Is All Desire Painful? How Would Epicurus Answer?

Quote from Cassius

I would ask, "In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

There is no pain or pleasure apart from the two feelings. I'm not saying you are intentionally, but your phrasing makes it sound like there is some abstract absolute thing called "pain" and "pleasure." There is no pleasure apart from the feeling of pleasure; there is no pain apart from the feeling of pain. When a person is experiencing something painful, there is pain. When there is no painful feeling, there is pleasure. When a person is experiencing a pleasurable feeling, there is pleasure. Saying something like "except pain" paints the wrong picture. It's similar to saying "When I'm dead..." There is NO "I" when death is present. Likewise, there is no "pain" without someone experiencing a painful feeling.

I'd also add that there is no "desire" without someone desiring something.

As to "Is All Desire Painful?"... What happens if we expand it: "Is every desire accompanied by painful feelings?" since as I said, there is no standalone "pain" without a person feeling painful feelings.

If we look at some expanded synonyms or definitions that encompass the connotations of desire (epithymia; verb epithymeo) "set one's heart upon a thing, long for, covet, desire" there is definitely a perceived lack of something that someone wants to acquire. However, there is also the idea of aspiring to something, wanting to achieve something. In that case, is it a pleasant feeling to feel you are working toward a positive goal??

I don't know if my ramblings help the discussion, but this is an interesting question. I can see how the split happened in the discussion!

Note: I started to write up a separate thread, but then noticed Cassius created this one. So I'm just copying over what I wrote there.

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In light of a recent thread on the categories of desire, and another recent conversation on the topic of this thread, I wanted to add some clarity to why I answer the title question affirmatively; yes, I am provisionally of the opinion that desire is a kind of pain. As I said in a recent conversation, this is a consistent opinion, though not a strong one. I really am quite uncertain about this.

Desire is a conscious or unconscious feeling in the mind of wanting something; a preference to have where I have not, or to have not where I have.¹ Because a.) desire is a feeling, and because b.) "the feelings are two, pleasure and pain", desire is either;

1. Always pleasureable
2. Sometimes pleasureable and sometimes painful, or
3. Always painful.

The first proposition strikes me as facially absurd, but if some one wishes to defend it I'll hear them out. The main theater of dispute is between the second and third propositions. Before I begin, I'll note something that will quickly become obvious - that this argument, which is ultimately about feelings, pathe, is also an argument about words and definition, and about how language is used and how it should be used.

Take, for example, the phrasing of the thread title; Is Desire a Kind of Pain? I argue that it is. But it could be said that in defending that precise construction I am using language in a way that is self-serving. This can be seen in my response to the following deductive argument:

• P1. There is nothing other than pain that is always painful, and there is nothing other than pleasure that is always pleasureable.
• P2. Desire is by definition something other than pain, and also something other than pleasure.
• C. Desire, then, is neither always painful, nor always pleasureable.

And now my response, in which I categorize desire differently:

• P1. The feeling of pain is always painful.
• P2. The feeling of pain is differentiable. Just as we speak of mental pain vs bodily pain, it is possible to speak with even greater precision of the kinds of mental pain, and the kinds of bodily pain.
• P3. Each kind of pain is always painful when it is present.
• P4. Desire is a kind of mental pain.
• C. Desire is always painful when it is present.

You see the importance of language. Now, here are my immediate responses to some other objections:

• Isn't my desire for the continuation of something good that I already have pleasureable?

No. The current enjoyment is pleasureable, and the feeling of security that comes with certainty of (if that were possible), or confidence in, future enjoyment is also pleasureable. Future pleasures are not pleasant until you feel them. Future pains are not painful until you feel them. Let's explore this further with the next objection:

• If it's Christmas Eve and presents are expected Christmas morning, isn't it pleasureable to anticipate those presents?

Perhaps, but anticipating is not the same as desiring. I can anticipate a slap to the face without ever desiring one. It is possible to experience both feelings at once, or, if not, then in quick succession. But the desire, when and if it is felt, is felt as a kind of pain.

Note that I have said nothing about the intensity of that pain. It may be the slightest prick, or it might be much greater.

If one does experience the desire for their Christmas presents on Christmas Eve, the desire is felt in that moment.

I'll stop there for now. Again, I don't feel nearly as strongly about this as I might seem to let on, and I think I could be easily persuaded to a different opinion. Epicurus himself refers to "desires that are not accompanied by pain when they go unfulfilled" in the Principle Doctrines. If he's right, I'm probably wrong.

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¹ I suppose I'm drawing a distinction between desires, which are mental, and fundamental biological urges, which are physical, and which even insects respond to. Do tapeworms have desires? I would think not...