You would generally expect that images coming from real objects will be observed over time and in varying conditions and are thus repeatable, while images arising from random combinations would be unlikely to be repeated in substantially similar form
Hmm... I can repeatedly think about centaurs and unicorns in substantially similar forms.
I agree looking in the Lucretius sections may be helpful, but I'm not sure I agree (at first blush) on your repeatability criteria.
Hmm... I can repeatedly think about centaurs and unicorns in substantially similar forms.
You can choose to imagine them, but I think it ought to be pretty apparent (at least in most situations) whether you are perceiving something that is "out there" beyond you, or whether you have chosen to summon the image from memory or from a new construct. At least I don't think I have any trouble distinguishing from constructs of my imagination vs things that I am perceiving due to some otherwise passive confrontation with them.
I also want to say for now in this thread too that I have expedited the production of Lucretius Today Episode 117 because although we don't grapple with images very much in this episode, what we do grapple with I think is very closely relevant to what we are discussing here:
You can choose to imagine them, but I think it ought to be pretty apparent (at least in most situations) whether you are perceiving something that is "out there" beyond you, or whether you have chosen to summon the image from memory or from a new construct.
See, that's my sticking point here in reference to the gods. No one has ever seen a god and yet Epicurus says we have an image of them?
PS...
Has anyone tracked down the "the gods are giant-people-shaped and speak Greek" citation?
See, that's my sticking point here in reference to the gods. No one has ever seen a god and yet Epicurus says we have an image of them?
I would say there that we should not presume that what we are thinking of as "a god" is what Epicurus is thinking, so there's no certainty that what we are perceiving as images of the gods are actually what we are expecting. Maybe the perceptions of the gods even through images are just the "feelings" of blissfulness that we get when we contemplate them. As far as I can tell the majority (maybe all?) of the specifics like tall, shaped like men, speak Greek, and stuff like that -- those could all be later interpolations of later Epicureans rather than from Epicurus himself.
So that's what I am trying to drill down on -- we don't know that when Epicurus was referring to clear visions of the gods he was really talking about seeing beings who look like the statue of Zeus or Athena. Until we are absolutely sure that his "clear visions" constitute seeing human-shaped figures, I don't think we should presume that is what he means.
This is one of those areas where we don't have Lucretius giving direct testimony, and where I do think that we have to take the views of Epicureans 200+ years later as not necessarily of the same reliability of Epicurus himself.
So I really do see that as one of the areas where we have to be extremely careful. It is one thing to speculate that the gods look like humans, that they speak Greek, etc. But are those speculations really the "clear visions" that Epicurus was talking about? I don't think we should jump to that conclusion, and I think that (like you are implying) the fact that we today are not seeing such visions is a good indication that Epicurus didn't either.
But what we have is all so fragmentary -- I think that the issue of the speculations about the nature of the gods could well be just speculations, and that those speculations can co-exist compatibly with Epicurus having said that we have clear visions of them -- but that those clear visions are not of their shape or size or things like that, but of their "blissfulness" --- clear "feelings" or "reactions" to them but that fall short of "visions" like you and I and everyone else are expecting to see.
See, that's my sticking point here in reference to the gods. No one has ever seen a god and yet Epicurus says we have an image of them?
Especially we should focus on the part of your question where we use the word "image." It seems pretty clear that "images" are specifically NOT things that we "see." They are "data" that enter our brain through means other than from the eyes -- this is the issue of the mind being a direct receiver of information. Birds presumably don't "see" magnetic waves either, but they still are able to use and be effected by them (if that analogy holds).
That last part (underlined) sounds to me like the the images are coming from the temples and the images are coming from whatever is in the temples.
I found this line of thinking intriguing, maybe simply because its novel to me. But maybe that's one reason Epicurus was able to enthusiastically advocating taking part in the regular worship of the Greek gods. It was the statues of the gods, the images in the temple as well as seeing the statues themselves that gave the Epicurean access to an image in the mind of a literally larger-than-life, blessed, incorruptible being to which the Epicurean could aspire.
A little late to this thread, replying to Don's post number 47. Having just been to the Parthenon replica in Nashville just two days ago. I think that statues do have an effect on the human psyche. As a modern, I am completely innocent/lacking in belief of ancient Greek religion, but there is something that comes to life through statues (could this be why in Islam all images and also all reproductions of living things are banned?) So the creation of this statue brings Athena to life. It can't affect me the way it might affect someone who is culturally inculcated, so there is no sense of reverence. The sense of what this is goes beyond words and thoughts. Yet perhaps I am uniquely affected and others might not feel anything at all (it's a very subtle feeling anyway).
Thanks for those pictures! Just as a general comment that applies to several different posts, I do agree that some of the "images" being discussed are coming from the statues, but I don't think that includes all of the images, some of which I think they though came directly from the intermundia.
Another general comment is that "images" so firmly conveys "vision" and "seeing" to us that I wonder if it would not be better to use another word (idols or even spectres) to make clear that we are not talking about sights visible to the eye.
When we use the word "images" it is hard for us in casual communication to know for sure which of us are rigorously making that visible/ not visible distinction and which of us are not.
Or maybe another way to make this clear is to always couple "images" with "invisible" so that we discuss "invisible images." That's an option that probably makes the issue clear, but also may sound a little weird - but perhaps not as weird as "spectres."
Mental images" might be a better description.
Except that I think that term would imply that they originate or exist only in the mind, which would pretty clearly contradict what they Epicureans state- they originate outside the mind.
There are all sorts of pitfalls:
"invisible" images sort of implies woo
"imperceptible" images might work, but they are supposedly perceptible to the mind
"non-visible" is awkward, but might actually be better than Invisible.
there's also the issue as to whether to describe them as "films" or some other word that conveys that they leave the surface of each object in sequence so as to retain to at least some degree the shape of the object. The word "shed" is almost more appropriate from that perspective.
Maybe I am coming around to Catius' "spectres 
QuoteDisplay MoreCassius had recently become a follower of the Epicurean school of philosophy.
[15.16] Cicero to Cassius [Rome, January, 45 B.C.] L I expect you must be just a little ashamed of yourself now that this is the third letter that has caught you before you have sent me a single leaf or even a line. But I am not pressing you, for I shall look forward to, or rather insist upon, a longer letter. As for myself, if I always had somebody to trust with them, I should send you as many as three an hour. For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres (for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that Democritus, called images).
2 But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that wing its way to my consciousness?
3 But of this later on. I am only sounding you now to see in what spirit you take it. For if you are angry and annoyed, I shall have more to say, and shall insist upon your being reinstated in that school of philosophy, out of which you have been ousted "by violence and an armed force." In this formula the words "within this year" are not usually added; so even if it is now two or three years since, bewitched by the blandishments of Pleasure, you sent a notice of divorce to Virtue, I am free to act as I like. And yet to whom am I talking? To you, the most gallant gentleman in the world, who, ever since you set foot in the forum, have done nothing but what bears every mark of the most impressive distinction. Why, in that very school you have selected I apprehend there is more vitality than I should have supposed, if only because it has your approval. "How did the whole subject occur to you ?" you will say. Because I had nothing else to write. About politics I can write nothing, for I do not care to write what I feel.
[15.19] Cassius to Cicero [Brundisium, latter half of January, 45 B.C.] L
I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.
Cicero: Letters to and from Cassius
Seems like the same confusion of issues and words was plaguing Cicero and Cassius.
From Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods:
XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and partly by reason. All men are told by nature that none but a human form can be ascribed to the Gods; for under what other image did it ever appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having recourse to our first notions, reason itself declares the same; for as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either because of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful, what composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form, what aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? Your sect, Lucilius (not like my friend Cotta, who sometimes says one thing and sometimes another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. Therefore, if the human form excels that of all other animal beings, as God himself is an animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most beautiful. Besides, the Gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the Gods, therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but something like blood. Though these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, I shall be more brief on the subject than otherwise I should be. Epicurus, who not only discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets of nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and nature of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the mind; nor are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or reducible to number, like those things which, because of their firmness, he calls Στερέμνια; but as images, perceived by similitude and transition. As infinite kinds of those images result from innumerable individuals, and centre in the Gods, our minds and understanding are directed towards and fixed with the greatest delight on them, in order to comprehend what that happy and eternal essence is.
I don't find anything in there about speaking Greek. Googling, I came across a reference to this Philodemus referring to the gods in this way, but I can't find a specific cite. Without the quotation in Philodemus, there's always the possibility that Cicero was up to his lawyerly trickery in this passage. The reasoning doesn't seem to be very Epicurean to my reading.
I don't find anything in there about speaking Greek. Googling, I came across a reference to this Philodemus referring to the gods in this way, but I can't find a specific cite. Without the quotation in Philodemus, there's always the possibility that Cicero was up to his lawyerly trickery in this passage.
I do think it is in Philodemus, maybe in "On Piety" but I really thought it was in that Velleius section, because I thought it was stated as "a language like Greek," just as in the other psuedo references like psuedo-blood.
If and when I come up with it I will post back - I bet someone here knows more quickly though.
From Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods:
The Latin section starts for what it's worth here:http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…%3Asection%3D46
I would dearly love to find some surviving Catius and - whose the other one - Rufinius?
And i need to fix in my mind what "insubrian" means
Insubria is a historical-geographical region which corresponds to the area inhabited in Classical antiquity by the Insubres; the name can also refer to the Duchy of Milan (1395–1810). For several centuries this name stood for an area stretching approximately between the Adda river in the east and the Sesia river in the west, and between the San Gottardo Pass in the north and the Po river in the south, thus it was a synonym of the Milan region and the countryside areas gravitating towards it.
Yes interesting. For some reason I was getting in my mind that Catiius might have been eastern / Syrian like Philodemus. This expands the geography somewhat.
So for our cosmopolitanism list:
Epicurus et al - Greek
Lucretius et al - Roman
Philodemus - Syrian (?)
Catiius - Celtic
Lucian was also Syrian, but has long been noted for his command of the Greek Language.
Diogenes was Lycian or Anatolian.
And I continue to think that it makes sense to situate Epicurus as particularly Ionian. Among the Pre-Socratics, Aristotle called the Ionians physiologoi---"those who study nature".
Lucian was also Syrian, but has long been noted for his command of the Greek Language.
Agreed. Koine Greek was the lingua franca of the Ancient World for quite some time. That's one reason Marcus Aurelius, a Roman *emperor* could choose to write his diary in Greek.
Joshua 's note about Lucian is one of the reasons Luke Ranieri chose to call his ancient Greek pronunciation convention "Lucian" https://lukeranieri.com/lucianpronunciation/
And I continue to think that it makes sense to situate Epicurus as particularly Ionian. Among the Pre-Socratics, Aristotle called the Ionians physiologoi---"those who study nature".
Agreed, he seems to be firmly in that Ionian tradition, although I wonder how Epicurus would feel about being seen as an Ionian and not Athenian. 
