Episode 227 - Cicero's OTNOTG - 02 - Velleius Begins His Attack On Traditional Views Of The Gods

I don't think we are going to reach an agreement regarding the nature of the gods and I don't think it matters, to be honest, as we are just people speculating about something way above our pay grade.

I just want to clarify that it was never my intention to eliminate gods from Epicureanism. The gods are integral and significant part of the philosophy. I'm first to admit it. I do study Epicurean theology as any other aspect of the philosophy but to my current knowledge, that aspect seems to be a weak link in the philosophy and I am definitely not going to pretend that emulation of gods is a viable option FOR ME just because Epicurus said so. I find insistence on emulation of unknown as dangerous as following any other gods people came up with through the history of mankind.

I hope I'm perfectly clear that it's my own personal stance on the topic and every conversation I'm involved in on this forum regarding gods is only my attempt to get some clarification and further study. I'm not interested in trying to convince anyone of anything I know very little about. Just in case someone gets the wrong impression that I'm against Epicureanism - I'm not. I find it fascinating and useful, most of the time.

This is exactly why I'm in the "idealist" camp when it comes to this topic.

I find it hard to fathom that Epicurus really posited atomic beings existing outside his kosmos, between world-systems. Remember, the stars we see are part of our kosmos. The "intermundia" has no world, no stars, no moons. It is, as far as I can determine, an undefined soup of random atoms that haven't coalesced into an orderly kosmos. I see no way an atomic material being would even have a place to stand in such a region of the Universe!

Epicurus did posit "alien" life elsewhere in the Universe, but they lived in their own cosmos. Those other beings weren't the gods.

My understanding of the "idealist" position is that each person can have their own conception of the best blessed life possible, and that is *their* "god." That, to me, is part of the significance of those singular "god"'s in Menoikeus. That kind of "god" is deathless because you can't kill an idea. It goes on, being reconceived again and again

That's where my head is at currently on this topic.

Perhaps the gods could be this kind of "preconception". This occurred to me as I was looking at an old book cover.

Face pareidolia - spotting faces in objects that have none. Pareidolia is a mistake of the mind, part of a human tendency to perceive patterns in random circumstances.

Quote from Don

My understanding of the "idealist" position is that each person can have their own conception of the best blessed life possible, and that is *their* "god." That, to me, is part of the significance of those singular "god"'s in Menoikeus. That kind of "god" is deathless because you can't kill an idea.

I guess like Don I'm more sympathetic to the 'idealist camp,' though I do tend to think the conception is probably shared rather than particular (or at least *more* shared than particular).

I suppose what puzzles me about the idea that we should aim to be like the gods is that it might seem perfectly sufficient to aim to be like the *sage.* If, for example, the sage expresses gratitude, but the gods do not (KD 1), then shouldn't I want to be like the sage because I am human?

Quote from Little Rocker

I suppose what puzzles me about the idea that we should aim to be like the gods is that it might seem perfectly sufficient to aim to be like the *sage.* If, for example, the sage expresses gratitude, but the gods do not (KD 1), then shouldn't I want to be like the sage because I am human?

Great question. LOL! Maybe it's all marketing. "Be an Epicurean. Live the life of the gods!"

In a slightly more serious vein, maybe it's the self-sufficiency (autarkeia) aspect of the gods. By Epicurean definition, they neither expect praise nor dispense random punishment. They are always "blessed" and have an unshakable (incorrupible) blessed life. So a sage can live a god-like life in the here and now?

I'll have to give this one some more thought 🤔

Quote from Cassius

At least that's the way I would interpret the "Captain Kirk perspective" on Epicurean philosophy - do everything possible to achieve more pleasure than pain, and push the envelope as far as you can on what is possible, because you're not going to get a second chance.

This may be slightly off-topic... but the problem with "Captain Kirk" is that he is a fictional character, and the on-going story gives him a kind of "immortality" - if he dies then the story ends - so he can't die for the sake of entertainment. In real life, the people who take on certain actions with great risks do end up dying due to events taking a bad turn. Also, I see him as a being like a "modern stoic".

Quote from Little Rocker

I suppose what puzzles me about the idea that we should aim to be like the gods is that it might seem perfectly sufficient to aim to be like the *sage.* If, for example, the sage expresses gratitude, but the gods do not (KD 1), then shouldn't I want to be like the sage because I am human?

Two possibilities:

-- The writings explaining this have been lost.

-- Epicurus may have allowed multiple ways to "consider the gods" as long as you foremost believed that they do not intervene or interact with humans.

Quote from Kalosyni

Two possibilities:

-- The writings explaining this have been lost.

-- Epicurus may have allowed multiple ways to "consider the gods" as long as you foremost believed that they do not intervene or interact with humans.

I think the first is definitely right and the second also seems right to me. We don't have what he wrote about this question, but he wrote something for sure. And my hunch is that his theological project was primarily negative (i.e. aimed at removing false beliefs about the gods rather than at developing a worked-out theology). It could very well be that his positive theology was something like--believe whatever you want about the gods so long as it is consistent with all the other stuff we accept.

I'll have to think more about Captain Kirk, but it seems to me that if Epicurus himself (or let's just say 'the sage') thought we have every reason to use scientific innovation to diminish pain and increase pleasure, then emulating the attitudes and efforts of the sage would again suit the aspirational purpose.

To tie those two thoughts together, and if I'm understanding Kalosyni roughly correctly--we need to eliminate false beliefs about the gods, but it remains unclear whether the gods themselves play an essential role that can't be fulfilled by thinking of the best way to live as a human being. There's a paper on 'Epicurean Immortality' I once read that I'm going track down and revisit.

There's an interesting paper "The Polytheism of the Epicureans" by Paul Terrence Matthias Jackson which may also be relevant here.

My guess is that Epicurus' take on the gods wasn't primarily negative, but equally positive in his redirected way of thinking about them. But we've moved so far from the Greek ideas of the gods that his ideas on the subject may seem irrelevant to us. So a further question is whether it makes sense for us to attempt to apply the Epicurean ideas of the gods to our modern lives, or is doing so a form of historical reenactment?

"For indeed, all concepts have arisen from the senses – according to [1] circumstance, [2] analogy, [3] similarity, or [4] synthesis – with reasoning also contributing something." (DL 10.32)

Given that all our ideas are necessarily built only from impressions of the outside world, I do not understand how the idealist interpretation is tenable. We need impressions from external physical objects to form our thoughts. By analogy to direct impressions we are able to "mentally contemplate invisible realities." (DL 10.59)

Additionally, if an idea synthesized in our mind does not accurately correspond to an external object, then it is an empty opinion.

If you imagine a centaur, you have synthesized your impressions from reality into something that no longer corresponds to reality. In this case, the centaur exists in your mind as a real impression because it moves your mind with the impression of a centaur, but that synthesis does not correspond to reality (again, an empty opinion).

DL 10.49, 50 (Mensch Trans.) "We must also believe that it is when something from the external objects enters us that we see and think of them; for external objects could not stamp in us the nature of their own color and shape through the air that is between them and us, nor by means of the rays of light or any sorts of currents that travel from us to them, but rather by the entrance into our eyes or minds (as their size determines) of certain rapidly moving outlines that have the same color and shape as the external objects themselves; the same cause explains how they present the appearance of a single, continuous object and preserve their mutual interconnection at a distance from the substratum, their corresponding impact on our senses being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the solid object from which they come."

"And whatever image we derive by focusing the mind or the sense organs, whether on the object's shape or its concomitant properties, this shape is the shape of the solid object and is due either to the continuous compacting or to the residue of the image. Falsehood and error always reside in the added opinion [when a fact is awaiting confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is subsequently not confirmed by virtue of an immovable opinion in ourselves that is linked to the imaginative impression, but distinct from it; it is this that gives rise to the falsehood]. For impressions like those received from a picture, or arising in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind, or by the other criteria, would not have resembled what we call the real and true things had it not been for certain actual things on which we had cast our eyes. Error would not have occurred unless we had experienced some other movement in ourselves that was linked to, but distinct from, the apprehension of the impression; and from this movement, if it is not confirmed or is contradicted, falsehood results; whereas if it is confirmed, or not contradicted, truth results. And to this view we must adhere, lest the criteria based on clear evidence be repudiated, or error, strengthened in the same way, throw all these things into confusion."

Quote from Bryan

Additionally, if an idea synthesized in our mind does not accurately correspond to an external object, then it is an empty opinion.

And yet, our ability to imagine often leads to discoveries about the external, sensual world that may not have come about otherwise: theoretical science often becomes physical science.

There is also the aesthetic element: Mozart imagined (“heard"/synthesized in his mind) combinations of musical notes that became a score – and hence a symphony that can be played and enjoyed.

And the very ways in which we represent the sensual world to ourselves, and think about it, may invariably involve some imaginative activity (at least I don’t think that can be discounted; and I think there is some empirical evidence for it). For example, “Even when you use your imagination to remember something that actually happened to you, you’re creating a simulation of a time and place that no longer exists.” (Jim Davies. Imagination: The Science of Your Mind's Greatest Power. 2019. Pegasus Books.) Also, imagination can be employed therapeutically to discover and address things about ourselves we might otherwise have not uncovered.

Quote from Godfrey

There's an interesting paper "The Polytheism of the Epicureans" by Paul Terrence Matthias Jackson which may also be relevant here.

The Polytheism of the Epicureans

Epicureans have been branded atheists since antiquity, but although they might have held unorthodox beliefs about divinity, they did nevertheless believe in…

www.academia.edu

Quote from Bryan

Given that all our ideas are necessarily built only from impressions of the outside world, I do not understand how the idealist interpretation is tenable. We need impressions from external physical objects to form our thoughts.

This is not something I have fixed views on, and apologies if I'm rehashing something already well-traveled, but Sedley has argued that Cicero has it right in the Nature of the Gods 1.43-5 that for Epicurus, our grasp of the gods is innate. As I understand it, Sedley thinks it's a natural outgrowth of another thing Epicurus considers innate--our desire for pleasure. Or at least that's how I'm reading this passage:

'The question then arises how we come to have this innate predisposition, given that, in Epicurean eyes, it cannot have been hardwired into us by any divine creator. The answer should be as follows. According to Epicurus all animals have, by nature and without divine design, an innate desire to maximize their own pleasure, and for human beings that maximization is identifiable with a life of blessed tranquillity, untainted by the fear of death. The gods, correctly understood in accordance with the basic prolepsis as blessed and altogether free from the fear of death, are an ideal model of just such a life. Each of us has an innate propensity to imagine – and in particular to dream of – the being we would ideally like to become. By doing so, we are ipso facto giving a concrete realization to the prolepsis of god. Hence our innate predisposition to form this prolepsis is likely to amount to our natural tendency to form a graphic picture of our own equally innate moral agenda. And the guaranteed truth of the prolepsis may well be identifiable with the truth of our intuitive underlying conception of the best life.'

In an effort to reconcile (DL 10.32) "All concepts have arisen from the senses" with (DND 1.43) "...gods exist, because nature herself has impressed a notion of them on the minds of all." I am thinking:

What has "nature used to impress a notion of gods on our minds" if not the very images of the gods that come from their bodies?

We also cannot forget that Philodemus discusses the actual physical processes by which the gods exist:

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.8.205: ^[Obbink] And having written another book On Holiness, in it too he makes clear that –not only that thing which exists indestructibly – but also (that which) continually exists in perfection as one and the same entity: are termed in the common usage "[unified] entities" – some of which [entities] are perfected out of the same elements, and others from similar elements.

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.347: ^[Obbink] Its constitution out of things similar would obviously be a unified entity: for it is possible [for beings constituted] out of similarity for ever to have perfect happiness – since [unified] entities can be formed no less out of identical than out of similar elements ([and both kinds of entity] are recognized by Epicurus as [being] exactly the same things, for example in his book On Holiness.)

Philódēmos, On Piety, 1.13.364: ^[Obbink] ...Therefore he was wont to say that nature brought all these things to completion alike – and that for the most part many things come about [when they are formed] from an aggregation of various similar particles…

Sedley is correct when he says "each of us has an innate propensity to imagine." We also have an innate ability to see -- but we have to actually look and see things to use that ability! So he goes too far by saying "By doing so, we are ipso facto giving a concrete realization to the prolepsis of god." We can give similar mental "realizations" to centaurs. The process Sedley is describing is actually how we form a hypolepsis (supposition) and unless it corresponds to an external body, it is an empty thought.

Quote from Bryan

What has "nature used to impress a notion of gods on our minds" if not the very images of the gods?

Drugs. And a few other things, but I'd like to start with drugs.

By definition, psychedelic chemicals are associated with the religious experience (from the ancient Greek ψυχή [psykhḗ]“mind" or "soul” and δῆλος [dêlos] “manifest" or "visible”). In addition to near-universal consumption of wine, as well as (what I deem to be) possible, recreational use of cannabis (as demonstrated by the Scythians according to Herodotus), the many Mystery Rites (such as the Orphic, Dionysian, and Eleusinian Mysteries) of Antiquity presented the average ancient Greek with a variety of ways to induce a religious experience, either through the inhalation or ingestion of psychoactive substances. The content of those experiences are categorically inspirational, and the experience, itself, can be psychologically and behaviorally transformational.

Dancing. It goes well with drugs for a reason.

Similar neurological patterns are activated through ritualistic dancing and/or drumming. In Islam, we see this with Sufi whirling, renown as inducing a mystical state. Dancing is a primary form of spiritual expression throughout the worlds cultures, too numerous to name. The repetitive, kinetic and acoustic rituals of rhythmic drumming and dancing are partners in inducing the religious experience. Dancing would have been a feature of Dionysian Mysteries, and the practice had a practical purpose, to induce the psychedelic experience, or, in Epicurean terms (so long as I am not conflating incompatible ideas), to "impress a notion of gods on our minds." Historically-speaking, getting high while dancing to rythmic music never gets old (and has never gotten old).

Meditation. It's another pathway to the gods.

Meditation yields similar neurological patters as drugs, dancing, and drumming. We can also throw chanting in this category (and, perhaps, singing). We find recorded examples in Tibetan Buddhism. For the same reasons that dancing and drumming induce psychedelic experiences, various forms of meditation, chanting, and breathing can facilitate psychological states in which lasting, psychologically-transformational impressions (such that we call them "divine") can be consciously apprehended. Focusing upon the icon of a deity can induce an experience that can lead to measurably-positive, behavioral changes. Here again, the Mystery Rites come into play.

Dreams. This is the big one in an Epicurean context.

I think that nocturnal dreams are the best example, not only because they are mentioned by Epicurus, but because they are the only psychedelic experience that occurs without consciously initiating it. Very rarely do we chose our dreams, and we are usually only observers of our dreams, much as, throughout the day, we are observers of sensations. A strong analogy can be made between the images our eyes apprehend in the day and the images our mind apprehends at night. Both are received without the bias of the rational mind, and can therefore be trusted as sources of data. As with optical illusions, it is up to the intellect to formulate a practical interpretation, but those images are already there for the intellect to consider when it awakens.

Those are some general ways of inducing transformational mental states that illicit the "perception of deities" and inspire the "divine nature". The Epicurean connection between piety and ethics reinforces to me the proposition (I'm making) that Epicurus' description of the gods (as impressive objects of a dreamy mind) can be expressed as a function of needing to provide a naturalistic explanation for psychedelic experiences, experiences that would have been common among ancient Greeks as demonstrated by the plethora of Mystery Rites.

Epicurean Philosophy is always practical, and Epicurean theology should be no different: sober vocabulary is required to ground theology in physics, or, in other words, to ground the religious experience within the framework of a universe that is made from particles dancing in void. Unlike the gods of metaphysicians, who were purely theoretical, the Epicurean gods were apparent, and the religious experience was not only accessible, but, through ritual, repeatable and reliable.