Posts by Cassius

Quote from Bryan

What has "nature used to impress a notion of gods on our minds" if not the very images of the gods that come from their bodies?

Yep I think that is definitely the question, but even as I argue for the realist position I am not sure that the question is answered very easily.

Do we have notions of "atoms" impressed on our minds even though we have never seen them?

Do we have notions of "justice" impressed on our minds even though justice is an abstract concept which cannot be seen in bodily form?

Quote from Pacatus

At least for me. But prolepsis really seems to be the key.)

Prolepsis being the key to LOTS of things, not just the gods, and that's a huge subject in itself.

I understand that we have to take the senses, anticipations, and feelings as given, as they are our connection with reality, but it seems to me it's all one big question: We have good reason to think that no supernatural god created them, and that they didn't occur simply by chance, but through the natural aspects of atoms moving through void. But I think we all have the tendency to presume that there must have been a **First** combination or event that led to everything else, and I think we have to get past that to connect with where Epicurus would have been going by asking us to study principles of infinity. Whatever process allows for life to develop and then evolve, that process has *always* been something that is naturally part of the universe, so we have to think through what that *always* means. If we take the optimistic view that mankind (our closest example) won't eventually destroy itself,*** then we've got infinite number of species with tremendously developed technologies all across the universe, and that's going to make it important eventually that we distinguish (1) advanced civilizations far ahead of us, which we expect to exist from (2)universe-creating supernatural gods, which we are confident cannot and do not exist.

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*** And even if mankind does destroy itself, we should presume that it wasn't fated that it do so, and that other speicies would not necessarily destroy themselves.

That's a great quote and I think that's consistent with Dewitt's view too that Velleius (taking that Cicero is simply following some contemporary Epicurean text) has it right.

But just like Velleius doesn't stop there, and he joins with it the isonomy argument, I am thinking that there is no reason that *we* should stop there either. We should also factor in the Epicurean argument for life on other worlds, existing in "equitable distribution" (based on how we see a progression of life here on earth). From those we can conclude that living beings more blessed than us, and deathless, are as certain to exist somewhere as are the atoms, which are also beyond our sensory reach, but about which we are confident, based on reasoning from observations that *are* within our sensory reach.

As far as the gods living "between" the worlds, that sounds to me more like one of those manifold possibilities that must satisfy us, rather than a requirement that they live *only* in that location. The requirement would be that they have mastery over their environment so that it provides all that they need for their happiness, and we could suggest numbers of possibilities for how that could be set up, rather than thinking that "intermundia" gives us a complete physical description of a specific particular location. The main thing is that we see no evidence or reason to believe that they would take any notice of us, wherever they are and no matter how many of them there may be.

I am editing last week's podcast, and we are now going through Velleius' criticisms of standard supernatural religion.

In so doing we will come up with a list (started here) of what Velleius (and presumably the Epicureans) thought to be the most important arguments to deal with . In addition, Joshua and I have already mentioned that we would like to include other issues (such as the "riddle" / problem of evil ) which may not be in Velleius' commentary.

So for those who find this topic of interest, let us know if you think there are particularly influential arguments that we should include in this series. There is probably an endless number of them, but certainly some are more popular than others, and we don't want to miss anything obvious, so please mention in the commente any that you would like us to be sure to cover. We particularly want to cover the "logical" or "natural" arguments that would tend to impress younger people who think they are being fair-minded, as opposed to those who are taking everything explicitly on faith.

Thanks!

Quote from Don

maybe it's the self-sufficiency (autarkeia) aspect of the gods. By Epicurean definition, they neither expect praise nor dispense random punishment. They are always "blessed" and have an unshakable (incorrupible) blessed life. So a sage can live a god-like life in the here and now?

I would say it that way too (that the gods are a model of achieving that we can aspire to even if we can't achieve their success ourselves).

Humans, even Epicurus, suffer from diseases and all sorts of nagging pains that detract from a totally pleasant life, and it would be desirable to expand our knowledge and technology to eliminate even those. So even Epicurus himself and the ancient Epicureans would have profited by "reverencing the gods" to the extent that emulating a "better" gives you motivation or ideas to work to maintain your own blessedness (live watching a master tennis player helps younger players get better).

At least that's the way I would interpret the "Captain Kirk perspective" on Epicurean philosophy - do everything possible to achieve more pleasure than pain, and push the envelope as far as you can on what is possible, because you're not going to get a second chance.

That would be another reason why I think there is work to be done on articulating Epicurus' full perspective on "impossible" goals, I don't think we have a well-developed-enough reconciliation of "life is desirable so it's desirable to live longer" with "it's impossible to live forever." Variation may not be new, and may not make the pleasure "greater" in every respect, but it seems clear that variation is itself desirable even if it doesn't "greaten" the total pleasure. Unless this calculation is made clear it seems a lot of people are tempted to accept less than what they could actually obtain if they focused their efforts on trying harder. (And of course I realize that some are going to say "you're just setting yourself up for disappointment," and I would respond with something like: "Since I know there is pain in life, and that I only have one life, I'll gladly accept the inevitability that at some point I will fail to stay alive in exchange for the pleasure that I will obtain by living longer. My goal is not running from every moment of pain, but achieving the most pleasurable life possible, so I gladly accept some pain in exchange for greater pleasure."

For some reason as I write this I am reminded of the abortion debate, and how medical technology has shifted the date of "viability" shorter and shorter and effectively overturned what seemed to be a way to come up with a dividing line. We surely don't want to talk too much about abortion here, but I think this specific analogy is relevant -- as medical technology advances, it's likely that humans can live longer and longer under better and better conditions, and old dividing lines about how long is reasonable to live will become obsolete.

My reading of Epicurus is that he would fully endorse living longer so long as conditions remain more pleasurable than painful, so it seems to me the focus really needs to be on "live as long as you can reasonably expect to experience more pleasure than pain" rather than suggesting that there is any period of XX number of years that everyone should deem to be sufficient - or too short.

Quote from Don

I'll admit that I hadn't heard the term "bicameral mind" before

A lot of this discussion is entirely new to me to, so I have little comment at least at this point. I am glad we have intelligent people who can bring things like this to our attention.

Quote from JMGuimas

Is there any way to make subtitles available on videos, it would make it much easier for those who understand little English. Thanks.

Thank you JM for the comment and to the responses.

I definitely agree that this is desirable and i will appreciate comments on other options.

The main affordable option i am aware of is to upload a media file to youtube and let it do the transcription and then hand-edit them afterwards.

But I also see and like what people are doing on videos on Facebook / TicTok /etc where the word that is spoken is highlighted as the voice goes forward - i have not even seen a hint on how that it is done.

This is definitely an area where i would appreciate input from any and all or our tech-savvy people. We have a lot of old material that would be good to convert over time, plus we can get started on making new material the best way.

Luckily for purposes of the podcast there is no reason to prejudice the issue. We will methodically go through the texts and see where we end up at the other end.

Going though On Ends was a cathartic experience for me, and I expect "On the Nature of the Gods," combined with Joshua's color commentary, to be the same!

Quote from Kalosyni

2. The gods have no influence on our lives.

i agree with points one and three, but on this one the formulation is probably too broad. I think Epicurus was saying that the gods don't INTERVENE in our lives, but that doesn't mean that their existence, and (I don't like the word contemplation so I will use) "consideration" of them does have a very strong influence on our lives.

If we consider them incorrectly that leads to disaster. If we consider them incorrectly that leads to the greatest confidence in the ability to live happily.

Quote from TauPhi

f the gods are incorruptible that means they cannot be corrupted. That also mean they do not have to act to maintain their blessedness as it cannot be taken from them. They are immortal. And since only atoms, void and the universe as a placeholder for them are eternal and cannot be corrupted, thanks to the Epicurean gods we can kiss Epicurean atomism bye, bye.

I don't agree that this is rigorous application of Epicuean principles. "Incorruptble" does not contain within it an explanation of how that incorruptibility is maintained. As DeWitt argues, only atoms and void are eternally unchangeable. Something must maintain the status of incorruptibility, and since there is no god over them to do so for them, the gods must maintain their incorruptibility themselves.

This is supported by Velleius' statement in the material we are covering:

"But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius, is the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato’s God?"

No one I have seen has asserted that Epicurus definitely held that an individual god has existed ETERNALLY, so unless you are contending that it is clear that Epicurus held that a particular god has existed eternally, just like an atom, then a god came together from atoms at some point just like we did. I am not saying it is the only difference, but for purpose of this discussion I would say that the major distinction is that the god has found a way to maintain his togetherness indefinitely (being in the intermundia is part of that) and that there is no necessity for a god to worry that he will cease to exist, unless the god were to for some reason stop doing the things that keeps it alive. I don't see anything beyond that as necessarily a part of "incorruptibility." Maybe there are ways to trace the etymology and definitions of the words used to a different conclusion, but again unless someone can point to clear references that the god (a god, the gods) had no beginning, then they are not exempt from the rule that only atoms have eternally unchanging nature.

Again, it's perfectly understandable if someone says that all this discussion of these issues is pure speculation and they want nothing to do with it, but that's not the position that Epicurus or the Epicureans took, and eliminating it from discussion is not Epicurean philosophy. It is, in fact, arguably the subject that the Epicureans considered of number one prime importance above all others.

Quote from TauPhi

To emulate anything we at the very least need to be exposed to it to have a vague idea of what we are supposed to be emulating. The only exposure in Epicureanism I'm aware of is 'eidola' and that is nothing more that: 'Hey, I imagined something so it must be true. From now on I will emulate it.' And with that approach I can only hope nobody starts imagining Freddie Kruger in a birthday balloon shop.

I think that objection is met by a rigorous application of what Epicurus said: believe NOTHING about them that is alien to incorruption or blessedness. I suspect this is where prolepsis comes in and the argument would be that it is no more appropriate to take from prolepisis that a god could be like Freddie Kruger than that oars when inserted in water are bent and when withdrawn from water return to their straight shape. Sure there are temporary "illusions" that cause some people at some times to form false opinions, when they don't apply prudent canonics to distinguish what they really know from what they don't, but these illusions are overcome by repeated rigorous observations -- and the same kind of repeated and rigorous examination of prolepsis leads to the conclusion that "blessedness" and "incorruptibility" do not comport with being a Freddie Kruger.

An awful lot of Epicurean philosophy depends on rigor in applying the fundamental premises. There are ONLY TWO FEELINGS, pleasure and pain, and if you don't *rigorously* apply that then you are going to spin your wheels forever on what "absence of pain" mean and fall into the trap of concluding that it means something other than pleasure.

If you don't *rigorously* apply proleptic concepts of blessedness and incorruptibility then you'll fall into the trap of thinking that *anything goes* and that a god could be like Freddie Kruger. Proper evaluation of prolepses leads to the conclusion that blessedness and incorruptibility involve self-sufficiency, happiness, and not playing enemies and favorites with others. Sure someone can argue over whether that assertion is correct, but they can also argue over whether oars get bent when they get placed in water. We all, in the end, have to make our own decisions about reality. Epicurus chooses to trust the senses, anticipations, and feelings, rather than to embrace skepticism or divine revelation or rationalism as replacing them.

And if you don't *rigorously* apply the viewpoint that some things are possible and some things are not possible, then you'll take the position that an infinity of time and boundlessness of space means that "anything goes." --- And on this last point I think that you and I are already together that it most certainly does NOT mean that, and that "anything goes" as an argument for where life came from (as in that Intelligent Design article) would be a perversion of Epicurean philosophy.

It seems to me that someone suggesting that Freddie Kruger could be like a god would be met by a classical Epicurean with the same kind of heated reaction as suggesting that infinity means that "anything is possible." Both are nonsensical contentions. (blasphemy! )

Letter to Menoeceus [123] The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life. First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his incorruption or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and incorruption.

Tau Phi I think that you've stated the relationship. There are lots of things that we cannot perceive directly, like atoms, but we hold firmly that they exist and we base our actions on confidence that they (atoms) are at the basis of all things, and not supernatural gods.

Further, I think those who say that we "cannot interact" with the gods have to be careful that they are not going further than the texts support. They were talking about perceiving images of the gods, and those images would not be magical and would presumably be traveling from the intermundia to us (although that section seems to indicate the opposite direction). A fair reading of the various texts certainly seems to imply that while we DO not see them, the reason is that they are too far off to see, not that there is some kind of magical impenetrable barrier to seeing them, if we were closer, just like we see that the tower up close is square rather than round.

Also, I do not think that the "cannot" should be extended to more than the observation that in Epicurus' time they "could not" travel to the moon. I would see no theoretical reason why, having advanced to space travel, humans could not travel toward or even to the intermundia, just as Lucretius analogizes when he talks about what he sees of the intermundia in his mind's eye in the poem.

I see no reason at all not to conclude that Epicurus thought that it was important to affirm that there is life throughout the universe, that there is life that operates more successfully (and less successfully) than we do, and that "the gods" are examples of what we expect to find as we extend our observations out into the universe.

I understand that there are people, Frances Wright among them, as seen in her writings after "A Few Days In Athens," who have no use for that kind of theorizing. They think we should focus our entire attention here on earth and not worry about more cosmic issues. But I think Epicurus thought that huge numbers of people DO have need for such theorizing as part of their confidence that the universe is entirely natural and has no supernatural component. I think that way myself, and I am confident that there are large numbers of people who, as part of their Epicurean reading, want to understand where Epicurus was coming from as a part of their overall thinking about the universe.

Those who are following along in the YONGE translation will note that I have changed the link to a different version, available at Archive.org here.

This version contains not only "On The Nature of the Gods" but also "On Divination" and "On Fate," as those works also contain commentary that is relevant to Epicurus' position on these issues.

What does it tell us, if anything, that Cicero equates gnawing on De Voluptate as analgous to the cost of yearly produce in the market?

Quote from Bryan

Cassius, I agree with most of DeWitt's thinking regarding the gods not being inherently immortal -

Let's grapple directly with the most infrequently-discussed of DeWitt's assertions: That any particular god has not by nature existed from eternity, and will not by nature remain immortal without attending to its own immortality.

In support of this beginning page 267 DeWitt cites:

1. The general reasoning that nothing but atoms are inherently immortally the same.
2. Gods are in the same order of beings as men and all other living things, all of which have a beginning and end;
3. Since there is nothing higher / supernatural to maintain them, they must maintain themselves;
4. Plutarch, for example, who, though hostile. wrote with texts of Epicurus before him, has this to say: "Freedom from pain along with incorruptibility should have been inherent in the nature of the blissful being, standing in no need of active concern:' 57 This manifestly implies that the Epicurean gods were unable to take their immunity from corruption for granted but must concern themselves for its perpetuation.
5. The incongruity between this selfish concern for their own bodily security and their indifference to the good of mankind was certain to elicit condemnation from believers in divine providence, and this has not escaped record. Thus the Christian Eusebius quotes his Atticus as saying: "According to Epicurus it's goodbye to providence, in spite of the fact that according to him the gods bring to bear all diligent care for the preservation of their own peculiar blessings." 58
6. DeWitt translates the initial section of the letter to Menoeceus differently (see the full version in his appendix to "St Paul and Epicurus" and says this: When once it has been discerned that the gods are under the necessity of preserving their own blessings, the next step is to learn that this
   activity is ascribed to them as a virtue. The recognition of this fact will serve to explain a rather cryptic statement from the pen of Epicurus himself. Writing of the "false suppositions" of the multitude, who thought of the gods, now as punishing the wicked, now as having venal relationships with them, he concluded as follows: "for [the gods], being exclusively devoted to their own peculiar virtues are partial to those like themselves, deeming all that is not such as alien:' 59 The first half of this statement has been variously interpreted, but the recognition of our puzzling doctrine will make the meaning intelligible. Just as it is the virtue of men to achieve their own happiness, so it is the virtue of the gods to preserve their own blissfulness. This task so completely engages their attention that no participation in human affairs is possible.

What do you guys think of those, especially the reference to the letter to Menoeceus? Obviously here DeWitt is trying to make things more clear by adding section titles, and in addition he is asserting by adding in a reference in brackets that the latter part is an independent reference to the gods and not a continuation of what was being asserted previously as to incorrect ideas about the gods. Is this another area where is asserting that the texts were emended? I did not include this reference in the podcast because I did not get a chance to check it beforehand.

If anyone has time I would appreciate comments on all three: this, the Eusebius reference, and the Plutarch reference. They aren't really needed to support the logical argument that Epicurean any single Epicurean god has not and will not exist "from everlasting to everlasting," but if any or all of them are persuasive then it's obvious why DeWitt cited them.

Let me be sure to call this post to the attention not only of Don and Bryan but also Eikadistes as I think this (if DeWitt can be supported) is a particularly important aspect of Epicurean theology. In emulating the gods, we would not only be emulating a *result*, but one aspect of that role model that we would be emulating comes in realizing that the gods, just like us, must act to maintain their blessedness. This would help stengthen the usefulness of the suggestion that the gods are objects of emulation -- Epicurus would be suggesting that we not only emulate them in result, but that we are emulation the act of working to sustain blessedness. I agree with DeWitt's suggestion that this would be a logical extension of Epicurus' theories about the gods. An example of that would be that when Torquatus describes to Cicero the characteristics of the best life, those are characteristics which must be maintained, whether by gods or by men.

Quote

[40] XII. Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. [41] When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better?

It looks like courtesy of Francis Ford Coppola's Megalopolis the world is about to get a reminder of the Cataline Conspiracy.

I don't know that we have any direct references to anyone accusing Cataline of being an Epicurean, but anyone who is accused of being a reprobate by Cicero is a candidate for looking into their backgound. At present the closest connection I can think of so far is that, in opposing the Death Penalty for some of the Catalinian Conspirators, Cicero accused Julius Caesar of showing Epicurean tendencies. We'll have to see if any hint of that sidelight shows up in the movie.

And we'll also need to be careful in discussing divisive politics to the extent that modern political issues are really the point of the movie.

But I thought I would post this as a place to comment since we might find that renewed discussions of Cataline afford an opportunity to talk to others about Epicurus.

Quote

What’s Megalopolis about?

Megalopolis stars Adam Driver as Cesar Catilina, a visionary architect who wants to build a utopian version of the sci-fi version of New York that’s on the brink of collapse, à la the Roman Empire.

However, Catilina is facing resistance from the corrupt Mayor Franklyn Cicero (Giancarlo Esposito), who is less into creating a sustainable future and instead wants to pave paradise with a parking lot — or, in this case, a casino. The mayor’s daughter Julia (Nathalie Emmanuel) complicates matters by falling for Catilina and struggling with her own alliances.

As indicated I would suggest comparing that excerpt from Cicero to Chapter 15 of A Few Days In Athens.

“But is not the existence of a first or creating cause demonstrated to our senses by all we see, and hear, and feel?”

“The existence of all that we see and hear and feel is demonstrated to our senses; and the belief we yield to this existence is immediate and irresistible, that is, intuitive. —The existence of the creating cause, that you speak of, is not demonstrated to our senses; and therefore the belief in it cannot be immediate and irresistible. I prefer the expression “creating” to “first” cause, because it seems to present a more intelligible meaning. When you shall have examined farther into the phenomena of nature, you will see, that there can be as little a first as a last cause.”

“But there must be always a cause, producing an effect.”

“Certainly; and so your cause, — creating all that we see and hear and feel — must itself have a producing cause, otherwise you are in the same difficulty as before.”

“I suppose it a Being unchangeable and eternal, itself unproduced, and producing all things.”

“Unchangeable it may be, — eternal it must be — since every thing is eternal.”

“Every thing eternal?”

“Yes; that is, the elements composing all substances are, so far as we know and can reason, eternal, and in their nature unchangeable; and it is apparently only the different disposition of these eternal and unchangeable atoms that produces all the varieties in the substances constituting the great material whole, of which we form a part. Those particles, whose peculiar agglomeration or arrangement, we call a vegetable to-day, pass into, and form part of an animal to-morrow; and that animal again, by the falling asunder of its constituent atoms, and the different approximation and agglomeration of the same, — or, of the same with other atoms, — is transformed into some other substance presenting a new assemblage of qualities. To this simple exposition of the phenomena of nature (which, you will observe, is not explaining their wonders, for that is impossible, but only observing them,) we are led by the exercise of our senses. In studying the existences which surround us, it is clearly our business to use our eyes, and not our imaginations. To see things as they are, is all we should attempt, and is all that is possible to be done. Unfortunately, we can do but little even here, as our eyes serve us to see but a very little way. But, were our eyes better — were they so good as to enable us to observe all the arcana of matter, we could never acquire any other knowledge of them, than that they are as they are; — and, in knowing this, that is, in seeing every link in the chain of occurrences, we should know all that even an omniscient being could know. One astronomer traces the course of the sun round the earth, another imagines that of the earth round the sun. Some future improvements in science may enable us to ascertain which conjecture is the true one. We shall then have ascertained a fact, which fact may lead to the discovery of other facts, and so on. Until this plain and simple view of the nature of all science be generally received, all the advances we may make in it are comparatively as nothing. Until we occupy ourselves in examining, observing, and ascertaining, and not in explaining, we are idly and childishly employed. — With every truth we may discover we shall mix a thousand errors; and, for one matter of fact, we shall charge our brain with a thousand fancies. To this leading misconception of the real, and only possible object of philosophical inquiry, I incline to attribute all the modes and forms of human superstition. The vague idea that some mysterious cause not merely precedes but produces the effect we behold, occasions us to wander from the real object in search of an imaginary one. We see the sun rise in the east: instead of confining our curiosity to the discovery of the time and manner of its rising, and of its course in the heavens, we ask also — why does it rise? What makes it move? The more ignorant immediately conceive some Being spurring it through the heavens, with fiery steeds, on wheels of gold, while the more learned tell us of laws of motion, decreed by an almighty fiat, and sustained by an almighty will. Imagine the truth of both suppositions: in the one case, we should see the application of what we call physical power in the driver and the steeds followed by the motion of the sun, and in the other, an almighty volition followed by the motion of the sun. But, in either case, should we understand why the sun moved? — why or how its motion followed what we call the impulse of the propelling power, or the propelling volition? All that we could then know, more than we now know, would be, that the occurrence of the motion of the sun was preceded by another occurrence; and if we afterwards frequently observed the same sequence of occurrences, they would become associated in our mind as necessary precedent and consequent — as cause and effect: and we might give to them the appellation of law of nature, or any other appellation; but they would still constitute merely a truth — that is a fact, and envelope no other mystery, than that involved in every occurrence and every existence.”

“But, according to this doctrine,” said Theon, “there would be no less reason in attributing the beautiful arrangement of the material world to the motion of a horse, than to the volition of an almighty mind.”

“If I saw the motion of a horse followed by the effect you speak of, I should believe in some relation between them; and if I saw it follow the volition of an almighty mind —the same.”

“But the cause would be inadequate to the effect.”

“It could not be so, if it were the cause. For what constitutes the adequacy of which you speak? Clearly only the contact, or immediate proximity of the two occurrences. If any sequence could in fact be more wonderful than another, it should rather seem to be for the consequent to impart grandeur to the precedent — the effect to the cause, — than for the cause to impart grandeur to the effect. But in reality all sequences are equally wonderful. That light should follow the appearance of the sun, is just as wonderful, and no more so, as if it were to follow the appearance of any other body — and did light follow the appearance of a black stone it would excite astonishment simply because we never saw light follow such an appearance before. Accustomed, as we now are, to see light when the sunrises, our wonder would be, if we did not see light when he rose : but were light regularly to attend the appearance of any other body, our wonder at such a sequence would, after a time, cease; and we should then say, as we now say, there is a light because such a body has risen; and imagine then, as we imagine now, that we understand why light is.”

“In like manner all existences are equally wonderful. An African lion is in himself nothing more extraordinary than a Grecian horse; although the whole people of Athens will assemble to gaze on the lion, and exclaim how wonderful! while no man observes the horse.”

“True — but this is the wondering of ignorance.”

“I reply — true again, but so is all wondering. If, indeed, we should consider it in this and in all other cases as simply an emotion of pleasurable surprise, acknowledging the presence of a novel object, the feeling is perfectly rational; but if it imagine anything more intrinsically marvelous in the novel existence, than in the familiar one, it is then clearly the idle — that is, the unreasoned and unreflecting marveling of ignorance. There is but one real wonder to the thinking mind: it is the existence of all things; that is the existence of matter. And the only rational ground of this one great wonder is, that the existence of matter is the last link in the chain of cause and effect at which we can arrive. You imagine yet another link — the existence of a power creating that matter. — My only objections to this additional link, or superadded cause, are, that it is imagined, and that it leaves the wonder as before; unless, indeed, we should say that it has superadded other wonders, since it supposes a power, or rather, an existence possessing a power, of which we never saw an example.”

“How so? Does not even man possess a species of creating power? And do you not suppose, in your inert matter, that very property which others attribute, with more reason it appears to me, to some superior and unknown existence?'”

“By no means. No existence, that we know of, possesses creating power, in the sense you suppose. Neither the existence we call a man, nor any other of the existences comprised under the generic names of matter, physical world, nature, &c., possesses the power of calling into being its own constituent elements, nor the constituent elements of any other substance. It can change one substance into another substance, by altering the position of its particles, or intermingling them with others: but it cannot call into being, any more than it can annihilate, those particles themselves. The hand of man causes to approach particles of earth and of water, and, by their approximation produces clay; to which clay it gives a regular form, and, by the application of fire, produces the vessel we call a vase. You may say that the hand of man creates the vase, but it does not create the earth, or the water, or the fire; neither has the admixture of these substances added to, or subtracted from, the sum of their elementary atoms. Observe, therefore, there is no analogy between the power inherent in matter, of changing its appearance and qualities, by a simple change in the position of its particles, and that which you attribute to some unseen existence, who by a simple volition, should have called into being matter itself, with all its wonderful properties. An existence possessing such a power I have never seen; and though this says nothing against the possibility of such an existence, it says every thing against my belief in it. And farther, the power which you attribute to this existence — that of willing every thing out of nothing, — being, not only what I have never seen, but that of which I cannot with any distinctness conceive — it must appear to me the greatest of all improbabilities.”

That sounds reasonable. The mice eating Plato's Republic reflects "negatively" on the state of the commonwealth, so the mice eating "On Pleasure" reflects negatively on pleasure - and the price of grain going up might account for the pleasure of people being affected negatively.

But is it clear that "the mice becoming obsessed with the pleasure of the belly" is a clear connection? Did the mice become obessesed with politics by eating the Republic, or is just an "indication" sent by the gods or something?

Anyone else see any different possibilities? Otherwise I think Don's probably makes the most sense.

Seems to me that this statement by Atticus, included in Cicero's "On The Law" is a good citation to support the observation that the feeling of pleasure is personal to he who feels it, and not something universally "objective." It's also useful for combating the allegation that there was no freedom of thought in the Epicurean school (an absurd suggestion but one you sometime hear):

Only time at the moment to connect a couple of references that relate to Epicurus views on causation and what (if anything) is "causless," which relates to attacks that some make against Epicurus when they allege that the swerve, being "uncaused," is ruled out of court.

Below is a Ciceronian discussion of Epicurus' views. I would suggest at some point we compare this to the way Frances Wright discusses Epicurus' view (responds to this argument?) in A Few Days In Athens: