"Epicurean Philosophy: An Introduction from the 'Garden of Athens'" edited by Christos Yapijakis

Todd I think this is a fair implication of what is stated in the letter to Herodotus and in Book One of Lucretius, but I too question whether it is sufficient to address the ultimate issue that concerns us. I think the point Epicurus wanted to drive home is that while both levels are "real," our level of reality is no less real than the atomic level. Our reality comes through the senses, without which we have death, and that is what is important to us and why we don't give in to Platonic arguments about a "true world" beyond our senses, as if ours is inferior and we should long to be somewhere else.

If you're not familiar with the Book One discussion of the Trojan war and properties and qualities, you will want to look that up.

I'm not seeing anything in the Letter to Herodotus or Book 1 that I take to be suggesting 2 levels of reality. I only noticed some references to there being things we can see and things we can't see. (I was skimming quickly, so maybe I missed something.)

That seems a far cry from saying there are 2 levels of reality. You might as well say there are things we can smell and things we can't smell.

If anyone has a more specific reference for this "two levels" idea, I'd appreciate it.

Todd I think most commentators generally look to the parts I am going to cite below for the proposition that the atoms and void are eternal and unchanging (which is one level of reality) while the bodies that we see and touch and feel are emergent properties and our level of reality. Maybe you would not refer to this as "levels of reality" but I would say that it's reasonable to refer to it that way.

Lucretius Book One:

[430] Besides these there is nothing which you could say is parted from all body and sundered from void, which could be discovered, as it were a third nature in the list. For whatever shall exist, must needs be something in itself; and if it suffer touch, however small and light, it will increase the count of body by a bulk great or maybe small, if it exists at all, and be added to its sum. But if it is not to be touched, inasmuch as it cannot on any side check anything from wandering through it and passing on its way, in truth it will be that which we call empty void. Or again, whatsoever exists by itself, will either do something or suffer itself while other things act upon it, or it will be such that things may exist and go on in it. But nothing can do or suffer without body, nor afford room again, unless it be void and empty space. And so besides void and bodies no third nature by itself can be left in the list of things, which might either at any time fall within the purview of our senses, or be grasped by any one through reasoning of the mind.

[449] For all things that have a name, you will find either properties linked to these two things or you will see them to be their accidents. That is a property which in no case can be sundered or separated without the fatal disunion of the thing, as is weight to rocks, heat to fire, moisture to water, touch to all bodies, intangibility to the void. On the other hand, slavery, poverty, riches, liberty, war, concord, and other things by whose coming and going the nature of things abides untouched, these we are used, as is natural, to call accidents. Even so time exists not by itself, but from actual things comes a feeling, what was brought to a close in time past, then what is present now, and further what is going to be hereafter. And it must be avowed that no man feels time by itself apart from the motion or quiet rest of things.

[464] Then again, when men say that ‘the rape of Tyndarus’s daughter’, or ‘the vanquishing of the Trojan tribes in war’ are things, beware that they do not perchance constrain us to avow that these things exist in themselves, just because the past ages have carried off beyond recall those races of men, of whom, in truth, these were the accidents. For firstly, we might well say that whatsoever has happened is an accident in one case of the countries, in another even of the regions of space. Or again, if there had been no substance of things nor place and space, in which all things are carried on, never would the flame of love have been fired by the beauty of Tyndaris, nor swelling deep in the Phrygian heart of Alexander have kindled the burning battles of savage war, nor unknown of the Trojans would the timber horse have set Pergama aflame at dead of night, when the sons of the Greeks issued from its womb. So that you may see clearly that all events from first to last do not exist, and are not by themselves like body, nor can they be spoken of in the same way as the being of the void, but rather so that you might justly call them the accidents of body and place, in which they are carried on, one and all.

Similar discussion in the letter to Herodotus:

[54] Moreover, we must suppose that the atoms do not possess any of the qualities belonging to perceptible things, except shape, weight, and size, and all that necessarily goes with shape. For every quality changes; but the atoms do not change at all, since there must needs be something which remains solid and indissoluble at the dissolution of compounds, which can cause changes; not changes into the nonexistent or from the non-existent, but changes effected by the shifting of position of some particles, and by the addition or departure of others. For this reason it is essential that the bodies which shift their position should be imperishable and should not possess the nature of what changes, but parts and configuration of their own. For thus much must needs remain constant.

[55] For even in things perceptible to us which change their shape by the withdrawal of matter it is seen that shape remains to them, whereas the qualities do not remain in the changing object, in the way in which shape is left behind, but are lost from the entire body. Now these particles which are left behind are sufficient to cause the differences in compound bodies, since it is essential that some things should be left behind and not be destroyed into the non-existent.

Moreover, we must not either suppose that every size exists among the atoms, in order that the evidence of phenomena may not contradict us, but we must suppose that there are some variations of size. For if this be the case, we can give a better account of what occurs in our feelings and sensations.

[56] But the existence of atoms of every size is not required to explain the differences of qualities in things, and at the same time some atoms would be bound to come within our ken and be visible; but this is never seen to be the case, nor is it possible to imagine how an atom could become visible.

And Todd also I realized in looking for the quotes that there are really lots of other observations in the book, and even in Book 4 where images are discussed, that could be used to bolster this argument, but which don't explicitly say "Two levels of reality." It's a good question as to how best to bring this out.

I would also site the Diogenes of Oinoanda point in support of this. The flux exists at the atomic level, but we can apprehend the result at our level:

Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

Yeah, I get the point. I guess I just don't like the sound of two levels of reality. Sounds dangerously close to "two realities".

Yep I agree, and yet this is the way everyone seems to want to address the issue, so we have to find a way to deal with the point convincingly. Maybe, as Kalosyni might say, even "metaphorically!"

Another way of stating my issue with the "two levels of reality" (or perhaps another problem with it)...

The so-called "two levels" are not actually any property (or accident) of reality. The two levels are a result of the limits of our ability to perceive reality. There is what we can perceive and what we cannot perceive. Reality is just what is.

If at some time in the distant future, humans evolved the ability to see (or otherwise perceive) atoms directly, would reality have changed in any way? No, only our ability to perceive it would have changed.

Quote from Todd

I'm not seeing anything in the Letter to Herodotus or Book 1 that I take to be suggesting 2 levels of reality. I only noticed some references to there being things we can see and things we can't see. (I was skimming quickly, so maybe I missed something.)

That seems a far cry from saying there are 2 levels of reality. You might as well say there are things we can smell and things we can't smell.

If anyone has a more specific reference for this "two levels" idea, I'd appreciate it.

Their describing "the level of atoms" as "timeless", versus "the level of the sensible world" which is "set in time" definitely has a Platonic tinge to it. This seems to contradict the way "time" is used in the Epistle To Herodotus:

"Moreover, their passage through the void [...] accomplishes every comprehensible distance in an inconceivably short time. [...] even in the least period of continuous time all the atoms in aggregate bodies move" (46b.1-62.7).

This goes back to Democritus:

νόμωι (γάρ φησι) γλυκὺ καὶ νόμωι πικρόν, νόμωι θερμόν, νόμωι ψυχρόν, νόμωι χροιή, ἐτεῆι δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν (Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, 9; Sext. Emp. adv. math. VII 135)

Sweet exists by convention, bitter by convention, colour by convention; atoms and Void [alone] exist in reality. (trans. Freeman 1948)[1], p. 92.

By convention sweet is sweet, bitter is bitter, hot is hot, cold is cold, color is color; but in truth there are only atoms and the void. (trans. Durant 1939)[2], Ch. XVI, §II, p. 353; citing C. Bakewell, Sourcebook in Ancient Philosophy, New York, 1909, "Fragment O" (Diels), p. 60

Along with Democritus's quote, it is a fact that sweet, bitter, and color are emergent properties of the atoms. Even my mind is an emergent property of my atoms that have no mind of their own. Atoms have no taste, color, etc., but in their configurations, they give rise to the phenomena of the cosmos which I experience on a day to day basis.

I personally have no problem accepting that there are "two levels" of reality, of the physical universe. I don't live in the realm of atoms, but I know its there. The fact that my physical senses that I feel are in reality *ultimately* composed of atoms and void doesn't make them any less real *for me.* Being composed of atoms doesn't lessen the "meaning" of my life (whatever that means... I'm not overly fond of the "M word.")

Thanks for the reminder of that Democritus quote, which Joshua cites regularly on the podcast. I don't know whether Democritus intended this in the original, or whether it is just an artifact of the translation, but it looks like the distinction between one level being real and another level being unreal goes back to Democritus himself. Did he know or intend that this formulation be taken to imply ethically that our world lacks "reality" such that we should view it as a mirage or illusion, or was it purely a scientific observation? Epicurus makes much the same observation, but by stressing that the senses are able to comprehend things (such as Diogenes of Oinoanda says about the flux) the resulting tone seems different.

Maybe Democritus' tone would seem different to us if we had more of his work, or maybe this was an area (like determinism) where Epicurus was modifying what Democritus had taught. Was Democritus laughing because he was truly happy, or was his laughter cynical and to the effect that people are nothing but whirling windbags of atoms bouncing around with no more intelligence than billiard balls?

Quote from Cassius

Maybe Democritus' tone would seem different to us if we had more of his work, or maybe this was an area (like determinism) where Epicurus was modifying what Democritus had taught.

You're right. Either is a possibility.

Quote from Cassius

Was Democritus laughing because he was truly happy, or was his laughter cynical and to the effect that people are nothing but whirling windbags of atoms bouncing around with no more intelligence than billiard balls?

My take has always been that Democritus is laughing because he doesn't take himself too seriously, in the end we're all atoms and void. I think he can laugh about people who get caught up in the rat race (to use a modern metaphor) and take themselves too seriously. People - all things! - really are *ultimately* nothing more than "whirling windbags of atoms." That doesn't mean in any way that we don't enjoy our lives at the level we experience them! But chill out! Take a breath! Carpe diem - pluck the fruit of each moment.

PS. From Heraclitus 's Wikipedia article:

Weeping philosopher

In Lucian of Samosata's "Philosophies for Sale," Heraclitus is auctioned off as the "weeping philosopher" alongside Democritus, who is known as the "laughing philosopher" part of the weeping and laughing philosopher motif. This pairing, which may have originated with the Cynic philosopher Menippus, has been portrayed several times in renaissance art, where it generally references their reactions to the folly of mankind.[better source needed] Heraclitus also appears in Raphael's School of Athens.

Quote from Don

My take has always been that Democritus is laughing because he doesn't take himself too seriously, in the end we're all atoms and void. I think he can laugh about people who get caught up in the rat race (to use a modern metaphor) and take themselves too seriously. People - all things! - really are *ultimately* nothing more than "whirling windbags of atoms." That doesn't mean in any way that we don't enjoy our lives at the level we experience them! But chill out! Take a breath! Carpe diem - pluck the fruit of each moment.

Yep the issue is that we have to both not take ourselves and our lives *too* seriously, while at the same time avoiding the pitfall of not taking ourselves and our lives seriously enough. Sort of like the perspective required in:

VS63. Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess.

To me this relates to the ongoing "metaphor" discussion in a nearby thread. In the end it might not be possible for many people to keep that proper balance between "not-too-serious" and "not-serious-enough" using purely intellectual analysis. Getting the result right seems to require metaphors/art/literature/music/etc to allow people to get an emotional grip on the situation in addition to an intellectual grip. And of course "health" is required too.

Quote from Cassius

I presume we are seeing a little roughness in the Greek to English translation, but aside from that what do you make of the list Nate? The "confirmed" and "cannot be confirmed" by the senses, but harder to tell about the "valid / invalid" labeling.

I am still deconstructing the expressions that the author employs to explain the principles of Epicurus’ analogical logic, so I am reserving an opinion about the second statements of each point.

For the most part, I find that the list coheres with the beginning of the Epistle To Herodotus and the elementary propositions defined therein. There are several items (as I predicted) which they organized as two separate points (infinite void and infinite particles being one example) instead of one. I think this is inevitable and mostly inconsequential. Like I mentioned before, I would be comfortable merging the first two propositions (no creation and no destruction) into one, though I am equally happy to recognize it as two, distinct points. Some of the points are two sides of the same observation, and can be appropriately expressed as such, so I am fine with those.

I think that some of their points are a little redundant. For example, 1. (that bodies exist) and 5. (that everything consists of bodies, except 6. void). Also, point 2. (the principle of linear, temporal causality, that one or more causes precede an effect) seems to be implied by 3. and 4. (that nothing is born out of nothing, and that nothing is annihilated). Also, points 7. (atoms having an unchanging and unbroken existence) and 8. (atoms being impenetrable) seem to be derivative of 4. (nothing being annihilated) so I would not personally include them. Point 14. (no divine intervention) seems implied by their recognition of 2. (things have temporal causes) and 5. (everything is made of bodies).

As Todd mentioned, 18. seems almost Platonic, and I do not find support for this proposition in Epicurus’ texts. I may be missing something in translation, but at this point I do not accept this one.

I will need to dig through what the author calls "analogical" and "Aristotelian logic" because I imagine that this criterion helped them organize each of their points, even when some seem (to me) to be redundant.

Quote from Nate

As Todd mentioned, #18 seems almost Platonic, and I do not find support for this proposition in Epicurus’ texts. I may be missing something in translation, but at this point I do not accept this one.

They also claim that this is proven because the opposite is invalid.

What is the opposite of 2 levels of reality? One, three, ten? Zero? Offhand, I can think of atomic/sub-atomic, molecular, cellular, <whatever you want to call the human-scale things>, geological, cosmological. I'm sure there are others, and also that the people who specialize in those fields break them down even further.

I'd be happy to talk about different aspects of reality instead of levels. "Aspect" implies an observer, rather than something inherent in the thing observed.

Quote from Nate

As Todd mentioned, #18 seems almost Platonic, and I do not find support for this proposition in Epicurus’ texts. I may be missing something in translation, but at this point I do not accept this one.

I don't like the "levels" in 18. That doesn't sound right. One text that ***maybe*** gets at 18's sentiment is from the end of the epistle to Herodotus:

Quote

81] "There is yet one more point to seize, namely, that the greatest anxiety of the human mind arises through the belief that the heavenly bodies are blessed and indestructible, and that at the same time they have volitions and actions and causality inconsistent with this belief ; and through expecting or apprehending some everlasting evil, either because of the myths, or because we are in dread of the mere insensibility of death, as if it had to do with us ; and through being reduced to this state not by conviction but by a certain irrational perversity, so that, if men do not set bounds to their terror, they endure as much or even more intense anxiety than the man whose views on these matters are quite vague. [82] But mental tranquillity (ἀταραξία ataraxia) means being released from all these troubles and cherishing a continual remembrance of the highest and most important truths.

[82] ...καὶ συνεχῆ μνήμην ἔχειν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κυριωτάτων.

... and having a constant memory...

τῶν ὅλων "of the whole"

(Interestingly τὸ ὅλον can also mean the universe, as in "the whole thing!"; differing from τὸ πᾶν, as implying a definite order)

... and κυριωτάτων of the highest/most important things.

(the superlative of κύριος kyrios as in κυριαι δοξαι Kyriai Doxai "Principle Doctrines")

I take that to mean we need to constantly remember that everything is reducible to atoms and void. Everything! If we remember that, we won't be fooled into looking for supernatural causes and all the rest.

Richard Dawkins proposed a line of thinking several years ago that might shed light on the whole "different levels of reality" issue. He suggested four different 'worlds' that living organisms might model for themselves in order to be better suited for their own size and speed;

• Atomic Scale (hypothetical)
• Microbe/Insect scale
• Animal Scale
• Cosmic Scale (Hypothetical)

Essentially what he's doing is extrapolating from the two middle scales outward in both directions to get to the hypothetical edges. The edges are hypothetical not because the don't exist in reality, but because there are no known organisms that operate in such a way as to require them to successfully model physics at those scales. In reality, there are more "worlds" modeled than the ones above--for example, blue herons model movement under water far better than humans do, because herons stand above the surface of water and hunt fast moving prey below it. Another example; creatures that live in ocean depths would model their world differently to those on dry land, or to those floating on air currents high above land. And further; the strange ability of hive insects to find their way back to the hive by 'recording' distance and estimating angles. There are apparently ants that can do this, or something very much like it.

Here's the general idea; at different scales, different physical forces interact in interesting ways. Here's one example; humans can't stand on water, but some insects can. At the insect scale, the forces of surface tension and air friction "outweigh" the force of gravity. They can walk on water, fall from high places without injury, etc. The result of this is that insects will be better fit for survival if they can successfully model surface tension, and humans will be better fit for survival if they can successfully model gravity. Nature is the same at each scale, but its implications for living things are different. If you were to imagine a whale-like animal the size of an asteroid that could live in space, the whale would need to successfully model things like the two body problem, inertial movement in a frictionless environment, how to use gravity wells as 'slingshots', and how to avoid falling into them--precisely the kinds of things that NASA needs to model when sending out probes and shuttles.

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For more information:

• A short Wikipedia page on this topic.
• This TEDtalk starting around the five minute mark.

It's certainly important to understand the issue of perspective, and it's pretty direct to illustrate the issue according to size. That works well.

I wonder if there is any other category of concern that we are seeing when we consider these formulations to be Platonic and therefore objectionable.

Is it a full statement of the issue to boil it down to "if there's another level of reality, then our level of reality is therefore less important (sort of a slippery slope to a nihilistic "our reality doesn't matter" perspective)?

If you see what I am asking, I am saying I think that what I have described (probably poorly) is probably the major issue. I am wondering if there are any other or related issues involved other than this?

From my perspective, I see 4 issues (but I reserve the right to identify more!)

1. Levels. This is just about terminology to me. I don't think I have any concerns about the ideas being described (so far as I understand them). But "2 levels of reality" sounds Platonic. It sounds kind of close to "2 realities". As Cassius has noted, if there are multiple levels, is one better, or more important somehow? It also has kind of a gnostic tinge...like there is secret knowledge about other levels of reality that will eventually be revealed to those who progress in their studies. Just everything about the word feels wrong to me. All this would be resolved by just using "aspect" or some other word instead of "levels". To me, this is about clarity of explanation.
2. Two. If there are multiple levels or aspects, why only 2?
3. Timeless. I think I know where they're getting this from. If they just mean "eternal" or always existing, I'm fine with that, I just think they should use a different word. I suspect they may mean something else, and I would disagree. I'd be happy to expand if anyone wants to dive into it.
4. I don't think this idea deserves to be elevated to the level of a fundamental principle, or whatever they are calling them. As I've said before, this is not even an attribute of reality. It is a matter of the perspective of the observer.