Perspectives On "Proving" That Pleasure is "The Good"

Ha my bad memory prevents me from disagreeing with you about my saying something pessimistic!

But maybe what I said then is something I still repeat - that while this is true sometimes, it's unfortunately not always true -

Quote from Todd

The battle is half won! We don't need to convince people to pursue pleasure.

As per a post I made earlier this afternoon, I think the real heart of Epicurus is not to help everyone go along their same merry way, just better calculating the expectable results in terms of pain vs pleasure (although that is indeed a part).

Unfortunately the battle is far from won against religion and false philosophies to accept that happiness *should be* the goal of life. Far too many people want to ignore Epicurus' views on the nature of the universe and the proper approach to knowledge, and cling to their existing religious and ethical views, and in so doing they miss the thrust and the long term benefit . They still haven't - and refuse to - admit that there is no "good" other than what derives from pleasure. (Which is the danger I think you and I are agreeing on in too easily thinking that our own personal preferences as to politics or anything else are necessarily synonymous with "the good."

And one reason for that is that inevitably in life crises will occur, and the standard calculation of maximizing pleasure over pain becomes very difficult to apply. That's in addition to the many who have already fallen into despair and find that they can't relate to a "pleasure" focus at all. If we aren't prepared on the "physics" and the "epistemology" then the emotional pain of the moment can easily cause us to fall back into despair or nihilism or both far too easily - or fail to climb out of it if we are already there.

Of course I don't think that's a "pessimistic" outlook - but I do think that were Epicurus here today he would stress those aspects of his philosophy as much or more than the psychology. In fact I think he would probably say "Look how little it has gotten you to focus on material wealth and the pleasures of the moment and how you still fail to understand your place in the universe and how to resist logical word games that have you as doubtful as ever about the ability to know anything at all."

Not disagreeing with you as much as using the opportunity to dig in as deep as possible on all the merits of Epicurus.

Absolutely agreed on all points in post 62. I presume you saw her article focusing on the stoic angle that is linked in the first post of this thread?

What Todd says about pleasure is something I mentioned on the podcast, I think in the first episode of the Torquatus material or near it.

Since I'm certain I did a poor job of explaining it then, I'll summarize a variation of the same idea.

1. Epicurus uses the example of infants and newborn animals to demonstrate the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain descriptively.

2. He proceeds by noticing that the condition of the infant is one unburdened by culture, education, sophistication, bias, social expectation, rationalization and so on.

3. The unwritten premise: that infancy, free from all of those, and directed in its pursuits only by nature itself, is the best guide to uncovering the proper end of life.

4. The normative conclusion: that the proper end of life is the pursuit of pleasure, and the avoidance of pain.

The descriptive premise (that pleasure is pursued as the goal) and the normative conclusion (that pleasure should be pursued as the goal) are connected, and I think inextricably so.

Infants and animals were examples used in ancient Greece to make an argument for pleasure, both "do" and "ought." Today we have neuroscientific research, such as Barrett, Lembke and others, to provide the "do." (I don't have more specifics at hand; just seeing if this will advance the discussion.) Then the task becomes getting to "ought." I've personally never found formal logic at all convincing. I tend toward more practical means, such as "if we understand that pleasure and pain are guides to our behavior, doesn't it make good sense to understand how best to work with them? Why not try it out for a while and evaluate your results?"

But I'm uncertain as to the posts between Todd and Joshua and where they're going....

Oh, I just noticed Todd 's edit; we cross posted. It makes more sense now.

Responding on the Epicurus argument, as I understand it it is simply an observation that the command to pursue pleasure and avoid pain is imprinted by Nature, and we know this because we observe through our senses that infants of all living types do it before they are corrupted by arguments in any direction otherwise. And of course in most cases (other than human) no other living being is ever corrupted away from that direction unless clearly by disease or some similar defect.

Now the question of whether we "should" follow nature as adults is something that people certainly have different opinions on, based on all sorts of logic and supernatural revelation. That's the classic argument of Cicero and others that we are not cows - we are somehow "better" than that. But I think Epicurus is saying that it is THOSE arguments which are flimsy. No constructs of the human mind carry the weight by which we should consider them valid to overturn the clear dictate of nature.

Of course people who consider logic and reason to be handed down from on high, or somehow "higher" than nature in any way, will never agree to this form of reasoning. But the observation and conclusion make perfect sense to me, and that's why Epicurus refused to accept that logical reasoning can or should be consulted in order to prove that pleasure is to be pursued and pain avoided.

That's where the dividing line is drawn. If nature provides us no direct leading as to what to avoid and what to pursue other than pleasure and pain, then no amount of argument and no type of logic can ever be accepted to contradict that leadership from nature - if we are to accept nature and not our own brainpower as the ultimate standard.

And this is why the canonics of Epicurus is so important, because it's in this field that we clearly and affirmatively take the position that abstract logical reasoning - divorced from observations based on nature - can never be allowed to trump the clear dictates of nature itself. Ignore the canonics and the physics with which it is intertwined and you''ll never be able to have confidence that this is the right conclusion.

And just so I can go on record as potentially offending everyone in the conversation , that's why I have only limited interest in the modern 'research' --

Quote from Godfrey

Today we have neuroscientific research, such as Barrett, Lembke and others, to provide the "do." (I don't have more specifics at hand; just seeing if this will advance the discussion.)

No amount of "research' is going to convince me more firmly of the truth of Epicurus' conclusion beyond my own observations of the young of all animals - exactly as Epicurus specified. This research and these arguments are interesting and perhaps helpful to some. But I would say that the dictate of nature to pursue pleasure and avoid pain is not something that needs to be proven, or really can be "proven," beyond the clear evidence that has been available to everyone to see for 3000 years (and really much longer than that).

This is why discussing these things is so helpful. It's on *this* issue where Epicurus stands or falls as a philosopher, and where he breaks the chains of both supernatural religion and false philosophy. The hedonic calculus and other practical observations on how to view and pursue pleasure are just icing on the cake. *This* - a confident basis for taking the position that we know pleasure to be "the good" - is the issue on which everything stands or falls.

I do think that modern research has largely been a confirmation of Epicurus' position, which I find informative. There's no reason to take what he said "on faith" when it makes intuitive sense and has empirical confirmation. His original reasoning has been confirmed, to the point where many of his detractors words throughout the centuries look pretty ridiculous now.

Todd I think the direction you are talking about would make for a really important discussion but we probably ought to branch it off from this thread on the Austin book. If you get time could you tee up that question under a new title, because I think it would help a lot if we had a thread on it - especially since you've had time to think about the issues for several years now, - would make for a good discussion that should be findable in the future.

Quote from Todd

A theory grounded in reality, of course, but still a theory. This is might be a corrosive desire.

I don't think that's a corrosive desire at all -- at least it's not corrosive to consider the question and try to come to a resting place on what is possible and what is not.

This from Pythocles seems applicable:

Quote from Letter to Pythocles

[86] We must not try to force an impossible explanation, nor employ a method of inquiry like our reasoning either about the modes of life or with respect to the solution of other physical problems: witness such propositions as that ‘the universe consists of bodies and the intangible,’ or that ‘the elements are indivisible,' and all such statements in circumstances where there is only one explanation which harmonizes with phenomena. For this is not so with the things above us: they admit of more than one cause of coming into being and more than one account of their nature which harmonizes with our sensations.

[87] For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principles, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.

Now all goes on without disturbance as far as regards each of those things which may be explained in several ways so as to harmonize with what we perceive, when one admits, as we are bound to do, probable theories about them. But when one accepts one theory and rejects another, which harmonizes as well with the phenomenon, it is obvious that he altogether leaves the path of scientific inquiry and has recourse to myth.

Display More

Quote from Todd

I feel like I want a theory. A theory grounded in reality, of course, but still a theory. This is might be a corrosive desire.

This is an interesting way to phrase that (and I'm meaning that as a positive thing not a criticism).

Could you share what you think of when you say "theory"? Would you have an example from another philosophy or religion (not that you necessarily agree with; just an example)? Or what you'd want the theory to be in Epicurean philosophy.

I think I will go ahead and break this into a new thread....

I've been searching for ways to strengthen the infant argument for some time now. I think you're correct in casting scrutiny upon its value in instructing others. One of the largest hurdles of speaking to others about the philosophy is trying to get someone to recognize the value of pleasure and why it shouldn't be shunned.

We may very well take to pointing to nature as "proof" but to someone unconvinced or highly skeptical, we're pointing to infantile bodily reactions and processes, something not wholly convincing in itself.

Quote from Todd

but I'll need to try to collect my thoughts a bit more to keep this from becoming a rambling stream-of-consciousness on my end.

Don't let that worry you too much!

Also:

To me what you are bringing up reminds me of this which Frances Wright addresses in her Chapter 15. I am not at all sure that what she is writing is what Epicurus would say, and in fact I think she goes significantly further and off in a different direction than Epicurus did. But the description of the topic I think is very much on point, and deciding whether what she says is right or consistent with Epicurus might help people think about what is really involved in the question of "theory" in the first place. Is this correct? - "In philosophy — that is, in knowledge — inquiry is everything; theory and hypothesis are worse than nothing."

Quote from Frances Wright A Few Days In Athens Chapter 15

“I admit the truth of the metaphor,” said Theon. “But may we not simplify too much as well as too little? May we not push investigation beyond the limits assigned to human reason, and, with a boldness approaching to profanity, tear, without removing, the veil which enwraps the mysteries of creation from our scrutiny?”

“Without challenging the meaning of the terms you have employed,” said Metrodorus, “I would observe, that there is little danger of our pushing investigation too far. Unhappily the limits prescribed to us by our few and imperfect senses must ever cramp the sphere of our observation, as compared to the boundless range of things; and that even when we shall have strained and improved our senses to the uttermost. We trace an effect to a cause, and that cause to another cause, and so on, till we hold some few links of a chain, whose extent like the charmed circle, is without beginning as without end.”

“I apprehend the difficulties,” observed Leontium, “which embarrass the mind of our young friend. Like most aspirants after knowledge, he has a vague and incorrect idea of what he is pursuing, and still more, of what may be attained. In the schools you have hitherto frequented,” she continued, addressing the youth, “certain images of virtue, vice, truth, knowledge, are presented to the imagination, and these abstract qualities, or we may call them, figurative beings, are made at once the objects of speculation and adoration. A law is laid down, and the feelings and opinions of men are predicated upon it; a theory is built, and all animate and inanimate nature is made to speak in its support; an hypothesis is advanced, and all the mysteries of nature are treated as explained. You have heard of, and studied various systems of philosophy; but real philosophy is opposed to all systems. Her whole business is observation; and the results of that observation constitute all her knowledge. She receives no truths, until she has tested them by experience; she advances no opinions, unsupported by the testimony of facts; she acknowledges no virtue, but that involved in beneficial actions; no vice, but that involved in actions hurtful to ourselves or to others. Above all, she advances no dogmas, — is slow to assert what is, — and calls nothing impossible.

The science of philosophy is simply a science of observation, both as regards the world without us, and the world within; and, to advance in it, are requisite only sound senses, well developed and exercised faculties, and a mind free of prejudice. The objects she has in view, as regards the external world, are, first, to see things as they are, and secondly, to examine their structure, to ascertain their properties, and to observe their relations one to the other. — As respects the world within, or the philosophy of mind, she has in view, first, to examine our sensations, or the impressions of external things on our senses; which operation involves, and is involved in, the examination of those external things themselves: secondly, to trace back to our sensations, the first development of all our faculties; and again, from these sensations, and the exercise of our different faculties as developed by them, to trace the gradual formation of our moral feelings, and of all our other emotions: thirdly, to analyze all these our sensations, thoughts, and emotions, — that is, to examine the qualities of our own internal, sentient matter, with the same, and yet more, closeness of scrutiny, than we have applied to the examination of the matter that is without us: finally, to investigate the justness of our moral feelings, and to weigh the merit and demerit of human actions; which is, in other words, to judge of their tendency to produce good or evil, — to excite pleasurable or painful feelings in ourselves or others. You will observe, therefore, that, both as regards the philosophy of physics, and the philosophy of mind, all is simply a process of investigation. It is a journey of discovery, in which, in the one case, we commission our senses to examine the qualities of that matter, which is around us, and, in the other, endeavor, by attention to the varieties of our consciousness, to gain a knowledge of those qualities of matter which constitute our susceptibilities of thought and feeling.”

“This explanation is new to me,” observed Theon, “and I will confess, startling to my imagination. It is pure materialism!”

“You may so call it,” rejoined Leontiurn, “But when you have so called it — what then? The question remains: is it true? or is it false?”

“I should be disposed to say — false, since it confounds all my preconceived notions of truth and error, of right and wrong.”

“Of truth and error, of right and wrong, in the sense of correct or incorrect is, I presume, your meaning,” said Leontium. “You do not involve moral rectitude or the contrary in a matter of opinion?”

“If the opinion have a moral or immoral tendency I do,” said the youth.

“A simple matter of fact can have no such tendency or ought not, if we are rational creatures.”

“And would not, if we were always reasoning beings,” said Metrodorus; “but as the ignorance and superstition which surround our infancy and youth, favor the development of the imagination at the expense of the judgment, we are ever employed in the coining of chimeras, rather than in the discovery of truths; and if ever the poor judgment make an effort to dispel these fancies of the brain, she is repulsed, like a sacrilegious intruder into religious mysteries.”

“Until our opinions are made to rest on facts,” said Leontium, “the error of our young friend — the most dangerous of all errors, being one of principle and involving many — must ever pervade the world. And it was because I suspected this leading misconception of the very nature — of the very end and aim of the science he is pursuing, that I attempted an explanation of what should be sought, and of what can alone be attained. In philosophy — that is, in knowledge — inquiry is everything; theory and hypothesis are worse than nothing. Truth is but approved facts. Truth, then, is one with the knowledge of these facts. To shrink from inquiry, is to shrink from knowledge. And to prejudge an opinion as true or false, because it interferes with some preconceived abstraction we call vice or virtue, is as if we were to draw the picture of a man we had never seen, and then, upon seeing him, were to dispute his being the man in question, because unlike our picture.”

“But if this opinion interfered with another, of whose truth we imagined ourselves certain.”

“Then clearly, in one or the other, we are mistaken; and the only way to settle the difficulty is to examine and compare the evidences of both.”

Display More

The discussion goes on further from there but that part is probably the heart of the question. What is the proper attitude toward "theory"?