Quote from Todd

If it seemed like I was making a distinction there, that was not my intent.

"lower-case goods" == "goods"

I was being too clever for my own good.

Okay, I'll go along with that. Maybe I was being pedantic.

That said, it sounds like we agree that there are "goods" (αγαθός) as a category.

Is our hangup then seeing "the good" (ταγαθον < το "the" + αγατθον "good") as being one of these "goods" but being special in that it is the only "good thing" that does not point to any other "good thing"?

Quote from Todd

1. goods (as referenced above) are things that produce pleasure. That is our definition of a good in this context.
2. We agree to stop referring to pleasure as a good. The Good, if you really must. Never a good. Please?

1. Within the context of Epicureanism, "goods" are instrumental to producing pleasure. Agreed. In other philosophies, the goods are ends in and out themselves. In Stoicism, virtue is "the highest good." That's what leads me to insisting that pleasure is not only "a good" but "the good" among "goods."

1a. I'm going to have to go back and see the specific words that Epicurus used when talking about prudence and pleasure and their being "goods."

2. See #1.

Quote from Todd

it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?

Yes, I think that's my position.

Quote from Todd

The Good, does not belong in the category of goods. It is different category.

From your perspective, what would that category be?

Bailey's Fragment 10 alludes to Epicurus having declared HΔONH ("pleasure") to be TAΓAΘON or “the good”.

The Tetrapharmakos also indicates that TAΓAΘON ("the good") is HΔONH ("pleasure").

Athanaeus seems to record Epicurus as identifying TAΓAΘON ("the good") with HΔONH ("pleasure") in Deipnosophists (U67). Diogenes Laërtius also documents this attestation in Lives of Eminent Philosophers.

Seneca records Epicurus as having written HIC SVMMVM BONVM VOLVPTAS EST, “here our highest good is pleasure” (Letters To Lucilius 21.10). Lucretius also employs the phrase BONVM SVMMVM in De Rerum Natura, Book VI.

In his Epistle to Menoikeus, Epicurus declares HΔONH ("pleasure") to be the ΠPOTON AΓAΘON the "first good". Interestingly, he later declares TO MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON ΦPONHΣIΣ, that "the greatest” or “highest good” is “prudence” (or “practical wisdom”). Epicurus also describes ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") as being the APXH, the "beginning" or "foundation". Incidentally, he also identifies HΔONH ("pleasure") as both the APXHN ("beginning") and TEΛOΣ ("end").

In KD7, Epicurus refers to AΣΦAΛEIAN (“security”) as a ΦΥΣEΩΣ AΓAΘΟΝ (“natural good”). Similarly, in KD6 (among a variety of translations), he describes any means by which to acquire ΘAPPEIN (“confidence” or “the assurance of safety”) from or between people as being a ΦΥΣΙΝ […] AΓAΘΟΝ (also translated as a “natural good”).

Philodemus contrasts the general ideas of TΩN AΓAΘΩN with TΩN KAKΩN or “the good” with “ill” (U38); of interest, later, Usener translates Philodemus’ phrase TON XPHΣTON (tón khrēstón) as “the good” (U180).

Lucretius implies pleasure is the "supreme good" bonum summum, too:

Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, BOOK VI, line 1

So he,

The master, then by his truth-speaking words,

Purged the breasts of men, and set the bounds

Of lust and terror, and exhibited

The supreme good whither we all endeavour,

And showed the path whereby we might arrive

Thereunto by a little cross-cut straight,

And what of ills in all affairs of mortals

Upsprang and flitted deviously about

(Whether by chance or force), since nature thus

Had destined; and from out what gates a man

Should sally to each combat.

...veridicis igitur purgavit pectora dictis

et finem statuit cuppedinis atque timoris

exposuitque bonum summum, quo tendimus omnes,

quid foret, atque viam monstravit, tramite parvo

qua possemus ad id recto contendere cursu,

quidve mali foret in rebus mortalibus passim,

quod fieret naturali varieque volaret

seu casu seu vi, quod sic natura parasset,

et quibus e portis occurri cuique deceret,

...

Quote from Nate

Epicurus also describes ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") as being the APXH, the "beginning" or "foundation". Incidentally, he also identifies HΔONH ("pleasure") as both the APXHN ("beginning") and TEΛOΣ ("end").

I've taken that as prudence is the foundation of all our choices and rejections. Pleasure is both the beginning and end, literally and figuratively, of our very existence.

I meant to conclude my last post with the following:

According to various ancient sources, Epicurus is recorded as having declared both [a] HΔONH ("pleasure") and also [b] ΦPONHΣIΣ ("prudence") to be both [1] MEΓIΣTON AΓAΘON (the "highest good") and also [2] APXH (the "beginning").

At this point, I think the various forms of AΓAΘON are being used casually, whereas TAΓAΘON is being used technically, according to the verbiage employed by other Eudaimonic philosophers of the Hellenistic age.

Only HΔONH ("pleasure") is ever positively identified as TAΓAΘON ("The Good", the SVMMVM BONVM).

Though, I am not sure that this nuance was universally recognized, as Philodemus identifies "the good" as TΩN AΓAΘΩN on one occasion, TON XPHΣTON on one, and TAΓAΘON on another, so, even then, the technical usage seems irrelevant.

It's all good.

Quote from Nate

Though, I am not sure that this nuance was universally recognized, as Philodemus identifies "the good" as TΩN AΓAΘΩN on one occasion, TON XPHΣTON on one, and TAΓAΘON on another, so, even then, the technical usage seems irrelevant.

It's all good.

The difference between TΩN AΓAΘΩN and TAΓAΘON is necessary if one is using genitive vs accusative cases. The article wouldn't end in a vowel in the genitive case so it couldn't be elided with the following vowel.

Could you share the context of TON XPHΣTON? I'd be very curious. It really appears to be synonymous with ΑΓΑΘΟΝ

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χρηστός

Quote from Todd

Quote from Don

Quote from Todd

it just has the special property of not referring to any other good?

Yes, I think that's my position.

This is a little surprising to me, because you seemed adamant earlier that prudence was the highest good most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing. (Sorry, it was Nate who said it was highest.)

But now I understand that you mean "[first?] in a category that also includes pleasure"! How do you reconcile these things?

Are you doing this in an effort to maintain the consistency of everything Epicurus ever said?

Prudence is the "most cardinal, chief, greatest good thing" in the instrumental goods category which includes everything except pleasure within the larger category of goods things.

Pleasure is "the" good thing that stands alone to which all the instrumental good things point.

As far as Epicurus's words, yes. If we can't reconcile the scant texts that we have, we're just picking and choosing cafeteria style. At least that's my goal.

Quote from Don

Quote from Nate

Though, I am not sure that this nuance was universally recognized, as Philodemus identifies "the good" as TΩN AΓAΘΩN on one occasion, TON XPHΣTON on one, and TAΓAΘON on another, so, even then, the technical usage seems irrelevant.

It's all good.

The difference between TΩN AΓAΘΩN and TAΓAΘON is necessary if one is using genitive vs accusative cases. The article wouldn't end in a vowel in the genitive case so it couldn't be elided with the following vowel.

Could you share the context of TON XPHΣTON? I'd be very curious. It really appears to be synonymous with ΑΓΑΘΟΝ

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=xrhsto/s

TON XPHΣTON is a reconstruction that comes from Usener 180 (transcribing Philodemus, Vol. Herc. 2, I.116): " ...of the difference relating to the good, for which reasons Epicurus proclaimed himself the supreme monarch, or at least considered himself residing principally with Athena, where they live [in envy?] of the philosophers."

Thanks!!

Oh, that is a lot of reconstruction. Some day, I'll try to track down a manuscript image.

Even so, I don't have a problem with ΤΟΝ ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ. It really does seem to be synonymous with TΟ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ. He are the two definitions side by side:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χρηστός

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀγα^θός

To excerpt some of the definitions:

ΑΓΑΘΟΝ good, serviceable; good, blessing, benefit

ΧΡΗΣΤΟΝ useful, good of its kind, serviceable; good for its purpose, effective; as Subst., benefits, kindnesses

Quote from Nate

In his Epistle to Menoikeus, Epicurus declares HΔONH ("pleasure") to be the ΠPOTON AΓAΘON the "first good". Interestingly

Here's my commentary from my translation on that phrase:

129a. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν,

ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον "fundamental/primary good"

Remember πρῶτον from way back in 123b! (Note: This refers to the place in the letter that many translators use "First, ..." I disagree with that ordinal number approach since he never uses a number elsewhere.) Since it's used there and here, I contend that, in neither place, is it meant to convey "first" as an ordinal number but rather "fundamental, primary"

...

129b.ii. καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες.

• "and against this (ἐπὶ ταύτην)
• κανόνι τῷ πάθει “by the standard of feeling (i.e., pleasure and pain, the pathe)”; “by the standard of the reaction (singular) we have of pleasure or pain”
  • ...
• κρίνοντες “judging, deciding + (accusative” πᾶν ἀγαθὸν “every good thing,” i.e., “every pleasure” against or by the κανόνι τῷ πάθει “the standard of how we react to what happens to us when we experience - or consider experiencing - that specific good thing.
• “And against this (that pleasure is a fundamental good and common to our nature), judging every good thing (i.e., every possible pleasurable experience) by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure.”

129c. Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον,

• σύμφυτον “born with, congenital, natural, inborn”, takes the place in this phrase of συγγενικὸν above (129a.)
• “And because this (pleasure) is the fundamental/primary and inborn good…”

129. Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing (πᾶν ἀγαθὸν) by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain.

I'm coming late to this discussion, but....

1. This seems like exactly the type of rabbit hole that Cicero cleverly led to in his discussion of Epicurus.

2. Todd you have mentioned repeatedly that in this thread you are only discussing ethics. I think that that's a mistake, because there's no Epicurean ethics without the physics. To me, separating the two is in this instance an error of dialectics, which can be useful for winning arguments but not terribly useful in gaining a complete understanding of a subject.

3. In light of 2, I think that we all agree that pleasure is the positive/attractive part of the faculty of Feelings. As such, a prudent understanding of one's feelings and desires is the core of Epicurean ethics.

4. Pleasure is good. It's a good. It's The Good. It feels good. It's everything described in the previous 138 posts.

5. From my perspective, there seem to be three things being discussed in this thread: a) parsing the concept "good," b) trying to gain a clear grasp of Epicurean philosophy, and c) coming to a way of presenting the philosophy to others. If I'm correct in this, it might be helpful to put a) into one thread and b) and c) into another thread. Combining them all, at least for me, is creating a lot of confusion. If new terminology is necessary, I think it would best derive from a discussion of the intent of the philosophy, from general to specific. Parsing the meaning of specific ancient words is important, but needs to be done in a very specific context. And, at least for me, the specificity of that context seems uncertain in this thread.

I "liked" Godfrey's post not to suggest that the discussion is counterproductive or should terminate, because surely there are lots of benefits to it, including the translation deep-dive. However I think he raises a point that should be considered, and another way of stating it is whether what we are currently engaged in violates the Plutarch fragment:

“That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about, prating meaninglessly about the good.” Epicurus, as cited in Usener Fragment U423

Does that fragment mean "anything that produces pleasure should be considered good" and you should not obsess over other implications of the word 'good'"?