I guess there does have to be a balance though, because it would also be awkward to translate between the Epicurean texts and the "modern, plain English" meanings.
Perspectives On "Proving" That Pleasure is "The Good"
Regularly Checking In On A Small Screen Device? Bookmark THIS page!
-
But don't you think all these different meanings of "good" is contributing to the problem?
Of course, we do need to untangle all that and understand what Epicurus was actually saying. Definitely.
But I think we need better terminology if we're planning to make any kind of outreach.
Agreed. We have (1) "good" the general adjective to refer to "being favorable"; we have (2) a "good" which is a philosophical category of virtues, we have (3) "good" used poetically by Epicurus to express Pleasure with respect to virtues, and we have (4) "The Good" which is the Goal in life toward which all other goods are instrumental.
I think, just in terms of making our vocabulary work for us and not against us, we can refer to "goods" as "virtues" or "instruments", and then "The Good" can be identified, variously, as "The Goal", The "End", or "The Telos".
Otherwise, it takes a more advanced understanding to deconstruct the fact that "goods are good because they lead to The Good, which is the first and last good, but not a good like the other goods, and also, not the highest good, which is the best good among goods, but the best good among goods is not The Good, which is technically not a good at all."
-
translate between the Epicurean texts and the "modern, plain English" meanings.
That's always the issue with texts originally written in a foreign language which we don't read. We (and I'm including myself here!) are at the mercy of translators and scholars, but they bring their own biases and interpretations. That's why I tend to use multiple English words where the texts have one, to try and pull out some nuances. Even if we spoke *modern* Greek, we'd still be at a disadvantage.
To pull this back to "good," that word has it's own semantic baggage in English but it's been decided over the decades that that's a "good" enough "equivalent" to αγαθός. It's important to remember that, but it's what we have to work with.
-
But then he goes on to say that the highest good is prudence. It seems that Epicurus said this, so he's on solid ground there.
Right. The highest *instrumental* good thing.
Nevertheless, I think it is useless and counter-productive to even discuss a "highest good" once you have established that pleasure is not it.
I don't think we've established that.
And providing the most pleasure is the only criteria we have to consider a good "highest", right?
No. We're getting hung up on the word "highest" here. It's not a value like "best." Well, in a way but not primarily. It's the highest at the summit towards which all other good things point. Or, within this discussion, to which all other good things serve as instrumental things.
And even if you could find one "highest good", so what? Are there some important goods that almost everyone will want to have? Sure. And Epicurean ethics should talk about those. But there is no need for a universal ranking to apply to everyone in all circumstances.
It's not a ranking. We're not putting good things into a hierarchy. I'll get to Epicurus's prudence in a moment. I've had this discussion with Cassius before, too. Pleasure is the only good thing that doesn't point to something else. That's what makes it the "highest", telos, goal, summum bonum, etc. The cheese stands alone, to use the Old McDonald had a Farm song. Practical wisdom/prudence can be characterized as the most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing (not The Good) because it is through this virtue that we're able to make them best decisions for what pleasures to choose and from which pleasures to flee. Butt it's still subordinate to and instrumental for achieving pleasure.
And so the foundation of all these and the greatest good (τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν) is φρόνησις, practical wisdom. On this account, practical wisdom is prized more dearly than philosophy itself, and from practical wisdom springs forth all the remaining virtues, teaching us that a pleasurable life does not exist without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; nor do the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice without pleasure: because the virtues grow together with a pleasurable life and the pleasurable life is inseparable from these.
-
If I could think of a way I would bookmark this discussion under "cautions to think about when reading Torquatus.". Maybe all of us don't come to the same conclusion DeWitt does as to life rather than pleasure being the "highest good," but Torquatus himself labels his own view as not totally in accord with Epicurus, so we need to continue to question whether the way he sets up the dialogue (an inquiry into the highest good) is really the way Epicurus approached things at all. Maybe Dewitt started the ball rolling in questioning Torquatus but didn't go far enough.
I am getting more and more comfortable that it is Lucretius rather than Torquatus who is the more orthodox Epicurean, and I think we are better off looking to Lucretius' format (start with looking at what drives all of Nature) rather than launching off in a Platonic-style dialog on "what is the highest good" before answering all sorts of other questions first.
Starting the discussion in the middle of a complex semantic debate over the meaning of words seems to be very much what Epicurus' warned against.
-
launching off in a Platonic-style dialog on "what is the highest good" before answering all sorts of other questions first.
From a historical perspective, I think the highest good idea was a relic of idealism
Epicurean philosophy should reject the entire concept of the highest good.
I won't presume you are endorsing my quotes, but that was one of my very first points! (this morning)
-
For anyone who's interested, here's a similar thread:
-
There are 2 relevant concepts:
Pleasure (aka The Good, The End, Telos)
goodsIf at all, where do you include the term "guide" in that division? Because I think Dia voluptas, dux vitae is sound basis for considering guide/leader as a key concept that may not clearly be included in either of those two, and meaning something more than lower-case good as one among many instrumentalities.
-
There are 2 relevant concepts:
Pleasure (aka The Good, The End, Telos)
goodsIf at all, where do you include the term "guide" in that division? Because I think Dia voluptas, dux vitae is sound basis for considering guide/leader as a key concept that may not clearly be included in either of those two, and meaning something more than lower-case good as one among many instrumentalities.
I'm not entirely clear what you mean by "guide". If you mean "pleasure is the guide", I can add that under the akas for pleasure.
If you mean something else, I don't think I would add it at all.
But where would you add it?
I want to keep concepts to a minimum. In general, but especially until we have agreement on these.
-
Your current division concerns me in that "feeling" strikes me as a faculty, as a result of which I gather that it was included in the standard of truth along with the five senses and anticipations.
"The Good / End/ Telos" appears to me to designate a destination or a concept describing an overall assessment.
In the case of "goods" -those seem to me to be instrumentalities useful to attaining pleasure, such as friendship or virtue or hammers.But as "faculty" akin to the five senses or anticipations, it seems to me that the feeling of pleasure (and likewise pain) is neither a destination or itself a simple instrumentality that we pick up and use as circumstances allow. It is a key component bestowed by nature that alone serves as the guide of life so long as we live. Now that may be not far from "goods" or "standard" as you are defining it, but it seems to me that it is so essential, while most everything else seems secondary in rank, that this function should not be left ambiguous.
-
Your current division concerns me in that "feeling" strikes me as a faculty, as a result of which I gather that it was included in the standard of truth along with the five senses and anticipations.
I'm thinking about ethics right now. And just the very basic ethical concepts. I have 2 more suggestions that I want to propose next, but I'd like to make sure there is some agreement on the these first, and that I'm not misstating or overlooking any viewpoints.
Not trying to list all the concepts involved in ethics, much less the entire philosophy!
"The Good / End/ Telos" appears to me to designate a destination or a concept describing an overall assessment.
Don't care (right now) how these terms were used in ancient Greece generally. I care how we would understand them as Epicureans. And I think to us they are just other words that describe pleasure.
-
I have not seen anyone arguing that there is overlap between those 2 categories - that pleasure is also a type of lower-case good. Is that correct?
Unfortunately, I don't think I'm onboard with that.
There are no "lower case" goods. From what I read, there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category and there is "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good").
I know Eikadistes said earlier in the thread that The Good wasn't a good (and I'm paraphrasing from memory so feel free to correct me!), but I'm not so sure about that.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Α α, , ἀγαθο-εργέω , ἀγα^θός
-
Unfortunately, I don't think I'm onboard with that.
There are no "lower case" goods. From what I read, there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category and there is "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good").
Dammit, Don !
I could have sworn I saw you say that in the other thread. But that's fine. Can't force agreement.
-
Wait! Maybe I just don't understand.
Unfortunately, I don't think I'm onboard with that.
There are no "lower case" goods. From what I read, there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category and there is "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good")
When I say "lower-case goods", I mean "goods" as a category. What distinction are you making there?
