The word "eudaimonia" according to Epicurus

τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου the whole/entirety of life

μακαριότητα makariotēta "most, highest blessedness" - the superlative of the same word used in PD1 to describe the gods

A question that I have regarding eudaimonia goes back to the thorny issue of active and static pleasures.

If I understand correctly, Aristotle conceived of eudaimonia as requiring activity. (Compare this to *practicing* wisdom...) My question is: was Epicurus agreeing with this idea, or did he conceive of eudaimonia differently? Perhaps eudaimonia requires action, but blessedness doesn't? My depth of knowledge in this regard is lacking, so I'm just posing the question

Quote from Kalosyni

It seems that eudaimonia isn't just a fleeting emotion of giddiness that arises when you get something that you want, but instead it is an expansive sense of fulfillment and completeness.

Yes, you must be correct. I think "well-being" has most of the same sense -- it is our deeply internal and long-enduring sense of well-being. Of course, we can easily see how well-being is closely connected with the pleasure of being alive.

Quote from Godfrey

Aristotle conceived of eudaimonia as requiring activity.

Yes Aristotle digs a deep hole for himself when he insists that "Pleasure does not occur except in action!" Eudḗmeian Ethics, 8.1249a: οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει). I cannot imagine reality (or Epicurus) agreeing with Aristotle on this point!

Quote from Godfrey

Perhaps eudaimonia requires action, but blessedness doesn't?

It seems that being alive requires having sensations of actions as well as sensations of condition.

I don't know that it is clear to me that there is a bright line between being aware of one's actions and being aware of one's condition, because I am not sure what "action" really means here. Our atoms are always in motion and the internals of our bodies are always in motion - is action the same as motion? Then as long as we are alive then we are in motion of one kind or another.

But what does seem clear is that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and that whatever you are aware of, whether it is an action or a condition or any number of other terms, that awareness is either painful or pleasurable. That means that if you are alive, unless you are specifically perceiving a pain, what you are perceiving is pleasure.

By seeing things that way you can always count on, if you are wise, experiencing more pleasure than pain.

But what *specific* pleasures you choose to experience, in all of the many ways they can be divided between parts of the body affected, intensity, and duration, as referenced in PD09, are going to be matters that you have to decide according to your context and your own evaluations.

There's no trophy waiting at the end of the road for anyone, no matter which choices they make on which pleasures to pursue. You can live low to the ground and eke out a life of 100 years on bread and water, or you can live 50 years mountainclimbing. No trophy either way, and I don't think Epicurus is telling us that the 100 years living low is better than the 50 years living high. In fact, he specifically says not to look at life solely in terms of time:

Letter to Menoeceus 126: "And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant."

In that context it seems to me that "most pleasant" is specifically intended to reinforce that we aren't gods who have unlimited time to do whatever we want, but human beings who have to make choices and go after what is most pleasant for us as best we can.