Posts by Cassius

Quote from TauPhi

f the gods are incorruptible that means they cannot be corrupted. That also mean they do not have to act to maintain their blessedness as it cannot be taken from them. They are immortal. And since only atoms, void and the universe as a placeholder for them are eternal and cannot be corrupted, thanks to the Epicurean gods we can kiss Epicurean atomism bye, bye.

I don't agree that this is rigorous application of Epicuean principles. "Incorruptble" does not contain within it an explanation of how that incorruptibility is maintained. As DeWitt argues, only atoms and void are eternally unchangeable. Something must maintain the status of incorruptibility, and since there is no god over them to do so for them, the gods must maintain their incorruptibility themselves.

This is supported by Velleius' statement in the material we are covering:

"But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius, is the same as Plato’s God, I ask you, as before, who were the assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato’s God?"

No one I have seen has asserted that Epicurus definitely held that an individual god has existed ETERNALLY, so unless you are contending that it is clear that Epicurus held that a particular god has existed eternally, just like an atom, then a god came together from atoms at some point just like we did. I am not saying it is the only difference, but for purpose of this discussion I would say that the major distinction is that the god has found a way to maintain his togetherness indefinitely (being in the intermundia is part of that) and that there is no necessity for a god to worry that he will cease to exist, unless the god were to for some reason stop doing the things that keeps it alive. I don't see anything beyond that as necessarily a part of "incorruptibility." Maybe there are ways to trace the etymology and definitions of the words used to a different conclusion, but again unless someone can point to clear references that the god (a god, the gods) had no beginning, then they are not exempt from the rule that only atoms have eternally unchanging nature.

Again, it's perfectly understandable if someone says that all this discussion of these issues is pure speculation and they want nothing to do with it, but that's not the position that Epicurus or the Epicureans took, and eliminating it from discussion is not Epicurean philosophy. It is, in fact, arguably the subject that the Epicureans considered of number one prime importance above all others.

Quote from TauPhi

To emulate anything we at the very least need to be exposed to it to have a vague idea of what we are supposed to be emulating. The only exposure in Epicureanism I'm aware of is 'eidola' and that is nothing more that: 'Hey, I imagined something so it must be true. From now on I will emulate it.' And with that approach I can only hope nobody starts imagining Freddie Kruger in a birthday balloon shop.

I think that objection is met by a rigorous application of what Epicurus said: believe NOTHING about them that is alien to incorruption or blessedness. I suspect this is where prolepsis comes in and the argument would be that it is no more appropriate to take from prolepisis that a god could be like Freddie Kruger than that oars when inserted in water are bent and when withdrawn from water return to their straight shape. Sure there are temporary "illusions" that cause some people at some times to form false opinions, when they don't apply prudent canonics to distinguish what they really know from what they don't, but these illusions are overcome by repeated rigorous observations -- and the same kind of repeated and rigorous examination of prolepsis leads to the conclusion that "blessedness" and "incorruptibility" do not comport with being a Freddie Kruger.

An awful lot of Epicurean philosophy depends on rigor in applying the fundamental premises. There are ONLY TWO FEELINGS, pleasure and pain, and if you don't *rigorously* apply that then you are going to spin your wheels forever on what "absence of pain" mean and fall into the trap of concluding that it means something other than pleasure.

If you don't *rigorously* apply proleptic concepts of blessedness and incorruptibility then you'll fall into the trap of thinking that *anything goes* and that a god could be like Freddie Kruger. Proper evaluation of prolepses leads to the conclusion that blessedness and incorruptibility involve self-sufficiency, happiness, and not playing enemies and favorites with others. Sure someone can argue over whether that assertion is correct, but they can also argue over whether oars get bent when they get placed in water. We all, in the end, have to make our own decisions about reality. Epicurus chooses to trust the senses, anticipations, and feelings, rather than to embrace skepticism or divine revelation or rationalism as replacing them.

And if you don't *rigorously* apply the viewpoint that some things are possible and some things are not possible, then you'll take the position that an infinity of time and boundlessness of space means that "anything goes." --- And on this last point I think that you and I are already together that it most certainly does NOT mean that, and that "anything goes" as an argument for where life came from (as in that Intelligent Design article) would be a perversion of Epicurean philosophy.

It seems to me that someone suggesting that Freddie Kruger could be like a god would be met by a classical Epicurean with the same kind of heated reaction as suggesting that infinity means that "anything is possible." Both are nonsensical contentions. (blasphemy! )

Letter to Menoeceus [123] The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life. First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his incorruption or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and incorruption.

Tau Phi I think that you've stated the relationship. There are lots of things that we cannot perceive directly, like atoms, but we hold firmly that they exist and we base our actions on confidence that they (atoms) are at the basis of all things, and not supernatural gods.

Further, I think those who say that we "cannot interact" with the gods have to be careful that they are not going further than the texts support. They were talking about perceiving images of the gods, and those images would not be magical and would presumably be traveling from the intermundia to us (although that section seems to indicate the opposite direction). A fair reading of the various texts certainly seems to imply that while we DO not see them, the reason is that they are too far off to see, not that there is some kind of magical impenetrable barrier to seeing them, if we were closer, just like we see that the tower up close is square rather than round.

Also, I do not think that the "cannot" should be extended to more than the observation that in Epicurus' time they "could not" travel to the moon. I would see no theoretical reason why, having advanced to space travel, humans could not travel toward or even to the intermundia, just as Lucretius analogizes when he talks about what he sees of the intermundia in his mind's eye in the poem.

I see no reason at all not to conclude that Epicurus thought that it was important to affirm that there is life throughout the universe, that there is life that operates more successfully (and less successfully) than we do, and that "the gods" are examples of what we expect to find as we extend our observations out into the universe.

I understand that there are people, Frances Wright among them, as seen in her writings after "A Few Days In Athens," who have no use for that kind of theorizing. They think we should focus our entire attention here on earth and not worry about more cosmic issues. But I think Epicurus thought that huge numbers of people DO have need for such theorizing as part of their confidence that the universe is entirely natural and has no supernatural component. I think that way myself, and I am confident that there are large numbers of people who, as part of their Epicurean reading, want to understand where Epicurus was coming from as a part of their overall thinking about the universe.

Those who are following along in the YONGE translation will note that I have changed the link to a different version, available at Archive.org here.

This version contains not only "On The Nature of the Gods" but also "On Divination" and "On Fate," as those works also contain commentary that is relevant to Epicurus' position on these issues.

What does it tell us, if anything, that Cicero equates gnawing on De Voluptate as analgous to the cost of yearly produce in the market?

Quote from Bryan

Cassius, I agree with most of DeWitt's thinking regarding the gods not being inherently immortal -

Let's grapple directly with the most infrequently-discussed of DeWitt's assertions: That any particular god has not by nature existed from eternity, and will not by nature remain immortal without attending to its own immortality.

In support of this beginning page 267 DeWitt cites:

1. The general reasoning that nothing but atoms are inherently immortally the same.
2. Gods are in the same order of beings as men and all other living things, all of which have a beginning and end;
3. Since there is nothing higher / supernatural to maintain them, they must maintain themselves;
4. Plutarch, for example, who, though hostile. wrote with texts of Epicurus before him, has this to say: "Freedom from pain along with incorruptibility should have been inherent in the nature of the blissful being, standing in no need of active concern:' 57 This manifestly implies that the Epicurean gods were unable to take their immunity from corruption for granted but must concern themselves for its perpetuation.
5. The incongruity between this selfish concern for their own bodily security and their indifference to the good of mankind was certain to elicit condemnation from believers in divine providence, and this has not escaped record. Thus the Christian Eusebius quotes his Atticus as saying: "According to Epicurus it's goodbye to providence, in spite of the fact that according to him the gods bring to bear all diligent care for the preservation of their own peculiar blessings." 58
6. DeWitt translates the initial section of the letter to Menoeceus differently (see the full version in his appendix to "St Paul and Epicurus" and says this: When once it has been discerned that the gods are under the necessity of preserving their own blessings, the next step is to learn that this
   activity is ascribed to them as a virtue. The recognition of this fact will serve to explain a rather cryptic statement from the pen of Epicurus himself. Writing of the "false suppositions" of the multitude, who thought of the gods, now as punishing the wicked, now as having venal relationships with them, he concluded as follows: "for [the gods], being exclusively devoted to their own peculiar virtues are partial to those like themselves, deeming all that is not such as alien:' 59 The first half of this statement has been variously interpreted, but the recognition of our puzzling doctrine will make the meaning intelligible. Just as it is the virtue of men to achieve their own happiness, so it is the virtue of the gods to preserve their own blissfulness. This task so completely engages their attention that no participation in human affairs is possible.

What do you guys think of those, especially the reference to the letter to Menoeceus? Obviously here DeWitt is trying to make things more clear by adding section titles, and in addition he is asserting by adding in a reference in brackets that the latter part is an independent reference to the gods and not a continuation of what was being asserted previously as to incorrect ideas about the gods. Is this another area where is asserting that the texts were emended? I did not include this reference in the podcast because I did not get a chance to check it beforehand.

If anyone has time I would appreciate comments on all three: this, the Eusebius reference, and the Plutarch reference. They aren't really needed to support the logical argument that Epicurean any single Epicurean god has not and will not exist "from everlasting to everlasting," but if any or all of them are persuasive then it's obvious why DeWitt cited them.

Let me be sure to call this post to the attention not only of Don and Bryan but also Eikadistes as I think this (if DeWitt can be supported) is a particularly important aspect of Epicurean theology. In emulating the gods, we would not only be emulating a *result*, but one aspect of that role model that we would be emulating comes in realizing that the gods, just like us, must act to maintain their blessedness. This would help stengthen the usefulness of the suggestion that the gods are objects of emulation -- Epicurus would be suggesting that we not only emulate them in result, but that we are emulation the act of working to sustain blessedness. I agree with DeWitt's suggestion that this would be a logical extension of Epicurus' theories about the gods. An example of that would be that when Torquatus describes to Cicero the characteristics of the best life, those are characteristics which must be maintained, whether by gods or by men.

Quote

[40] XII. Again, the truth that pleasure is the supreme good can be most easily apprehended from the following consideration. Let us imagine an individual in the enjoyment of pleasures great, numerous and constant, both mental and bodily, with no pain to thwart or threaten them; I ask what circumstances can we describe as more excellent than these or more desirable? A man whose circumstances are such must needs possess, as well as other things, a robust mind subject to no fear of death or pain, because death is apart from sensation, and pain when lasting is usually slight, when oppressive is of short duration, so that its temporariness reconciles us to its intensity, and its slightness to its continuance. [41] When in addition we suppose that such a man is in no awe of the influence of the gods, and does not allow his past pleasures to slip away, but takes delight in constantly recalling them, what circumstance is it possible to add to these, to make his condition better?

It looks like courtesy of Francis Ford Coppola's Megalopolis the world is about to get a reminder of the Cataline Conspiracy.

I don't know that we have any direct references to anyone accusing Cataline of being an Epicurean, but anyone who is accused of being a reprobate by Cicero is a candidate for looking into their backgound. At present the closest connection I can think of so far is that, in opposing the Death Penalty for some of the Catalinian Conspirators, Cicero accused Julius Caesar of showing Epicurean tendencies. We'll have to see if any hint of that sidelight shows up in the movie.

And we'll also need to be careful in discussing divisive politics to the extent that modern political issues are really the point of the movie.

But I thought I would post this as a place to comment since we might find that renewed discussions of Cataline afford an opportunity to talk to others about Epicurus.

Quote

What’s Megalopolis about?

Megalopolis stars Adam Driver as Cesar Catilina, a visionary architect who wants to build a utopian version of the sci-fi version of New York that’s on the brink of collapse, à la the Roman Empire.

However, Catilina is facing resistance from the corrupt Mayor Franklyn Cicero (Giancarlo Esposito), who is less into creating a sustainable future and instead wants to pave paradise with a parking lot — or, in this case, a casino. The mayor’s daughter Julia (Nathalie Emmanuel) complicates matters by falling for Catilina and struggling with her own alliances.

As indicated I would suggest comparing that excerpt from Cicero to Chapter 15 of A Few Days In Athens.

“But is not the existence of a first or creating cause demonstrated to our senses by all we see, and hear, and feel?”

“The existence of all that we see and hear and feel is demonstrated to our senses; and the belief we yield to this existence is immediate and irresistible, that is, intuitive. —The existence of the creating cause, that you speak of, is not demonstrated to our senses; and therefore the belief in it cannot be immediate and irresistible. I prefer the expression “creating” to “first” cause, because it seems to present a more intelligible meaning. When you shall have examined farther into the phenomena of nature, you will see, that there can be as little a first as a last cause.”

“But there must be always a cause, producing an effect.”

“Certainly; and so your cause, — creating all that we see and hear and feel — must itself have a producing cause, otherwise you are in the same difficulty as before.”

“I suppose it a Being unchangeable and eternal, itself unproduced, and producing all things.”

“Unchangeable it may be, — eternal it must be — since every thing is eternal.”

“Every thing eternal?”

“Yes; that is, the elements composing all substances are, so far as we know and can reason, eternal, and in their nature unchangeable; and it is apparently only the different disposition of these eternal and unchangeable atoms that produces all the varieties in the substances constituting the great material whole, of which we form a part. Those particles, whose peculiar agglomeration or arrangement, we call a vegetable to-day, pass into, and form part of an animal to-morrow; and that animal again, by the falling asunder of its constituent atoms, and the different approximation and agglomeration of the same, — or, of the same with other atoms, — is transformed into some other substance presenting a new assemblage of qualities. To this simple exposition of the phenomena of nature (which, you will observe, is not explaining their wonders, for that is impossible, but only observing them,) we are led by the exercise of our senses. In studying the existences which surround us, it is clearly our business to use our eyes, and not our imaginations. To see things as they are, is all we should attempt, and is all that is possible to be done. Unfortunately, we can do but little even here, as our eyes serve us to see but a very little way. But, were our eyes better — were they so good as to enable us to observe all the arcana of matter, we could never acquire any other knowledge of them, than that they are as they are; — and, in knowing this, that is, in seeing every link in the chain of occurrences, we should know all that even an omniscient being could know. One astronomer traces the course of the sun round the earth, another imagines that of the earth round the sun. Some future improvements in science may enable us to ascertain which conjecture is the true one. We shall then have ascertained a fact, which fact may lead to the discovery of other facts, and so on. Until this plain and simple view of the nature of all science be generally received, all the advances we may make in it are comparatively as nothing. Until we occupy ourselves in examining, observing, and ascertaining, and not in explaining, we are idly and childishly employed. — With every truth we may discover we shall mix a thousand errors; and, for one matter of fact, we shall charge our brain with a thousand fancies. To this leading misconception of the real, and only possible object of philosophical inquiry, I incline to attribute all the modes and forms of human superstition. The vague idea that some mysterious cause not merely precedes but produces the effect we behold, occasions us to wander from the real object in search of an imaginary one. We see the sun rise in the east: instead of confining our curiosity to the discovery of the time and manner of its rising, and of its course in the heavens, we ask also — why does it rise? What makes it move? The more ignorant immediately conceive some Being spurring it through the heavens, with fiery steeds, on wheels of gold, while the more learned tell us of laws of motion, decreed by an almighty fiat, and sustained by an almighty will. Imagine the truth of both suppositions: in the one case, we should see the application of what we call physical power in the driver and the steeds followed by the motion of the sun, and in the other, an almighty volition followed by the motion of the sun. But, in either case, should we understand why the sun moved? — why or how its motion followed what we call the impulse of the propelling power, or the propelling volition? All that we could then know, more than we now know, would be, that the occurrence of the motion of the sun was preceded by another occurrence; and if we afterwards frequently observed the same sequence of occurrences, they would become associated in our mind as necessary precedent and consequent — as cause and effect: and we might give to them the appellation of law of nature, or any other appellation; but they would still constitute merely a truth — that is a fact, and envelope no other mystery, than that involved in every occurrence and every existence.”

“But, according to this doctrine,” said Theon, “there would be no less reason in attributing the beautiful arrangement of the material world to the motion of a horse, than to the volition of an almighty mind.”

“If I saw the motion of a horse followed by the effect you speak of, I should believe in some relation between them; and if I saw it follow the volition of an almighty mind —the same.”

“But the cause would be inadequate to the effect.”

“It could not be so, if it were the cause. For what constitutes the adequacy of which you speak? Clearly only the contact, or immediate proximity of the two occurrences. If any sequence could in fact be more wonderful than another, it should rather seem to be for the consequent to impart grandeur to the precedent — the effect to the cause, — than for the cause to impart grandeur to the effect. But in reality all sequences are equally wonderful. That light should follow the appearance of the sun, is just as wonderful, and no more so, as if it were to follow the appearance of any other body — and did light follow the appearance of a black stone it would excite astonishment simply because we never saw light follow such an appearance before. Accustomed, as we now are, to see light when the sunrises, our wonder would be, if we did not see light when he rose : but were light regularly to attend the appearance of any other body, our wonder at such a sequence would, after a time, cease; and we should then say, as we now say, there is a light because such a body has risen; and imagine then, as we imagine now, that we understand why light is.”

“In like manner all existences are equally wonderful. An African lion is in himself nothing more extraordinary than a Grecian horse; although the whole people of Athens will assemble to gaze on the lion, and exclaim how wonderful! while no man observes the horse.”

“True — but this is the wondering of ignorance.”

“I reply — true again, but so is all wondering. If, indeed, we should consider it in this and in all other cases as simply an emotion of pleasurable surprise, acknowledging the presence of a novel object, the feeling is perfectly rational; but if it imagine anything more intrinsically marvelous in the novel existence, than in the familiar one, it is then clearly the idle — that is, the unreasoned and unreflecting marveling of ignorance. There is but one real wonder to the thinking mind: it is the existence of all things; that is the existence of matter. And the only rational ground of this one great wonder is, that the existence of matter is the last link in the chain of cause and effect at which we can arrive. You imagine yet another link — the existence of a power creating that matter. — My only objections to this additional link, or superadded cause, are, that it is imagined, and that it leaves the wonder as before; unless, indeed, we should say that it has superadded other wonders, since it supposes a power, or rather, an existence possessing a power, of which we never saw an example.”

“How so? Does not even man possess a species of creating power? And do you not suppose, in your inert matter, that very property which others attribute, with more reason it appears to me, to some superior and unknown existence?'”

“By no means. No existence, that we know of, possesses creating power, in the sense you suppose. Neither the existence we call a man, nor any other of the existences comprised under the generic names of matter, physical world, nature, &c., possesses the power of calling into being its own constituent elements, nor the constituent elements of any other substance. It can change one substance into another substance, by altering the position of its particles, or intermingling them with others: but it cannot call into being, any more than it can annihilate, those particles themselves. The hand of man causes to approach particles of earth and of water, and, by their approximation produces clay; to which clay it gives a regular form, and, by the application of fire, produces the vessel we call a vase. You may say that the hand of man creates the vase, but it does not create the earth, or the water, or the fire; neither has the admixture of these substances added to, or subtracted from, the sum of their elementary atoms. Observe, therefore, there is no analogy between the power inherent in matter, of changing its appearance and qualities, by a simple change in the position of its particles, and that which you attribute to some unseen existence, who by a simple volition, should have called into being matter itself, with all its wonderful properties. An existence possessing such a power I have never seen; and though this says nothing against the possibility of such an existence, it says every thing against my belief in it. And farther, the power which you attribute to this existence — that of willing every thing out of nothing, — being, not only what I have never seen, but that of which I cannot with any distinctness conceive — it must appear to me the greatest of all improbabilities.”

That sounds reasonable. The mice eating Plato's Republic reflects "negatively" on the state of the commonwealth, so the mice eating "On Pleasure" reflects negatively on pleasure - and the price of grain going up might account for the pleasure of people being affected negatively.

But is it clear that "the mice becoming obsessed with the pleasure of the belly" is a clear connection? Did the mice become obessesed with politics by eating the Republic, or is just an "indication" sent by the gods or something?

Anyone else see any different possibilities? Otherwise I think Don's probably makes the most sense.

Seems to me that this statement by Atticus, included in Cicero's "On The Law" is a good citation to support the observation that the feeling of pleasure is personal to he who feels it, and not something universally "objective." It's also useful for combating the allegation that there was no freedom of thought in the Epicurean school (an absurd suggestion but one you sometime hear):

Only time at the moment to connect a couple of references that relate to Epicurus views on causation and what (if anything) is "causless," which relates to attacks that some make against Epicurus when they allege that the swerve, being "uncaused," is ruled out of court.

Below is a Ciceronian discussion of Epicurus' views. I would suggest at some point we compare this to the way Frances Wright discusses Epicurus' view (responds to this argument?) in A Few Days In Athens:

This is a Yonge translation of Cicero's On Fate - a section that mentions Epicurus' views:

We are going to need to find a way to incorporate references from Cicero's "On Divination" in this series of episodes as well. For example, here's a good explanation of the boundlessness argument, and I did not know that about Ennius sounds pretty close to Epicurus on the gods:

This reference from Cicero's "On Divination seems fairly funny, and it might not even be demeaning to Epicurus, as Cicero can often be. But I bet there is more to the reference of "corn rising on the market" than is immediately obvious to me, so I thought I would post and maybe over time we can consult the Latin and track down a more precise meaning. As it is, this translation reference to corn (I think by Yonge) seems a little broad, so probably there's some subtlety to be dug out of it. I was just scanning over this looking for references to Epicurus and it's not immediately clear to me whether this is Cicero speaking for himself, or someone else speaking...

Agenda For This Episode

1. Did Epicurus Argue That Infinity Alone (given eternal time and boundless space, anything can happen, and anything includes life) is sufficient explanation for life in the universe? We'll respond to this argument as mentioned in this recent article, especially since this Wikipedia article suggests that this argument will appear later in "On The Nature of The Gods."
2. These are your doctrines, Lucilius; but what those of others are I will endeavor to ascertain by tracing them back from the earliest of ancient philosophers. Thales the Milesian, who first inquired after such subjects, asserted water to be the origin of things, and that God was that mind which formed all things from water. If the Gods can exist without corporeal sense, and if there can be a mind without a body, why did he annex a mind to water?
3. It was Anaximander’s opinion that the Gods were born; that after a great length of time they died; and that they are innumerable worlds. But what conception can we possibly have of a Deity who is not eternal?
4. Anaximenes, after him, taught that the air is God, and that he was generated, and that he is immense, infinite, and always in motion; as if air, which has no form, could possibly be God; for the Deity must necessarily be not only of some form or other, but of the most beautiful form. Besides, is not everything that had a beginning subject to mortality?
5. XI. Anaxagoras, who received his learning from Anaximenes, was the first who affirmed the system and disposition of all things to be contrived and perfected by the power and reason of an infinite mind; in which infinity he did not perceive that there could be no conjunction of sense and motion, nor any sense in the least degree, where nature herself could feel no impulse. If he would have this mind to be a sort of animal, then there must be some more internal principle from whence that animal should receive its appellation. But what can be more internal than the mind? Let it, therefore, be clothed with an external body. But this is not agreeable to his doctrine; but we are utterly unable to conceive how a pure simple mind can exist without any substance annexed to it.
6. Alcmæon of Crotona, in attributing a divinity to the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, and also to the mind, did not perceive that he was ascribing immortality to mortal beings.
7. Pythagoras, who supposed the Deity to be one soul, mixing with and pervading all nature, from which our souls are taken, did not consider that the Deity himself must, in consequence of this doctrine, be maimed and torn with the rending every human soul from it; nor that, when the human mind is afflicted (as is the case in many instances), that part of the Deity must likewise be afflicted, which cannot be. If the human mind were a Deity, how could it be ignorant of any thing? Besides, how could that Deity, if it is nothing but soul, be mixed with, or infused into, the world?
8. Then Xenophanes, who said that everything in the world which had any existence, with the addition of intellect, was God, is as liable to exception as the rest, especially in relation to the infinity of it, in which there can be nothing sentient, nothing composite.
9. Parmenides formed a conceit to himself of something circular like a crown. (He names it Stephane.) It is an orb of constant light and heat around the heavens; this he calls God; in which there is no room to imagine any divine form or sense. And he uttered many other absurdities on the same subject; for he ascribed a divinity to war, to discord, to lust, and other passions of the same kind, which are destroyed by disease, or sleep, or oblivion, or age. The same honor he gives to the stars; but I shall forbear making any objections to his system here, having already done it in another place.

I've been reminded recently that our podcast is often the first point of contact that people have when they hear about EpicureanFriends, and that in the early months of the episode we used a longer introduction to each episode to address those new listeners.

Over time I shortened that just for the sake of time, but in this episode and probably for the foreseeable future we'll go back to a revised version of the old one for the sake of those new listeners. Regulars can skip over the first two minutes if they prefer, but I think the tradeoff is worth it for the sake of new people who decide to take a chance on the podcast, just like we include similar points for those who sample the front page of the forum.

The revised opening will be something like this:

Welcome to Episode 229 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com. Be aware that none of us are professional philosophers, and everyone here is a a self-taught Epicurean.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: The opinions stated here are those of the people making them. Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it, which is often not the same as presented by many modern commentators. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and one of the best places to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts will shows that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning at the end of Section 10.

Quote from TauPhi

I guess making shopping lists wouldn't be the worst idea in the world.

A ha! A major confession! Tau Phi is not a LISTMAKER!

I begin over the years to think that some form of habit of listmaking or outlining is a requirement of being a "good Epicurean!"

Quote

[Letter to Herodotus 36] Indeed it is necessary to go back on the main principles, and constantly to fix in one’s memory enough to give one the most essential comprehension of the truth. And in fact the accurate knowledge of details will be fully discovered, if the general principles in the various departments are thoroughly grasped and borne in mind; for even in the case of one fully initiated the most essential feature in all accurate knowledge is the capacity to make a rapid use of observation and mental apprehension, and this can be done if everything is summed up in elementary principles and formulae. For it is not possible for anyone to abbreviate the complete course through the whole system, if he cannot embrace in his own mind by means of short formulae all that might be set out with accuracy in detail.

Right the mind's direct reception of images is the really interesting aspect of the theory. I don't have a strongly preferred interpretation but I don't write it off as nonsense either.

Lots of good material there I want to think about. In the meantime as to whether the ancients saw gods, my general suspicion is that Epicurus probably didn't think they did either, and the images theory was a more general outgrowth of atomism, meant to explain the way the senses work, rather than focused on excusing hallucinations - I suspect if someone came to Epicurus in 300 BC and told him they had seen a god in their front yard that Epicurus would have considered that person just as unreliable as if someone told me that today.

Those are good questions and this following is a truncated answer. Aspects of all four are probably true, but with major qualifications in my own mind as to each one. For the time being:

1. There can never be another Epicurus, but there can be separate "schools" in all sorts of institutional forms, formal and informal, and they will want to (have to, to remain organized) spell out their own lists of important principles and understandings of Epicurus for the sake of their own clarity of association.

2. Sure I would think that cultural recognition in popular discussion would be an inevitable outcome of increased Epicurean activity.

3. Yes but I personally have never accepted that Epicureans lived in "communes." It's only natural and consistent with the last several PDs that people of like mind would want to live near each other for mutual support. Online is the starting point and then later should come geographic closeness. Until positions clarify as to more precise lines of what "Epicurean" means, it doesn't make sense to talk about anything closer than online. I've indicated before and still hold that many who claim to be of Epicurean attitude (but which I consider to be "quietist" or "tranquilist") I would personally want nothing to do with, just as I am sure that they would not want to associate with me. This issue is something that to me precedes in importance all the other questions and has to come first.

4. That would not be my idea of a major short term goal, and my favored governments would not be in the business of granting favors or privileges to religions, but similar to answer 2 in some circumstances I do think it should be normal for people to consider themselves as "Epicurean" and to be proud of that label.