Posts by Cassius

Bailey: 33. Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another, in any place whatever, and at any time, it is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.

**ΟΥΚ ΗΝ TΙ ΚAΘ' EAΥTΟ ΔΙΚAΙΟΣΥΝΗ ****AΛΛ' EΝ TAΙΣ ΜET' **

**AΛΛΗΛΩΝ ΣΥΣTΡΟΦAΙΣ ****ΚAΘ' ΟΠΗΛΙΚΟΥΣ ****ΔΗ ΠΟTE AEΙ**

**TΟΠΟΥΣ ΣΥΝΘΗΚΗ ****TΙΣ ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ ****Η**

**ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ. **

“Justice has no independent existence; it results from mutual contracts, and establishes itself wherever there is a mutual engagement to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury.” Yonge (1853)

“There never was an absolute justice, but only a convention made in mutual intercourse, in whatever region, from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.” Hicks (1910)

“There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in reciprocal intercourse in whatever localities now and again from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.” Hicks (1925)

“Justice never is anything in itself, but in the dealings of men with one another in any place whatever and at any time is a kind of compact not to harm or be harmed.” Bailey (1926)

“There is no such thing as justice in the abstract; it is merely a compact between men in their various relations with each other, in whatever circumstances they may be, that they will neither injure nor be injured.” Geer (1964)

“Justice was never anything per se, but a contract, regularly arising at some place or other in people's dealings with one another, over not harming or being harmed.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“There is no such thing as 'justice in itself'; it is, rather, always a certain compact made during men's dealings with one another in different places, not to do harm or to be harmed.” O'Connor (1993)

“Justice was not a thing in its own right, but [exists] in mutual dealings in whatever places there [is] a pact about neither harming one another nor being harmed.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Absolute justice does not exist. There are only mutual agreements among men, made at various times and places, not to inflict nor allow harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Abstract justice in itself does not exist. Justice rather [comes into being only] in instances of reciprocal intercourse, applies specifically to this or that place [and time,] and consists in a covenanted agreement to refrain from inflicting harm for the sake of not having harm inflicted on oneself.” Makridis (2005)

“Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed, which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Justice was never an entity in itself. It is a kind of agreement not to harm or be harmed, made when men associate with each other at any time and in communities of any size whatsoever.” Strodach (2012)

“Justice was not something in itself but existed in mutual relations wherever and whenever there was an agreement that provided against the inflicting or suffering of harm.” Mensch (2018)

“Justice was not anything in its own right, but rather a kind of agreement not to harm or be harmed in our dealings with one another within areas of whatever size they may be.”

Bailey: 32. For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another, or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise, too, for all tribes of men which have been unable, or unwilling, to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.

**ΟΣA TΩΝ ΖῼΩΝ ****ΜΗ EΔΥΝATΟ ΣΥΝΘΗΚAΣ ΠΟΙEΙΣΘAΙ ****TAΣ**

**ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ AΛΛA ΜΗΔE ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ ****ΠΡΟΣ**

**TAΥTA ΟΥΘEΝ ****ΗΝ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****ΟΥΔE AΔΙΚΟΝ·**** ΩΣAΥTΩΣ ΔE**

**ΚAΙ TΩΝ EΘΝΩΝ ****ΟΣA ΜΗ EΔΥΝATΟ ****Η ΜΗ EΒΟΥΛETΟ ****TAΣ**

**ΣΥΝΘΗΚAΣ ΠΟΙEΙΣΘAΙ ****TAΣ ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ ΜΗΔE**

**ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ. **

“Those animals which are unable to enter into an argument of this nature, or to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury, have no such thing as justice or injustice. And the case is the same with those nations, the members of which are either unwilling or unable to enter into a covenant to respect their mutual interests.” Yonge (1853)

“Those animals which were incapable of making compacts with one another, to the end that they might neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. Similarly those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in the like case.” Hicks (1910)

“Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in like case.” Hicks (1925)

“For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise too for all tribes of men which have been unable or unwilling to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.” Bailey (1926)

“To all animate creatures that have been unable to make the covenants about not injuring one another or being injured nothing is just nor unjust either; this statement holds equally true for all human races that have been unable or unwilling to make the covenant about not injuring or being injured.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 295 (1954)

“There is no such thing as justice or injustice among those beasts that cannot make agreements not to injure or be injured. This is also true of those tribes that are unable or unwilling to make agreements not to injure or be injured.” Geer (1964)

“Nothing is just or unjust in relation to those creatures which were unable to make contracts over not harming one another and not being harmed: so too with all peoples which were unable or unwilling to make contracts over not harming and not being harmed.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“For those living creatures that are unable to form compacts not to harm or harm others or to be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice. It is the same for all tribes of men unable or unwilling to form compacts not to do harm or to be harmed.” O'Connor (1993)

“There was no justice or injustice with respect to all those animals which were unable to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed. Similarly, [there was no justice or injustice] for all those nations which were unable or unwilling to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“For all living creatures incapable of making agreements not to harm one another, nothing is ever just or unjust; and so it is likewise for all tribes of men which have been unable or unwilling to make such agreements.” Anderson (2004)

“Some animals are incapable of entering into compacts that agree not to inflict harm in order to avoid suffering harm: in the cases of such animals neither moral right nor moral wrong can be said to apply. Similarly, there are communities which are either incapable or unwilling to make treaties that undertake not to inflict harm in order to avoid suffering harm: [in the cases of such communities, the concepts of moral right and moral wrong cannot be said to apply either.]” Makridis (2005)

“With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Nothing is either just or unjust in the eyes of those animals that have been unable to make agreements not to harm each other or be harmed. The same is true of those peoples who are unable or unwilling to make covenants not to be harm or be harmed.” Strodach (2012)

“Those animals incapable of making agreements with one another, that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without justice or injustice. The same is true of peoples who are unable or unwilling to make such agreements.” Mensch (2018)

“There was nothing just or unjust regarding any animals that were unable to make agreements not to harm others or be harmed; and likewise among any culture that were unable or unwilling to make agreements not to harm or be harmed.” White (2021)

Bailey: 22. We must consider both the real purpose, and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion.

**TΟ ΥΦEΣTΗΚΟΣ ****ΔEΙ TEΛΟΣ EΠΙΛΟΓΙΖEΣΘAΙ ****ΚAΙ ΠAΣAΝ**

**TΗΝ EΝAΡΓEΙAΝ ****EΦ ΗΝ TA ΔΟΞAΖΟΜEΝA AΝAΓΟΜEΝ·**** EΙ**

**ΔE ΜΗ ΠAΝTA AΚΡΙΣΙAΣ ****ΚAΙ TAΡAΧΗΣ ****EΣTAΙ ΜEΣTA. **

“But as to the ultimate aim, we ought to consider it with all the clearness and evidence which we refer to whatever we think and believe; otherwise, all things will be full of confusion and uncertainty of judgment.” Yonge (1853)

“We must take into account as the end all that really exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion.” Hicks (1910)

“We must take into account as the end all that really exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion.” Hicks (1925)

“We must consider both the real purpose and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion.” Bailey (1926)

“We must take into our reckoning the established telos of all manifest evidence, to which we refer our judgments; otherwise all life will be filled with indecision and unrest.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 152 (1954)

“It is necessary to take into account the real purpose of knowledge and all the evidence of that clear perception to which we refer our opinions. If we do not, all will be full of bad judgment and confusion.” Geer (1964)

“We must take into account both the underlying purpose and all the evidence of clear perception, to which we refer our opinions. Otherwise, everything will be filled with confusion and indecision.” O'Connor (1993)

“One must reason about the real goal and every clear fact, to which we refer mere opinions. If not, everything will be full of indecision and disturbance.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“We must consider the ultimate goal to be real, and reconcile our opinions with sensory experience; otherwise, life will be full of confusion and disturbance.” Anderson (2004)

“When all is said and done, we need to take into account what kinds of things exist in the universe and every vivid and clear sense perception, to which we must refer opinions; if we fail to do so, everything will be full of gullibility and confusion.” Makridis (2005)

“You must reflect on the fundamental goal and everything that is clear, to which opinions are referred; if you do not, all will be full of trouble and confusion.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is necessary to take into account both the actual goal of life and the whole body of clear and distinct precepts to which we refer our judgments. If we fail to do this, everything will be in disorder and confusion.” Strodach (2012)

“We must reason about the true goal and about all the evidence to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything will be full of confusion and disorder.” Mensch (2018)

“We must appraise the established end, and all the manifest evidence to which we refer all we believe; otherwise, everything will be full of indecision and turmoil.” White (2021)

Bailey: 18. The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.

**ΟΥΚ EΠAΥΞETAΙ ****EΝ Tῌ ΣAΡΚΙ ****Η ΗΔΟΝΗ EΠEΙΔAΝ ****AΠAΞ**

**TΟ ΚAT' EΝΔEΙAΝ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΞAΙΡEΘῌ ****AΛΛA ΜΟΝΟΝ**

**ΠΟΙΚΙΛΛETAΙ. **** TΗΣ ΔE ΔΙAΝΟΙAΣ ****TΟ ΠEΡAΣ ****TΟ ΚATA TΗΝ**

**ΗΔΟΝΗΝ AΠEΓEΝΝΗΣEΝ ****Η TE TΟΥTΩΝ AΥTΩΝ EΚΛΟΓΙΣΙΣ**

**ΚAΙ TΩΝ ΟΜΟΓEΝΩΝ ****TΟΥTΟΙΣ ΟΣA TΟΥΣ ΜEΓΙΣTΟΥΣ**

**ΦΟΒΟΥΣ ΠAΡEΣΚEΥAΖE Tῌ ΔΙAΝΟΙᾼ. **

“Pleasure in the flesh is not increased, when once the pain arising from want is removed; it is only diversified. The most perfect happiness of the soul depends on these refection, and on opinions of a similar character on all those questions which cause the greatest alarm to the mind.” Yonge (1853)

“Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of pleasure in the mind is obtained by calculating the pleasures themselves and the contrary pains, which cause the mind the greatest alarms.” Hicks (1910)

“Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of pleasure in the mind, however, is reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their congeners which cause the mind the greatest alarms.” Hicks (1925)

“The pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.” Bailey (1926)

“The pleasure in the flesh is incapable of increase when once the pain arising from need has been removed but is merely embellished. As for the mind, its limit of pleasure is begotten by reasoning out these very problems and those akin to these, all that once created the worst fears for the mind.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 227-228 (1954)

“When once the pain caused by need has been removed, bodily pleasure will not be increased in amount but only varied in quality. The mind attains its utmost pleasure in reflecting on the very things that used to cause the greatest mental fears and on things like them.” Geer (1964)

“The pleasure in the flesh does not increase when once the pain of need has been removed, but it is only varied. And the limit of pleasure in the mind is produced by rationalizing those very things and their congeners which used to present the mind with its greatest fears.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“The pleasure in the flesh will not be increased when once the pain resulting from want is taken away, but only varied. The limit of understanding as regards pleasure is obtained by a refection on these same pleasures and the sensations akin to them, which used to furnish the mind with its greatest fears.” O'Connor (1993)

“As soon as the feeling of pain produced by want is removed, pleasure in the flesh will not increase but is only varied. But the limit of mental pleasures is produced by a reasoning out of these very pleasures [of the flesh] and of the things related to these, which used to cause the greatest fears in the intellect.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“When pain arising from need has been removed, bodily pleasure cannot increase – it merely varies. But the limit of mental pleasure is reached after we reflect upon these bodily pleasures and the related mental distress prior to fulfillment.” Anderson (2004)

“Bodily pleasure cannot increase anymore once all the pain produced by need has been removed, even if this happened for the first time; [after that point, additional] pleasure can only [accrue from] variation. But the limit of the pleasure produced by mental pursuits is generally attained by means of reflecting on all those things, and on others kindred to the things, which furnish the mind with the greatest frights.” Makridis (2005)

“As soon as the pain produced by the lack of something is removed, pleasure in the flesh is not increased but only embellished. Yet the limit of enjoyment in the mind is produced by thinking through these very things and similar things, which once provoked the greatest fears in the mind.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Bodily pleasure is not enlarged once the pains brought on by need have been done away with; it is only diversified. And the limit o f mental pleasure is established by rational refection on pleasures themselves and those kindred emotions that once instilled extreme fear in human minds.” Strodach (2012)

“Fleshly pleasure does not increase once the pain of want has been removed; it merely diversifies. But the limit of mental pleasure is reached when one reflects on these very realities, and others of the same kind, which afflict the mind with its worst fears. Mensch (2018)

“Pleasure does not increase in the flesh once any pain caused by need is removed; it only adds variety. As for thought, the very limit of its pleasure is a result of the appraisal of these very things and all the related things that formerly caused our thought the greatest fears.” White (2021)

ailey: 16. In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters, reason has ordained, and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.

“The wise man is but little favoured by fortune; but his reason procures him the greatest and most valuable goods, and these he does enjoy, and will enjoy the whole of his life.” Yonge (1853)

“Fortune but slightly crosses the wise man's path; his greatest and highest interests are directed by reason throughout the course of life.” Hicks (1910)

“Fortune but seldom interferes with the wise man; his greatest and highest interests have been, are, and will be, directed by reason throughout the course of his life.” Hicks (1925)

“In but few things chance hinders a wise man, but the greatest and most important matters reason has ordained and throughout the whole period of life does and will ordain.” Bailey (1926)

“Fortune plays but little part in the life of a wise man and the things that are of most value and consequence are subject to arrangement by rational planning, and throughout the whole extent of life are subject and will be subject to it.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 177-178 (1954)

“Fortune seldom troubles the wise man. Reason has controlled his greatest and most important affairs, controls them throughout his life, and will continue to control them.” Geer (1964)

“In a few instances does chance intrude upon the wise man, but reason has administered his greatest and most important affairs, and will continue to do so throughout his whole life.” O'Connor (1993)

“Chance has a small impact on the wise man, while reasoning has arranged for, is arranging for, and will arrange for the greatest and most important matters throughout the whole of his life.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Chance has little effect upon the wise man, for his greatest and highest interests are directed by reason throughout the course of life.” Anderson (2004)

“The wise are rarely infringed by chance; the matters that are most signifcant and decisive have been, are, and always will be governed by reason throughout the entire span of a wise person's life.” Makridis (2005)

“Chance steals only a bit into the life of a wise person: for throughout the complete span of his life the greatest and most important matters have been, are, and will be directed by the power of reason.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Bad luck strikes the sophisticated man in a few cases, but reason has directed the big, essential things, and for the duration of life it is and will be the guide.” Strodach (2012)

“Fortune impinges but little on a wise man; reason has directed his greatest and most important pursuits; these it directs and will continue to direct over the course of his life.” Mensch (2018)

“Fortune has little impact on the wise; their reasoning has already arranged the greatest and most important matters, and it does so and will continue to do so throughout their lifetime.” White (2021)

"If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life." Epicurus PD10 (Bailey)

**EΙ TA ΠΟΙΗTΙΚA ****TΩΝ ΠEΡΙ TΟΥΣ AΣΩTΟΥΣ ΗΔΟΝΩΝ ****EΛΥE**

**TΟΥΣ ΦΟΒΟΥΣ ****TΗΣ ΔΙAΝΟΙAΣ ****TΟΥΣ TE ΠEΡΙ ΜETEΩΡΩΝ**

**ΚAΙ ΘAΝATΟΥ ****ΚAΙ AΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ ****ETΙ TE TΟ ΠEΡAΣ ****TΩΝ**

**EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****[ΚAΙ TΩΝ AΛΓΗΔΟΝΩΝ]***** EΔΙΔAΣΚEΝ ****ΟΥΚ AΝ**

**ΠΟTE EΙΧΟΜEΝ ****Ο TΙ ΜEΜΨAΙΜEΘA ****AΥTΟΙΣ ΠAΝTAΧΟΘEΝ**

**EΚΠΛΗΡΟΥΜEΝΟΙΣ TΩΝ ΗΔΟΝΩΝ ****ΚAΙ ΟΥΔAΜΟΘEΝ ****ΟΥTE**

**TΟ AΛΓΟΥΝ ****ΟΥTE TΟ ΛΥΠΟΥΜEΝΟΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****Ο ΠEΡ EΣTΙ**

**TΟ ΚAΚΟΝ. ** Arrighetti**

“If those things which make the pleasures of debauched men, put an end to the fears of the mind, and to those which arise about the heavenly bodies, and death, and pain; and if they taught us what ought to be the limit of our desires, we should have no pretense for blaming those who wholly devote themselves to pleasure, and who never feel any pain or grief (which is the chief evil) from any quarter.” Yonge (1853)

“If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind—the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain—if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should not have any reason to censure such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasure to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil.” Hicks (1910)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky and death and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires [and of pains], we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full with pleasures from every source and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.” Bailey (1926)

“If the practices productive of the pleasures of profligates dispelled the fears of the mind about celestial things and death and pains and also taught the limit of the desires, we should never have fault to find with profligates, enjoying pleasures to the full from all quarters, and suffering neither pain nor distress from any quarter, wherein the evil lies." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute were able to drive away from their minds their fears about what is above them and about death and pain, and to teach them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find them the limit of desires, we would have no reason to find fault with the dissolute; for they would fill themselves with pleasure from every source and would be free from pain and sorrow, which are evil.” Geer (1964)

“If the causes of the pleasures of the dissipated released mental fears concerning celestial phenomena and death and distress, and in addition taught the limit of desires, we should never have any reason to reproach them [i.e. the dissipated], since they would be satisfying themselves with pleasures from all directions and would never have pain or distress, which constitutes the bad.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If the things that beget pleasure in dissolute individuals could dispel their minds' fears about the heavens, death, and pain, and could still teach them the limits of desires, we would have no grounds for finding fault with the dissolute, since they would be filling themselves with pleasures from every source and in no way suffering from pain or grief, which are evil.” O'Connor (1993)

“If the things which produce the pleasures of profligate men dissolved the intellect's fears about the phenomena of the heavens and about death and pains and, moreover, if they taught us the limit of our desires, then we would not have reason to criticize them, since they would be filled with pleasures from every source and would contain no feeling of pain or distress from any source—and that is what is bad.” Inwood (1994)

“If the things which debauched men find pleasurable put an end to all fears (such as concerns about the heavenly bodies, death, and pain) and if they revealed how we ought to limit our desires, we would have no reason to reproach them, for they would be fulfilled with pleasures from every source while experiencing no pain, neither in mind nor body, which is the chief evil of life.” Anderson (2004)

“If those elements that are productive of the pleasures of the debauched released them from the mental apprehensions aroused by natural phenomena, fear of death, and [obsessive anticipation of] pain; if, in addition, they formed their characters in such a way that they knew when to set a limit to their desires, we would then never have anything to censure them about: indeed, they would then be fully actualizing all the pleasures and in no way would they have either what is painful or what is productive of grief in them—and it is this latter condition [which they would be avoiding] that is morally bad.” Makridis (2005)

“If the things that produce the delights of those who are decadent washe#d away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that's what is bad).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If the things that produce the debauchee's pleasures dissolved the mind's fears regarding the heavenly bodies, death, and pain and also told us how to limit our desires, we would never have any reason to find fault with such people, because they would be glutting themselves with every sort of pleasure and never suffer physical or mental pain, which is the real evil.” Strodach (2012)

“If the objects that afforded pleasure to profligate men actually freed them from mental fears, namely those that relate to celestial phenomena and death and pain, and also taught them to limit their desires, we would never have any occasion to find fault with such men, since they would then be filled with pleasures from all sides and would be free of all pain and grief—that is, of all that is bad.” Mensch (2018)

“If the things that produce the pleasures of the dissolute released our minds from fear of celestial things and death and pain, and if they taught us the limit of desire, then we would have nothing to reproach in them, since they would then be replete with pleasures from every source and devoid of pain or sorrow from any source, which are precisely what is bad.” White (2021)

"If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another." Epicurus PD9 (Bailey)

EΙ ΚATEΠΥΚΝΟΥTΟ ΠAΣA ΗΔΟΝΗ ΚAΙ ΧΡΟΝῼ ΚAΙ ΠEΡΙ ΟΛΟΝ TΟ AΘΡΟΙΣΜA ΥΠΗΡΧEΝ Η TA ΚΥΡΙΩTATA ΜEΡΗ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΟΥΚ AΝ ΠΟTE ΔΙEΦEΡΟΝ AΛΛΗΛΩΝ AΙ ΗΔΟΝAΙ.

“If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man's nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is.” Hicks (1910)

“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.” Hicks (1925)

“If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)

“If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other.” Geer (1964)

“If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another.” O'Connor (1993)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Anderson (2004)

“If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect.” Makridis (2005)

“If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other.” Strodach (2012)

“If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another.” Mensch (2018)

“If every pleasure were concentrated in place and time and affected our whole aggregate or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” White (2021)

The Principal Doctrines forum reorganization is mostly complete. One thing remaining is that the "Alternate Translations" posts are in the wiki, rather than the forum, so they are not showing up automatically, and it will likely be necessary to re-create those within the forum section so that they work properly.

"No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures." Epicurus PD8 (Bailey)

Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν.

“No pleasure is intrinsically bad: but the effective causes of some pleasures bring with them a great many perturbations of pleasure.” Yonge (1853)

“No pleasure is evil in itself, but the objects productive of certain pleasures may lead to annoyances many times greater than the pleasure.” Wallace,

Epicureanism 150 (1880)

“No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Hicks (1910)

“No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Hicks (1925)

“No pleasure is a bad thing in itself: but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.” Bailey (1926)

”No pleasure is evil in itself but the practices productive of certain pleasures bring troubles in their train that by many times outweigh the pleasures themselves.” De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)

“No pleasure is evil it itself; but the means by which certain pleasures are gained bring pains many times greater than the pleasures.” Geer (1964)

“No pleasure is something bad per se: but the causes of some pleasures produce stresses many times greater than the pleasures” Long,

The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“No pleasure is evil in itself; but the means of obtaining some pleasures bring in their wake troubles many times greater than the pleasures.” O'Connor (1993)

“No pleasure is a bad thing in itself. But the things which produce certain pleasures bring troubles many times greater than the pleasures.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but some pleasures are only obtainable at the cost of excessive troubles.” Anderson (2004)

“No pleasure is a morally bad thing in itself. But the agents that produce certain pleasures bring about vexations that outnumber the pleasures themselves.” Makridis (2005)

“No pleasure is bad in itself; but the means of paying for some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“No pleasure is bad in itself. But the things that make for pleasure in certain cases entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Strodach (2012)

“No pleasure is intrinsically bad; but the means of producing certain pleasures may entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.” Mensch (2018)

“No pleasure is in itself anything bad; but some pleasures are produced by things that bring along troubles many times greater than those pleasures.” White (2021)

"Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at first by the instinct of nature." Epicurus PD7 (Bailey)

**EΝΔΟΞΟΙ ****ΚAΙ ΠEΡΙΒΛEΠTΟΙ ****TΙΝEΣ EΒΟΥΛΗΘΗΣAΝ**

**ΓEΝEΣΘAΙ ****TΗΝ EΞ AΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ AΣΦAΛEΙAΝ ****ΟΥTΩ**

**ΝΟΜΙΖΟΝTEΣ ΠEΡΙΠΟΙΗΣEΣΘAΙ ****ΩΣTE EΙ ΜEΝ AΣΦAΛΗΣ ****Ο**

**TΩΝ TΟΙΟΥTΩΝ ΒΙΟΣ AΠEΛAΒΟΝ ****TΟ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ AΓAΘΟΝ·**

**EΙ ΔE ΜΗ AΣΦAΛΗΣ ****ΟΥΚ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟΥ EΝEΚA EΞ AΡΧΗΣ**

**ΚATA TΟ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΟΙΚEΙΟΝ ΩΡEΧΘΗΣAΝ. **

“Some men have wished to be eminent and powerful, thinking that so they would secure safety as far as men are concerned. So that if the life of such men is safe, they have attained to the nature of good; but if it is not safe, then they have failed in obtaining that for the sake of which they originally desired power according to the order of nature.” Yonge (1853)

“Some men sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-men. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own promptings they originally sought.” Hicks (1910)

“Some men have sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-men. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good ; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own prompting they originally sought.” Hicks (1925)

“Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men. Wherefore if the life of such men is safe, they have obtained the good which nature craves; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for which they strove at the frst by the instinct of nature.” Bailey (1926)

“Some men have chosen to become celebrities and to be in the public eye, thinking thus to achieve security from the attacks of men. Consequently, if the lives of such men are safe, they have reaped the end of Nature, but if their lives are not safe, they lack that for the sake of which at the outset they reached out by the instinct of Nature. ” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 189 (1954)

“Some men wish to gain reputation and to be in the public eye, thinking by this means to win security from the attacks of men. Consequently, if the lives of these men are safe they have achieved the end ordained by Nature; if, on the contrary, their lives are not safe they lack that for which at the outset they reached out in obedience to an instinct of Nature." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“Some, thinking thus to make themselves safe from men, wished to become famous and renowned. They won a natural good if they made their lives secure; but if their lives were not secure, they did not have that for which, following the rule of nature, they first sought.” Geer (1964)

“Certain people wanted to become famous and admired, thinking that they would thus acquire security from other men. Consequently, if such people's life was secure, they did obtain nature's good; but if it was not secure, they are not in possession of the objective which they originally sought after on the basis of nature's affinity.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 126 (1987)

“Some men wished to become esteemed and admired by everyone, thinking that in this way they would procure for themselves safety from others. Therefore, if the life of such men is safe, they have received the good that comes from nature. If it is not safe, they do not have that for which they struggled at first by natural instinct.” O'Connor (1993)

“Some men want to become famous and respected, believing that this is the way to acquire security against [other] men. Thus if the life of such men is secure, they acquire the natural good; but if it is not secure, they do not have that for the sake of which they strove from the beginning according to what is naturally congenial.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Some seek fame and status, thinking that they could thereby protect themselves against other men. If their lives really are secure, then they have attained a natural good; if, however, they're insecure, they still lack what they originally sought by natural instinct.” Anderson (2004)

“Some have wished to become famous and enviable, thinking that they would in this way procure for themselves security from other human beings. In that case: if their life is secure, they have indeed enjoyed what is the good by nature; if, however, they are not safe, they still lack that naturally familiar good for the sake of which our appetites have striven from the very first stirrings of human nature and in accordance with natural principles.” Makridis (2005)

“Some people want to be well esteemed and widely admired, believing that in this way they will be safe from others; if the life of such people is secure then they have gained its natural benefit, but if not then they have not gained what they sought from the beginning in accordance with what is naturally appropriate.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Some men have desired to gain reputation and to be well regarded, thinking in this way to gain protection from other people. If the lives of such men are secure, they have acquired a natural blessing; but if they are not, they do not possess what they originally reached for by natural instinct.” Strodach (2012)

“Some have longed to become famous and celebrated, thinking that they would thereby obtain security against other men. If the lives of such persons were secure, they attained what is naturally good; but if insecure, they did not attain the object that they were originally prompted by nature to seek.” Mensch (2018)

“Some people wanted to become famous and admired, supposing they would in this way achieve security from other people. Hence, if the life of such people is secure, they obtained their nature’s good; but if it is not secure, they do not have the goal they initially desired in the way congenial to their nature.” White (2021)

Discussion Forum - Doctrine 7 - Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous...

"Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good." Epicurus PD6 (Essential Epicurus - Eugene O'Connor)

**EΝEΚA TΟΥ ΘAΡΡEΙΝ ****EΞ AΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ ****ΗΝ ΚATA ΦΥΣΙΝ**

**[AΡΧΗΣ ****ΚAΙ ΒAΣΙΛEΙAΣ]***** AΓAΘΟΝ ****EΞ ΩΝ AΝ ΠΟTE TΟΥTΟ**

**ΟΙΟΣ T' ῌ ΠAΡAΣΚEΥAΖEΣΘAΙ. **

***Arrighetti**

“For the sake of feeling confidence and security with regard to men, anything in nature is good, if it provides the means to achieve this.” Yonge (1853)

“As far as concerns protection from other men, any means of procuring this was a natural good.” Hicks (1910)

“In order to obtain security from other men any means whatsoever of procuring this was a natural good.” Hicks (1925)

“To secure protection from men anything is a natural good, by which you may be able to attain this end.” Bailey (1926)

“As for the assurance of safety from the attacks of men, by virtue of the nature of political dominion and kingly power this is a good thing, no matter by whose aid one is able to procure it." DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 79 (1954)

“Political rule and kingly power being what they are, it is a good thing to feel secure in human relations no matter through whose agency one is able to attain this." DeWitt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“Any device whatever by which one frees himself from the fear of others is a natural good.” Geer (1964)

“Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good.” O'Connor (1993)

“The natural good of public office and kingship is for the sake of getting confidence from [other] men, [at least] from those from whom one is able to provide this.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“That natural benefit of kingship and high office is (and only is) the degree to which they provide security from other men.” Anderson (2004)

“This [human ability to lead a good life] originally became possible by nature and for the sake of imparting courage in human beings [who were then living in a pre-social condition.] And this is the natural origin and principle on which all authority—be it even kingship—is based. And it is from the same [natural propensities] that a human being is able also to arrange a good and pleasant life.” Makridis (2005)

“It is a natural benefit of leadership and kingship to take courage from other men (or at least from the sort of men who can give one courage).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“Any means by which it is possible to procure freedom from fearing other men is a natural good.” Strodach (2012)

“In order that men might not fear one another, there was a natural benefit to be had from government and kingship, provided that they are able to bring about this result.” Mensch (2018)

“There was some natural good in leadership and kingship for the purpose of establishing mutual confidence among people, any time someone is thereby able to do so.” White (2021)

New Greek Version: “In order to obtain security from other people, there was (always) the natural good of sovereignty and kingship, through which (someone) once could have accomplished this.”

Discussion Forum: Doctrine 6 - To secure protection from men anything ...

**ΟΥΚ EΣTΙΝ ΗΔEΩΣ ΖΗΝ ****AΝEΥ TΟΥ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΚAΛΩΣ**

**ΚAΙ ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ ****[ΟΥΔE ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΚAΛΩΣ ****ΚAΙ ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ] **

**AΝEΥ TΟΥ ΗΔEΩΣ·**** ΟTῼ Δ' EN TΟΥTΩN ΜΗ ΥΠAΡΧEΙ ****ΟION**

**ΖΗΝ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΩΣ ****KAI ΚAΛΩΣ ****KAI ΔΙΚAΙΩΣ ΥΠAΡΧEΙ ****OΥΧ**

**EΣTΙ TΟΥTΟΝ ΗΔEΩΣ ΖΗΝ. **

"It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honor, and justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life is not living prudently, honorably, and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life] cannot possibly live pleasantly." Epicurus PD5 (Bailey)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, and honourably, and justly; nor to live prudently, and honourably, and justly, without living pleasantly. But to whom it does not happen to live prudently, honourably, and justly cannot possibly live pleasantly.” Yonge (1853)

“It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man does not live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Hicks (1910)

“It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Hicks (1925)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life, is not living prudently and honourably and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life], cannot possibly live pleasantly.” Bailey (1926)

“It is impossible to live pleasurably without living according to reason, honor and justice, nor to live according to reason, honor, and justice without living pleasurably….” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 184, 246 (1954)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, well, and justly, (and to live prudently, well, and justly) without living pleasantly. Even though a man live well and justly, it is not possible for him to live pleasantly if he lacks that from which stems the prudent life.” Geer (1964)

“It is impossible to live a pleasantly without living prudently, well, and justly, nor is it possible to live prudently, well, and justly without living pleasantly. The man for whom this latter condition is impossible cannot live prudently, well, or justly; he for whom the former is impossible, cannot live pleasantly.” O'Connor (1993)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honourably, and justly and impossible to live prudently, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly. And whoever lacks this cannot live pleasantly.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“It is impossible to live pleasantly without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking (when, for instance, one is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly) it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Anderson (2004)

“It is impossible to lead a pleasant life without leading a life that is prudent, proper, and just. Nor is it possible to live a life that is prudent, proper, and just without living a life that is pleasant. Whoever lacks [any one of] the above [elements of a good and pleasant life] cannot have a good life.” Makridis (2005)

“It is not possible to live joyously without also living wisely and beautifully and rightly, nor to live wisely and beautifully and rightly without living joyously; and whoever lacks this cannot live joyously.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“It is impossible to live the pleasant life without also living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely it is impossible to live sensibly, nobly, and justly without living pleasantly. A person who does not have a pleasant life is not living sensibly, nobly, and justly, and conversely the person who does not have these virtues cannot live pleasantly.” Strodach (2012)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly; nor can one live prudently, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly. Nor is it possible for the man who does not live prudently, though he may live honorably and justly, to live pleasantly.” Mensch (2018)

“It is not possible to live pleasantly without living wisely, honorably, and justly, [nor wisely, honorably, and justly] without living pleasantly; and for anyone who does not have that, {does not live wisely, honorably, and justly, does not have,} it is not possible for him to live pleasantly.” White (2021)

For Discussion in the Forum See: Doctrine 5 - It is not possible to live pleasantly without living...

“Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh.” Yonge (1853)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh, and pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not occur for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1910)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1925) “Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Bailey (1926)

“Pain does not prevail continuously in the flesh but the peak of it is present for the briefest interval, and the pain that barely exceeds the pleasure in the flesh is not with us many days, while protracted illnesses have an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 244 (1954)

“Continuous bodily suffering does not last long. Intense pain is very brief, and even pain that barely outweighs physical pleasure does not last many days. Long illnesses permit physical pleasures that are greater than the pain.” Geer (1964)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh: when acute it is there for a very short time, while the pain which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not persist for many days; and chronic illnesses contain an excess of pleasure in the flesh over pain.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“Pain does not dwell continuously in the flesh. Extreme pain is present but a very brief time, and that which barely exceeds bodily pleasure continues no more than a few days. But chronic illness allows greater pleasure than pain in the flesh. ” O'Connor (1993)

“The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is present for the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in the flesh lasts only a few days. And diseases which last a long time involve feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of pain.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Continuous physical pain does not last long. Instead, extreme pain lasts only a very short time, and even less-extreme pain does not last for many days at once. Even protracted diseases allow periods of physical comfort that exceed feelings of pain.” Anderson (2004)

“What produces pain does not remain constantly in the body over a long period of time; it is rather that the maximal pain persists for the least span of time, and even that bodily pain which barely exceeds pleasure does not continue to happen for many days <in a row.> And, indeed, chronic illnesses themselves have an excess of what produces bodily pleasure over what is productive of pain.” Makridis (2005)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains.” Saint-Andre (2008) “Bodily pain does not last continuously. The peak is present for a very brief period, and pains that barely exceed the state of bodily pleasure do not continue for many days. On the other hand, protracted illnesses show a balance of bodily pleasure over pain.” Strodach (2012)

“Pain does not last long in the flesh; in fact, extreme pain is present for the briefest time, while that which hardly outweighs pleasure does not last for many days. And illnesses that are prolonged may even afford the flesh more pleasure than pain.” Mensch (2018)

“Pain does not continue for long in the flesh. Rather, the most intense pain lasts the shortest time; any pain that exceeds pleasant feeling in the flesh does not last many days; and lengthy infrmities have more pleasant feeling in the flesh than pain.” White (2021)

“Pain does not abide continuously in the flesh, but in its extremity it is present only a very short time. That pain which only just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh, does not last many days. But long diseases have in them more that is pleasant than painful to the flesh.” Yonge (1853)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh, and pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not occur for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1910)

“Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Hicks (1925) “Pain does not last continuously in the flesh, but the acutest pain is there for a very short time, and even that which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not continue for many days at once. But chronic illnesses permit a predominance of pleasure over pain in the flesh.” Bailey (1926)

“Pain does not prevail continuously in the flesh but the peak of it is present for the briefest interval, and the pain that barely exceeds the pleasure in the flesh is not with us many days, while protracted illnesses have an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 244 (1954)

“Continuous bodily suffering does not last long. Intense pain is very brief, and even pain that barely outweighs physical pleasure does not last many days. Long illnesses permit physical pleasures that are greater than the pain.” Geer (1964)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh: when acute it is there for a very short time, while the pain which just exceeds the pleasure in the flesh does not persist for many days; and chronic illnesses contain an excess of pleasure in the flesh over pain.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“Pain does not dwell continuously in the flesh. Extreme pain is present but a very brief time, and that which barely exceeds bodily pleasure continues no more than a few days. But chronic illness allows greater pleasure than pain in the flesh. ” O'Connor (1993)

“The feeling of pain does not linger continuously in the flesh; rather, the sharpest is present for the shortest time, while what merely exceeds the feeling of pleasure in the flesh lasts only a few days. And diseases which last a long time involve feelings of pleasure which exceed feelings of pain.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Continuous physical pain does not last long. Instead, extreme pain lasts only a very short time, and even less-extreme pain does not last for many days at once. Even protracted diseases allow periods of physical comfort that exceed feelings of pain.” Anderson (2004)

“What produces pain does not remain constantly in the body over a long period of time; it is rather that the maximal pain persists for the least span of time, and even that bodily pain which barely exceeds pleasure does not continue to happen for many days <in a row.> And, indeed, chronic illnesses themselves have an excess of what produces bodily pleasure over what is productive of pain.” Makridis (2005)

“Pain does not last continuously in the flesh; instead, the sharpest pain lasts the shortest time, a pain that exceeds bodily pleasure lasts only a few days, and diseases that last a long time involve delights that exceed their pains.” Saint-Andre (2008) “Bodily pain does not last continuously. The peak is present for a very brief period, and pains that barely exceed the state of bodily pleasure do not continue for many days. On the other hand, protracted illnesses show a balance of bodily pleasure over pain.” Strodach (2012)

“Pain does not last long in the flesh; in fact, extreme pain is present for the briefest time, while that which hardly outweighs pleasure does not last for many days. And illnesses that are prolonged may even afford the flesh more pleasure than pain.” Mensch (2018)

“Pain does not continue for long in the flesh. Rather, the most intense pain lasts the shortest time; any pain that exceeds pleasant feeling in the flesh does not last many days; and lengthy infirmities have more pleasant feeling in the flesh than pain.” White (2021)

Dewitt commentary is below from page 244 of "Epicurus and His Philosophy." This comment is among DeWitt's rare criticisms of Epicurus, but more can be done with this, and we should be able to find Platonic doctrine of which PD04 would constitute a refutation (probably related to Platonic doctrine also being criticized in PD03).

For Discussion of this topic see: Doctrine 4 - Pain does not last continuously in the flesh...

Bailey: 3. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

ΟΡΟΣ TΟΥ ΜEΓEΘΟΥΣ TΩΝ ΗΔΟΝΩΝ Η ΠAΝTΟΣ TΟΥ AΛΓΟΥΝTΟΣ ΥΠEΞAΙΡEΣΙΣ. ΟΠΟΥ Δ' AΝ TΟ ΗΔΟΜEΝΟΝ EΝῌ ΚAΘ' ΟΝ AΝ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ ῌ ΟΥΚ EΣTΙ TΟ AΛΓΟΥΝ Η ΛΥΠΟΥΜEΝΟΝ Η TΟ ΣΥΝAΜΦΟTEΡΟΝ.

“The limit of great pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is, as long as it lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them, are absent.” Yonge (1853)

“The magnitude of pleasures is limited by the removal of all pain. Wherever there is pleasure, so long as it is present, there is no pain either of body or of mind or both.” Hicks (1910)

“The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.” Hicks (1925)

“The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once.” Bailey (1926)

“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. And wherever the experience of pleasure is present, so long as it prevails, there is no pain or distress or a combination of them.” De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 226, 241 (1954)

“The removal of all that causes pain marks the boundary of pleasure. Wherever pleasure is present and as long as it continues, there is neither suffering nor grieving nor both togethers.” Geer (1964)

“The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, pain or distress or their combination is absent.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

“The limit of the extent of pleasure is the removal of all pain. Wherever pleasure is present, for however long a time, there can be no pain or grief, or both of these.” O'Connor (1993)

“The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together.” Anderson (2004)

“Pleasure has its <upper> limit in the removal of everything that produces pain. For, wherever that which produces pleasure resides, for as long as it abides, there can be nothing that produces pain, grief, or both.” Makridis (2005)

“The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The quantitative limit of pleasure is the elimination of all feelings of pain. Wherever the pleasurable state exists, there is neither bodily pain nor mental pain nor both together, so long as the state continues.” Strodach (2012)

“The limit of pleasure is reached with the removal of all pain. Whenever pleasure is present, and for however long, there is neither pain nor grief nor any combination of the two.” Mensch (2018)

“The limit to the magnitude of pleasures is the elimination of everything painful; and wherever there is pleasant feeling, so long as it lasts, there is no painful feeling or sorrow, or both together.” White (2021)

FURTHER COMMENTARY:

As to the first sentence of PD3:

See Page 226 of DeWitt's "Epicurus And His Philosophy"

As to "the limit of quantity of pleasure," Plato had previously asserted that pleasure has no limit:

Plato's Philebus 27(e):

Plato's Republic 586b (Book 9)

As to the second sentence of PD03, see DeWitt page 241:

For Discussion of this topic in the forum see: Doctrine 3 - The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal ...

Alternate Renderings

TΟ ΜAΚAΡΙΟΝ ΚAΙ AΦΘAΡTΟΝ ΟΥTE AΥTΟ ΠΡAΓΜATA EΧEΙ ΟΥTE AΛΛῼ ΠAΡEΧEΙ· ΩΣTE ΟΥTE ΟΡΓAΙΣ ΟΥTE ΧAΡΙΣΙ ΣΥΝEΧETAΙ· EΝ AΣΘEΝEΙ ΓAΡ ΠAΝ TΟ TΟΙΟΥTΟΝ.

"The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself, nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favor. For all such things exist only in the weak." Epicurus PD1 (Bailey)

“That which is happy and imperishable, neither has trouble itself, nor does it cause it to anything; so that it is not subject to feelings of either anger or gratitude; for these feelings only exist in what is weak.” Yonge (1853)

“The blessed and incorruptible has no toil or trouble of its own, and causes none to others. It is not subject either to anger or favour.” Wallace, Epicureanism 110 (1880)

“A blessed and eternal being has no trouble itself and brings no trouble upon any other being; hence it is exempt from movements of anger and favour, for every such movement implies weakness.” Hicks (1910)

“A happy and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being ; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness.” Hicks (1925)

“The blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favour. For all such things exist only in the weak.” Bailey (1926)

“The blissful and incorruptible being neither knows trouble itself nor occasions trouble to another, and is consequently immune to either anger or gratitude, for all such emotions reside in a weak creature.” De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 252 (1954)

“The blessed and incorruptible being neither knows tribulation itself nor occasions it to another; it is consequently immune to feelings of either anger or gratitude, for all such emotion signifies a weak creature." De Witt, St. Paul and Epicurus 187 (1954)

“That which is blessed and immortal is not troubled itself, nor does it cause trouble to another. As a result, it is not affected by anger or favor, for these belong to weakness.” Geer (1964)

“That which is blessed and imperishable neither suffers nor inflicts trouble, and therefore is affected neither by anger nor by favour. For all such things are marks of weakness.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 140 (1987)

“The blessed and immortal is itself free from trouble nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore, it is not constrained either by anger or by favor. For such sentiments exist only in the weak.” O'Connor (1993)

“ What is blessed and indestructible has no trouble itself nor does it give trouble to anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“A blessed and imperishable being neither has trouble itself nor does it cause trouble for anyone else; therefore, it does not experience feelings of anger or indebtedness, for such feelings signify weakness.” Anderson (2004)

“That which is blessed and indestructible has no affairs of its own to attend to; nor does it inflict any trouble on others. So, it is agitated neither by ire nor by partiality. For all such are to be found in that which lacks power.” Makridis (2005)

“That which is blissful and immortal has no troubles itself, nor does it cause trouble for others, so that it is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness).” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The blessed and indestructible being of the divine has no concerns of its own, nor does it make trouble for others. It is not affected by feelings of anger or benevolence,because these are found where there is a lack of strength.” Strodach (2012)

“The blessed and immortal has no troubles himself and causes none for anyone else; hence he has nothing to do with resentments and partisanship; for all such impulses are a sign of weakness.” Mensch (2018)

“What is in bliss and imperishable neither has troubles itself nor causes any for others, so it experiences no feelings of either anger or gratitude; for everything of that sort indicates weakness.” White (2021)

Note: Alternate Renderings are from Kuriai Doxai - A Compilation of Translations by Nathan Bartman

I have now completed phase one of the reorganization of the Vatican Sayings and Principal Doctrines forums, and the result of the Vatican Sayings reorganization is here:

Epicurus - The "Vatican List" of Sayings

On both, I intend to add more links to the full list of sayings and doctrines so that you can navigate from a list (which has the full text of each doctrine/saying) to the discussion section. I plan to do that by going to the texts section and linking each saying to the tag for each saying.

When complete this change will eliminate the looonnnggg scrolling through the full forum list by reducing 121 subforums down to four or so, and I think the material will still be findable a variety of ways.

Please let me know what obvious problems you run into before I do the same to the Principal Doctrines. I doubt I will get to that today so no immediate rush.

Sorry for all the "Thread Starter" notifications today, but as you can see from the number of them, many of the subforums were totally empty.

VS80. The first measure of security is to watch over one’s youth, and to guard against what makes havoc of all by means of maddening desires.

VS79. The man who is serene causes no disturbance to himself or to another.

VS78. The truly noble man busies himself chiefly with wisdom and friendship, of which the one is an understandable good but the other is immortal.

See this linked discussion here for the reason "understandable" is superior to "immortal" as the best translation. Bailey has: "The noble soul occupies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these, the one is a mortal good, the other immortal."

VS77. The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom.