Can Determinism Be Reconciled With Epicureanism?

    I am confused. I was listening to a French writer Michel Onfray, who is known for his Epicurean views. The first half was very much in-line with what I would expect. Then there are his views on determinism. I have added the link, unfortunately, in French, but the essence is:


    1. Your life has been impacted by many events driven partly by necessity (e.g. you were raised in the South, you taste for food would be a function of that) and partly by chance (people and events you encounter in your life limit your decisions). You choose very little. Even now, when you look back, few would have chosen exactly the life they had lived. So there is little free will. Onfray calls this determinism and accepts it as a reality.


    2. Religion (he spoke specifically of Christianity) on the other hand assumes you have free will and can choose between good and bad, and can be punished for a bad choice. This, in Onfray's view, is the free will and he rejects it.


    I am not very well versed in this, but isn't determinism rejected by Epicurus? How can Epicureanism and determinism co-exist in Onfray's mind?


    Link to the video

    Quote from waterholic

    isn't determinism rejected by Epicurus? How can Epicureanism and determinism co-exist in Onfray's mind?


    Link to the video

    You are correct that Epicurus rejected strict determinism. A primary point of contention Epicurus had with Democritean atomism was his determinism. If you have not come across it yet, I recommend reading Karl Marx's doctoral dissertation "The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature" which addresses this point:


    Full text of "Marx, Karl Doctoral Thesis The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature"


    (Marx gets a few things wrong, but it is an interesting and somewhat surprising read)


    Onfray positions himself in a long line of hedonists and materialists in general, but is not necessarily an Epicureanism in particular. However, based on your description, Onfray is not arguing for strict determinism, but rather, what we might call a compatibilist proposition, wherein determinism and indeterminism are not seen as being mutually exclusive.


    While I try to avoid placing Epicurus within the buckets on modern philosophical categories, compatibilism might be the appropriate bucket in which to place him. Onfray seems to agree with Epicurus that "some [events] [...] happen by necessity and some by chance, and some are within our control" (Letter to Menoikeus).


    Regarding "free will", we tend to look upon the concept with scorn, not because of the proposition of indeterminism, but because the concept of "free will" is a Christian form of (pseudo-)indeterminism that is contextualized within the domain of a Creator deity. The term "free will" is problematic for materialists, but not indeterminism, itself.

    Quote from Nate

    The term "free will" is problematic for materialists, but not indeterminism, itself.

    Thank you Nate, I am closer to understanding Onfray, though he extends the argument too far for my liking.


    I will definitely look into Marx's thesis; I am a bit familiar with his dialectical materialism and political economy, as well as Popper's extendee criticism of Marx, but I never knew about his Epicurean references.


    But with regards to free will, aside from the context of a deity (some external intelligence that "tests" us - an idea that has been an excuse to avoid any critical thought), what could materialism have against the concept of free will?

    Free will has the connotation of a supernatural soul. In materialism without hard determinism, "agency" is the preferred term to replace the term "free will" to get rid of that supernatural connotation. This leaves enough room for anything from the little "free will" of Onfray to a lot of "free will" and is flexible enough to not be refuted by future research results on how far agency actually goes unless those results prove hard determinism. A proof of hard determinism in the real world as perceived by us appears to be not conceivable as of now.

    Quote from waterholic

    But with regards to free will, aside from the context of a deity (some external intelligence that "tests" us - an idea that has been an excuse to avoid any critical thought), what could materialism have against the concept of free will

    If you reduce everything to atoms and motion in a straight line, people think that that would lead to a totally mechanistic result, and so a straight line materialist such as Democritus would conclude that everything is in the grip of an iron "fate" that allows no room for personal decisions whatsoever. Cicero made this argument against Epicurus in criticizing the swerve as a departure and regression from Democritus.

    Quote from Cassius

    If you reduce everything to atoms and motion in a straight line, people think that that would lead to a totally mechanistic result, and so a straight line materialist such as Democritus would conclude that everything is in the grip of an iron "fate" that allows no room for personal decisions whatsoever. Cicero made this argument against Epicurus in criticizing the swerve as a departure and regression from Democritus.

    Ok, so this is where the Epicurean "swerve" comes in to introduce some level of chance. Looking at this from the vantage point of the modern science, we know for a fact that the small-scale world operates on probability (quantum mechanics) and not linearly. Additionally, complex systems, Mandelbrot sets (fractals) all demonstrate how you can get from simple predictable small elements into extreme unpredictable complex whole. This suggests that absolute determinism cannot be defended. In this sense, I suppose "compatibilism" is probably the best description of the reality, though I somewhat dislike the notion of describing a certain feature of universe by accepting co-existence of two extreme and improbable ideas.



    Quote from Martin

    Free will has the connotation of a supernatural soul. In materialism without hard determinism, "agency" is the preferred term to replace the term "free will" to get rid of that supernatural connotation. This leaves enough room for anything from the little "free will" of Onfray to a lot of "free will" and is flexible enough to not be refuted by future research results on how far agency actually goes unless those results prove hard determinism. A proof of hard determinism in the real world as perceived by us appears to be not conceivable as of now.

    Thank you Martin, I now understand the connotation of a supernatural soul coming from "outside the system". I have been raised in a completely non-religious environment and developed scepticism later in life, so I did not develop a radar for theological red flags. I like the term agency!

    Quote from waterholic

    I have been raised in a completely non-religious environment

    Lucky you! :)

    So your upbringing would fall under the first or second category of Epicurus's "some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some by our own power."

    Quote from Don

    Lucky you! :)

    So your upbringing would fall under the first or second category of Epicurus's "some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some by our own power."

    Well I did get my fair share of a toxic mixture of cultural conservatism and marxist-stoicism. The net result is probably marginally better than a catholic school. It's funny how you can get even religion out of the people but not the instinctive hatred and mistrust of pleasure.

    Quote from Cassius

    If you reduce everything to atoms and motion in a straight line, people think that that would lead to a totally mechanistic result, and so a straight line materialist such as Democritus would conclude that everything is in the grip of an iron "fate" that allows no room for personal decisions whatsoever. Cicero made this argument against Epicurus in criticizing the swerve as a departure and regression from Democritus.

    I hope to add something to the discussion by bringing up the difference between determinism and fatalism.
    I don't think that Democritus' position imply that there's no room for personal decision, but I recognize that Epicurus could have understood so. Those who do think that we can't change our future whatever we do are the stoics. (They even talk frequently about Providence.)
    Democritus was a determinist, stoics were fatalist. What's the difference? A determinist thinks that every event, including our decisions, is determined by previous states of the universe (out of our control). Every thought, decision and action is determined by too many factors (a good example is in the book "Behave" by Robert Sapolsky), but we don't know all of them. However, determinists consider our agency as part of the causes in the world. Whatever we do has consequences in the world. So, there's room for personal decisions. The future is unknown for us, but we are part of the causes that determine it.
    (The practical implications, by the way, include the elimination of retrospective moral responsibility, that is: we're not responsible for what we've done, but we are for what we're going to do).
    Fatalist, on the other hand, think that the future is pre-established. Whatever we do, that future won't change. We can decide and act, but it doesn't matter. So, it's like not having personal decision at all.

    Now, by the wat, I've never understood how the swerve can give us freedom. How random and subtle movements of the atoms can make macro-organisms to have the power of decision and action? Maybe you've discussed this in another thread, but I don't find it :D
    I agree with Nate on how the quote from the Letter to Menoeceus suggests a compatibilist position of Epicurus. However, the postulation of the swerve as the source of our freedom would imply that Epicurus is a hard incompatibilist (that is, either the world is determinstic or we are free and responsible; and he takes the latter; so the world is indeterministic).
    As I said, it's confusing to me. ?(
    I know that we should not apply some modern labels to ancient philosophers, but I think in this case it's relevant. :D
    What do you think?

    You're right Onenski that I don't think we have had too many discussions in the past on this topic. I personally have not made myself an expert on the different theories that get packaged under the name "determinism" so (since it is late when I write this) I will see if others answer first before I reply further myself.


    I guess the key to unwinding this is going to be figuring out if this makes sense, which intuitively seems hard to follow:


    Quote from Onenski

    ? A determinist thinks that every event, including our decisions, is determined by previous states of the universe (out of our control). Every thought, decision and action is determined by too many factors (a good example is in the book "Behave" by Robert Sapolsky), but we don't know all of them. However, determinists consider our agency as part of the causes in the world. Whatever we do has consequences in the world. So, there's room for personal decisions. The future is unknown for us, but we are part of the causes that determine it

    Quote from Onenski

    Now, by the wat, I've never understood how the swerve can give us freedom. How random and subtle movements of the atoms can make macro-organisms to have the power of decision and action? Maybe you've discussed this in another thread, but I don't find it :D

    As Cassius said, this field is very confusing, but also very relevant and interesting not just for understanding the ancient thought but also for having an Epicurean approach to every day life.

    My understanding is that Epicurus introduced the concept of swerve to avoid adopting full determinism (or fatalism, to be honest I still don't follow the intricacy of the difference). A key part of the philosophy is absence of anything non-material in the body, including our thoughts, feelings and decisions. These are all driven by material non-divisible particles that are in motion. But since, the logic goes, their movements are geometric and predictable (no movement comes from "outside the system"), the consequence is that every decision one makes, every thought one has, every event that happens, is in theory pre-determined (imagine a super computer that calculates the position of every atom at every moment). This is why Epicurus introduced the "swerve" - a randomness in the system that is unpredictable.

    With the modern vantage point "the swerve" combined with the idea of the void are remarkable achievements of pure deductive reasoning. Although quantum mechanics does not exactly work as imagined by Epicurus, the introduction of chance/randomness is essential for understanding how the world works.

    Quote from waterholic

    (or fatalism, to be honest I still don't follow the intricacy of the difference)

    Yes that will be key in unwinding the question. I can imaging the possibility based on those words that "fatalism" embodies a supernatural force guiding things, while determinism simply means everything is mechanical, but I would not rush to embrace those terms without a standard point of reference identifying them as such.

  • Cassius

    Changed the title of the thread from “Is determinism Epicurean?” to “Can Determinism Be Reconciled With Epicureanism?”.

    I'm sorry if I made things more confusing by introducing the distinction determinism/fatalism. I just wanted to make some justice to Democritus' position. Specially because there are contemporary people who defend something similar, that "free will" (that's the term they use) is an illusion.

    Quote from waterholic

    This is why Epicurus introduced the "swerve" - a randomness in the system that is unpredictable.

    With the modern vantage point "the swerve" combined with the idea of the void are remarkable achievements of pure deductive reasoning. Although quantum mechanics does not exactly work as imagined by Epicurus, the introduction of chance/randomness is essential for understanding how the world works.

    I totally agree with you, Nate. However by introducing the swerve in the nature of the world Epicurus (or Lucretius) introduced a form of indeterminism. (The supercomputer that you mentioned could not predict a future state of the world.)

    So we arrive to what in philosophy is called the problem of luck: if the world is indeterministic (in the macro level), then we must be lucky if our actions have the outcomes we want they have. A subtle deviation may cause a very great deviation (like in chaos theory that you mentioned).

    In other words, if some random (even subtle) things happen, we have less control than we think we have.

    (I'm sorry if, again, I make thing more confusing. I just think this can contribute to our understanding of Epicurus' position in order to make it more plausible.)

    Onenski absolutely no reason to apologise, introducing this dinstinction only means we (I) have to read and discover more, which is one of the reasons we are here! Besides, not understanding is my natural state, it's nobody's fault :)

    Quote from Onenski

    In other words, if some random (even subtle) things happen, we have less control than we think we have.

    I am not very well versed in philosophy, so my take on this comes from everyday life observations. There is a range of different types of outcomes that populate the "control axis".


    (Let's call these Type A) There are outcomes we can control nearly 100%. In front of me there is a paper cup that I can smash. I control this outcome with a probability of nearly 100%, since barring a small (but not null) chance of me having a heart attack before I smash it, I can definitely do it.


    (Type B) Then there are outcomes that we can learn to control. Consider me with a basketball at the 3-point line. The probability of scoring is maybe 1 in 30. However, I know for a fact that if I dedicate my effort to it for a year or two, I will increase that probability to 20-30% (still a far cry from Stephen Curry, who hits 50% with the opposing team defending). The key here is that the controlled, repetitive environment of the game renders itself to learning and having an impact on the end outcome.


    (Type C) Finally, at the extreme end of the scale are events that no matter how hard I try I cannot control. Flip of a coin is a simple example, but more interesting examples are economic forecasts, the performance of mutual fund investments or political analysis. No matter how hard I try, there is no benefit from learning (monkeys throughing darts have the same or better results).


    These observations are very much aligned with my understanding of Epicurean/Lucretian position on chance. There are things that are outside our control indeed. Even in the paper cup case, some subtle things as you say may have an impact on the end result, but with very small probability. More complex situations will be impacted by endless permutations of events, which makes them hard to predict with any probability.


    The key aspect of (in)determinism, in my view, is that we have agency, meaning that it was not pre-determined that I would want to smash that cup. This still does not mean that absolutely everything is unpredictable.


    A final observation: somehow, we are much better at predicting the weather patterns (a complex system) and not so good at predicting social phenomena (wars, economic growth etc.) Is this because components of weather do not have agency?

    Quote from Onenski

    In other words, if some random (even subtle) things happen, we have less control than we think we have.

    What I have in mind here, perhaps is clearer if I put it like this. Determinism is the idea that every event in the universe has a causal explanation. Every event is explained appealing to past events that caused it. There is no event without cause.
    The idea of a swerve implies an event that is not caused (because is random). So, the world is indeterministic if we accept the swerve.
    I imagine something like: you're a chemist, but in an indeterministic world sometimes chemical reactions doesn't work (because some atoms or molecules deviate from the behaviour we think they're going to have). Wouldn´t that be strange? If chemical reactions sometimes doesn't work, then the same would happen to biochemical reaction. Life would have been hard even impossible.
    In other words, the swerve is an event without cause, and it's hard to see how it helps to explain that I can do what I do. In fact, makes the explanation of my behavior more difficult, because some events previous to my action doesn't have an explanation. They are more out of my control in virtue of their randomness.

    Quote from waterholic

    The key aspect of (in)determinism, in my view, is that we have agency, meaning that it was not pre-determined that I would want to smash that cup. This still does not mean that absolutely everything is unpredictable.

    Thanks for your answer, Nate. My understanding of determinism it's that even what you want is determined by previous events (what you've experienced, the culture where you live, the beliefs with which you've grown up, etc.). So the fact that you wanted to smash the cup was determined as well (I recommend one more time Sapolsky's book "Behave" for more on this).
    I fear that the use of the word "agency" in this paragraph and the next refers to a special kind of causation in the world. (Sorry if I misinterpet this part of your point of view.) If agency was special, we should wonder what make it so special?
    Perhaps you meant that agency is a kind of very complex causation, so that social phenomena it's harder to predict. I think a determinist could agree, because complexity is not indeterminism.

    Onenski I should have thought of this earlier but one of my favorite articles in all my Epicurean reading bears on what you are talking about.


    It's "Chance and Natural Law In Epicureanism" by A A Long.


    Look for it here: Long: "Chance and Natural Law In Epicureanism"


    The bottom line (one among many) is that Long suggests that while the swerve is potentially operational at all times, it only "breaks through" to cause observable action in our world in the realm of higher living things who actually exhibit free will.


    There's a reference in the letter to Herodotus how Epicurus held that indeed "most things" at least in the physical world are largely deterministic, but Long argues that we can have our cake and eat it too if we observe how Epicurus observed that the swerve was only very slight, meaning that only in rare cases (in the great scheme of things) is it observable in action, which still allows "natural law" to govern most things in our observable world.


    I think you will find the article on point and I would very much like to hear what you think about it.

    In response to #16:

    Anyone who has done chemical lab courses can probably confirm that some chemical reactions are difficult to reproduce, which may make passing a lab course in time difficult. Chemistry students make jokes about this, e.g., there is a reaction called Mannich reaction, named after Carl Mannich. Instead, you can interpret the name of the reaction as in the verbal German phrase "ma' nich'" (in written German "mal nicht" for "once not"), so it is the reaction which sometimes works and sometimes not.

    Joking aside, the reason for such difficulties is usually that the reaction is very sensitive to the experimental conditions. It is conceivable that this sensitivity is associated with amplification from an atomic level subjected to quantum indeterminacy to the macroscopic level in some cases, especially if we have a microscopic cell structure with complex connections and interplay between chemical reactions and charge transport at every connection.


    Now, let us take a simplistic model of the brain with domains for sensory input, memory, internal drives and a domain for random generation sensitive to quantum indeterminacy, all connected to a domain for reasoning, which in turn is connected to a domain for decision-making and a domain which controls actions. Especially the domains for memory and internal drives distinguishes an individual person from others.

    If the sensory inputs indicate a problem, the domain for reasoning tries to find a solution. The domain for memory may provide something which worked in the past, but the case may appear too different to mechanistically repeat a past action. The domain for random generation produces a series of random patterns, whereby almost all of them are useless nonsense but a few might represent solutions. The domain for reasoning discards the nonsense and picks a workable solution, possibly one which is based on experience modified by an idea from the domain for random generation.

    There is no proof that this model is adequate for decision-making of the human brain or that there are amplification mechanisms in the brain to get from quantum indeterminacy to a different output of a domain. However, the model does provide a conceivable explanation how quantum indeterminacy (i.e. the swerve) can lead to free will / agency of the individual in a world which is mostly deterministic at the macroscopic level.