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Not sure who Jack Gedney is, but this new Substack account looks worth following. He likes Emily Austin's book and references Dewitt.
This is not meant to be nearly as negative as it is going to sound. Be sure to read to the last line of my post.
But - here's a quote from the article:
O’Keefe’s latest piece on Epicurean ethics is another work of helpful synthesis. While many correctly note that Epicurean “hedonism” is primarily about the reduction of pain, that bald summary can overlook the next layer of analysis: Epicurus believes that avoiding bodily pain is pretty simple, and that therefore most of our therapeutic attention should go to avoiding mental pain. The largest component of mental pain is fear. (Epicurus does also discuss other disturbing emotions such as regret and envy.)
"Correctly note that Epicurean "hedonism" is primarily about the reduction of pain!" ????
As a technical statement this means nothing different from saying "primarily about pleasure" because absence of pain and pleasure are the same thing.
As a choice of wording in presenting the philosophy it is disastrous. And the elaboration that follows it just digs the hole deeper. The whole line of thinking is not only inaccurate, but It encourages the worst tendencies of seeing the world as mostly suffering, as if through a Buddhist or Stoic prism.
I've read enough of OKeefe over the years to think that this problem isn't attributable to Jack Gedney, but rather it's the sense I've gotten from reading O'Keefe directly. This is exactly why I take O'Keefe very cautiously and do not prefer to cite his articles, even though they often contain very good research and information.
I don't think this is the way Emily Austin conveys Epicurus ("Living for Pleasure") and I would consider her work head and shoulders better than OKeefe's.
Other than that I applaud Jack Gedney (I don't know who he is either) for his activity!
I am really glad Don posted that article because otherwise I might not have seen it.
It very much helps crystallize my thinking about one of the most important moderating decisions I have to make in administering this forum.
If someone comes here thinking that "Epicurean 'hedonism' is primarily about the reduction of pain," then I would welcome them and welcome the opportunity to explain how that is an inversion of the truth and of the meaning of the reliable ancient texts.
However if someone comes here dedicated to and advocating the idea that "many correctly note that Epicurean 'hedonism' is primarily about the reduction of pain" then that is beyond the terms of our "Community Standards" and "Terms of Use" and our "Not Neo-Epicurean" statement, and their membership will be rescinded.
There are plenty of places on the internet where people can focus on suffering and devote their time to studying Buddhism and Stoicism to the exclusion of and with indifference to joy, delight, pleasure, and happiness as those terms are ordinarily understood by ordinary people.
The purpose of this forum is to study and promote Classical Epicurean Philosophy as Epicurus taught it. It is extremely important for us to grapple with Epicurus' framing of the term "absence of pain" and explain how Epicurus is about PLEASURE - which can indeed be defined for certain important uses as "absence of pain" or "reduction of pain." But to place PAIN in the center of the philosophy rather than PLEASURE is not what the ancient Epicureans did, and it's not consistent with the mission of this forum to allow for the regular advocacy of that position here.
Again, we'll talk about pleasure and absence of pain as often and as intensely as necessary, but if in the future some new person wishes to join and use their membership to cross over into advocacy for Epicurean philosophy is primarily about alleviation of suffering on a regular basis that's something that will not be allowed to continue.
Just to be clear - neither Don nor anyone else here has done that, nor are they anywhere close to doing so. I think it's likely that our "Community Standards" and "Terms of Service" and "Not Neo-Epicurean" statements that are stressed in our registration process have done their intended work, and we don't have dedicated advocates for that position here.
But new people come on the scene all the time, and this is a good opportunity to write something up to address this.
As administrator I have no right or ability to state flatly that "this is" or "this is not" true Epicurean philosophy for the general world and for all time. Everyone has to decide that for themselves. But I do have the right and ability to help steer this forum into the direction set for it when it was launched, and as long as I am here to administrate I will continue to do that.
Peace and love to all!
Peace and love to all!
Backatcha! 
For instance, “natural” desires for food or sex are biologically determined and probably can’t be eliminated. To argue for their elimination would be foolish, so instead we should try to manage those desires prudently. In contrast, unnatural desires (which are culturally learned, rather than innate) are more likely candidates for elimination: the desires to be portrayed in public statues or to have a billion dollars, for instance, are clearly not innate, and so it seems plausible to remove those desires through the cognitive training of philosophy.
Here's something i really disagree with on with the TIm O'Keef, and i've been curious about other's opinion on this for a long time.
Does Epicurus mean natural as innate or natural as in nature approves of it? I think Tim O'Keefe misreads natural desires as meaning innate, whereas it actually means "actually helps with pleasure", this is why natural desires can turn into vain or unnatural desires if they become sources of stress or likely to cause harm. It's natural and should be pursued when brining more pleasure than pain but unnatural when not and should be shunned. There is also the fact that i think Epicurus just outright disagrees that sex or lavish food is necessary for happiness and can't be eliminated and he seems to say the opposite below.
PD30: Those natural desires which create no pain when unfulfilled, though pursued with an intense effort, are also due to baseless opinion; and if they are not dispelled, it is not because of their own nature, but because of human vanity.
Emily A. Austin seems to agree with me on this btw.
While both necessary and extravagant desires earn Epicurus' endorsement as "natural," corrosives desires are both unnatural and unnecessary. Recall that when Epicurus says "unnatural" here, he doesn't mean "artificial". Instead he means contrary to our nature, or not conductive to human well-being. (Pg.50)
I quite like DeWitt on this point;
That's from pages 66-67 of Epicurus and his Philosophy. Lucretius had indeed written (Book IV, line 823) that sight did not exist before the eyes, or language before the tongue; these organs were not created to fulfill a purpose. Rather, their existence afforded the opportunity to be adapted by the organism for the uses with which we now associate them.
In this way the early Epicureans prefigured Charles Darwin, who also wrote about the eye in a well-remembered passage that is often abused by creationists:
To suppose that the eye, with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest possible degree. Yet reason tells me, that if numerous gradations from a perfect and complex eye to one very imperfect and simple, each grade being useful to its possessor, can be shown to exist; if further, the eye does vary ever so slightly, and the variations be inherited, which is certainly the case; and if any variation or modification in the organ be ever useful to an animal under changing conditions of life, then the difficulty of believing that a perfect and complex eye could be formed by natural selection, though insuperable by our imagination, can hardly be considered real. How a nerve comes to be sensitive to light, hardly concerns us more than how life itself first originated; but I may remark that several facts make me suspect that any sensitive nerve may be rendered sensitive to light, and likewise to those coarser vibrations of the air which produce sound.
But if Epicurus rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian view of teleology, what justification can we make for his continued use of the word telos (τέλος)? DeWitt resolves the problem by suggesting that, while Epicurus did throw out creationism and intelligent design, he did not wholly reject teleology.
"This amounts to saying that a nonpurposive Nature had produced a purposive creature, for whom alone an end or goal of living could have a meaning. This is teleology at a minimum."
He enlarges on this theme with a discussion of the word nature as opposed to reason on pages 127-132, and here is a relevant excerpt:
The priority of Nature was also insisted upon in establishing the identity of the end or telos. Aristotle had furnished a precious hint in this connection; he wrote "that perhaps even in the case of the lower animals there is some natural good superior to their scale of intelligence which aims at the corresponding good." To this principle Epicurus adapted his procedure. By the promptings of Nature alone, apart from reason, every animate thing, the moment it is born, reaches out for pleasure and shrinks from pain. Consistent with this reasoning is the steady practice of referring to pleasure as "the end of Nature," which occurs five times in our scant remains. As analogous phrases may be cited "the good of Nature" and "the pleasure of Nature," all of them implying that reason played no necessary role in establishing the truth. Similar is the implication of parallel phrases such as "the wealth of Nature," signifying that Nature and not reason reveals the true meaning of wealth; and also "the limits of Nature," implying that Nature and not reason teaches the true limits of the desires.
Does Epicurus mean natural as innate or natural as in nature approves of it? I think Tim O'Keefe misreads natural desires as meaning innate, whereas it actually means "actually helps with pleasure", this is why natural desires can turn into vain or unnatural desires if they become sources of stress or likely to cause harm. It's natural and should be pursued when brining more pleasure than pain but unnatural when not and should be shunned. There is also the fact that i think Epicurus just outright disagrees that sex or lavish food is necessary for happiness and can't be eliminated and he seems to say the opposite below.
Depending on how many further responses we get on this I may move Wbernys' comments and responses on this topic to a separate thread given that it seems to regularly be of interest.
Especially the second sentence I underlined:
Can a natural desire turn into an unnatural desire? If so, what does that mean?
Does that mean that the true defining criteria of what should be classified as natural or unnatural is not whether the desire in question is with us at birth, but something about the way we pursue it?
Does that mean that the true defining criteria of what should be classified as natural or unnatural is not whether the desire in question is with us at birth, but something about the way we pursue it?
Yes. (Added: something about the way we pursue it to clarify a question noted by Cassius below)
Maybe it's specificity. The desire for food and drink is natural and necessary and leads to pleasure. The desire for occasional variety or novelty in food and drink is natural but unnecessary and maintains pleasure. The desire for "an endless string of drinking parties and festivals" is unnatural and unnecessary does not lead to pleasure in the end but rather leads ultimately to more pain than pleasure.
I would go so far as to say the desire for an occasional drinking party or festival is a natural but unnecessary desire. However. I find it interesting that Epicurus uses the word πότος (potos) and not συμπόσιον (symposion) "symposium, drinking-party." He wrote a book or dialogue entitled Symposium in which he wrote "Even when drunk, the wise one will not talk nonsense or act silly." So, Epicurus didn't seem to oppose drinking wine or attending drinking-parties. There seems to be a distinction between πότος and συμπόσιον, possibly with the difference being one of emphasis on drinking versus conviviality.
A κῶμος is "a village festival: a revel, carousal, merry-making, Latin: comissatio." They seem to have involved crowned revelers parading the streets, bearing torches, singing, dancing, and "playing frolics."
Note that he doesn't say you can't attend a drinking party or take part in village festivals! He's saying life shouldn't be an "endless string" of them (οὐ συνείροντες "not stringing together"). That's going to lead to more pain than pleasure in the end.
That might not hold up in every natural/unnatural desire situation, but I would be interested to see if others hold up under this paradigm.
And just to remind everyone: natural/unnatural & necessary/unnecessary refers to desires and not pleasure. This reminder is as much for myself as the the thread.
Ok there Don you're addressing the full categorization scheme by referencing necessary/unnecessary.
What if we focus precisely on one of the aspects of what wbernys said:
Can something that is a "natural desire" turn into an unnatural desire?
I think a lot of the confusion comes from the appropriate thought that we ought to be able to construct a table with "natural desires" in one column and "unnatural desires" on the other so that we can see clearly what distinguishes the two categories.
If "desire for food" is natural but "desire for caviar" is not, then should we not be able to consider them as forever separate so that we can see what element or aspect must be "added to" the desire for food in order to identify something that is unnatural?
And we ought to be able to do that separate from considering the "necessary" part.
Separate and apart from any other topic, what makes something "natural" and something else "unnatural"? It's NOT simply a question of "is it present at birth?" Or is it?
I presume your "Yes" means you think that you don't think it is sufficient to say "the desire was present at birth."
Separate and apart from the necessary criteria, what does "natural" mean? Because I can see someone arguing that if it's natural, it's natural from the start and forever, just like atoms have shape, size, and weight.
I presume your "Yes" means you think that you don't think it is sufficient to say "the desire was present at birth
Actually my yes was responding to "something about the way we pursue it"
Yes, I'm picking nits but they're nits that deserve picking.
Yes I very much agree that this needs deep analysis.
I think there is a simple answer to the meaning of natural/unnatural. It refers to the criterion provided by nature: the feelings.
A natural desire is one that is likely to result in net pleasure if fulfilled.
An unnatural desire is one that we only imagine as likely to produce pleasure, but in fact is likely result in net pain. Also referred to as "vain and empty". The first definition that comes up when I search "vain" is "not yielding the desired outcome; fruitless" - the desired outcome being pleasure. Empty means empty of pleasure.
Separate and apart from the necessary criteria, what does "natural" mean? Because I can see someone arguing that if it's natural, it's natural from the start and forever, just like atoms have shape, size, and weight.
As is my wont, let's consult LSJ: The word Epicurus uses is φυσικός (physikos) "natural, produced or caused by nature, inborn, native; of or concerning the order of external nature, natural, physical." So, I take that to mean a desire which is aligned with the natural order of things, in other words, a desire which aligns with the natural order of seeking pleasure. If a desire leads to pain with no accompanying pleasure (I'm thinking the desire for the pleasure of a healthy body via the pain of exercise is natural) that's an "empty/vain/corrosive" desire.
As is my wont, let's consult LSJ: The word Epicurus uses is φυσικός (physikos) "natural, produced or caused by nature, inborn, native; of or concerning the order of external nature, natural, physical." So, I take that to mean a desire which is aligned with the natural order of things, in other words, a desire which aligns with the natural order of seeking pleasure. If a desire leads to pain with no accompanying pleasure (I'm thinking the desire for the pleasure of a healthy body via the pain of exercise is natural) that's an "empty/vain/corrosive" desire.
Ok well now if I understand you that, that would be to consider nature as "aligned with the goal of nature" and NOT "inborn with us at birth." Presumably there could be something destructive inborn in us at birth that is NOT aligned with the goal of nature, thus those are two different things.
So you are in the "alignment with nature's goal" camp rather than "inborn at birth" camp?
So you are in the "alignment with nature's goal" camp rather than "inborn at birth" camp?
I don't know whether I'd say I'm encamped. That sounds like I'm queueing up for battle. But yeah that appears to be my current (checks watch) perspective.
nature as "aligned with the goal of nature"
As aligned with the natural goal of seeking pleasure. The way you stated it seems more of a tautology.
Presumably there could be something destructive inborn in us at birth that is NOT aligned with the goal of nature, thus those are two different things.
Agreed, but I'd like us to come up with examples before we plant that flag. According to Epicurus, ALL our actions, decisions, etc. ultimately end up as a pursuit of pleasure.
I think there is a simple answer to the meaning of natural/unnatural. It refers to the criterion provided by nature: the feelings.
A natural desire is one that is likely to result in net pleasure if fulfilled.
An unnatural desire is one that we only imagine as likely to produce pleasure, but in fact is likely result in net pain. Also referred to as "vain and empty". The first definition that comes up when I search "vain" is "not yielding the desired outcome; fruitless" - the desired outcome being pleasure. Empty means empty of pleasure.
Agreed. Well stated.
I just see that I missed post #13 from Todd earlier..... seeing it now.
According to Epicurus, ALL our actions, decisions, etc. ultimately end up as a pursuit of pleasure.
did you mean to include "should" there, as "should ultimately end up as..." Otherwise we get back into the "psychological hedonism" word play again, and I don't agree that Epicurus would say that we can't consciously choose to pursue pain, even knowing that it is not going to be pleasurable for us to do so.
But that's probably related to the current discussion.
I read Todd to be saying that Epicurus would say that a desire is "natural" if in fact it ends up producing more pleasure than pain. So that would be a "final consequence" test that you don't know whether the desire is natural or unnatural until all the consequences are added up in total.
And in that respect our state at birth would have no immediate relevance to whether a desire is natural or not.
I read Todd to be saying that Epicurus would say that a desire is "natural" if in fact it ends up producing more pleasure than pain.
Not in fact. Only in expectation.
And I would say any classification of specific desires has to be taken as more or less of a generalization that (even in expectation) might differ for different people and in different circumstances.
