Can Determinism Be Reconciled With Epicureanism? (Admin Edit - No, But Let's Talk About Why Not)

Onenski
Thanks for the comprehensive summary.
Our exchange was not about ideological but metaphysical opinions. Suitable metaphysical assumptions facilitate depth of understanding and avoidance of skepticism. Most of Epicurus' physics was actually metaphysics at that time. Advancement of science has enabled us to replace a lot of what was metaphysics with physics, whereby some of Epicurus' assumptions have been confirmed to be facts, some have been completely refuted, and some have been formally refuted but have noteworthy analogies in today's physics. It is good that we agree on the core of Epicurus' philosophy despite the differences in our metaphysical opinions. I expect that the discussed topics will come up again on occasion in other threads, so it is helpful to have clarified one difference among us.

Here is a gem I came across today from Epicurus on determinism:

P.Herc. 1056, Epicurus, On Nature 25.7.9 (Sedley trans.) “For this is a self-refuting kind of argument, and can never prove that everything is of the kind called ‘under compulsion.’ In fact, in disputing this very question he treats his opponent as if he were speaking nonsense by his own choice. And even if, as far as mere words go, he keeps on ad infinitum always saying that he is on the contrary doing it under compulsion, he is not reasoning it empirically, since he imputes to himself the responsibility for having reasoned correctly, and to his opponent the responsibility for having reasoned incorrectly.”