Ohhhh, yes, I wasn't denying that the absence of pain (i.e., tranquility and the asence of bodily pain) is pleasure. The question is, in large part, what "pleasure" means. What it doesn't mean (in my view) is that tranquility feels great in the way that caviar or a beautiful view does. Epicurus doesn't have a preset idea of pleasure, shared with everyone else, that he then asserts ataraxia is an example of. Rather, he thinks pleasure is the good, but he has a distinctive idea of what pleasure means. It is very clear that the good is pleasure and vice versa, but it is not at all clear waht pleasure(s) actually determine a blessed life. Only the absence of pain does that; but he expects that lots of other pleasures will be present in a blessed life.
Two of my more complicated views (can say more later):
1) in Epicurus's epistemology, a pleasure is whatever plays the functional role of appearing good to us and motivating us to pursue it (DL 10.33, pathos is one of the criteria)
2) Epicurus is a hedonist because he thinks only pleasures appear good to us evidently [i.e., with enargeia]