The pleasurability brought about by clearing the mind and setting the Epicurean student on the reasonable approach to life using the Doctrine and other sources of Epicurean philosophy, ought to be, philosophically and teleologically, a distinct state of affairs from the myriad of ideas one could bring to the table about Pleasure and Pain and pathos in general.
Now there is a statement that deserves more comment, because I place that framing squarely within the "heap" / sorities framing. Like grains of sand, there are myriad experiences that can be described as pleasure, and yet "happiness" or "the best life" or "the highest pleasure" is not found in any one of them, any more than "heapness" is found in any particular grain of sand.
It is surely legitimate to talk about heaps as real, and likewise talk about happiness or "the greatest pleasure" as real, and yet the latter (happiness, the highest pleasure) are not found in any one single experience, or set of experiences.
And that's why it is necessary to be clear to people that "heap" is a concept rather than a particular "thing," just like happiness and the highest pleasure are not particular "things."