How do we know that we only get one life?

I conducted similar thought experiment some time ago and tried to imagine how Epicureans in antiquity could tackle this problem. I hope you find it interesting:

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Ancient Epicurean worldview (classes of compounds of atoms)

A few of the recent conversations got me thinking and as a result a new perspective on ancient Epicurean worldview emerged in my mind. I'm curious how viable you think the perspective is, my dear EpicureanFriends.

Firstly, the required Epicurean foundations:
1) The universe is infinite. (both is geometry and duration)
2) Atoms and void are infinite (atoms in quantity (but not quality!) and duration, the void in geometry and duration)
3) Compounds of atoms are finite in quality (there are limits to…

TauPhi

September 2, 2024 at 2:44 PM

Quote from LAMAR__44

Perhaps it’s that we wouldn’t feel a continuation of existence like we do now,

Perhaps Tau Phi's post mentions this (haven't read it yet) but your specific question is addressed by Lucretius. His answer is as you indicate, that our exact atoms could reassemble in the future, but that we would have no memory of it so it would not be us in actuality.

I think your question of why the memory would not reassemble is also a good one, but as I understand Lucretius his answer is that we would not expect that because human experience is indeed that we now have no memory of past lives, so we would not expect that past experience to change. That's an issue that bleeds over into Epicurean canonics in general and Phildemus' On Signs in particular, as a question of when we have enough information to infer that we are confident of the answer. I would expect this to be one of those times.

EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Lucretius

Multi-column side-by-side Lucretius text comparison tool featuring Munro, Bailey, Dunster, and Condensed editions.

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3-843

And even if the nature of mind and the power of soul has feeling, after it has been rent asunder from our body, yet it is naught to us, who are made one by the mating and marriage of body and soul. Nor, if time should gather together our substance after our decease and bring it back again as it is now placed, if once more the light of life should be vouchsafed to us, yet, even were that done, it would not concern us at all, when once the remembrance of our former selves were snapped in twain. And even now we care not at all for the selves that we once were, not at all are we touched by any torturing pain for them. For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how manifold are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, whereof we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now; and yet we cannot recall that in our mind’s memory; for in between lies a break in life, and all the motions have wandered everywhere far astray from sense.

Quote from LAMAR__44

Why then wouldn’t this be me living again?

The future animal that looks like you will have different friends.

To be the same, you'd also need the same context, the same culture, the same language, the same fashion, the same laws, the same relationships, the same experience that guarantees an identical existence. As animals, we're defined by our development, not a permanent prototype.

I'm thinkin' ... maybe, like, Toy Story? Sure, millions of toy cowboys named Woody were produced, but Andy only loves one Woody, and there's only one Woody who loves Andy. In the words of the great Randy Newman, "Some other folks might be a little bit smarter than I am, maybe stronger to. But none of them will ever love you the way I do. Just me and you, boy. And as the years go by, our friendship will never die. You've gotta see it's our destiny. You've got a friend in me."

Hmm ... maybe that's it. Love. (Of course, "friend" and "love" are the same word in Greek.) Friendship doesn't die with friends, so your memories are another crucial piece of you.

I'm also thinking of Annihilation with Natalie Portman in it. I'm not going to spoil if any readers haven't seen it (go see it!), but, in a nutshell ... a thing that looks like you in every way is not you. Or ... at least so my personal viewership gathered from that eery narrative.

Also, quick thought experiment. I'm thinking Rick & Morty here (adult cartoon). So, we have a mad scientist. He wants to trick your family. He makes a bunch of indistinguishable robot clones that (to others) are like you in every way. It lives with your family for years, and begins evolving functional relationships that allow for improvisation and development. The mad scientist, hoping not to alert your family, switches you in the night, and induces selective amnesia in you. You awaken. Your family notices that you have gestures, habits, and a vocabulary that reflects you at a younger age, not the version of you that has developed and grown with them. So ... who are you? I have to think that you are the victim of the mad scientist, not the form of you that can be reproduced. Even if everyone externally recognizes the robot clone as you, the robot clone is other than the scientist's victim.

Also, my bad in reflecting for demonstrating my point with mythic narratives.

Read the citation Cassius shared for a proper, Epicurean defense.