As To The Three Legs Of The Canon (Sensations, Feelings, Anticipations) Is it Possible to Experience (Receive Data?) From One Without The Others?

    This morning we recorded the first episode for Chapter 8 and one thing that we came across, but did not deal with yet, led us to consider whether it is possible to experience "feeling" (pleasure or pain) separate and apart and independently of anticipations and feelings. This question arises in discussing the connection and relationship between the three faculties.


    This question implicates PD2 (without sensation we are dead) and it is something discussed in the Wenham article which I regularly cite on the kinetic/katastematic issue.


    Before we address it (probably episode 161) it would be good to discuss it in a thread. I am initially posting this in 160s notes but will probably move the topic to a separate thread of its own.


    Perhaps a better way of asking the question would involve formulations like:

    1. Can you experience pleasure without a sensation being involved / give rise to it?
    2. Does every sensation evoke a feeling of pleasure or pain?

    Given the big issues involving what anticipations really are, adding it into the mix may be more trouble than it is worth, but probably the same questions apply:

    1. Can you experience pleasure without an anticipation being involved / give rise to it?
    2. Does every anticipation evoke a feeling of pleasure or pain?


    What of the workings of the mind in all this? Do those workings of the mind constitute or generate sensations?


    How do the three work together? DeWitt's formulation starts out with:


    Quote

    The three criteria are neither three aspects of a single capacity nor yet three discrete capacities which function separately from one another. To Epicurus body and soul are alike corporeal; they are also coterminous. Consequently all reactions of the individual to his environment are total or psychosomatic. Thus in the case of every reaction Nature is on the alert to register approval or disapproval by the signals of pleasure and pain. This is the function of the Feelings in the meaning of the Canon.


    It is true that in the Greek language all three criteria may be called pathe, in modern parlance "reactions," but they are not identical. It is true also that all three may be components of a given reaction but still they occur in sequence. Sensation is irrational and merely registers a quality, for example, sweetness. It is the intelligence that says, "This is honey," and it is the Feelings that report, "I like it" or "I don't like it." Again, it is positively known that Epicurus postulated the existence of an innate sense of justice and called this an Anticipation. Now injustice hurts and it is the Feelings that register this fact. If a man is condemned to pay an unjust penalty, the pain is a reaction distinct from the aural sensation of hearing the verdict.

    Agree? Disagree? Your comments are welcome!

    Quote from Cassius
    1. Can you experience pleasure without a sensation being involved / give rise to it?
    2. Does every sensation evoke a feeling of pleasure or pain?

    1. No.

    2. Yes.

    How's that for being dogmatic ^^

    Quote from Cassius
    1. Can you experience pleasure without an anticipation being involved / give rise to it?
    2. Does every anticipation evoke a feeling of pleasure or pain?

    1. Yes.

    2. I don't think so. My take is that anticipations are linked to sensations somehow. But that's a sticky wicket.

    While DeWitt is a little wordy and convoluted, I think I agree with the general direction he's going.

    Joshua did I frame this question accurately to the way we were discussing it?


    I don't recall that we have addressed this question before and it's full of difficulties. I agree with Don's comments generally with the possible exception as to anticipations. I will need to reread the rest of the chapter and see if there are any academic articles on this topic.


    I think my eventual answer is going to be that they all three function together and all the time, but that will move "anticipations" more deeply into the center of all brain activity than I have previously considered it to be. However that may well be possible.


    Though Dewitt occasionally uses the term ideas I think reject the view that anticipations are "ideas" of any kind, and I think I prefer the view that they were considered to be by Epicurus some kind of "firmware" or "operating system" process always involved in consciousness (probably involving patten assembly and recognition).


    In that I am influenced by the Barwis argument that we are born with "principles of operation" (again genetic or similar methods of functioning) but not with "ideas.". In that I see a strong analogy to pleasure and pain and the senses, in that they are in operation at birth (or some time after conception) though containing no prior experiences.

    Yes, that's basically the discussion we were having this morning. I had tentatively suggested that it would be possible to experience pleasure not caused by sensation. For example, if one is plagued with anxiety about the fear of death, then the removal of that fear (which is not a sensation) produces a pleasurable feeling of relief. I then clarified that it might be possible to experience pleasure or pain uncaused by sensation, but requiring nevertheless some kind of change in stimulus. In the case I mentioned above, the change in stimulus would be changing one's mind.

    Yes to repeat we brought up the subject and then quickly realized that it was going to be very complex and dropped back to continue the podcast without it. So as far as I am concerned we are essentially a blank slate on this topic!

    As far as the anticipations, using justice as an example, I always go back to the research on fairness done with babies and toddlers that shows a clear preference for fair behavior from basically birth before any acculturation can happen.

    Quote

    I then clarified that it might be possible to experience pleasure or pain uncaused by sensation, but requiring nevertheless some kind of change in stimulus

    Is not the awareness of consciousness itself - of being alive - a "sensation" of some kind? And would that not factor in to the apparent view that so long as pain is not present what is being felt is pleasure, even if it is just awareness of being alive?


    I presume these are the kinds of issues this question calls for answering.

    Yes!


    I pointed to four situations that suggest an innate faculty for fairness by four different lines of evidence.


    1. Among very small children, if you break a cookie in two unequal halves they'll each be happy to get a part of the cookie even if they don't get equal shares. When they're very young they'll notice that they both got "cookie", but they won't notice differences in quantity.


    2. Among somewhat older children, two unequal shares won't cut it anymore. They each want a perfect half, or each individual wants the larger half for themselves.


    3. Among chimpanzees, if two are given celery they'll both be happy. If one is given celery and one is given grapes, the one given celery will be visibly upset--grapes are better than celery.


    4. Among chimpanzees, if you give food to chimpanzees that are not in a cage they will sometimes share their food with another chimpanzee in the cage who didn't get food.

    To clarify, my "yes!" Was in response to Don's post and not Cassius' question (in which we cross posted).


    Quote

    Is not the awareness of consciousness itself - of being alive - a "sensation" of some kind? And would that not factor in to the apparent view that so long as pain is not present what is being felt is pleasure, even if it is just awareness of being alive?

    My (again, tentative) reaction to this would be no. When DeWitt says that Epicurus was not an Empiricist he was pushing back against the tendency to merge all faculties into one and call it sensation. DeWitt regards sensation as being incapable of judgment, memory, etc.


    When Epicurus talks about 'pleasant expectations for the future', or 'the memory of past pleasures' he's describing mental faculties apart from sensation. DeWitt uses the example of the man unjustly convicted in court. He experiences a feeling of pain at hearing the judgment quite apart from the aural sensation itself. It would of course be impossible for the man to know of his unjust conviction without sensation, but after he knows of it he stops requiring sensation to feel pleasure or pain about it.

    Quote from Joshua

    When Epicurus talks about 'pleasant expectations for the future', or 'the memory of past pleasures' he's describing mental faculties apart from sensation.

    I've always been confused about this, because on one reading (from my perspective) Epicurus seems to treat the mental faculties of the mind as a sense organ picking up sensations from subtle images leading to thought and memory.

    I'll have to think (pun intended) on this.

    Quote from Don

    Epicurus seems to treat the mental faculties of the mind as a sense organ picking up sensations from subtle images leading to thought and memory.

    As I read things there is no doubt about that being part of the big picture of the operation of the mind. Clearly Epicurus says this.


    I presume that a tricky part is per Joshua:

    Quote from Joshua

    but after he knows of it he stops requiring sensation to feel pleasure or pain about it.

    Would this be consistent with PD2 relating to absence of sensation being nothing to us? Do the faculties operate so independently that "over here" we have the five senses operating on one set of data while "over here" the pleasure faculty is operating on an entirely different set of data or somehow operating without any data at all?


    Are we talking about memory here, to the effect that once a memory is stored the five senses are no longer involved at all? Is not the pleasure or pain from our memory essentially a stored sensation?


    In other words for purposes of PD2 and maybe other uses, should we be considering memory of a sensation to be the equivalent of a "new" or "contemporaneous" sensation?


    Is "pleasure" like "yellow" - in that pleasure does not exist apart from sensations that are pleasurable just like yellow does not exist apart from things that are yellow? This question I think is particularly important.


    Should we ask the same about anticipations? Do anticipations exist apart from sensations and feelings?


    Can any of these three faculties be considered to have an independent existence apart from the others?


    Would it be concerning if we were to admit that "pleasure" exists apart from "sensations that are pleasurable?" I sense that this question is closely related to the also-troubling contention that katastematic pleasure is some kind of special and higher pleasure, different in nature from any other "normal" type of pleasure, and somehow separate and apart from experience/sensation.


    This reminds me of Dewitt's observation that pleasure has no meaning except to the living. "Pleasure" can exist outside the normal functioning living being no more than a soul or spirit can be considered to exist outside the living body, right?


    Also: we can choose in our mind to consider yellow apart from a lemon if we prefer, but that doesn't mean yellow exists without our picturing in our mind's eye something that is yellow, does it? This phrase "mind's eye" may be related to the topic. Does our mind have an ear and a nose and a tongue too?


    When we say "Imagine something..." Does that mean anything different than summoning up the "image" from storage rather than from the "current" eyeball input? Is summoning up the image from storage so conceptually different for our current purposes such that the result should not be considered to be a sensation? If we close our eyes for just a moment is the pleasure we are feeling from the stored picture in our mind (of the same object while our eyes are closed) so very different in kind? Does the blink of an eye while we are standing in the Louvre change how we should consider the pleasure we feel in appreciating the Mona Lisa?


    Seems to me that we are in danger if we don't consider that this discussion has both "biological" aspects and "philosophical" or "conceptual" aspects. Can't (or shouldn't) we conceive of both stored and contemporaneous images as having exactly the same ability to be considered properly as sensations?


    PD02. Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.


    Does that mean that we should consider ourselves to be dead when we stop receiving new sensations from functioning organs, or only after our minds have ceased to function and to be able to *both* receive new *and* operate on stored memories of sensations?


    All this interrelationship is why I think it is ridiculous to single out and interpret "katastematic pleasure" or "tranquility" or "ataraxia" or "aponia" or any other particular word as something higher than, or special in kind, or anything more than one among many experiences of (or aspects of or perspectives on) the "Pleasure" that we use as a description of our general goal in living a full human life.


    (And when I say I think it is ridiculous, what I mean is I think Epicurus would have thought this interpretation of his words to be ridiculous too.)


    It makes much more sense that Epicurus was taking a very general and common sense perspective on life, so that when he was asked "What is the Goal of Life?" the discussion went something like this:


    - Can life be considered to have a goal, Epicurus?

    - "If you would like to, Yes."

    - Is the goal of life Virtue, or living nobly and virtuously?

    - "No."

    - is the goal of life Piety, or obedience to the Gods?

    - "No."

    - Is the goal of life Rationality, since the distinguishing factor of man is that he is the rational animal?

    - "No."

    - Is the goal of life constant partying, as people claim you do?

    - "No."

    - Is the goal of life Tranquility, or the elimination of pain?

    - "No."

    - "Is the goal of life Happiness, or eudaemonia, or flourishing, or well-being?

    - "No, not in the clearest manner of speaking."

    - Then what do you say the goal is, Epicurus?

    - "Pleasure - which includes the pleasure that comes from living virtuously, and the pleasure that comes from having holy opinions about the gods, and the pleasure that comes from using our minds rationally, and the pleasure that comes from partying, and the pleasure that comes from tranquility, and the pleasure that comes from eliminating pain, and the pleasure that comes from feeling happiness, and the pleasure that comes from many other types of experiences as well."

    Quote from Cassius

    also-troubling contention that katastematic pleasure is some kind of special and higher pleasure, different in nature from any other "normal" type of pleasure, and somehow separate and apart from experience/sensation

    My take: I have other thoughts on your post but this one elicited an immediate reaction from me.

    To me, the only troubling part of katastematic pleasures are their continuing misinterpretation. They are not "special" or "higher". They're merely those pleasures that arise within ourselves like tranquility, pleasant memories, homeostasis, etc. They are "special" only insofar as they are the pleasures we can be most confident in having, even when we are unable to partake in kinetic pleasures like walking in the country, dancing, etc. Tranquility can serve as a foundation for fully experiencing kinetic pleasure free from anxiety.

    Quote from Cassius

    All this interrelationship is why I think it is ridiculous to single out and interpret "katastematic pleasure" or "tranquility" or "ataraxia" or "aponia" or any other particular word as something higher than, or special in kind, or anything more than one among many experiences of (or aspects of or perspectives on) the "Pleasure" that we use as a description of our general goal in living a full human life.

    Again, I will continue to soapbox that katastematic pleasures are not special, but Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Philodemus all refer to them. They cannot be dismissed out of hand like some of those academic authors do or be singled out as *the* goal like other authors do. But Epicurus consistently stresses the importance of ataraxia *in* a pleasurable life. It seems to me he is saying it is necessary but not sufficient for a pleasurable life.

    I would also translate them as stable pleasures not static pleasures. They are pleasures in which we can have confidence at all times.

    There is a whole lot of interesting ideas and questions coming up in this thread, starting with questions on understanding the canon. (But also includes other issues in post 11. Cassius then adds in a few more good questions about the goal of life according to Epicureanism, which gets me wanting to comment on that too, but first wanting to deal with the canon.)


    For myself, I need to first understanding the meaning of "anticipations" -- where is that in the Letter to Herodotus? How do you more clearly define it? Are "anticipations" what we see/imagine in our mind's eye? Or am I incorrect on thinking that?

    Quote from Cassius

    Are we talking about memory here, to the effect that once a memory is stored the five senses are no longer involved at all? Is not the pleasure or pain from our memory essentially a stored sensation?

    My understanding is that memories, per Epicurus, are not stored anywhere. There are "images" (let's call them "potential sensory inputs" that can be picked up by sense organs) constantly swirling around us. For memories, the images impact our mind. For memories, similar images have - for want of a better term - carved a groove or slot in our mind from our repeated recall and then our minds easily picks up the images when we recall them.

    Quote from Cassius

    When we say "Imagine something..." Does that mean anything different than summoning up the "image" from storage rather than from the "current" eyeball input?

    I don't think it's "stored" anywhere in our bodies. I think it's that slot/groove thing and our minds sense the proper images to perceive the memory.


    I need to add that this is not how memory really works. However, I do find it intriguing that the same neurons that perceive sight, sound, etc. also fire when we recollect a sight, sound, etc. Brains are amazing things! Plus, the interplay between brains and our gut biome and other body systems to affect what we think of as our mind is complex and astonishing stuff!

    Quote from Cassius

    Would it be concerning if we were to admit that "pleasure" exists apart from "sensations that are pleasurable?"

    Pleasure cannot exist apart from "sensations that are pleasurable." Everything has a physical basis. There is no pleasure without sensation, and no sensation without a feeling - pleasure or pain - resulting from it, although it can be a small and subtle response. The excerpt from Cassius here swerves too close to Platonic ideal Forms. There is no capital-P Pleasure against which pleasure is measured or of which our pleasure is some kind of pale reflection.

    We certainly agree in your first sentence but I do think there is a "concept" of pleasure which is used as a placeholder in these discussions where the discussion demands a single word that references the full concept.


    I don't think all concepts constitute Platonic ideal forms, do they?

    Quote from Cassius

    We certainly agree in your first sentence but I do think there is a "concept" of pleasure which is used as a placeholder in these discussions where the discussion demands a single word that references the full concept.


    I don't think all concepts constitute Platonic ideal forms, do they?

    I'll give you that. I suppose we can use pleasure as a word that refers to a group of positive sensations the same way we use dog to talk about a particular kind of animal that is a member of a group of domesticated canines... without going down the Pleasure and Dog ideal form route. We just have to remember we're talking language and not philosophy (although, yeah, the line is fuzzy).

    Quote

    I suppose we can use pleasure as a word that refers to a group of positive sensations the same way we use dog to talk about a particular kind of animal that is a member of a group of domesticated canines... without going down the Pleasure and Dog ideal form route. We just have to remember we're talking language and not philosophy (although, yeah, the line is fuzzy).

    What DeWitt is saying is that pleasure ≠ sensation; that no pleasure is a sensation because pleasure presumes judgment ("I like this") and sensation is irrational and incapable of judgment. I realize that after a certain point this all begins to get a little nit-picky.

    Quote from Joshua
    Quote

    I suppose we can use pleasure as a word that refers to a group of positive sensations the same way we use dog to talk about a particular kind of animal that is a member of a group of domesticated canines... without going down the Pleasure and Dog ideal form route. We just have to remember we're talking language and not philosophy (although, yeah, the line is fuzzy).

    What DeWitt is saying is that pleasure ≠ sensation; that no pleasure is a sensation because pleasure presumes judgment ("I like this") and sensation is irrational and incapable of judgment. I realize that after a certain point this all begins to get a little nit-picky.

    I'd agree with.

    To me, the sequence is: We have to have an irrational sensation first, then an involuntary response (literal meaning of pathē: pleasure or pain) to that sensation, then our rational part kicks in with a thought like "I like this".

    Quote from Don

    I'd agree with.

    To me, the sequence is: We have to have an irrational sensation first, then an involuntary response (literal meaning of pathē: pleasure or pain) to that sensation, then our rational part kicks in with a thought like "I like this".

    The problem is that this is not how our brains work per the current research of people like Dr. Feldman Barrett and many others. We wouldn't survive if we waited to react to sensations, e.g., the snake would already have bitten us. Our brains function like prediction engines, constantly assessing incoming data from our bodies and external stimuli and checking it against the "most likely scenario." When we walk through the woods, our brains basically are primed to "beware of long skinny things on ground = danger!". Then if we register a long skinny thing, we jump immediately. It's only after that we realize it was just a twig or discarded rope.

    That's woefully inadequate and probably wrong in some spots, but that's my memory off the top of my head on Barrett's and others findings. There's also the registering of brain waves clearly showing our brains "decide" to initiate an action well before we're conscious of it.

    There's no way Epicurus would have known ANY of this, but it intrigues me to see the brain's prediction faculty as somewhat akin to "anticipations."

    References:

    Our brain is a prediction machine that is always active
    Our brain works a bit like the autocomplete function on your phone -- it is constantly trying to guess the next word when we are listening to a book, reading…
    www.sciencedaily.com

    Interoceptive predictions in the brain
    Intuition suggests that perception follows sensation and therefore bodily feelings originate in the body. However, recent evidence goes against this logic:…
    www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

    How Your "Predictive Brain" Takes Care of You
    What is your predictive brain and why does it matter? According to Barrett, the predictive brain is key to your health and mood.
    www.shortform.com