An Epicurean Understanding of Pleasure

Quote from Don

There is no consideration necessary of the duration, intensity, etc. of the specific *pleasure* itself of drinking wine. What will be the result of this desire if it is fulfilled? If not? The decision to pursue one's desire to experience the pleasure derived from drinking wine is completely contingent on personal factors and subjective feelings of what pain and pleasure will result from whether this desire is fulfilled or not.

See in that first sentence i would say that it is impossible and illogical to evaluate the result without considering each of the factors (duration intensity etc) that we are discussing. The result IS largely those resulting factors, is it not?

Quote from Godfrey

I still think that there are subtle but useful differences between desire and pleasure.

- Pleasure is a Feeling, a faculty, a criterion or measurement. Desire is not.

- To my limited understanding, pleasure and desire are neurologically/biochemically different.

- Pleasure is "The Goal", desire is not.

I agree with this, but probably more is needed to define what desire really is.

Are we talking a Nietzchean "will to power" -- some kind of basic urge of the will that would cause someone to look at something pleasureable that he or she might experience without any pain at all but would cause him to say "Nah, I don't think i will partake of that pleasure, I just don't want to."

Quote from Cassius

I agree with this, but probably more is needed to define what desire really is.

The word Epicurus uses when talking about natural, necessary, etc is επιθυμία epithymia:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἐπιθυ_μ-ία

I'll admit I have only the barest knowledge of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Using Epicurus's method of using what the generally-accepted definition of a word is, I'd offer that a "desire" is a mental concept sensing a need for some thing one does not currently have or for an experience one is not currently undergoing. One senses a lack or void that one feels needs to be filled. Whether one fills that sensed need is the crux of making choices and rejections.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

There is no consideration necessary of the duration, intensity, etc. of the specific *pleasure* itself of drinking wine. What will be the result of this desire if it is fulfilled? If not? The decision to pursue one's desire to experience the pleasure derived from drinking wine is completely contingent on personal factors and subjective feelings of what pain and pleasure will result from whether this desire is fulfilled or not.

See in that first sentence i would say that it is impossible and illogical to evaluate the result without considering each of the factors (duration intensity etc) that we are discussing. The result IS largely those resulting factors, is it not?

I wouldn't say the *result* is the duration/intensity. The result is what happens *after* the desire is filled or experienced; After you've experienced the duration/intensity. The decision of whether or not to fulfill a specific desire is contingent on what happens if it's fulfilled or what happens if it's not, after the experience. How much pleasure ensues from fulfilling this desire balanced against how much pain ensues from fulfilling that desire. I desire/decide to undergo the pain of exercise because the *result* I desire is a healthier life. I sense a lack of exercise is detrimental and I desire to fill that lack. The result I wish to achieve is a healthier life.

Admittedly, this is very stream of consciousness. I reserve the right to revise and extend my remarks.

I see this related to "Choices and Avoidances" as well, which I gather is a title to one of Epicurus' works.

So OK we have at least two high-level questions:

(1) What is the relationship between desire and pleasure?

That needs to be pursued, but I am thinking that we are beginning to stray from the original question of

(2) What is the meaning of "Most pleasant"(?) [That was based on the comment in the post above to the effect that Don submits: "I interpret that "the most pleasant" with the idea of pleasure *over a period of time.* The *length* of time is not the focus; it's the *persistence* of pleasure over the time in question."]

Godfrey for a long time I've observed that one of the approaches I like least is Nussbaum's "Therapy of Desire."

It seems to me there is definitely an issue in focusing on "desire" as opposed to "pleasure" but I don't have a handle on what the issue would be.

Do you agree with Don's: I'd offer that a "desire" is a mental concept sensing a need for some thing one does not currently have or for an experience one is not currently undergoing. One senses a lack or void that one feels needs to be filled. Whether one fills that sensed need is the crux of making choices and rejections. "

I am not sure whether it is clear to me that a desire is a "mental concept" or a feeling or what?

I think you can write down and define a desire much better than you can a pleasure, but I am not sure I see them as entirely separate things, especially in the way the words are commonly used.

At the moment I am just not sure about the implications of these words at all.

The larger context of that phrase is:

Quote from Epicurus

...the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest.

So, he's specifically talking about enjoying the most pleasant time. Not a specific pleasure. The phrase is in the context of talking about the span of one's life. A life doesn't have to be long to be the "most pleasant." What makes the pleasant life? I go back to Cicero's Torquatus:

Quote from Cicero

Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable?

Quote from Cassius

(1) What is the relationship between desire and pleasure?

We desire to experience pleasure.

We desire to avoid pain.

I would say that may be too broad. Can't we desire to feel pain in order to experience more pleasure later?

On the other hand, while we are feeling pain or pleasure we are feeling it without thinking why - we just feel it.

Is that not a difference?

Is not a desire somehow more "willed" while pleasure and pain are simply reactions?

That gets back to pathe right? A desire is not a pathe is it?

Quote from Cassius

I would say that may be too broad. Can't we desire to feel pain in order to experience more pleasure later?

We choose to experience pain for a larger pleasure. We don't desire to experience pain.

Quote from Cassius

On the other hand, while we are feeling pain or pleasure we are feeling it without thinking why - we just feel it.

Right. We feel pleasure and pain resulting from a specific desire being fulfilled.

Quote from Cassius

Is not a desire somehow more "willed" while pleasure and pain are simply reactions?

Desires are conscious thoughts - "longings" - for something.

Pleasure and pain are the feelings we experience which help us choose which desires to fulfill and which to reject.

Quote from Cassius

That gets back to pathe right? A desire is not a pathe is it?

A desire is an επιθυμια epithymia; pain and pleasure are παθη pathe. Yes, two different words. Two different "things."

I would also add we can consciously desire something. We can think about wanting something. We don't get a choice but to experience pain or pleasure when it's happening. We react. If I hit my thumb with a hammer, I feel pain! I don't get to decide if it's painful, it just is.

Now, I can "will" myself to endure the pain... like the experiments that have subjects hold their hand in ice water. Those who swear can more readily withstand the cold longer than those who are not allowed to swear. They are both experiencing pain but one group experiences it as less painful. Same stimulus, different reactions.

Quote from Don

We feel pleasure and pain resulting from a specific desire being fulfilled.

But remember I think it is clear too that we also feel pleasure or pain independently of any desire -- thinks happen to us which we did not plan in any way. I think we are not veering into the discussion of "replenishment" theory of pleasure and similar, because the reason this comes to mind is that there is apparently a classical example of walking outside and smelling a rose or flower -- you in no way planned or anticipated or lacked anything prior to that moment, but when the fragrance came to your nose you experienced pleasure that was in no way related to a "lack" of anything. Or at least that is what I have read somewhere in philosophy writings.

Quote from Cassius

it is clear too that we also feel pleasure or pain independently of any desire

Absolutely! The literal definition of πάθη pathē is "what is done or what happens to a person." See my #71 above that you reacted to. That's why desires and pleasure (& pain) are two very different things. We can choose our desires. Pleasure and pain will happen to us irregardless of whether we choose one over the other or not. What Epicurus's philosophy does is give us a goal toward which to direct what choices we make about which desires to pursue and which to reject at any given time depending on our context and circumstances.

Pardon the delay.... Referring back to post #66, here's the Wikipedia link for desire fwiw:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desire. I haven't had the chance to read the whole article but this excerpt from the beginning is to me pretty spot. I've underlined one sentence but the rest is also pertinent.

Quote

Desires are states of mind that are expressed by terms like "wanting", "wishing", "longing" or "craving". A great variety of features is commonly associated with desires. They are seen as propositional attitudes towards conceivable states of affairs. They aim to change the world by representing how the world should be, unlike beliefs, which aim to represent how the world actually is. Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent to realize them. For this to be possible, a desire has to be combined with a belief about which action would realize it. Desires present their objects in a favorable light, as something that appears to be good. Their fulfillment is normally experienced as pleasurable in contrast to the negative experience of failing to do so. Conscious desires are usually accompanied by some form of emotional response. While many researchers roughly agree on these general features, there is significant disagreement about how to define desires, i.e. which of these features are essential and which ones are merely accidental. Action-based theories define desires as structures that incline us toward actions. Pleasure-based theories focus on the tendency of desires to cause pleasure when fulfilled. Value-based theories identify desires with attitudes toward values, like judging or having an appearance that something is good.

I wouldn't limit a desire to a mental concept, it could also be a physical or psychological craving.

I'm not very familiar with Nussbaum. Is she in the "absence of pain" camp? I can see how, if one was so inclined, they could mistakenly interpret Epicurus' categories of desires as tending toward asceticism. I look at them more along the lines of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, which maybe could be thought of as a positive, not negative, hedonic treadmill. More of a hedonic ladder.

Good post, Godfrey . Pulling out a couple more sentences for emphasis from the WP article:

• Desires are closely related to agency: they motivate the agent to realize them
• [Desires'] fulfillment is normally experienced as pleasurable in contrast to the negative experience of failing to do so.
• there is significant disagreement about how to define desires (This one made me laugh... Yeah, Wikipedia, no kidding!)
• Pleasure-based theories focus on the tendency of desires to cause pleasure when fulfilled. (This one does seem spot-on to how we're trying to define desires here)

Quote from Godfrey

I wouldn't limit a desire to a mental concept, it could also be a physical or psychological craving.

Trying to wrap my head around your statement here. Are you referring to things like addiction? A "desire" that is more of an involuntary craving? I would categorize addiction or craving as different from a desire. A desire - in my mind - has to be voluntarily brought to mind. You have to have agency to decide to fulfill the desire or not. Yes, I'm picking up on agency from Wikipedia. A craving for an addiction takes the agency out of the picture. But.. hmm.. what about a strong desire to possess something or to be with someone? Still working all this out.

The sense I was trying to get across with the "a desire is a mental concept" is that a desire is something you can think about. In fact, the thought "I want X" (and its many permutations) is itself the desire. On the other hand, pleasure and pain are something that happens to you. You can think about the feelings of pleasure and pain after they occur.. or before they occur if you have a desire for something. Pleasure and pain are, after all, what we attempt to experience or avoid, respectively. But, in the moment, pleasure or pain just happens. You can desire lunch with a friend. You can schedule lunch with a friend. But during the lunch with a friend you experience the feeling of pleasure welling up. You can't think "Now, I will experience pleasure." That's like that beer commercial from a number of years ago where the person says, "Commence relaxation NOW!"

Quote

The commercials ... make fun of a certain Teutonic obsession with control, using various scenarios whose humor would come through whether it was a beer ad or a late-night comedy skit. In one, a blond actor struggles to get comfortable on a couch for a relaxation session. He is wearing a stiff white shirt and tie and is listening to a compact disk titled "Das Kalm." "Commence relaxation now," an offscreen voice commands. It does not work out well. "Germans don't do laid back," the announcer intones in an unmistakable German accent. "They do beer."

(PS... with apologies to Martin btw)

It's that idea of willing something that needs to be allowed to arise naturally that I'm trying to get at. Pleasure and pain can't be willed. They can be nurtured and chosen but you can't say "Commence feeling pleasure NOW!". You can say, "I desire this experience that will result in pleasure."

Quote from Don

The sense I was trying to get across with the "a desire is a mental concept" is that a desire is something you can think about. In fact, the thought "I want X" (and its many permutations) is itself the desire. On the other hand, pleasure and pain are something that happens to you.

I'm still trying to wrap my head around desire as well. Don I think we're in agreement as to pleasure, although I'm not sure whether Cassius agrees with our take. (???)

The first sentence of the Wikipedia quote lists desire as wanting, wishing, longing or craving; I've also seen it called an emotion. I agree that agency is key to desire, I'm just not sure how it all fits together.

Thinking this through, say for example that you had just decided to give up alcohol. You find yourself walking in Munich and suddenly you are strolling by a beer garden and see and smell some of the excellent local beer. Wham! You get hit by a tremendous craving for some delicious golden brew: it's visceral. But you have agency to decide whether or not to give in to the desire. Is your mental concept the "place" where the agency comes from? Further, it's possible that you would just experience a feeling of pleasure from the sights, sounds and smells of the garden, the day, and the people enjoying themselves, without any desire at all. I'm not sure that this clarifies anything, but I've just experienced mental pleasure by imagining this scenario! Maybe mixed with just a tiny taste of desire...

Bottoms up!

As is usual when we start talking about the natural and necessary analysis I end up thinking I am being too hard on it. I so think it is used as a justification for asceticism by those who are inclined to it for other reasons, but I think that is "their problem" and it is not inherent in the analysis. I think one can easily be oriented toward normal pleasure maximization (as I think Epicurus was) and use the observations simply as a tool of analysis for how much trouble to expect from any course of action. No harm in that UNLESS one has already bought into the goal of avoiding pain "at any cost.".

Yes Godfrey I see that in Nussbaum, but that is likely because she is strongly disposed towards the Stoics, and not because Stoicism was hiding in Epicurus' when he penned the doctrine.

We can go as far as we need to in analysis of this issue of how desire relates to pleasure, but let's not forget to come back to the reason we got into it: how does one analyze and determine what Epicurus' meant when he said not to choose which pleasure is longest but which is "most pleasant."

If we don't get back to it soon though I suspect we will have lost track of Philia and the reason for her posting the thread

I'm going to duplicate my post from above on that phrase "most pleasant" so it doesn't get lost. Eikadistes 's excellent compilation of PD translations might prove helpful in this analysis as well.

Quote from Don

The larger context of that phrase is:

Quote from Epicurus

...the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest.

So, he's specifically talking about enjoying the most pleasant time. Not a specific pleasure. The phrase is in the context of talking about the span of one's life. A life doesn't have to be long to be the "most pleasant." What makes the most pleasant life? I go back to Cicero's Torquatus:

Quote from Cicero

Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable?

Cassius is right and we need to return to Kalosyni 's original list that started this thread and what is meant when an Epicurean talks about pleasure. Godfrey 's mention of Maslow's hierarchy above reminded me of a post I wrote last year. Here's the applicable excerpt:

Quote

I was listening to a TED Radio Hour today about Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs… and realized it seemed VERY Epicurean: KD 29: Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion). The necessary desires are at the bottom. To not be hungry, etc. The need for security is the social contract Epicurus talks about. Love and friendship is next. It gets a little more fuzzy with self-esteem and self-actualization but I think the similarities remain and are worth exploring!

I wanted to emphasize again - at the risk of derailing the thread immediately - that those categories pertain to desires not pleasure. We *need* air, food, water, shelter. We can gain pleasure from those "necessary needs", but it is a necessary desire to seek air, food, water, shelter. Without wanting, seeking, and procuring adequate air, we die. Without adequate food, we die. Etc.There is an agency to making sure we have those necessary desires filled. Fulfilling those desires also gives us pleasure and removes pain. Think of swimming underwater. We can decide to stay under as long as possible, but at some point we're going to "desire" to breathe. Our heads splash through the surface and we take in a big breath of air. Ahhhhhhh!! Yeah, baby! That's the pleasure. So, my contention is that a desire need not be grand. It need not be capital-D Desire. Just like pleasure doesn't need to be capital-P Pleasure. There are things that we desire because they're necessary for living, and only the living can experience pleasure. Then pleasures can be varied. We can desire different foods, clothing, shelter, etc. A desire for those varieties are "unnecessary" in the sense that any food would do if we were starving, but there's nothing "wrong" or "bad" about deriving pleasure from fulfilling a desire for shrimp rather than bread when it comes to the "necessary" desire for food as long as it's not an undue struggle or painful process of fulfilling that variety.

Again, this was all very stream of consciousness so I'm hoping Kalosyni is at least getting pleasure from reading these digressions.

Quote from Don

I'm going to duplicate my post from above on that phrase "most pleasant" so it doesn't get lost.

I am thinking it would it be helpful to go through and collect the posts specifically on desire vs pleasure and "copy" (as opposed to move" them to either a new thread or an existing one on the same topic. What do you think?