Perspectives On "Proving" That Pleasure is "The Good"

Also, I had a "DUH" moment this morning about something that needs to be included in this thread.

Torquatus does not gve us *only* the "use your eyes and look at the young of all species before they are corrupted" argument.

He also gives us:

(2) A thought experiment (or perhaps an appeal to anticipations, or "conceivability"?) that is probably analogous to the use of the Javelin argument as to the size of the universe:

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XII. The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection, and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement.

Suppose on the other hand a person crushed beneath the heaviest load of mental and of bodily anguish to which humanity is liable. Grant him no hope of ultimate relief in view also give him no pleasure either present or in prospect. Can one describe or imagine a more pitiable state? If then a life full of pain is the thing most to be avoided, it follows that to live in pain is the highest evil; and this position implies that a life of pleasure is the ultimate good. In fact the mind possesses nothing in itself upon which it can rest as final. Every fear, every sorrow can be traced back to pain; there is no other thing besides pain which is of its own nature capable of causing either anxiety or distress. Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.

And (3) - a more practical "Why do we do anything that we do?" argument:

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XIII. Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science, but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure.

I therefore wonder to what extent Torquatus is indeed giving us an example of each of the perspectives he mentions in the opening. And I also wonder to what extent Torquatus represents the "After 300 years of combatting Stoicism we've learned that you better understand the logic side of the argument or you'll get steamrolled" segment of the school, vs the extent to which Lucretius represents the more traditional "here's what you need to know and to hell with the other schools for now" perspective.

If that explains the difference between the two manners of presentation, there is no good reason to "fault" either one, and we need to be fluent in both so that they are both available to use for talking to different people in different circumstances.

And from that perspective Torquatus is not to be criticized entirely for playing the other side's game, but he's dealing with the reality that some people have been "corrupted" by opposing philosophies more than others, and they have to be walked back as it were from the precipice in steps. Others, on the other hand, who are not so far down the road of corruption through skepticism or idealism or supernatural religion can be approach more directly with the "this is the way things work" approach.

Quote from Godfrey

Pleasure is good. It's a good. It's The Good. It feels good. It's everything described in the previous 138 posts.

LOL! Well, when you put it like that...!

Epicurean bumper sticker anyone?

Quote from Godfrey

Todd you have mentioned repeatedly that in this thread you are only discussing ethics. I think that that's a mistake, because there's no Epicurean ethics without the physics.

I see Godfrey 's point. I would add that isolating the philosophy from its historical context isn't possible either. Not that this is necessarily being done in this thread! Just something to keep in mind. Epicurus was reacting to the philosophical and cultural environment in which he found himself. His philosophy is a direct attack/response to Cyrenaic, Platonic, and Aristotelian positions of his day. It would be up to Philodemus and later Epicureans to address Stoic ideas.

Quote from Godfrey

I think that we all agree that pleasure is the positive/attractive part of the faculty of Feelings. As such, a prudent understanding of one's feelings and desires is the core of Epicurean ethics.

I can agree with that.

Quote from Cassius

the Plutarch fragment:

“That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about, prating meaninglessly about the good.” Epicurus, as cited in Usener Fragment U423

Does that fragment mean "anything that produces pleasure should be considered good" and you should not obsess over other implications of the word 'good'"?

Come with me, this way, down another tunnel in the rabbit warren:

That Plutarch fragment is a little more complex than I first realized. That specific excerpt is a little misleading. Here's the link to Perseus:

Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, section 7

(Emphasis and notations added)

Quote from Epicurus as reported by Plutarch

Like unto this is that of Epicurus, where he saith: The very essence of good arises from the escaping of bad, *and* a man's recollecting, considering, and rejoicing within himself that this hath befallen him. For what occasions transcending joy (he saith) is some great impending evil escaped; and in this lies the very nature and essence of good, if a man attain unto it aright, and contain himself when he hath done, and not ramble and prate idly about it.

The archaic language is hard to parse. Bailey provides more context:

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That which creates Joy insuperable is the complete

removal of a great evil. And this is the nature of good, one can once grasp it rightly, and then hold by it, and not walk about babbling idly about the good.

Is Plutarch saying that Epicurus said don't talk about "the good" or don't talk about escaping the evil that brought you pleasure? Just experience the pleasure of escaping the evil and move on with your life? That's going to take some parsing in Plutarch's Greek.

Quote from Todd

After reading Torquatus (I will admit that I didn't get all the way through), I didn't get the impression that Cicero was cleverly misleading his readers. OTOH, maybe he was just very good at it!

You may not have seen this quote from a review written by Norman Dewitt:

Cicero's Presentation of Epicurean Ethics. New York, The Columbia University Press, 1938. Pp. 127. Columbia Diss.

This study is most commendable. It is clearly written and well printed, acutely reasoned and amply documented. The treatment confines itself to De Finibus I-II and is divided into two chapters: 1. Cicero's Presentation of Epicurean Philosophy in De Finibus I. 2. Cicero's Critique of Epicurean Philosophy, Presented in De Finibus I and II. Each chapter concludes with a summary, and the text of Epicurus himself is abundantly cited. The conclusion is that Cicero failed "to understand Epicureanism as a consistently unified philosophy (p. 81)," but is acquitted of having been "deliberately and intentionally unfair (p. 119)." It is only to this acquittal that I take exception. Every debater has the choice of arguing to reveal the truth in its entirety or of arguing to make points. The former method is adapted to the Supreme Court, the latter to a trial by jury. Cicero was a crafty old trial lawyer and he deliberately argued to make points, because he was pleading before a reading audience, which functions like a jury, and his shrewd legal mind had long discerned the vulnerability of Epicureanism before this style of attack. His attitude was that of William J. Bryan toward biological evolution, and his pleadings are comparable to a Scopes trial, but I do not believe he could have misrepresented the truth so successfully had he not understood it completely. In the Scopes trial, the crafty old lawyer was on the opposite side-Clarence Darrow.

NORMAN W. DEWITT. VICTORIA COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Quote from Todd

But this strikes me as a rather bland, (somewhat) non-controversial flavor of Epicureanism. I would like to be able to make stronger claims, and to do that, you have to be very clear on what words actually mean and how concepts relate. Again, this is possibly a personal failing of mine.

Certainly you're not the only one. And at least to some point, it surely isn't a failing. I do think there is a question however whether at some point the quest becomes counterproductive, and that's what Epicurus seems to have been warning against. I doubt that we've reached that point in this discussion, but it's good to keep in mind that at some point we might.

Sounds good.

Quote from Todd

I'll cut him some slack if he made a few mistakes, or occasionally said some things that were not consistent.

There's also the ongoing issue that so much of what Epicurus "said" is filtered through unreliable and hostile witnesses, ex., Cicero, Plutarch, et al.

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Quote from Godfrey 3. In light of 2, I think that we all agree that pleasure is the positive/attractive part of the faculty of Feelings. As such, a prudent understanding of one's feelings and desires is the core of Epicurean ethics.

Yes, of course.

However, saying things in such a general way that no one could possibly disagree and still call themselves an Epicurean is not interesting to me (possibly a personal failing).

I was mainly trying to clarify a point of agreement with that comment, bc I was losing track of where the discussion was going.

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Quote from Godfrey 4. Pleasure is good. It's a good. It's The Good. It feels good. It's everything described in the previous 138 posts.

for the clever way of putting that.

But this strikes me as a rather bland, (somewhat) non-controversial flavor of Epicureanism. I would like to be able to make stronger claims, and to do that, you have to be very clear on what words actually mean and how concepts relate. Again, this is possibly a personal failing of mine.

Definitely not a personal failing!

This comment 4 was a tongue-halfway-in-cheek way of saying, in conjunction with 3, that (at least for me) it's more productive to discuss "pleasure" than "good." I don't call this bland or non-controversial; consider

- there is no supernatural

- there is no life after death

- the basis of ethics is pleasure

- Plato and Aristotle were in many ways misguided and misleading

- the starting point of philosophy is the individual, not the polis

These five assertions have made opponents apoplectic for 2300 years! Just the idea that the basis of ethics is pleasure drives people crazy. But I wasn't trying to derail the discussion as much as clarify the parameters. Good discussion!

Todd That summary was very helpful to get us back on track and to clearly present your position. Thank you! I am taking pleasure in this discussion, and hope I've engaged in a respectful manner.

Of course, I have thoughts ...

Quote from Todd

1) There is no such thing as a good (or a bad) in nature. The concept of a good is a product of human reason. So first we need to define what a good is (or stop talking about them).

I would agree that humans are the ones to assign concepts to natural phenomena. That said, from the human perspective, there are good things and bad things in nature with respect to their effect on humans. And I'm consciously using "good thing" and "bad thing" not the platonic sounding "good" and "bad."

Quote from Todd

2) How would we define a good, using only the tools nature gave us? Pleasure and pain seem like the obvious tools for the job.

I found the LSJ definition of αγαθός instructive in that it used words like benefit to define the word. A "good thing" provides a benefit of service. That's why other schools can say virtue or reason are "good things." For Epicureans, a good thing is that which leads to pleasure. Likewise, a bad thing produces pain.

Quote from Todd

3) A good, then, is something that produces pleasure. Producing pleasure is not just a property that goods happen to have. It is the very standard by which we are able to say they are goods at all. It is the ONLY property of a good, as such. Everything that has this property is a good. Nothing that lacks this property is a good.

I *think* I agree with that. I'll admit I'm still parsing that paragraph. There's a lot going on in there.

Quote from Todd

4) So is pleasure a good? Does it produce pleasure? No, it IS pleasure. Therefore, it is not a good.

That's an interesting question. I still maintain that pleasure is that to which all goods point, or, to be more exact to my thinking, pleasure is the ultimate motivation underpinning all....

Hmmm. That's not right. Hmmm, I'm going to have to cogitate on this a little more.

It remains a fact that Epicurus used the word "good" and "the good." It behooves is to understand why.

Quote from Todd

Don suggested an idea earlier, that there is a category called Goods that includes pleasure and a sub-category called Instrumental Goods. (A Venn diagram would be handy here.)

Well, I have to share thoughts on that Now I'm not so sure on that, but as I said above, those are Epicurus's words (well, not instrumental. I'm going to have to dig a little more on this one).

It seems my action item is to define "good" if I want to stay the course on that topic. Stay tuned.

I don't have a lot of additional comment at the moment but I want to register that I largely agree with the direction that Todd is going. Loose talk about "the good" is a huge problem. People talk about "good" as if everyone knows and agrees with what they mean when clearly they do not. I recall a sentence in Frances Wright to the effect of Epicurus saying that there is no good but pleasure, no evil but pain, and although that forumulation might violate the construction that Todd is looking for (and i might remember the wording wrong), the thrust is probably the same point.

Quote from Todd

1) There is no such thing as a good (or a bad) in nature. The concept of a good is a product of human reason. So first we need to define what a good is (or stop talking about them).

2) How would we define a good, using only the tools nature gave us? Pleasure and pain seem like the obvious tools for the job.

I'd like to dig into this, thinking out loud (as it were). If I'm not mistaken, Epicurus defined pleasure as what is conducive to life and pain as what is not conducive to life. Offhand, I don’t recall if this is in his extant writing, or if I got it elsewhere. But this would apply to all life: single cells, plants, animals, babies, adult philosophy enthusiasts, etc. As pointed out in 2), this makes pleasure and pain obvious choices for defining good and bad.

What is conducive to life would be intuited by that life as good, not conducive as bad. I guess this is where the anticipation comes in. So pleasure = good, and pain = bad. Now what produces pleasure is also a good, and what produces pain is also a bad. By this way of thinking, "good" is pleasure and "a good" produces pleasure/good.

Quote from Todd

4) So is pleasure a good? Does it produce pleasure? No, it IS pleasure. Therefore, it is not a good.

So it seems to me that the word "good" has multiple meanings that are so intertwined as to resist this conclusion. It's a little bit like "read" in the phrase "read that book" v the phrase "they read that book." "Read" is both a command and a past tense verb, and also has different pronunciations. How would this apply to good/a good/the good? I'm not enough of a linguist to answer that, so I'll ask the question because I think this needs to be dealt with.

Quote from Godfrey

How would this apply to good/a good/the good? I'm not enough of a linguist to answer that, so I'll ask the question because I think this needs to be dealt with.

As i see it that is the problem we are going to keep coming back to because "good" has multiple meanings. And that leads to "the highest good" having multiple meanings as well, and there's simply no way to untangle this without qualifiers attached to the word "good" to define which meaning we are referring to. This is very similar to what DeWitt points out in regard to "true" in "all sensations are true," and it can also be used to justify the conclusion that life is the greatest good (at least in terms of "good" thought of as an 'asset').

Good as a noun, good as an adjective. etc etc etc.

Quote from Cassius

And that leads to "the highest good" having multiple meanings

See, I don't agree with that. The "highest good" or summum bonum or τέλος telos is "that to which all other good things points." You can paraphrase that as need be, but that's the definition as I see it in the texts.

Just came across this. Haven't had a chance to peruse, but here it is:

The Good in Ancient Philosophy | open.conted.ox.ac.uk (beta)

agathon ἀγαθόν good — often with a connotation with utility and advantage (for the agent), i.e. ‘good for’