Preconceptions and PD24

I'm going to re-visit this, but I need a placeholder.

As I'm translating into 10.50 of the Epistle to Hēródotos, I am finding a shit-ton of employments of phantastikai epibolai tês dianoias as τὴν φαντασίαν, φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, τῶν φαντασμῶν, τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας , τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, and I am sure many others. He specifically starts throwing around this phrase when discussing the mechanics of sight.

He drops this phrase (as I recall) once in the KD, and once (I think) by Diogénēs Laértios in his own description. As it turns out Ep. Hēr. provides us with a real wealth of examples of this phrase.

... also, neither here nor there, but I detect a tone of admonishment from Epíkouros toward Hērodotos.

All right, so, this is by no means authoritative, but I did my best to try to illustrate what I understand to be the semantic context of these phrases, primarily found in 10.49-52:

"Theories of Vision

49 It is necessary then also to know [that the] impinging [of images occurs] on account of a certain thing from the outside [that enables] us to observe and to consider, since the nature [of objects] cannot be impressed [while we are] removed from the [objects] themselves, as [in the case] of an [object’s] color and of an [object’s] morphology [as though this these qualities could be extrapolated] from the air that [rests] between both of us and of the [objects as Aristotélēs says], nor [could it] on account of the “rays” [or “beams“] or whatever [is believed] of those presenting streams [of Empedoklḗs and Pláton], as a result of us [directing our gaze] toward those [objects]; therefore, just as in the case of some impressions [that are] impinging [upon] us [as] a result of both the colorful realities and of like morphologies concerning a harmonious magnitude [entering]into [either] the face or the mind, they are being swiftly assailed [by] the [atomic] forces, ⁵⁰[and] then because of the latter[forcible] cause of that one [magnitude], both of [a] constant [stream of particles] yielding a [perceptual] phantasm¹⁵ and an[affective] sympathy as a result of the observing, [they] are [both] being established thereafter by symmetrical impact out of a [body] by breadth at the [immensely] fast [movement] of the pulsing of the uncuttable [particles]. And we could have immediately apprehended this applicative phantasm [within] the mind¹⁶ or [else could have apprehended] the sensations either [in the case] of [a body’s physical] morphology or of [a body’s qualitative] attributes.

Fact, Fiction, and Fantasia

That morphology exists [as] a solid [structure since] an [appearance] is being generated sequentially by a concentration or residue of the eídṓlou; moreover, a pseudodoxy, as [compared with] a [true belief], has gone astray from the [observable reality that] is being experienced [and] perpetually [that reality] exists. <In the case of what remains> to be confirmed or to be contradicted, either it will be confirmed <or it will be contradicted> (in respect of some motion within us [that] is [in]ourselves being merged with the creative application [of the mind],¹⁷ then possessing [such a] judgment, the pseudodoxy is being generated by that [creative application that can be either true or false]). ⁵¹For also that likeness of the [perceptual] phantasms¹⁸ [that] are being grasped as by [an] image are being generated, either in respect of [dreaming like during] slumbers or in respect of some other applications of the mind,¹⁹ or it could not actually be of the remaining criteria [of truth]— at some point it can have been arising [from] The Real just as true [statements] are being addressed, if [indeed] it was not a certain something, and in such manner besides that which we were apprehending; but having gone astray [from the facts], the proposition could could not have been arising [from Nature’s kanṓn], whether [or not] we were not grasping [the truth] and [instead preferred to follow] some other [persuasive] motion in us ourselves [that] is indeed being combined [to produce] a creative application²⁰ [that] is being engaged; moreover, [this faculty] is [capable of] possessing [reliable] judgment, but again if [the faculty] was [either] not [capable of] confirming or [if] it was contradicting the [evidence], a pseudodoxy is being generated; but, if it was being confirmed, or [at least] was not being contradicted, [then] the [proposition is] true."

And here are the corresponding footnotes, describing each declension:

15. τὴν φαντασίαν (tḗn phantasían) meaning “a phantasm” or “the fantasy“.
— τὴν (tḗn) – (fem. acc. sing.) – “a“, “the“.
— φαντασίαν (phantasían) – (n. sing. acc.) meaning a “appearance“, “presentation“, “display“. ↩︎

16. λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ (lámbōmen phantasían épiblētikõs têi dianoíai), the “applicative fantasy” in “the mind“.
— λάβωμεν (lámbōmen) – (v. 1st. pl. aor.) meaning “we received“, “we seized“, “we understood“, “we grasped“, “we apprehended“.
— φαντασίαν (phantasían) – (n. sing. acc.) meaning “appearance“, “presentation“, “display“, “phantasm“, “fantasy“, “creative [application]”.
— ἐπιβλητικῶς (épiblētikõs) – (adj. pl. acc.) meaning “apprehending immediately“, “apprehending directly, “quickly“, or “applicative“.
— τῇ (têi) – (art. fem. dat. sing.) meaning “a“, “the [mind]“.
— διανοίᾳ (dianoíai) – (n. dat. sing.) meaning “intention“, “purpose“, “thinking“, “mind“, “understanding“. ↩︎

17. τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ (têi phantastikéi épiboléi) or “a creative” or “the creative application” of the mind.
— τῇ (têi) – (fem. dat. sing.) meaning “a“, “the [application]”.
— φανταστικῇ (phantastikéi) – (adj. dat. sing.) meaning “creative“, “productive“, “fantastic“.
— ἐπιβολῇ (épiboléi) – (n. sing. masc. dat.) meaning “throwing“, “apprehending“, “application“, “projection“. ↩︎

18. τῶν φαντασμῶν (tṓn phantasmṓn) or “of the phantasms“, “of the appearances“, “of the fantasies [of the mind]“.
— τῶν (tṓn) – (art. gen. pl) meaning “of the [phantasms]”.
— φαντασμῶν (phantasmṓn) – (n. gen. pl) meaning “of phantasms“, “mental images“, “vain imaginings“, “visions“. ↩︎

19. ἄλλας τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας (állas tinàs épibolàs tḗs dianoías) meaning “some other application of the mind“.
— ἄλλας (állas) – (adj. fem. acc. pl.) meaning “other“, “another“, “different“, “else“, “yet“, “still“.
— τινὰς (tinàs) – (pron. masc. fem. acc. pl.) meaning “some“.
— ἐπιβολὰς (épibolàs) – (n. sing. acc. pl.) meaning “apprehending“, “application“, “throwing“, “reaching“.
— τῆς (tḗs) – (art. gen. sing. fem.) meaning “of a [thought]”, “of the [mind]”.
— διανοίας (dianoías) – (gen. sing.) meaning “mind“. ↩︎

20. τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ (têi phantastikéi épiboléi) or “a creative” or “the creative application” of the mind.
— τῇ (têi) – (fem. dat. sing.) meaning “a“, “the [application]”.
— φανταστικῇ (phantastikéi) – (adj. dat. sing.) meaning “creative“, “productive“, “fantastic“.
— ἐπιβολῇ (épiboléi) – (n. sing. masc. dat.) meaning “throwing“, “apprehending“, “application“, “projection“. ↩︎

The other two examples are found in Key Doctrine 24 and Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.

This placement in 10.62 is interesting: he presents a scenario where the ἐπιβολὴν λαμβανόμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ (épibolēn lampanómenon têi dianoíai), the "apprehending being grasped [by] the intellect" ἐστι ἀληθές or "is true", verus it being false under dissimilar conditions.

More and more, it seems to me that there is no, true "Fourth Criterion" of the Kanon because Epíkouros, himself, writes that one such apprehension "is true" but another such "is false". However, that does not mean this, true apprehension is un-useful in having coherence with reality.

Also, based on the consistency with which this phrase is re-employed, combined with the naturalistic language he uses when making analogies, I think he supposes that thinking, itself, can reliably be said to be like a fisherman purposefully casting a net in meaningful directions to catch thoughts.