Confidence in Katastematic Pleasure

    This thread grows out of another thread, specifically my "soapboxing" posts that were a response to @A_Gardner and @Cassius where I "took a stand for ataraxia."

    For those who don't want too much review, my primary contentions were:

    1. Epicurus advocates strengthening a quiet, calm, anxiety-free mind.
    2. Equanimity/tranquility/ataraxia is available at all times, even under duress and trying circumstances.
    3. IF we can cultivate ataraxia, we have a much better chance of making a good choice to remove, move around, or avoid the "obstacle to pleasure" than we would if we get anxious, feel "psychological unrest" or get agitated or fearful.
    4. Tranquility / ataraxia are not the "goal of life" but Epicurus stresses over and over the importance of freedom from disturbance in the mind and "pain in the body" (I have a problem with this kind of translation of aponia, but we'll leave that for another time.) (Still not that time btw :) )
    5. PLEASURE is the goal, and tranquility is pleasure, freedom from anxiety is pleasure, but it is pleasure that is always available to us which is why Epicurus places such importance on it - NOT exclusionary importance as the ONLY pleasure we should pursue but of significant and paramount importance to give us the possibility of the best pleasurable life possible in addition to all the other pleasures we can experience.
    6. My metaphor of what is meant by ataraxia / tranquility / calm is the picture of a musk ox, facing into the howling winter wind, legs braces, ice forming on its hair and face, knowing the disturbance will eventually pass ("Pain is short...") and it can then go on and paw the snow for luscious plants to eat. (Note: just a metaphor btw. Not saying musk oxen are Epicureans.)
    7. My reading of katastematic pleasures, including ataraxia, are those that arise from within ourselves and that these are the only pleasures in life that we can be confident of at all times.
    8. The kinetic pleasures arise from our interaction with external stimuli and phenomena.
    9. Metrodorus stresses the importance of both kinds of pleasures, but he also wrote a book entitled "On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects."
    10. Cassius raises the point that the following is a new assertion to him and he is not "aware of textual citations to support it": my reading of katastematic pleasures, including ataraxia, are those that arise from within ourselves and that these are the only pleasures in life that we can be confident of at all times.
    11. Cassius countered with citing Diogenes Laertius quote about the wise man will "cry out and lament" when on the rack.
      • I countered his quotation with the quote just prior to that with "even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy (eudaimonia)."

    And that is where we left it. I encourage anyone interested in the full context to go back and read the other thread. I'm starting this one so as not to further hijack the other thread. In this thread, we will inevitably talk about the katastematic/kinetic pleasure "controversy" but my primary goal at the beginning is to establish (IF I can establish) that katastematic pleasure... or pleasure primarily experienced in the mind as a stable state... is the one in which we can be more confident than pleasures resulting from external stimuli or phenomena.

    Let the games begin...

    I really started down this road in part with the discovery of Metrodorus being quoted in Clement of Alexandria's Stromata II.131, p. 498 which states (in translation )

    Quote from Clement of Alexandria

    Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?

    The primary source for my contention was simply the title of Metrodorus's book: On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects. The Greek title reads: Περι του μειζονα ειναι την παρ' ημας αιτιαν προς ευδαιμονιαν της εκ των πραγματων αγαθον. The idea that the source of our well-being/eudaimonia is greater "in ourselves than that which arises from Objects" tells me that we can't *rely* on objects outside ourselves for pleasure (happiness, eudaimonia, well-being). We can certainly take pleasure in them, but we can't rely on them. The only thing we can have the most confidence in are the pleasures that are within ourselves. That's how I read that title.

    The πρᾶγμᾰ in the title (πραγματων is simply the genitive plural) means "deed, act; thing; circumstances (in the plural)."


    Alfred Koerte's anthology of the sayings of Metrodorus also referenceσ the following (using Google Translate, I know... but it's the quickest route):

    Cicero, De Finibus II, 28, 92 ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter Epicurus, beatum esse describit his fere verbis cum corpus bene constitutum sit, et sit exploratum ita futurum. (...for Metrodorus himself, almost another Epicurus, describes himself as happy in these words, when the body is well constituted, and the future is thus explored.)

    Cicero Tusc. disp. II, 6, 17 Metrodorus quidem perfecte eum putat beatum, cui corpus bene constitutum sit et exploratum ita semper fore. (Cicero Tusc. disp. 2, 6, 17 Metrodorus, indeed, considers him perfectly happy, whose body is well formed and examined, and will always be so.)

    Cicero Tusc. disp. V, 9, 27 tu vero Metrodore, qui. . . definieris summum bonum firma corporis affectione explorataque eius spe contineri, fortunae aditus interclusisti ? (Cicero Tusc. disp. 5, 9, 27 you, Metrodorus, who . . You have determined that the highest good is contained by the firm affection of the body and its explored hope, have you blocked the access of fortune?)

    Cicero de officiis III, 33, 117 nam si non modo utilitas sed vita omnis beata corporis firma constitutione eiusque constitutionis spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro scriptum est, continetur, certe haec utilitas et quidem summa — sic enim censent — cum honestate pugnabit. (Cicero de officii III, 33, 117 For if not only utility, but every happy life is contained in the firm constitution of the body and the hope of its constitution, as it is written by Metrodorus, surely this utility and indeed the highest - for so they think - will fight with honesty.)

    Hoc fragmentum paene ad verbum congruit cum Epicuri fragmento 68 Us. (This fragment agrees almost verbatim with Epicurus' fragment 68 Us.).

    Using Attalus' site, here is Usener 68 which appears to be quoted from Plutarch and Aulus Gellius:

    Quote from Usener 68

    Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.


    Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2: Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."

    This is just a start, but I thought I'd establish where my train of thought left the station first.


    PS: Please note that the English translations from Koerte are really bad, now that I go back and read them more closely. They are simply cut and paste Google Translations from the Latin. Consider them at best poor Cliffs Notes. Refer to the Latin and puzzle out your own translations would be my recommendation.

    The description of kinetic and katastematic from The Faith of Epicurus by Benjamin Farrington (1967) is spot on from my perspective:

    Quote from Farrington, p. 132

    " 'pleasure' may be eitherr kinetic (i.e., produced by a stimulus from without) or katastematic (i.e., a state of the organism created by itself without external stimulus)."

    I posted a screenshot of this page on a prior thread.

    I am together with all of this with the probable exception of post 3. That is not what Diogenes Laertius says about the two categories, is it?


    And of course I also want the record to reflect that I agree with Boris Nikolsky that the whole "katastematic" question is an overlay of non-Epicurean analysis adopted from other schools, well apart from Epicurus, which is an artifact of Diogenes Laertius' well meaning but imprecise attempt to categorize Epicurus according to theories well known at DL's time.


    As for mental pleasures being more significant than bodily ones at times I agree that makes sense as stated by Torquatus in his discussion with Cicero, so Metrodorus' book title would fit that well.


    I also think it is useful to highlight the confidence of maintaining ones pleasures and the ability to experience pleasures mentally (including the memory of pleasures of the past) which is also well documented.


    The only real problem that I have is that framing all this in terms of "katastematic pleasure" seems to me to be bound to be interpreted by those who are not so subtle as Don to be justification for their continuing focus on this term for their implication that katastematic pleasure is something higher than any other kind of pleasure, which I believe is not justified and is very harmful.


    Of the points raised by Don, points 4 and 5 are lost on the "katastematic pleasure above all" crowd, and the difficulty is that the view of "Confidence in Katastematic Pleasure" will continue to crowd out and undermine the proper focus, which was as summarized by Torquatus more accurately as


    "pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them" (Reid)


    Nothing there about "katastematic pleasure" being the primary goal," and to elevate it loosely as many do is to implicitly derogate all the rest.


    So to me the task is to flesh out the benefits of the subject without confounding errors (which are in many cases intentional under the influence of Buddhism and Stoicism) even worse than before.


    I have no doubt Don can do that here, but in general conversation about Epicurus elsewhere using this terminology is like hobbling oneself at the beginning by explaining "what's good is easy to get" and "what's terrible is easy to endure" to starving children. That's not a challenge that any Epicurean has any need to undertake voluntarily, because those contentions phrased that way are not well founded in the core texts of Epicurus himself. To me, those phrasings are best considered to be innocent but harmful diversions from the main core and stream of Epicurean thought. "Easy" and "katastematic" are similarly troublesome, and I don't advise people to look for unnecessary trouble!

    On looking up examples of damage that comes from loose construction, (which Don is surely avoiding, I know) I happened to look again at this from Wikipedia on the T. Take a look at the last sentence in this paragraph:



    What is terrible is easy to endure

    The Epicureans understood that, in nature, illness and pain is not suffered for very long, for pain and suffering is either "brief or chronic ... either mild or intense, but discomfort that is both chronic and intense is very unusual; so there is no need to be concerned about the prospect of suffering." Like "What is good is easy to get," recognizing one's physical and mental limit and one's threshold of pain — understanding how much pain the body or mind can endure — and maintaining confidence that pleasure only follows pain (and the avoidance of anxiety about the length of pain), is the remedy against prolonged suffering.[13



    The "REMEDY"? Or as people are fond of saying "the CURE"? I think Epicurus would say "No"! The remedy or the cure of a disease is to root it out and destroy it. What is being described here in 3 and 4 are "coping mechanisms" which are certainly desirable but in no way a "cure." I am surely in favor of aspirin, but aspirin does not really cure the source of the pain at least in most cases. The "cure" of these pains is not in thinking about them as short or mild, the cure comes in "curing" them, and to the extent that the phrasing of 3 and 4 suggests that Epicurus would suggest "coping" rather than "curing" this is extremely damaging to Epicurean theory.


    I am not so down on 1 and 2 as I am on 3 and 4, but in sum the total effect of these is to more aptly deserve the name the "Four-Part Coping Mechanism" than the Four-Part "cure."


    This is just the kind of diversion from proper focus that undue emphasis on the word "katastematic" creates in the minds of those who do not understand that "katastematic" (to the extent it has a clear definition stated by Epicurus at all) is simply one among many pleasures - and one that does not rate even the clear emphasis Epicurus gave to friendship and prudence as of special importance.

    I thought of another perspective:


    What about the pleasure of remembering past pleasures?


    Is that not always available to us too?


    That is something that we all I think acknowledge to be a great pleasure, and always available, just like confidence or whatever we are designating as "katastematic."


    But none of us would suggest that " remembering past pleasures" is somehow the highest pleasure or the goal of all other pleasures, would we?


    Thinking about why "katastematic pleasure" is an obsession of some people and why "remembering past pleasures" is not such an obsession is something to consider. The answer, I think, is that a word like "katastematic" is so obscure that it is easy to bend to one's own prior Stoic or Buddhist or Christian or Platonic disposition, while other and more clear words describing specific pleasures are not.


    Again, not talking about Don, but about a cultural force that catapulted "Katastematic Pleasure" into what is alleged to be the full meaning of the philosophy.


    Over and over I repeat that my words are not meant to be disagreeable to Don. Were he not exploring these issues we would not have such a good opportunity to examine it.

    Don here are some of my thought to points in post 1 above:


    1. Not completely correct -- "strengthening" implies you do all sorts of things. But we only see that this is some kind of result that happens to correspond to removing fear of death and the gods (an after affect).

    2. Not correct - impossible to do and where is this in Epicurean philosophy?

    3. Not correct - we cultivate prudence so that we don't choose pleasures with cause much worse pains

    4. Not completely correct - "Epicurus stresses over and over" -- this is an exaggeration, perhaps we should count when and where this is stated in the texts (how many times?)

    5. Correct

    6. Don't agree -- sounds Stoic - if that ox was smart he would find some bushes and other oxes to hunker down with instead of standing out in the wind -- luckily we aren't oxes.

    7. Too vague -- if you are talking about being confident in your bodily health, and enjoying feeling healthy in the body, then I will agree

    8. What about sitting out in the sunshine and the feeling that comes with enjoying that? (And this strengthens the feeling of "health in the body")

    9. In my opinion what Metrodorus wrote doesn't take into consideration how the environment that you live in (which contains physical objects) affects your physical and mental well being. We are animals which require certain basic conditions for our physical and mental well being.

    10. This seems not completely correct -- I am confident that my next meal with bring pleasure -- is that something which arises only in myself?

    11. I don't agree with this "happy on the rack" -- I personally think this "happiness in all circumstances" doesn't make sense to me.

    It's good to go number by number. When I reread the list I found I had completely slipped over the ox analogy item.


    And for example the reference to the book by Metrodorus being cited by Clement of Alexandria... Is that title also cited by Diogenes Laertius? I thought DL cites the titles of Metrodorus" book too?


    Lots of good things to talk about in this thread.

    Ok so yes there is a list of Metrodorus' works in DL and that's not in it, right? Is It clear that Clement is talking about the same Metrodorus?


    I don't really doubt the sentiment, given the statement in Torquatus that mental feelings can be stronger than bodily ones, but I don't know that we have more to work with than that, and I would expect the emphasis to be on "can" rather than "are always."


    Being burned in phalaris' bull might not be able to extinguish every scintilla of pleasurable memory until the person is dead, but for much of the time I would think the pain of the experience would be much stronger than those good memories. And during that time calling the victim "happy" would be more of a very broad abstraction rather than a common sense summary of total feelings (or even a specific feeling of wellbeing) as we normally attach to the word.

    Now I am unfortunately inserting something random but I will be short: Here I feel in sympathy with Cicero. English, like Latin, is a rich language. There is something fundamentally wrong going on when we have a supposedly critical concept for which people insist on using an untranslated foreign word, as if English were insufficient to explain the concept. Like Lucretius, we should use our own language to explain what we mean by "katastematic pleasure," and if we can't or don't then that in itself indicates a major issue. And that's exactly what the great majority of commentators are doing in perpetuating the kinetic / katastematic discussion rather than engaging with people who come to Epicurean Philosophy for real answers.

    Wow! Y'all have been busy. I'll respond to your various points, but I had to provide some context for my musk ox analogy.

    The musk ox (umingmak "the bearded one" in the language of the Inuit) is easily my favorite animal, followed closely by the tardigrade (yes, big nerd here).

    In the habitat in which the musk ox lives - the northern Arctic tundra - there are no trees, no bushes, nothing to hide behind. In fact, they typically prefer windswept land in winter where the wind keeps the snow swept away. They'll either stand in the wind or lay down in a gale to reduce their exposure. They appear unfazed by the conditions, and my metaphor was that they know the storm will pass, "the pain will be brief."

    It's not a perfect analogy by any means, but, hey, I got to talk about musk oxen ^^

    Quote from Cassius

    Ok so yes there is a list of Metrodorus' works in DL and that's not in it, right? Is It clear that Clement is talking about the same Metrodorus?

    As I remember, DL doesn't list all of Epicurus's titles either. There are titles mentioned elsewhere that aren't in his list.

    I'm finding it difficult to swipe between Kalosyni 's responses and my first post, so for easier reference, here are the two closer to each other.

    So, that'll be a little easier to refer to. I'm not saying I agree or disagree with Kalosyni's points at this point, but I do think they move the conversation forward. Thanks!

    May I posit that the musk ox is actually pursuing pleasure and not tolerating pain out on the tundra? I get this from time spent with Milo the Alaskan Malamute. He prefers spending his time in the snow, in below zero temperatures, in a snowstorm. He'll hang inside with his people and other dogs, but given the choice, he'll go for the snow.


    Of course this is no knock on the musk ox. It may even make it more Epicurean! I'm just questioning this particular analogy ;)

    I'm putting this here primarily as an interesting tidbit but also partly in reference to numbers 7 & 8 on my initial list.

    From Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances, columns 4 and 5:

    [4] [Epicurus teaches us that good is easy for us to procure] and that evil is [not] only limited precisely because it is useless to have defined the good (τἀγαθόν), if it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to attain, nor to have fixed limits to evil, if it is difficult to bear because of its long duration. This knowledge has the effect of prohibiting both the pursuit of any [good] which is not by nature capable of eliminating pain - such are, most of the time, the [goods] which have motivated a search eager in humans -, and let none be discarded which does not prevent having pleasure -- that is how one must [conceive] most of [those which are acquired] gradually. And, in reverse, for [missing approximately 20 lines]

    [5] [missing 3 lines] After that, it is also necessary to take into account the differences that present the desires (ἐπιθυμ̣[ιῶ]ν̣) relating to the pleasures and to what produces them, since precisely the lack of discernment on this subject gives rise to serious errors concerning the choices and the rejections. It is indeed because they regard as what is most necessary the goods which are most external to them, I mean a sovereign power, a dazzling fame, an exceptional wealth and sources of pleasure of this sort and other similar ones that they are in charge of the most painful evils; and that, conversely, [they remain deaf to their most necessary appetites] (ἀναγκαιοτάτων), because they take them for what is most exterior to them [missing about 20 lines].


    Notes:

    The "external" in the middle of column 5 is: External; alien; ξενοτάτων

    II. c. gen. rei, strange to a thing, unacquainted with, ignorant of it; III. strange, unusual.

    A related word appears in Epicurus fragment 266:

    From the perspective of the infinite time that has passed, nothing novel occurs in the universe.

    οὐδὲν ξένον ἐν τῷ παντv ἀποτελεῖται παρὰ τὸν ἤδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἄπειρον.


    The idea of ξένος is the strange, foreign, something or someone from "outside". There's a whole cultural thing about xenia but I don't think that's relevant in the current context.

    The external analysis seems reasonable to me, and the "'zenia" might indeed be relevant if less attractive to us today, but - as to:


    [4] [Epicurus teaches us that good is easy for us to procure] and that evil is [not] only limited precisely because it is useless to have defined the good (τἀγαθόν), if it is difficult, if not impossible, for us to attain,


    Do those brackets mean that this is partly or totally reconstructed? If so by how much? Is this bootstrapped off the later "Tetrapharmakon"?


    Also is this Voula Tsouna? Do you have the more specific cite?


    As you know I would myself never read "EASY" unless the text demands it. (Which reminds me to follow up at some point and determine if in fact a particular text does demand the "EASY" as if so I am not aware of it outside apparently the T)


    thanks!

    Quote from Cassius

    a particular text does demand the "EASY"

    Easy is due to the eu- prefix on the verbs in lines 3 & 4 of the Tetrapharmakos.

    Take a look at the LSJ definitions for a number of words in ancient Greek that begin eu-. Many have the connotation of easy, easily, without effort, honestly, etc.

    Quote

    Now I am unfortunately inserting something random but I will be short: Here I feel in sympathy with Cicero. English, like Latin, is a rich language. There is something fundamentally wrong going on when we have a supposedly critical concept for which people insist on using an untranslated foreign word, as if English were insufficient to explain the concept. Like Lucretius, we should use our own language to explain what we mean by "katastematic pleasure," and if we can't or don't then that in itself indicates a major issue. And that's exactly what the great majority of commentators are doing in perpetuating the kinetic / katastematic discussion rather than engaging with people who come to Epicurean Philosophy for real answers.

    A quote from William Harris on the subject:


    Quote

    Latin has a relatively small vocabulary, with less that four thousand words in general, current use. Greek has three times that number, modern English prescribes 10,000 for a college student, 50,000 for a teacher, and there are half a million words available one way or another.


    I'm not really prepared to unpack all that, but I thought it was worth mentioning. There are several cases in which foreign loan words seem more appropriate than any English equivalent would be, as in the cases of schadenfreude, déjà vu, or a cappella. I'm not sure katastematic is on that level though!