dance" would never trip over their own feet, the "Great One" has the best statistics in the NHL, so a "god" of humans would never condemn humanity, and the "god" of living beings would not threaten lives, and the "divine nature", itself, cannot be responsible for harm.

    While I struggle with the idea of piety, personally, this is where I find it to be useful, not necessarily in constructing a positive image of god in my mind, but in deconstructing incoherent assumptions that are largely informed by either unexamined myths or intentional propaganda.

    That was a bit of a tangent; I think really just meant to answer with, "atomistic polytheism".

    Quote from Joshua

    Polyenphysiszodeism.

    Innumerable gods who are living beings and have their existence entirely in nature, but stand aloof from human affairs.

    I hold a copyright on that term! 8)

    Poly - many

    En - Within

    Physis - Nature

    Zo - animal or living being

    Deism - god(s), and non-interventionist at that

    Great -ism, Joshua!

    FWIW here is a link to page 75 in the text where that appears:

    Philodemus On Methods Of Inference De Lacey : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
    On Methods of Inference or On Signs
    archive.org


    There's a lot more context but here is part of it:

    Quote

    Thus we shall use successfully the inference from living beings, when we consider that nothing prevents god from being similar in body to man since man alone of living beings in our experience is capable of thought. For god cannot be conceived apart from thought; and even though god was not born, yet he is composed of soul and body and with this nature he is necessarily a living creature.

    > For god cannot be conceived apart from thought


    I was confused by this phrase, but I think in context this must mean that god/a god can't be conceived of as a thoughtless being (like a p-zombie).

    Quote from Eikadistes

    According to Philodemus, “even though god was not born, yet he is composed of soul and body and with this nature he is necessarily a living creature.” (On Methods of Inference)

    What do you make of this proposition?

    The gods are projections of ourselves, and are just like us, except better. 😉

    Here's the official transliteration:

    χων πορευόμενοι καθάπερ ἡμεῖς
    [δ]ι' ἀέρος. πρὸς δὲ τὸ τρίτον, ὅτι πο-
    τὲ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπαραλλά-
    κτων μεταβησόμεθ', ὅταν ἦι τι
    5δισταζόμενον τῶν περὶ [αὐ]τὰ
    συμβαιν[όν]των, τῶι δὲ τὸ [μὲν ἐ-]
    ξ ἐναργεία̣ς καταλαμβάν[ε]σθαι
    τὸ δὲ μὴ πρόδηλον εἶναι, [χρ]ησόμε-
    θα σημείωι τῶι βλεπομέ[ν]ωι πρὸς
    10τὴν παραδοχὴν τοῦ φα[ινο]μέ-
    νου· ποτὲ δὲ [ἀπὸ τ]ῶν οὐκ [ἀπ]αραλ-
    λάκτων, ἐ[φὸ] καὶ καθὸ μ[ετ]έχει
    τῆς αὐτ[ῆς γε] κοινότη[το]ς τῶν
    ὁμοίων α̣[ὑτοῖ]ς̣ συμπτωμάτων,
    οἷον ὅταν̣ [τινὰ] μὲν ἀνθρώποις
    μ̣[όνο]ι̣ς̣ ἐ̣[οίκ]η<ι>, τινὰ δ' ἐο̣[ικότα τ]ῶ̣[ι θ]ε̣-
    ῶ̣ι̣ [ζ]ῶιά ἐστ̣ιν. εὐστόχως ἄ[ρα τ]ῆ̣ι ἐ[κ]
    ζώ[ι]ω̣ν μετα̣βάσει χ[ρησόμεθα],
    νο[μίζοντες] οὐδὲν [κωλύειν]
    [μὴ τῶι φρονεῖν μ]ὲν ἀνθρ̣[ώποις]
    ὡ[μοιωμένον] τὸν θεὸν ὑπ[ά]ρχ[ειν]
    δ[ιὰ τὸ τὸν] ἄνθρωπον φρο̣ν[ή-]
    σε[ως μόνον τῶν] παρ' ἡμῖν ζώιων
    δεκτικ̣[όν, φρ]ονήσεως δὲ χωρὶς
    μ̣[ὴ νοεῖσθ', ἀλλ]ὰ̣ μὴ γεννᾶσθαι
    συνεσ[τηκένα]ι̣ δ' ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ
    σώμα[τος· καὶ ἔσ]τ̣α̣ι ζῶιον σὺν
    τούτωι [καὶ ἀθ]ά[νατον]. πρὸς...


    The "body...........'living being'" line is highlighted below...

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