1. Home
    1. Study Guide
    2. Community Standards
    3. Site Map
    4. Quizzes
    5. Articles On Physics
    6. Articles On Canonics
    7. Articles On Ethics
    8. All Articles
    9. Elli's Blog Posts
    10. Kalosyni's Blog
    11. All Blog Posts
  2. Lexicon
    1. Lexicon Home
    2. FAQ
    3. Files
    4. Search Assistance
    5. Foundations
    6. Navigation Outlines
    7. Reading List
    8. Key Pages
    9. Last Changes
  3. Forum
    1. Full Forum List
    2. Welcome Threads
    3. Ancient Texts Forum
    4. Physics
    5. Canonics
    6. Ethics
    7. Forum Shortcuts
    8. Forum Navigation Map
    9. Featured
    10. Most Discussed
  4. Latest
    1. New Activity
    2. Latest Threads
    3. Dashboard
    4. Search By Tag
    5. Complete Tag List
  5. Podcast
    1. Lucretius Today Podcast
    2. Episode Guide
    3. Lucretius Today At Youtube
    4. EpicureanFriends Youtube Page
  6. Texts
    1. Overview
    2. Torquatus On Ethics
    3. Velleius On Divinity
    4. Diogenes Laertius
    5. Principal Doctrines
    6. Vatican Collection
    7. Lucretius
    8. Herodotus
    9. Pythocles
    10. Menoeceus
    11. Fragments - Usener Collection
    12. Greek/Latin Help
  7. Gallery
    1. Latest Images
    2. Featured images
    3. Latest Comments
  8. More
    1. Featured Content
    2. Logbook
    3. EF ToDo List
  • Login
  • Register
  • Search
This Thread
  • Everywhere
  • This Thread
  • This Forum
  • Forum
  • Articles
  • Blog Articles
  • Files
  • Gallery
  • Pages
  • Wiki
  • FAQ
  • More Options
  1. EpicureanFriends - Classical Epicurean Philosophy
  2. Forum
  3. The Lucretius Today Podcast and EpicureanFriends Videos
  4. The Lucretius Today Podcast

Episode 360 - EATAQ42 - Should We Refrain From Having An Opinion On Anything At All Because We Might Be Wrong?

  • Cassius
  • November 14, 2026 at 1:44 PM
  • Go to last post
  • Cassius
    5 - Administrator
    • I Too Am An Epicurean
    • Advocate
    • Lucretius Today Podcast Co-Host
    • 2025 Contributor
    • Active Member 5 Years or more
    Points
    116,097
    Posts
    15,999
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • November 14, 2026 at 1:44 PM
    • #1

    Welcome to Episode 360 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

    This week we are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective, which gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and helps us understand Epicurus' position on the same issues. This week will continue in Section 21 of Book 2, where we are now seeing Cicero argue on behalf of skepticism, and we will be interjecting Epicurean responses.

    Our text will come from
    Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackham translation here: Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

    As we proceed through the end of Academic Questions, these are the topics we expect to cover:

    24. Lucullus's Extended Rebuttal of the Academic Doctrine, and His Concluding Appeal to Cicero (2:XIII)
    25. Cicero Begins His Reply (2:XX)
    26. Cicero Lays Out the Syllogism About Assent and Opinion (2:XXI)
    27. Cicero Turns to Antiochus's Own Inconsistency (2:XXII)
    28. Cicero Defends His Citation of the Ancient Philosophers (2:XXIII)
    29. Cicero Adds Chrysippus and the Cyrenaics, Then Returns to Arcesilas and Zeno (2:XXIV)
    30. Cicero Returns to Attacking the Senses (2:XXV)
    31. Cicero Presses the Sun's Size and the Limits of Trained Perception (2:XXVI)
    32. Cicero Turns the "Art" Argument Back on Lucullus (2:XXVII)
    33. Cicero Multiplies Examples From Madness (2:XXVIII)
    34. Cicero Attacks Reason and Dialectics: The Sorites Paradox (2:XXIX)
    35. Cicero Presses the Liar Paradox (2:XXX)
    36. Cicero Presents Carneades's Own Positive Doctrine of Probability (2:XXXI)
    37. Cicero Distinguishes the Academic Position From Epicurus's (2:XXXII)
    38. Cicero Defends Probability Against the Charge That It Cannot Support Memory or Action (2:XXXIII)
    39. Cicero Answers the "Self-Refuting" and "Two Incompatible Propositions" Objections (2:XXXIV)
    40. Cicero Broadens the Argument Beyond the Stoics (2:XXXV)
    41. Cicero Reflects on His Own Position Among the Competing Schools (2:XXXVI)
    42. Cicero's Survey of Disagreement Among the Natural Philosophers (2:XXXVII)
    43. Cicero Presses the Problem of Providence and the Limits of Physics (2:XXXVIII)
    44. Cicero's Survey Continues: The Soul, the Antipodes, and the Motion of the Earth (2:XXXIX)
    45. Cicero Asks Which Natural Philosopher He Would Even Choose to Follow (2:XL)
    46. Cicero Turns to Ethics: Even the Gods Are Disputed (2:XLI)
    47. Cicero's Roll Call of Rival Schools on the Chief Good, Part One (2:XLII)
    48. Cicero's Roll Call of Rival Schools on the Chief Good, Part Two (2:XLIII)
    49. Cicero Weighs Zeno Against Antiochus on Virtue and the Happy Life (2:XLIV)
    50. Cicero Catalogs the Stoic Paradoxes About the Wise Man (2:XLV)
    51. Cicero's Climactic Debate Between Pleasure and Honor (2:XLVI)
    52. Cicero Turns to the Canon of Truth, and Zeno's Hand (2:XLVII)
    53. The Dialogue's Close (2:XLVIII)


  • Cassius November 20, 2026 at 9:18 AM

    Changed the title of the thread from “Episode 360 - EATAQ42 - Continuing in Part 20 of Book 2 of Academic Questions - Not Yet Recorded” to “Episode 360 - EATAQ42 - Cicero Sets Out Basics of Skepticism”.
  • Cassius
    5 - Administrator
    • I Too Am An Epicurean
    • Advocate
    • Lucretius Today Podcast Co-Host
    • 2025 Contributor
    • Active Member 5 Years or more
    Points
    116,097
    Posts
    15,999
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • November 20, 2026 at 9:23 AM
    • #2

    This podcast will be out soon, and one issue that we discuss near the beginning is that of being careful about the word "opinion."

    As Cicero is using the word, "opinion" carries the connotation of being false or unproven, and definitely inferior to words that imply knowledge. And he is stating the Skeptic position that the wise man is never going to hold an "opinion" of any kind.

    Epicurus, on the other hand, is regularly talking about true opinion vs false opinion, so Epicurus doesn't seem to automatically imply that every use of "opinion" is a bad thing. Presumably the goal of the wise man can be legitimately described among other words as holding "true opinions."

    It's very confusing to try to go back and forth between the various meanings of the Greek words and translate that into clear English, but we'll work to do that.

    For our purposes, it's likely that the important divide is between true and real vs false and illusory, and no matter what English word combinations we use we're trying to focus on what we can have confidence in as being true, and what we can be confident is false, and when we are in a situation where we have to "wait" for more information before picking from among the viable possibilities.

  • Cassius
    5 - Administrator
    • I Too Am An Epicurean
    • Advocate
    • Lucretius Today Podcast Co-Host
    • 2025 Contributor
    • Active Member 5 Years or more
    Points
    116,097
    Posts
    15,999
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • November 20, 2026 at 10:26 AM
    • #3

    In connection with the proper interpretation of the word "opinion," Joshua points out in this episode that the word translated as “opinion” is doxa (δόξα), and that Epicurus’ Principal Doctrines are known in Greek as Kyriai Doxai (Κύριαι Δόξαι).

    That means that the Epicureans were referring to their list of Epicurus' most important doctrines as "key" or "authorized" opinions.

  • Cassius November 20, 2026 at 4:55 PM

    Changed the title of the thread from “Episode 360 - EATAQ42 - Cicero Sets Out Basics of Skepticism” to “Episode 360 - EATAQ42 - Should We Refrain From Having An Opinion On Anything At All Because We Might Be Wrong?”.
  • Cassius
    5 - Administrator
    • I Too Am An Epicurean
    • Advocate
    • Lucretius Today Podcast Co-Host
    • 2025 Contributor
    • Active Member 5 Years or more
    Points
    116,097
    Posts
    15,999
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • November 20, 2026 at 5:01 PM
    • #4

    Lucretius Today Podcast Episode 360 is now available: "Should We Refrain From Having An Opinion About Anything At All Because We Might Be Wrong?"

  • Cassius
    5 - Administrator
    • I Too Am An Epicurean
    • Advocate
    • Lucretius Today Podcast Co-Host
    • 2025 Contributor
    • Active Member 5 Years or more
    Points
    116,097
    Posts
    15,999
    Quizzes
    9
    Quiz rate
    100.0 %
    • November 20, 2026 at 9:23 PM
    • #5

    Summary:

    Cassius and Joshua take up Section 21 of Book Two of Cicero's Academic Questions, the syllogism at the heart of the dispute between the Stoics and the skeptics: if the wise man ever assents to anything, he will sometimes hold an opinion; but he will never hold an opinion; so he will never assent to anything. Cassius opens by explaining why this matters: every conclusion in ethics rests on the positions we take in physics and canonics, and a man who really believes nothing can be known will end by doing nothing. Joshua begins with Hippocrates of Kos, who held that epilepsy, the "sacred disease," has a natural cause, and who divided epistēmē (knowledge or science) from doxa (opinion), the first producing understanding and the second ignorance. Joshua discusses "temerity," which Brittain renders as "rashness," and reads Section 21, where Arcesilaus accepts the syllogism, Carneades sometimes grants that the wise man assents, and the Stoics and Antiochus deny that assent requires opinion, because they claim they can tell the true from the false. Joshua points out that Epicurus called his Principal Doctrines Kyriai Doxai (authoritative opinions), so he rejects the premise that the wise man never holds an opinion, and he reviews Zeno's hand gesture for perception, assent, comprehension and knowledge. Cassius calls the gesture stagecraft that hides the real question of how true is told from false; the Epicurean answer is open: an opinion is true when the sensations, anticipations and feelings support it and false when they contradict it. Joshua reads Lucullus's reply from Section 11 on the "mark belonging peculiarly to truth," and Cassius asks where such a mark could come from except a designer, pointing to the heap paradox and to identical atoms, where no mark exists. They close by noting that Cicero's preference for navigating by the wandering Helice over the North Star remains unexplained, and look ahead to Section 22.


    Full Transcript:

    Display Spoiler

    Cassius:

    Welcome to Episode 360 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote On the Nature of Things, the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

    We're continuing in Book Two of Cicero's Academic Questions, and we are going to be dealing today mostly with Section 21. We're in the middle of a very important argument that is going to take some effort to sort out. Cicero has launched his defense of skepticism, and one of the things that I think people really have a hard time grasping is this: they think that, well, nobody would take an extreme position that nothing could really be known. Everybody knows that they have to make decisions based on limited information, and we can just forget about all this terminology.

    But in the world of philosophy, you build on foundations, and every conclusion you're going to reach in ethics is going to be guided by the decisions that you make in physics and canonics. If you think that the world is guided by a supernatural being, then you're going to follow the dictates of that supernatural being if you possibly can. If you think that knowledge is impossible, then at some point, if you take that literally, you're going to just sit down and do nothing. You're not going to speak. You're not going to write. You're not going to take any action, because you don't know anything about what you should do with your life.

    That's why it's important from the very beginning to take a reasoned, wise approach to philosophy. And the role that we are taking here on this podcast is to defend and explain the Epicurean position in the face of these competing positions that the various skeptics were reaching in the ancient world. We're going to defend and promote the possibility of knowledge in a way that is based on nature, and not based on some kind of a divine scheme like the Stoics came up with, which was the fundamental flaw of their whole approach to nature. Many of the things the Stoics used to say were similar to the things that Epicurus would have said in terms of living according to nature. But when you think that nature is an intelligent being that has designed this world for our benefit, you're going to come to very, very different conclusions about how to live your life.

    So today we're dealing with the question that underlies everything. What attitude do we take about knowledge and truth and reality? When do we know that something is true? When do we know that something is false? And when do we think we don't have enough information to make a decision about that? The schools took very different positions on those issues. The material that Joshua is going to be reading in just a minute states the ultimate division between the Stoics and the skeptics on this question, because they were focused on what they called assent: whether they are going to hold that a perception is ever true or false.

    The skeptics took the position, and in fact drafted Democritus to their side, that every impression that you might confront could be false, and that there's no way to determine whether the impression you've received is true or false. And if you can't determine which are true and which are false, then you had better just simply step back and avoid taking a position on anything that could possibly be false. Because this is an area of agreement between the Stoics and the skeptics: the last thing you want to do, the most disgraceful thing you possibly could do if you want to be wise, is to affirm or assent to something that is false.

    Their wise man is going to be essentially infallible. From the Stoic position, he's infallible because he's able to determine what is true and false through perception. From the skeptic position, he's going to be infallible because he's never going to represent to you that he's got the truth about anything. He is never going to assert that anything is true, and therefore he can't be wrong. He's never going to be in the position of having asserted a particular position as the truth, and so he's never going to be cornered and told, "You were wrong about that."

    Epicurus, of course, is going to reject the shared conclusion of the skeptics and the Stoics that to live according to opinion is disgraceful, because Epicurus is going to develop and promote a method of separating true opinion from false opinion based on the senses and the proper use of them.

    Today we're going to be getting into another one of these academic syllogisms, in which they set out a formula and argue about whether the wise man will ever assent to anything at all. There are going to be a lot of twists and turns in this discussion, and I know that Joshua will have a lead-in here that will hopefully explain where we are considerably better than I just did. But I'll turn it over to Joshua after repeating that this is very important material, and as we work our way through it, I think you're going to see why. So, Joshua, whenever you're ready.

    Joshua:

    There are a number of places that we could start today, Cassius, but I think I want to start with Hippocrates of Kos. This is the renowned physician from the ancient world, and it'll be apparent in a moment why I'm bringing this up. His biographer was a second-century Greek physician named Soranus of Ephesus. He takes his name from his grandfather, Hippocrates I. He was a Greek physician and philosopher of the classical period who is considered one of the most outstanding figures in the history of medicine. He (and I assume we're talking about the grandson here) is traditionally referred to as the father of medicine in recognition of his lasting contributions to the field, such as the use of prognosis and clinical observation, the systematic categorization of diseases, and the later discredited theory of the four humors. His studies set out the basic ideas of modern-day specialties, including surgery, urology, neurology, and so on.

    In a book on epilepsy, which was known in the ancient world as the sacred disease, he wrote:

    "It is thus with regard to the disease which is called sacred. It appears to me to be no wise more divine, nor more sacred than other diseases, but has a natural cause. Men regard its nature and cause as divine from ignorance and wonder."

    So in the history of Greek medicine, he was early in dispensing with supernatural and divine explanations for natural diseases. And on the Wiktionary page for the ancient Greek word doxa, he is quoted, and the quote runs like this:

    "There are two kinds of knowledge, science and opinion. The former produces understanding, the latter ignorance. It is science that gives understanding, whereas opinion results in ignorance."

    Now, "science" may not be the best translation, but the two words in Greek are epistēmē and doxa. In the Greek, he says epistēmē poiei to epistasthai: epistēmē, or science as the translation has it, produces or gives rise to understanding. And doxa to agnoein: doxa produces ignorance.

    I chose this because, for one thing, the question of how a physician in the ancient world goes about his day-to-day business in light of the philosophical questions moving around him is an interesting one. And what is his opinion on knowledge and opinion and ignorance? His biographer says that while he learned medicine from his grandfather and father, he may have studied with Democritus. And that brings us even closer to the central question of the text for today, which is: is it possible to know the truth?

    We've already seen in the Academic Questions Lucullus imagining his skeptic audience mocking him by saying, "What do you want us to do? It's not our fault that knowledge is impossible. Democritus had already said that truth lies at the bottom of a well." So here from Hippocrates we have this pretty clear division, whether we agree with it or not: you have epistēmē and doxa, science and opinion; the former produces understanding and the latter ignorance. And what we're going to try to do today is to figure out how the other schools of philosophy fall into place on either side of this definition.

    Cassius:

    And for those of you out there who don't speak ancient Greek, we are going to translate this into English and try to make it understandable for you.

    Joshua:

    Yes. Yes. Hopefully without muddying the genuine meaning of these words too much, because we keep using the words "opinion" and "assent." I kind of feel like, especially with the word "opinion," having an opinion that one dish tastes better than another is not relevant to our question. But part of our goal is to come to an understanding of what we mean by opinion, what the translators of these texts mean by opinion, and how that fits into the broader picture. So holding epistēmē and doxa, knowledge or science and opinion, as the two key pieces here may be helpful.

    In the last paragraph of Section 20, after Cicero provides for us this metaphor of the Phoenician sailor in the poem of Aratus, and the stars and constellations by which we are to navigate, he goes on to say this:

    "I am not a wise man, therefore I submit to perceptions and cannot resist them: but Arcesilas, being on this point in agreement with Zeno, thinks that this is the most important part of the power of a wise man, that he can guard against being entangled, and provide against being deceived. For there is nothing more incompatible with the idea which we have of the gravity of a wise man than error, levity, and temerity. Why, then, need I speak of the firmness of a wise man? whom even you too, Lucullus, admit to be never guided by mere opinion. And since this is sanctioned by you, (if I am dealing irregularly with you at this moment, I will soon return to the proper order of your arguments,) just consider what force this first conclusion has."

    And that brings us to Section 21 for today.

    Cassius:

    Joshua, before we go into 21, I see that he says that there's nothing more incompatible with the idea we have of the gravity of a wise man than error, levity, and temerity. Just in case some of our listeners are not sure what temerity means, what do you think of that?

    Joshua:

    He's listing a number of faults here. One is for the wise man to fall into error, which is a huge part of what we're going to be talking about. Another is for the wise man to err into levity, to take things too lightly or lightheartedly. And finally, he says temerity. The confusion around this word is that it sounds kind of like the word "timorous," which means shy or fearful, almost cowardly, right? Temerity is almost the opposite: reckless boldness, a foolhardy bravery, or an excessive and often disrespectful confidence to do or say something that shocks others. That last part of the definition connects it with levity. A person who approaches a serious philosophical question with levity, and a person who approaches it with the disrespectful confidence to do or say something that shocks others, are both failing to take it seriously.

    Cassius:

    Brittain uses the word "rashness" there. So I think "rashness" makes more sense to most of us too.

    Joshua:

    Right. We're threading a very, very delicate needle here, and it's important that we get a proper understanding of the terms and of the nature of the argument. Error, levity, rashness: these things are incompatible, he says, with the gravity of a wise man. Then he says in the opening of Section 21:

    "If the wise man ever assents to anything, he will likewise sometimes form opinions: but he never will form opinions: therefore he will never assent to anything."

    That's kind of the complete argument that he's making right there, isn't it? I mean, it's very short, but there's a lot to talk about in there. He goes on to say:

    "This conclusion was approved of by Arcesilas, for it confirmed both his first and second proposition. But Carneades sometimes granted that minor premiss, that the wise man did at times assent: then it followed that he also was at times guided by opinion; which you will not allow; and you are right, as it seems to me: but the first proposition, that the wise man, if he expresses assent, must also be guided by opinion, is denied by the Stoics and their follower on this point, Antiochus.

    "For they say that they can distinguish what is false from what is true, and what cannot be perceived from what can. But, in the first place, even if anything can be perceived, still the very custom of expressing assent appears to us to be perilous and unsure. Wherefore, as it is plain that is so faulty a proceeding, to assent to anything that is either false or unknown, all assent must rather be removed, lest it should rush on into difficulties if it proceeds rashly. For what is false is so much akin to what is true, and the things which cannot be perceived to those which can, (if, indeed, there are any such, for we shall examine that point presently,) that a wise man ought not to trust himself in such a hazardous position.

    "But if I assume that there is actually nothing which can be perceived, and if I also take what you grant me, that a wise man is never guided by opinion, then the consequence will be that the wise man will restrain all assent on his part; so that you must consider whether you would rather have it so, or let the wise man sometimes form opinions. You do not approve of either, you will say. Let us, then, endeavour to prove that nothing can be perceived; for that is what the whole controversy turns upon."

    Cassius:

    Joshua, thanks for reading that, and we'll go back over each of those sentences closely. To start, though, I would point out that Brittain, in his recent translation, sets the points of the first sentence off as numbered lines, because this is the syllogism that they're arguing about. Number one: if the wise person ever assents to anything, he will sometimes hold an opinion. Number two: but he will never hold an opinion. And then number three: so he will never assent to anything.

    You used the expression a few minutes ago about threading a needle. We are trying to thread the needle here in terms of being as accurate as possible in discussing this, which is going to be difficult, and we may have to come back and revise things later on if we find something we've said needs to be clarified. But our main audience in this podcast is non-professionals who are trying to use this information to live a better life. So we are going to attempt to bring out the practical implications of what is being discussed as we go through the details. I never want us to get so deep into the discussion of a particular word or phrasing that we lose track of the ultimate issue, because in fact this first sentence states the issue very clearly.

    The question is, what is the wise man going to do? If you are like Cicero, if you are like the Stoics, if you are like the skeptics of any kind, you are holding, as Cicero said, that it is disgraceful to be wrong. You never, ever, under any circumstances, want to assent to something that is wrong. You are going to avoid that with every ounce of your being. And that is why this syllogism brings it all to the front. It makes clear that if you're trying to be a wise man and you assent to something, that means you have an opinion. But if you accept the view of these people that the wise man will never have an opinion, then you can't assent to anything, because to assent to something means, in their view, to hold an opinion.

    And that is why this very clearly sets up the challenge. If you can't assent to anything, then how can you hold anything to be true? And if you take that to its logical extreme, then you are going to step back and never hold anything to be true, from Cicero's and the skeptics' position. You can try to dance around that question as much as you like, and the Stoics do attempt to dance around it by saying, as we'll discuss further, "Well, we are assenting to something, but only to those things that are true, because we can tell which things are true from which things are false. So we're never assenting to anything that's false." The skeptics say, "That's BS. It doesn't make sense. You can't do it." That's what we're struggling with here.

    And always in the background, we're standing on the sidelines and pointing out from the Epicurean position that this is a false dilemma. Humans are not omniscient, omnipotent, and inerrant. We do hold opinions. We're going to look to hold opinions that are true, and we're going to avoid holding opinions that are false. But we're not going to say, "I'm not going to live my life, and I'll never hold an opinion." I am going to live my life. I am going to hold opinions, and I'm going to do my best to make sure that they're true. We are not going to step away from the game of life because of a logical syllogism that says we'll never hold an opinion, and that we can't hold an opinion unless we're absolutely certain that it's true. That's not the way humans work. There are no gods who are going to tell us the difference between true and false. We are going to come up with a method based on the senses, anticipations, and feelings that allows us to hold true opinions.

    Now, of course, all of that is not packed into this first paragraph, but that's the direction we're going in. Maybe one of the first things we might dig out here, after simply restating the syllogism, is that the skeptics couldn't agree among themselves either about how to deal with this. Carneades was one of the major skeptics, but as Cicero points out, Carneades said that sometimes the wise man will assent to something, and that creates all sorts of logical problems. It's just like when Socrates said, "I know that I know nothing." That explodes in contradictions, because how can you say that it's impossible to know anything and yet say that you know that you know nothing? So Carneades is going to attempt to wiggle around that by granting the minor premise that the wise man will sometimes assent to something, but on a very limited basis. And that creates all sorts of argument between the skeptics and the Stoics.

    Joshua:

    Now, in trying to carry this argument over into the other schools, you start to run into an issue. The Stoics adopt more or less the terminology that Cicero is using of assent, and they also adopt one of Cicero's core premises, which is that the wise man will never be guided by opinion. But when you try to take this framework and figure out how Epicurus might have responded to it, you run into two problems. Number one, the question of assent is not foremost among the questions of Epicurean epistemology, and maybe we should talk about that for a moment. Question number two: opinion is doxa, right? And Epicurus called his Principal Doctrines the Kyriai Doxai. In other words, if some of what we regard as opinion is to be thought true, even by the wise man, then Epicurus rejects this premise that the Stoics have granted.

    Now, to get a handle on this question of assent, we should go back to the image of Zeno holding out his hand and using it to explain Stoic epistemology. This is much later in Book Two, and we've quoted it before. This is where Cicero says:

    "For Zeno and Antiochus both deny that any of you know anything."

    Meaning the people who are in the room while this discussion is going on.

    "How so? you will say; for we allege, on the other hand, that even a man without wisdom comprehends many things. But you affirm that no one except a wise man knows one single thing."

    You could say you comprehend it, but even you have to acknowledge that, according to Zeno, you don't know it.

    "And Zeno professed to illustrate this by a piece of action; for when he stretched out his fingers, and showed the palm of his hand, 'Perception,' said he, 'is a thing like this.'"

    So when the fingers are stretched out and the palm is upward, perception is like this. You haven't gotten hold of anything. Perception is just floating about.

    "Then, when he had a little closed his fingers, 'Assent is like this.' Afterwards, when he had completely closed his hand, and held forth his fist, that, he said, was comprehension. From which simile he also gave that state a name which it had not before, and called it catalepsis."

    Or comprehensio in Latin. And we get this in a lot of English words like "comprehend" or "apprehend," right? The same idea of a grasp.

    "But when he brought his left hand against his right, and with it took a firm and tight hold of his fist, knowledge, he said, was of that character; and that was what none but a wise man possessed."

    So this is my interpretation of what's happening here. Perception is something that's just flowing around. You've got your palm out, but you're not actually holding on to anything. But occasionally a perception will cross over your hand in such a way that you're able to close your fingers a little bit and kind of grab hold of it. This is what it means to assent to a given perception. Information is constantly streaming in through all of our senses. And this image of assent, of closing your fingers slightly to grab onto something, is how the Stoics get away from the idea that information streaming into our senses that might be erroneous is an error in our judgment.

    Now, there's a distinct difference here with Epicurus, if I'm right about that explanation. With Epicurus, the error is not in the information. The information just is what it is. It's neither right nor wrong. It's just input. And the error doesn't come in until it has crossed your senses and struck your mind and you've formed a judgment about it. That's when error comes in. Are we agreed on that, Cassius?

    Cassius:

    We are agreed on that.

    Joshua:

    But it seems to me that the Stoics think that if you follow this course of action, perception, assent, comprehension, and then knowledge, error never enters into the equation. And what Cicero is saying is that the perceptions are flowing over you all the time. How can you, holding out your hand, grab onto any particular perception and assent to it unless you already know whether it's true or false?

    Now, the main question here, Cassius, is that in order to understand the Stoic response to this, we have to know where opinion comes in. The Stoics seem to think that for the wise man, all the way through assent, comprehension, and knowledge, opinion never creeps in. And what Cicero is saying is that you can't assent without forming an opinion; the act of assent is the formation of an opinion. So clarify that for me, if you will.

    Cassius:

    Joshua, I think you've described that correctly, and let me go back and emphasize what you've said. In just a moment, Cicero is going to say, "still the very custom of expressing assent appears to us to be perilous and unsure." Well, let me triple down on what Cicero is saying there. This dramatization of assent according to how you hold your hand and how you grasp things in your hand is bogus. It is nothing more than the misdirection of an actor on a stage, and it adds nothing to this discussion. It is an attempt to illustrate something without giving any explanation whatsoever of how you're doing it. I just want to emphasize at this moment that this whole dramatic display of grasping something in your hand deserves much worse than to be called perilous and unsure.

    It doesn't lead to anything, because the implicit presumption they are hiding with this dramatization is what Cicero states in the next sentence, where he says, referring to the Stoics, "For they say that they can distinguish what is false from what is true, and what cannot be perceived from what can." Okay, that's the key to what Zeno is trying to do. He's trying to say, "Well, I'm going to grasp it in my hand and close my fist around it. I'm going to hug it as tight as I can, because I know that it is true. And I can determine before I start grasping and holding and hugging that it's true as opposed to false." But that's exactly the problem. You cannot do that, Zeno.

    And that's where Cicero is arguing, I think, correctly. Zeno, you have given no basis whatsoever that enables us to understand how you distinguish the true from the false. You are not able to do that because, as Democritus said, for every impression that is true there is also a false one. Things can be identical, and you don't have any way of distinguishing them. Of course, later on and in different discussions, we'll find that the Stoics go back to their designer: there's something intrinsic in the truth that allows the wise man, who may be as rare as a phoenix, eventually to determine what to embrace and what not to embrace. But Zeno hasn't done anything by this illusion of grasping something in your hand. All he's done is dramatize that he's all in on asserting one particular thing to be true because he thinks he can recognize it. But that's the whole point. You haven't done anything, Zeno. You haven't told us how to recognize the truth so that you can then grasp it.

    As we go forward, Cicero will continue with that. But I think what you've said, Joshua, is absolutely the case. Drama and acting do not allow us to understand the difference between true and false. The difference between true and false is, as Epicurus said, that the true is what is supported by the evidence of the feelings, sensations, and anticipations, and the false is what is contradicted by those things. We do not shy away from holding opinions, because we are able, through the senses, anticipations, and feelings, to test the opinions that we derive from that evidence and determine which are true and which are false.

    We are going to tell you, as Epicureans, what the basis is for our judgment. And when we tell you that, we're going to tell you that the basis is in the sensations, feelings, and anticipations that nature has given to us. We are not going to hide the ball and say that there are ideal forms. We're not going to say that there are essences within things that will tell us. We're not going to say that there's a prime mover or a divine creator who set everything in motion from the beginning of time and encoded it with the truth. We're going to evaluate our opinions and separate the true from the false according to the sensations, anticipations, and feelings. Everything's on the table. We're not hiding the ball. And we're not going to stand up on the stage and make all sorts of hand motions in place of describing for you what nature gives us as the basis for opinions.

    Joshua:

    Right. Because somewhere in this process, somewhere in this chain of perception, assent, comprehension, knowledge, there has to be something that processes inputs and separates them into true and false, into what accords with the phenomena and what does not. And it seems to me that Cicero has a point: the Stoics are putting knowledge at the end of this list, but saying that the process by which you sort the true from the false is at the beginning of it. You can't have this imaginary separation between those two. They are kind of one and the same.

    It's not a problem for the skeptics to be unable to sort true from false, because, as Cicero says in the last paragraph, if a wise man is never guided by opinion, then the wise man will restrain all assent on his part and will never even get to the point of talking about knowledge or comprehension. So it really does seem to be the case that this whole claim of assent, that you can assent to a perception before you have knowledge, before you comprehend what you're even looking at, in some unexplained way (because, as you're saying, there's no description of the process involved here), is ridiculous. The idea that you can assent to it without already having knowledge is ridiculous.

    Cassius:

    Joshua, I think that takes us back to our prior discussion of the word "rashness" and why it's included here. In fact, the cliché that comes to my mind is, "Fools rush in where angels fear to tread." They seem to be revolving around this attitude: "I don't want to make a mistake under any circumstances. The possibility of being wrong is so unworthy of the wise man that I am simply not going to assent to anything." That is, as you said, the skeptic point of view, and it does make more sense than the Stoic point of view, unless you can identify clearly what it is that allows you to separate the true perception from the false perception.

    Just in terms of consistency, the skeptic position is persuasive, and it has to be met by what the Epicureans would call a canon of truth. You have to have a standard of truth to test what is true and false against, or else it makes no sense to do anything other than be a skeptic and be afraid of making a decision, because there's no way you can avoid being wrong. And as Cicero says, "a wise man ought not to trust himself in such a hazardous position." As we begin to wind down toward the end of the episode, I think that's what the rest of 21 is largely saying in several different ways. The wise man is going to recognize that nothing can be perceived. You can't tell the difference between truth and falsity. And if you're going to avoid being guided by opinion, then the only option you have is simply never to assent to anything at all.

    Joshua:

    Now, in fairness to Lucullus, he does address this question in Section 11, which we covered ten sections ago. So maybe it's worth at least presenting his thought on this. He says:

    "But what rule can there be, if we have no notion whatever of true or false, because it is impossible to distinguish one from the other? For, if we have such a notion, then there must be a difference between what is true and what is false, as there is between what is right and what is wrong. If there is no difference, then there is no rule; nor can a man to whom what is true and what is false appear under one common aspect, have any means of judging of, or any mark at all by which he can know the truth. For when they say, that they take away nothing but the idea of anything being able to appear in such a manner that it cannot possibly appear false in the same manner but that they admit everything else, they are acting childishly."

    I think that's Lucullus's response to the skeptical position. He goes on to say:

    "For though they have taken away that by which everything is judged of, they deny that they take away the rest; just as if a person were to deprive a man of his eyes, and then say that he has not taken away from him those things which can be seen. For just as those things are known by the eyes, so are the other things known by the perceptions; but by a mark belonging peculiarly to truth, and not common to what is true and false."

    Cassius:

    All right, this goes pretty deep here, but it will be worth looking into for a moment. And Joshua, you have emphasized the key word from my point of view, which is "mark." They are saying that the truth is marked. Well, where does this mark come from? How do we know that this mark is there? How does the mark get there in the first place? Their answer is the divine creator who has marked the truth.

    Much of the rest of what you read, I think Epicurus would agree with, because if you're going to talk about true and false, then you have to have some idea of what true and false mean. There Lucullus is pointing out the self-refuting argument of skepticism. He's pointing out that you can't just be an absolute skeptic, or else you're wasting your time talking, writing, or even arguing about anything. If you're going to argue about truth and falsity, then you have to have a standard.

    The problem with the Stoics is their standard: the idea that there is a mark in things, and that you look for that mark and there you'll find the truth. That mark simply does not exist, at least from an Epicurean point of view. The Stoics will go on to try to argue that these marks exist. But at least in this part of our analysis, it certainly looks to me like the Stoics are suggesting, and at times explicitly saying, that this mark was placed there by the designer of the universe.

    Joshua:

    I was saying a moment ago that at some point you have to sort the true from the false, right? And what Cicero is saying is that the Stoics are trying to have it both ways: they say that assent is the thing by which they sort true from false, but you can't know true from false unless you already have knowledge, and knowledge comes later than assent in their course of epistemology. And Lucullus is making it clear here that the thing by which they sort true from false is these marks.

    We talked about the inhabitants of an island in the Mediterranean who were able, by looking at an egg, to determine which hen had laid it. That was a while ago, and I don't know if people will remember what I'm talking about, but Lucullus brought this up to demonstrate that even things that appear very nearly identical to us, such that we would not be able to tell them apart, can be separated if you have the skill required to find the mark that distinguishes them. That is how you separate true from false, what can be perceived from what cannot.

    Cassius:

    And there you follow up with the Sorites, or heap, paradox, and point out that within a heap of grains, there is no mark that tells you that you have a heap versus not having a heap. You can look as far and wide as you like, but within that heap there is no mark. Or for Epicurus, between two atoms —

    Joshua:

    — that have the same shape, the same weight, and the same size, you run into the same problem.

    Cassius:

    Right. And you end up testing the result by the senses in any particular situation. I think that would be a good way of looking at it. What is the mark of a heap? I don't think it has one. Josh, we're very deep into this issue at the moment, but we're probably going to have to bring today's episode to a conclusion. Can you begin to wrap up your thoughts?

    Joshua:

    One thing I would say here at the end is that we didn't talk in any more detail about the metaphor Cicero used in the previous section, about the stars and the constellations and what you choose to navigate by. But you did pull out a lot of information on that, and we both discussed it at length in the thread for the last episode. So anyone who is interested in pursuing that metaphor further will find far more than they could ever need or want by going to that thread.

    Cassius:

    Yeah, I agree. There's a lot more to be said about that. Perhaps we can bring it back in future episodes, because we did unearth a lot more material that applies to it, but it remains as paradoxical to me at the moment as it did when we first encountered it: why Cicero would argue that it is better to navigate your ship by a constellation that he knows wanders much more widely than the single star that seems to be more reliable. We haven't reached a resolution on that yet, but that question will be in the background as we proceed.

    For the moment, we should bring today's episode to a conclusion and come back next week. Section 21 was relatively short, although very deep, and we will dig further into this argument as Cicero goes forward in Section 22 beginning next week. So Joshua, with that, let's bring today's episode to a close. Thanks, everyone, for your time today. As always, we invite everyone to drop by the EpicureanFriends forum and let us know if you have any questions or comments about this episode. Thanks again for being with us. We'll see you again soon. Bye.

Resources

  1. Getting Started At EpicureanFriends
  2. Community Standards And Posting Policies
  3. The Major Doctrines of Classical Epicurean Philosophy
  4. Introductory Videos
  5. Lexicon
  6. Lucretius Today Podcast
    1. Podcast Episode Guide
  7. Key Epicurean Texts
    1. Chart Of Key Quotes
    2. Outline Of Key Quotes
    3. Side-By-Side Diogenes Laertius X (Bio And All Key Writings of Epicurus)
    4. Side-By-Side Lucretius - On The Nature Of Things
    5. Side-By-Side Torquatus On Ethics
    6. Side-By-Side Velleius on Divinity
    7. Lucretius Topical Outline
    8. Usener Fragment Collection
  8. Frequently Asked Questions
    1. FAQ Discussions
  9. Full List of Forums
    1. Physics Discussions
    2. Canonics Discussions
    3. Ethics Discussions
    4. All Recent Forum Activities
  10. Image Gallery
  11. Featured Articles
  12. Featured Blog Posts
  13. Quiz Section
  14. Special Resource Pages
  15. File Database
  16. Site Map
    1. Home

Frequently Used Forums

  • Frequently Asked / Introductory Questions
  • News And Announcements
  • Lucretius Today Podcast
  • Physics (The Nature of the Universe)
  • Canonics (The Tests Of Truth)
  • Ethics (How To Live)
  • Against Determinism
  • Against Skepticism
  • The "Meaning of Life" Question
  • Uncategorized Discussion
  • Comparisons With Other Philosophies
  • Historical Figures
  • Ancient Writers and Texts
  • Decline of The Ancient Epicurean Age
  • Unsolved Questions of Epicurean History
  • Welcome New Participants
  • Events - Activism - Outreach
  • Full Forum List

Latest Posts

  1. Discussion of Article - "One Wise Man Is Not Wiser Than Another: What Epicurus' Saying Tells Us About Pleasure, Happiness, And How We Know What Is Real"

    Cassius
    November 20, 2026 at 9:28 PM
  2. Episode 360 - EATAQ42 - Should We Refrain From Having An Opinion On Anything At All Because We Might Be Wrong?

    Cassius
    November 20, 2026 at 9:23 PM
  3. World's Worst Epicurus Videos

    Cassius
    November 20, 2026 at 3:30 PM
  4. Happy Twentieth of November 2026!

    Kalosyni
    November 20, 2026 at 9:31 AM
  5. Recommendations for Happy Living

    Bryan
    November 19, 2026 at 10:48 PM
  6. Is One Wise Man Wiser Than Another? Why Did Epicurus Answer "No"?

    Cassius
    November 19, 2026 at 9:33 AM
  7. New Article: One Wise Man Is Not Wiser Than Another: What Epicurus' Saying Tells Us About Pleasure, Happiness, And How We Know What Is Real

    Cassius
    November 19, 2026 at 9:23 AM
  8. Discussion of Article: "On Pleasure, Pain and Happiness"

    Noah Calderon
    November 19, 2026 at 8:12 AM
  9. Video: "Before You Can Change Your World You Must Understand Your World"

    Patrikios
    November 18, 2026 at 2:45 PM
  10. Epicurean Pleasure and Enjoyment Differs Depending on Introvert vs. Extrovert Brain Differences

    Patrikios
    November 18, 2026 at 10:24 AM

Frequently Used Tags

In addition to posting in the appropriate forums, participants are encouraged to reference the following tags in their posts:

  • #Physics
    • #Atomism
    • #Gods
    • #Images
    • #Infinity
    • #Eternity
    • #Life
    • #Death
  • #Canonics
    • #Knowledge
    • #Scepticism
  • #Ethics

    • #Pleasure
    • #Pain
    • #Engagement
    • #EpicureanLiving
    • #Happiness
    • #Virtue
      • #Wisdom
      • #Temperance
      • #Courage
      • #Justice
      • #Honesty
      • #Faith (Confidence)
      • #Suavity
      • #Consideration
      • #Hope
      • #Gratitude
      • #Friendship



Click Here To Search All Tags

To Suggest Additions To This List Click Here

EpicureanFriends - Classical Epicurean Philosophy

  1. Home
    1. About Us
    2. Classical Epicurean Philosophy
    3. Rules, Terms & Policies
  2. Lexicon
    1. Getting Started
  3. Frequently Asked Questions
    1. Site Map
  4. Forum
    1. Latest Threads
    2. Featured Threads
    3. Unread Posts
  5. Texts
    1. Core Texts
    2. Biography of Epicurus
    3. Lucretius
  6. Articles
    1. Latest Articles
  7. Gallery
    1. Featured Images
  8. Calendar
    1. This Month At EpicureanFriends
Powered by WoltLab Suite™ 6.2.9
Style: Inspire by cls-design
Stylename
Inspire
Manufacturer
cls-design
Licence
Commercial styles
Help
Supportforum
Visit cls-design