Episode 299 - TD27 - Was Epicurus Right That There Are Only Two Feelings - Pleasure And Pain? Not Yet Released

Welcome to Episode 299 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we return to our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint, and today we will be following up on last week's discussion as we continue in Section XX, where Cicero hammers against the inconsistencies he sees in holding "absence of pain" to be pleasure.

In the text for this episode, Cicero uses the story of the Gracchi and their reforms to illustrate how dramatically words and goals can differ. It will be worth knowing a little about that background, so here's a pretty good video setting the stage.

Cicero specifically mentions the Sempronian law:

Lex Sempronia - Wikipedia

Also:

Gracchan opposition

Since Piso was in Sicily during his entire consulship, ancient sources do not tell his attitude towards Tiberius Gracchus, who as plebeian tribune moved an ambitious set of reforms to redistribute Roman public lands. It is generally assumed that Piso was among his opponents, because he was later an outspoken enemy of Gaius Gracchus (Tiberius' younger brother), but several politicians initially supported Tiberius and later opposed his reforms or his attempt to be reelected as tribune, starting with Scaevola, Piso's consular colleague.^[31] D C Earl suggests that Piso initially regarded Tiberius' program with a "benevolent neutrality" as he had connections with the Fulvii Flacci and the patrician Claudii, who were Gracchan allies.^[32]

The main anecdote for Piso's opposition is an anecdote placed in his mouth by Cicero. According to Cicero, after Gaius Gracchus passed a law establishing a subsidised grain supply over Piso's opposition, Piso appeared in the queue and when Gaius enquired as to his hypocrisy, he responded "I'm not keen, Gracchus... on you getting the idea of sharing out my property man by man, but if that's what you're going to do, I'll take my cut".^[33][34][35]

As i am editing I can point out that this week we focus on the second of three challenges Cicero raised in Section XX of part 3 of Tusculan disputations. - that Epicurus is wrong that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain.

This challenge is common to both Cicero and Plutarch, and it's important for us to think about all possible responses because a lot rides on it.

We phrased the question in terms of "What was Epicurus's justification for dividing feeling into only two categories- pleasure and pain? Why not three, or thirty, or three hundred, giving names to many more types or categories of experiences? Where do we find the basis for this classification?

Here's on of the places Cicero states his complaint, in section III-XX.¶

Quote

It may be said, What! do you imagine Epicurus really meant this, and that he maintained anything so sensual? Indeed I do not imagine so, for I am sensible that he has uttered many excellent things and sentiments, and delivered maxims of great weight. Therefore, as I said before, I am speaking of his acuteness, not of his morals. Though he should hold those pleasures in contempt, which he just now commended, yet I must remember wherein he places the chief good. For he was not contented with barely saying this, but he has explained what he meant: he says, that taste, and embraces, and sports, and music, and those forms which affect the eyes with pleasure, are the chief good. Have I invented this? have I misrepresented him? I should be glad to be confuted; for what am I endeavouring at, but to clear up truth in every question? Well, but the same man says, that pleasure is at its height where pain ceases, and that to be free from all pain is the very greatest pleasure. Here are three very great mistakes in a very few words. One is, that he contradicts himself; for, but just now, he could not imagine anything good, unless the senses were in a manner tickled with some pleasure; but now he says that to be free from pain is the highest pleasure. Can any one contradict himself more? The next mistake is, that where there is naturally a threefold division, the first, to be pleased; next, to be in pain; the last, to be affected neither by pleasure nor pain: he imagines the first and the last to be the same, and makes no difference betwixt pleasure and a cessation of pain. The last mistake he falls into in common with some others; which is this: that as virtue is the most desirable thing, and as philosophy has been investigated with a view to the attainment of it, he has separated the chief good from virtue. But he commends virtue, and that frequently; and indeed C. Gracchus, when he had made the largest distributions of the public money, and had exhausted the treasury, nevertheless spoke much of defending the treasury. What signifies what men say, when we see what they do? That Piso, who was surnamed Frugal, had always harangued against the law that was proposed for distributing the corn, but when it had passed, though a man of consular dignity, he came to receive the corn. Gracchus observed Piso standing in the court, and asked him, in the hearing of the people, how it was consistent for him to take corn by a law he had himself opposed? “It was,” said he, “against your distributing my goods to every man as you thought proper; but, as you do so, I claim my share.” Did not this grave and wise man sufficiently show that the public revenue was dissipated by the Sempronian law? Read Gracchus's speeches, and you will pronounce him the advocate of the treasury. Epicurus denies that any one can live pleasantly who does not lead a life of virtue; he denies that fortune has any power over a wise man: he prefers a spare diet to great plenty, and maintains that a wise man is always happy. All these things become a philosopher to say, but they are not consistent with pleasure. But the reply is, that he doth not mean that pleasure: let him mean any pleasure, it must be such a one as makes no part of virtue. But suppose we are mistaken as to his pleasure, are we so too as to his pain? I maintain therefore the impropriety of language which that man uses when talking of virtue, who would measure every great evil by pain?

Episode 299 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today our episode is entitled: "Was Epicurus Right That There Are Only Two Feelings - Pleasure And Pain?

I've added this one to substack here:

Was Epicurus Right That There Are Only Two Feelings - Pleasure And Pain?

If so, why? Today we address that question in Episode 299 of the Lucretius Today podcast.

epicureanfriends.substack.com

Don -- Yes that circle represents another model. Like any other model I would expect that the author of the model would say that it is grounded in reality, so I would say the original question remains.

For example, all of those headings around the circumference are labels that the model-writer has assigned based on his or her experience. Would it be any less legitimate to assign them differently?

So the question that I underlies the whole discussion is: What is the authority or foundation of this or any other model?

Are both Epicurus' model (with no middle ground) and the majority model (with a middle ground) equally legitimate in terms of evidence, differing only in conceptual labelling?

Epicurus obviously thought that it made sense to use a model in which there is no middle ground. Plato, Cicero, et al. prefer a model in which there is a middle ground. Is there really a difference in real-world evidence that says that one model conforms with reality more than does the other?

Now obviously I think the Epicurean model provides a far superior method of analysis. By affirming that there is a bright line between pleasure and pain you can make everything fall on one side or the other and see much more clearly that even non-stimulated situations are pleasure or pain. But i also think it is important to state that this is a model that our minds need to comprehend, and not leave it to speculation that there might be some kind of natural law or evidence or force that compels us to say that this model is "true to the evidence" while the other model is "false to the evidence."

As Joshua stated several times in the episode, I think Epicurus and we agree that pleasure and pain are highly subjective, even in terms of likes and dislikes as to food. So who are we to say to Cicero "No you wrong - when you're not in stimulative pain or pleasure, you must still use the same terms (pain or pleasure) to describe the condition that you are in."

Cicero and Plutarch are leaving out that what Epicurus is not saying "You're missing the obvious - when you think you are in neutral you are the same as if you're eating the best steak of your life!"

Instead, what Epicurus is doing is stating a conceptual framework that allows us to analyze the full problem more productively. Epicurus isn't exactly saying to the world: "No, when you're not being stimulated one way or the other, you may not realize it, but you're still being stimulated." The world says that's not true because they know the difference between numbness and eating the best steak they've ever had.

What seems to be in issue is labeling rather than evidence. And what we're arguing about with Cicero as to what to label is what constitutes a healthy state of peak performance of mind and body.

The problem facing us is that the view that "all you have to do is remove pain and you are in the greatest pleasure possible." That's being taken by some as a statement that you can reach the highest pleasure possible by numbing your mind and body as with a drug.

I think we're saying pretty much the opposite - that you want your mind and body to be MORE sensitive to what's going on in them and whether they are healthy or not. In the case of Chrysippus' hand the assertion is that the hand is in its normal operating condition, which in the case of the limited abilities of a hand a statement of peak condition. In the case of the mind, however, the mind isn't in peak condition unless it understands how the universe operates,that we aren't subject to supernatural gods or punishment/reward by supernatural forces after death, and that we can have the confident expectation of remaining in that condition.

That latter condition of the mind is the opposite of "emptying" or "numbing" the mind so as to allegedly automatically achieve its peak pleasure. That peak performance of the mind is going to require understanding of the nature of things (as listed above) which requires intellectual effort.

And it seems to me that in order to explain the model it is helpful to make clear that what we're talking about isn't that the general public has defective senses, but rather what they are missing is a conceptual model that is required for the proper understanding of the best life.

Quote from Don

The fact - yes, fact - is that if you are alive, you're feeling something positive or negative. There is no "middle ground" and no "neutral" feeling. "Meh, I'm okay" is still positive, albeit at a low level of intensity.

Maybe what I am saying is so obvious that it doesn't need to be said.

I'm looking for "what would Epicurus have said himself if he had been present with Cicero or Plutarch and been allowed to speak further beyond what Torquatus was allowed to say, or beyond what Cicero or Plutarch quoted of him.

When Cicero/Plutarch said "everyone knows that there is a state between pain and pleasure where we aren't feeling much of anything," and "everyone knows that absence of pain is certainly not the height of pleasure," what's the first thing out of Epicurus' mouth?

Would it start with "It depends on how you look at it"?

Would such a start be obvious, or controversial?

Quote from Don

Nothing. I am in a neutral state, I am feeling neither pleasure nor pain.

Then you are not alive but dead.

Harrrrumph! Well, the absence of pain is not the highest pleasure.

If you are alive, you are *feeling*, experiencing sensations. Someone who is alive is always feeling...

As to especially "then you are not alive but dead" and also "someone who is alive is always feeling," that is not the way most people talk, and Cicero is going to win that argument every day of the week in front of most juries, Greek, Roman, or today. When it's Epicurus' turn to speak, he's going to have to give more explanation than that to satisfy any fair-minded jury.

In a recent zoom meeting TauPhi raised this issue in regard to "the size of the sun is as it appears to be" (and perhaps as to other contexts as well). He said in essence that "sloganeering" can be fun but it is not persuasive.

Not saying that you or Epicurus are sloganeering or not being a fair-minded juror of course, but I think you know what I mean! What we have looks like sloganeering because the enemies of Epicurus have selectively preserved the part they want to keep without the part that explains it.

When people of good faith are being approached with something new, they have to be brought along at the right speed. I'm thinking more along the lines of the way Frances Wright has Epicurus speaking to Zeno in A Few Days In Athens, there needs to be a "wind-up" before the pitch. "If you are alive you are feeling something" and "absence of pain is pleasure" and "absence of pain is in fact the highest pleasure" are smoking-hot fastballs on which most batters are going to strike out.

But we're not trying to deceive the batter and strike him out by throwing it past him. We're trying to telegraph the pitch, and deliver it right over the plate so the batter can hit it out of the park.

Don I note you did not comment on this:

Quote from Cassius

Would it start with "It depends on how you look at it"?

Would such a start be obvious, or controversial?

Does that mean that you think "it depends on how you look at it" would be incorrect?

In this case we're not talking about physics, where the ultimate questions certainly don't depend on how you look at it. Atoms and void don't exist or not depending on how we look at them.

And we're not really talking about individual feelings of pain and pleasure, which like snow is white honey is sweet are unmistakable.

But in regard to "pleasure" conceptually as the guide of life or "happiness" as the goal, does it in fact depend on how you choose to look at it?

Quote from Don

"It depends how you look at it" plays into the other person's hands. You've accepted their terms and are agreeing to play by their rules on their turf.

Ok that's why I am thinking that the approach would be controversial, but I am not yet sure that it isn't essentially what Epicurus is saying. Again playing off Joshua's observation, we'd have to deal with the subjectivity of the whole question and whether it is every appropriate to tell someone that what they are feeling is different from what they perceive it to be.

We can definitely dispute about "opinions," but I am not sure that it makes sense to say essentially "if you think about it this current feeling that you perceive as blahness is really the greatest pleasure anyone can experience in life!"

Quote from Don

That's the point. What they rightly subjectively perceive as blahness isn't the highest pleasure. They are not really free from all pain. I would go so far as to say that none of us are ever going to be at the highest pleasure.

I agree with that.

But ok, where's the disconnect? Torquatus is making these statements very "flatly," He's speaking almost literally "The absence of pain is pleasure - in fact it's the highest pleasure." And I'd say that Epicurus is doing the same thing in the letter to Menoeceus. There's an explanation for the different perspectives, but I don't think we are yet articulating that explanation as Epicurus would.

For the generic man-on-the-street "I feel no pain" doesn't translate into "you are experiencing the height of pleasure" without more explanation that tells them how they are "looking at things" wrong. And leaving out the explanation as Cicero and Plutarch do makes Epicurus looks ridiculous. In the case of Epicurus' letter to Menoeceus I think we can excuse the omission on the grounds that Menoeceus was to all appearances a student, for whom this letter was a summary, and he would be expected to know the full explanation. But for those of us reading Cicero or Plutarch or reading the letter out of context, there's much more to be said.