Let them three parts of wine all duly season
With nine of water, who'd preserve their reason;
...
Quote from Fragment from the Greek Playwright Euboulos
"For sensible men...
I find it interesting that "preserve their reason" and "sensible men" translates τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι (tois eu phronousi) which is related to phronesis "practical wisdom." Something like "those who exercise their wisdom well."
I guess I'm just saying that I'm willing to consider going a lot further into traditional hedonism than a lot of people might find comfortable.
I agree with Don's comments agreeing with your direction here, and I think your direction is compelled by the philosophy even though it is the place a lot of division occurs and a lot of people eventually drop away. In fact I would say that people who never reach this point of understanding about Epicurus have never really understood the atomist foundations of Epicurean philosophy. They are still stuck in some variation of idealism of which they can't let go.
It's tricky to describe and yet not sound like a "monster," but it seems to me that Epicurus was saying that the universe simply doesn't care about our moralities. We're given pleasure and pain to do with what we will, and while most people are constituted similarly and do generally tend toward the same conclusions about how best to implement those choices, no matter how strongly we feel that "our way" is the best, the moral evaluation can never be more than "our perspective." That's not to say that we shouldn't consider our perspective critically important. I think Epicurus was allowing that we should engage with the world even in politics to the extent it is necessary and leads to a more pleasant life under our own circumstances. I too think that each of us should work as hard as we can to bring the kind of world we would like to live in to reality, at least in our own personal context. But given the atomist nature of the universe, we always have to remember that our perspective remains our own, and now matter how much emotional investment we place in it, that emotional investment never transmutes into the blessing of supernatural gods, ideal forms, or any other kind of unchanging absolute standard of morality.
That chills some people and drives them away, but "it is what it is" if you follow Epicurean philosophy to its logical conclusions. Fudging on this point is what I think leads to disillusionment and disappointment, and I think we are better off biting the bullet and following the philosophy to its logical end point.
It's tricky to describe and yet not sound like a "monster," but it seems to me that Epicurus was saying that the universe simply doesn't care about our moralities.
Thoughts...
One doesn't sound like a "monster" saying the universe doesn't care - about us, our moralities, our culture, our world. That's a simple fact. Fully onboard with that idea.
However...
One starts to sound like that "monster" if it's implied or inferred or understood that Epicureans see "no problem" when people harm or kill others for pleasure. I continue to hold that the philosophy does not do that. I've had this conversation on this forum before, so apologies for anyone who was around for that. But after that basic premise, it gets complicated. After that, it's all contextual. And, I think, I'm able to now get my head around some nuances to that idea. "Torquatus" provides some tough contexts to consider. But this thread has really made me think about the foundational place that context and intention play in sizing up any "ethical" discussion in Epicurean philosophy. It seems to me that one can't really talk about "right" and "wrong" but rather, for example, "just" and "unjust." But there's no judge on high or stone-carved rulebook. A "commandment" like Thou shall not kill is somewhat useless and almost universally ignored. I'm intentionally using that as it's one of the most provocative.
Should you kill to protect your life?
Should you kill to protect your family?
Should you kill to protect your friends?
Should you kill to protect a stranger?
Should you kill to protect your car?
Should you kill to *prevent* harm to your life or your loved ones?
Should you hire someone to kill for you to prevent harm to yourself?
Should you kill animals to eat?
Should you kill rats in your house?
Should you kill bacteria that make you sick?
Should you kill animals in experiments?
Should you kill people like the TV character Dexter does because they've done "bad" things?
I'm hoping the list made you more uneasy as you went down.
To be clear, none of these scenarios matter one way or the other at all to "the universe."
However, we live in a human society with social contracts that provide context for these scenarios. There are just and unjust actions. There are choices and rejections to make. There are wise and unwise choices. *Almost* every one of those scenarios could have multiple contingencies, contexts within which some choices would be prudent and other choices that would not be prudent. Not having a rulebook is hard but it can also be seen as freeing. Because of this, I see Epicurean philosophy as a very grown up, adult way of living. There are exemplars like Epicurus, but ultimately it's up to each individual to make prudent decisions that lead to a healthy body, a tranquil mind, friends that can be relied on, enough community goodwill to be safe, and extravagant pleasures that provide for a pleasurable life.
I'll relinquish the soapbox for now.
But Cassius, surely it's more than simply my 'perspective' that Stoicism sucks! 
Isn't Stoicism, like, transcendentally bad?!
I admit that your Epicurus does sound uncommonly sceptical to me. At least on their surface, KD 36-8 suggests that there's a 'basic grasp' of justice that sets the standard. I find those justice doctrines inscrutable, but it seems that he thinks there's some objectivity at stake and that some laws and contracts are actually better than others.
At least on their surface, KD 36-8 suggests that there's a 'basic grasp' of justice that sets the standard
I agree. That "standard" seems to me to be P31
"Natural justice is a covenant for mutual benefit, to not harm one another or be harmed."
I've also begun to understand the prolepsis of justice to be connected in some way to the inborn sense of fairness seen in research with babies and toddlers.
Ex:
Infants as young as 12 months expect resources to be divided equally between two characters in a scene. By preschool, children will protest getting less than peers, even paying to prevent the peer from getting more. As children get older, they are willing to punish those who have been unfair both when they are the victims of unfairness as well as when they witness someone else being treated unfairly.
A nascent sensitivity to fairness can be traced back to infancy. At 15 months of age, infants look longer at unfair distribution outcomes (i.e., a 3:1 distribution) compared to fair outcomes (i.e., a 2:2 distribution; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). This looking time preference suggests that infants expect resources to be distributed equally among recipients and they are able to identify a violation of this norm of equality.
A new study presents the first evidence that a basic sense of fairness and altruism appears in infancy. Babies as young as 15 months perceived the difference between equal and unequal distribution of food, and their awareness of equal rations was linked to their willingness to share a toy.
Isn't Stoicism, like, transcendentally bad?!
I admit when you put it that way it's hard to disagree!! 
I find those justice doctrines inscrutable, but it seems that he thinks there's some objectivity at stake and that some laws and contracts are actually better than others.
"Inscrutable" is a good word for me too, but there must be a way to decode it. He spends so much time stressing how things that were previously just become unjust when circumstances change that the whole presentation seems to be weighted more toward establishing the limitations of the abstract concept of justice rather than specific examples of justice in the real world.
And maybe that presentation choice makes sense given how much attachment we have to the idea of thinking that there is an absolute justice, and therefore the need to shake us out of our complacency. I suppose it is important too to point out that since neither gods nor ideal forms create permanent and absolute justice, even we humans, in forming our agreements with each other not to harm or be harmed, don't in so doing create anything that has permanency or absoluteness to it.
But regardless of whether "justice" is involved, i think the faculty of pleasure and pain gives us much of what we want in this department. Just like "normal" people like ice cream, "normal" people find the things most people consider to be benevolent to be pleasing, and most people find things that we ordinarily consider to be malevolent to be painful. And our liking for ice cream and dislike for things that taste nasty is to a significant degree hard wired into us.
The phrasing I like to quote on that issue comes from a 1779 book I found some years ago from Jackson Barwis written against John Locke's version of blank slate theory:
When we are told that benevolence is pleasing; that malevolence is painful; we are not convinced of these truths by reasoning, nor by forming them into propositions: but by an appeal to the innate internal affections of our souls: and if on such an appeal, we could not feel within the sentiment of benevolence, and the peculiar pleasure attending it; and that of malevolence and its concomitant pain, not all the reasoning in the world could ever make us sensible of them, or enable us to understand their nature.
He spends so much time stressing how things that were previously just become unjust when circumstances change that the whole presentation seems to be weighted more toward establishing the limitations of the abstract concept of justice rather than specific examples of justice in the real world.
I agree.
I also find it interesting that PD39 follows immediately after the PDs talking about justice.
I see PD39 as relating to the idea of justice as much as (or more so than) friendship. Based on the awkwardness of the translations, I doubt Epicurus even used the word for friendship there. Was he instead referring to the establishment and content of the agreements that constitute justice?
Implied in PD39 is the insight that cooperation is far more productive of pleasure than conflict or isolation.
If our ethic is to pursue pleasure, and cooperation with others (to the extent possible) is the best way of doing that, then I think that provides a basis for saying more specific things about justice and which kinds of behavior are going to get us the most pleasure in the long run.
But Cassius, surely it's more than simply my 'perspective' that Stoicism sucks!
Yes! It is so refreshing to read that.
There *are* healthier ways of living than others, ways *more aligned* with "the way things are" than others.
I see PD39 as relating to the idea of justice as much as (or more so than) friendship. Based on the awkwardness of the translations, I doubt Epicurus even used the word for friendship there.
Yeah, I'm like a moth to a flame 
You are correct. Epicurus did not use any word that specifically refers to "friendship" like philia φιλιά anywhere in that PD. The Saint-Andre translation is one of the more literal ones I've seen:
The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away anything that is not advantageous.
Ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκευάσατο· τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά γε· ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμικτος ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐξηρέσατο ὅσα τούτων λυσιτελῆ πράττειν.
For ones like this, I always encourage people to check out Eikadistes 's compilation of translations of the PDs in the File library here at EoicureanFriends.
PS: I wonder, as I read those translations compiled by Eikadistes , if those "external threats" refer in some way to the "external threats" to our inner tranquility. That confidence referred to in PD39 reminds me of Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Philodemus talking about the assurance we can have about pleasure arising from internal sources against the less confidence we can have about pleasure from sources outside ourselves. I may be stating the obvious, but it literally just hit me as I was reading through Eikadistes 's doc.
Cassius, I suspect we agree about more than we disagree about. We agree that justice does not ‘exist’ in a Platonic sense and that it can vary by circumstance. We also agree that you simply can't get everyone to acknowledge or conform to a reasonable contract that involves, for example, not murdering your fellow citizens.
I think we might disagree about whether Epicurus thinks there’s a fact of the matter about whether particular political arrangements are just or unjust. I think there’s a core to justice that Epicurus takes to be objective, and he would not mind if most people disagreed because he often thinks most people are confused about what follows from basic grasps (see most people’s ideas about piety). I think he would be fine saying, ‘they think that’s just, but they’re mistaken.’
That said, I have a feeling that he thinks the objective elements of justice are pretty thin (exhausted perhaps by securing ‘confidence’ from your neighbors) and that many of the political matters that tie people in knots are of little interest to Epicurus because he thinks you shouldn’t get emotionally invested in things that are not necessary for fundamental security. So he might very well say, ‘They think that’s a question of justice, but they’re mistaken.’ But again, we have so little textual evidence.
Quote from ToddI see PD39 as relating to the idea of justice as much as (or more so than) friendship. Based on the awkwardness of the translations, I doubt Epicurus even used the word for friendship there
I agree, though I admit that PD 39 gives me nightmares. Translating Epicurus is like eating burnt toast for every meal. FWIW, I think 40 also ties together justice and friendship.
Some thoughts on PD39...since it has come up in this thread...and apparently I am incorrectly interpreting the meaning of this PD.
"The man who has best ordered the element of disquiet arising from external circumstances has made those things that he could akin to himself, and the rest at least not alien; but with all to which he could not do even this, he has refrained from mixing, and has expelled from his life all which it was of advantage to treat thus." PD39 (Bailey)
"The person who has put together the best means for confidence about external threats is one who has become familiar with what is possible and at least not unfamiliar with what is not possible, but who has not mixed with things where even this could not be managed and who has driven away anything that is not advantageous." PD39 (St. Andre)
This is one in which it would be good to be able to directly translate from the original. Here is how I interpret this PD regarding "external circumstances".There is a chance that an astroid will hit earth and cause an apocalypse. Also, a coronal mass ejection (CME) could wipe out all electrical systems, satellites, and the internet.
So I see this PD as dealing with threats and how you make peace with these threats -- the understanding of those threats -- what is true and what is not true about those threats. About a year and a half ago, my mom was telling me that an astroid was soon going to hit the earth. Her Christian friend had given her "reliable" information about the Apophis astroid, and that scientists had made an error in their calculations -- that the astroid was going to definitely hit earth. But instead of taking any "bait" on this, I calmly replied: "Oh that's interesting", and proceeded to do research about an nearby astroids. After my research, I was sufficently reassured regarding the unlikelihood of an astroid collision. (Also knowing that there is a still a future chance of impact by an astroid, but not for a long time to come).
Regarding coronal mass ejections, I also researched this, but what I learned was not encouraging -- there is a high likelihood of this causing problems if/when it occurs, and at what level of intensity. So this is one in which we should be ready to recognize the signs of this and realize how it will affect all of us -- and make peace with it. Enjoy life now, prudently, knowing that the continuance of life has uncertainties.
So I see this as expelling mis-information and understanding the natural world.
Here are some of the key Greek words from PD39, and their meanings. (Thanks to Nate for that awesome compilation & glossary!)
ALLOPHYLA - AΛΛAΦYΛA - ἀλλόφυλά - /aːlː'o.pʰyːlaː/ - plural declension of ἀλλόφυλος (allóphulos) from ἄλλος (állos, “different”) + φῦλον (phúlon, “type”) meaning “different group”, “race”, “stock”, “kin”, “sex”, “religion”, “tribe”, “country”, “ethnicity”, “foreign”
HOMOPHYLA - OMOΦYΛA - ὁμόφυλα - /ho.'mo.pʰyːla/ - a plural infection of ομόφυλος (omóphulos) from ὁμός (homós, “same”) + φῦλον (phúlon) meaning “same race”, “stock”, “kin”, “sex”, “religion”, “tribe”, “country”, “ethnicity”.
SYSTESAMENOS - ΣYΣTHΣAMENOΣ - συστησάμενος - /syːstεː'sa.me.nos/ - related to the word συνίστημι (synístemi, “to combine”) meaning “make friends”, “unite together”,“treat akin to oneself”, “prepared a family”, “forged a community [of all the creatures]”.
The rest of the words seem relatively generic, but those three clearly refer to people. Or in the case of the last one, it seems like it would usually refer to people, and given the presence of the other 2 words, that seems like the clear intent.
It seems presumptuous of many of the translators to disregard the "people" connotations of these terms and just refer to "things".
Again, many thanks to Nate for that wonderful resource!
Also, this...seems important:
Good call, Todd , in returning to the source. Kicking myself for relying on translations
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φῦλον
You are correct in seeing those as referring to humans of the (homophylos) same tribe etc and (allophylos) other tribes.
This probably circles back to those with whom you can make social agreements and those you can't.
Thanks!
So this is one in which we should be ready to recognize the signs of this and realize how it will affect all of us -- and make peace with it.
"And make peace with it...". Or first and preferably, to the extent possible, prepare to harden our systems to minimize as best as possible the effect of it. Or, where that is not possible, prepare a spaceship to allow as many as possible to escape the impact. Only when I am facing absolutely certain early destruction (which does happen in many cases) or circumstances such as preventing death of a friend as Epicurus describes) would I make peace with early destruction that might possibly be avoided.
Now I will return to watching my copy of "When Worlds Collide." Excellent movie.
The weirdest part of the commentary that Don kindly posted (and there's a wealth of weirdness) is the claim about 39: 'all through, the neuter really implies persons.' In other words, the fact that Epicurus uses neuter plural means he could be talking about people or things. But in this case I agree, so at some point my efforts yielded the following very literal rendering, which I certainly won't fight for to the death:
"The one who best contrived against a lack of confidence about external threats made those he was able kin, while those he was unable, he did not make aliens. Those with whom he was not able to do even this, he avoided and banished so far as it was advantageous to do so."
The 'with whom' gives away my decision to go with 'persons,' but basically, you would have reason to translate it either way. That said, the opening construction is loosely the same in KD 40, and it does seem pretty clear there he's talking about people. So who knows, really?
The truth is that Epicurus tends to just sort of make up grammar and new uses for prepositions, and people are always like, 'why in the world is this genitive' or 'to which of three possible antecedents does this use of 'these' refer.' I love Epicurus, but I stand by my verdict that translating him is like a steady diet of burnt toast.
"The one who best contrived against a lack of confidence about external threats made those he was able kin, while those he was unable, he did not make aliens. Those with whom he was not able to do even this, he avoided and banished so far as it was advantageous to do so."
...The 'with whom' gives away my decision to go with 'persons,' but basically, you would have reason to translate it either way. That said, the opening construction is loosely the same in KD 40, and it does seem pretty clear there he's talking about people.
Your mention of 40 reinforces my conviction that there really aren't "40 principal doctrines." That appears to me to have been imposed much later because the manuscripts do not appear to have been delineated like that. The Kyriai Doxai looks to me as is it was originally a prose work similar to the letters which means there wouldn't have been "hard and fast" demarcations between "doctrines" but rather paragraphs on different topics. Reading them individually as if in isolation has seemed the wrong approach - to me, at least - for awhile now.
PS...
a steady diet of burnt toast
LOL! I must like burnt toast because I get a kick out of it. That said, I hear you!
The 'with whom' gives away my decision to go with 'persons,' but basically, you would have reason to translate it either way. That said, the opening construction is loosely the same in KD 40, and it does seem pretty clear there he's talking about people. So who knows, really?
For me, your mention of the opening construction of PD40 reinforces my opinion that PD39 & 40 on are really a continuation of the justice discussion, and social relations more broadly: not all "things", but also not really friendship either.
PD39 & 40 both start off with a reference to security from threats. I suspect those refer to threats from other people, which is precisely the aim of justice, but there is no need to assume that. I'm happy to concede that Epicurus is talking about any type of threat to our enjoyment of pleasure. However, it does suggest that these two PDs are closely related.
PD39 is about social relations. I am assuming that most of PD39 is talking about people.
1) "Homophyla" and "Allophyla" have too many "people" connotations to ignore without a good reason
2) It just makes a lot more sense of the rest of the PD, in my opinion
3) Several translators seem to agree, though not all
If you accept that PD39 is talking about people, then there are strong suggestions of references to justice.
Epicurus says we should try to treat as many people as possible like kin. "Like kin" implies more than mere justice. It would include justice, of course, but goes beyond. I'd call it something like active cooperation. The "as many people as possible" part of that doesn't sound like friendship to me though, because we are advised to extend it to as many people as possible. Our friends would be a subset of these relationships.
There are some people with whom we can't productively cooperate. But we also prefer not to make enemies of them. I would say these are the people we deal with by simply agreeing not to harm each other. Justice, and nothing more.
And then there are the people who won't even agree not to harm us. Or they do agree, but then harm us anyway. Epicurus says we should avoid them. Good advice, whether or not that is what Epicurus meant. And the fact that it is good advice is yet another point in favor of this interpretation.
Finally, PD40 describes the benefits of following the above procedure: the ability to live pleasantly with friends.
An important point about my interpretation of PD40 is that the friends with whom you live pleasantly are (probably) not the same people from whom you had to secure protection!
Some translations of PD40 make it sound like you obtain confidence and security by being friends with everyone around you. That might work if it was possible, but few of us are in a position to carefully curate our neighbors, classmates, co-workers, etc. Epicurean philosophy is supposed to work for everyone, not just an elite few.
My view of PD40 is more like, "Being confidently secure from your neighbors (those around you), now live pleasantly with your friends."
Epicurus never uses philia in PD39 or 40, only above in PD27 & 28. That was the "section" on friendship, IMO.
