Toward A Better Understanding of Epicurean Justice And Injustice (With Examples of "Just" and "Unjust")

Quote from Cassius

So in the it is one of those dangerous aspects of life that some people have no conscience and are killers, just like wolves and lions. We in civil society will organize force to deal with them and if done rationally can hope to be successful most of the time

Okay, I can get behind this part. We agree to contracts among members of a society to neither harm nor be harmed. Some people decide to not abide by that contract - like wild animals with whom we have no contract. There are people in the society to enforce the contract for the security of those who have agreed to abide by it. That all hangs together, and it's part of the next two KDs, too, if I remember.

But KD 34 & 35 rely on someone being afraid of consequences of their actions to not go against the contract?

Wait... ....

Actually, the way I just stated that right there makes more sense to me, especially from an Epicurean perspective. If I commit an unjust act - defined as an act in opposition to the social contract - my life will be more unpleasant if I'm caught. Therefore, I do my best to not commit unjust acts. I act prudently and justly with regard to my fellow citizens. This leads to a more pleasant life.

Is this what Epicurus is implying here in 34 & 35????

Quote from Cassius

Well, you could call it "implying" or maybe even "stating clearly"

LOL

Actually, let me expand on that LOL.

I think I was getting hung up on the idea that someone had to commit the act *then* be afraid of getting caught.

Instead, the whole intent is to weigh the pain or pleasure stemming from your commission of an act counter to the law before you commit it. Your children are starving and you decide to steal food. You may get caught but your children eat. You can live with the fear of getting caught because the pleasure of fed children outweighs the pain of the fear of retribution.

Yes?

Or am I imposing my own desired meaning on the text instead of reading what's there?

It doesn't look that on the literal front, but then again...

Ahhh! It's too late in the day for textual criticism.

This all still so far doesn't address the "injustice" of the biggies (e.g., atrocities, genocide, mass murder, etc.), but I think we're getting there and, rest assured, I'mma gonna circle back around to all that before we're done with this thread.

For now, I like where my head is ending up for 34 & 35... Until I start thinking again. We'll see.

Quote from Don

Saint-Andre translation: It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection

Okay, reading this in the light of day, I can see how it is consistent with the philosophy. It seems (now) to be reinforcing the personal responsibility inherent in Epicurus's writings. I.e.,..

If you're weighing the choice of whether or not you're going to commit an act contrary to the laws of the community in which you live, you're free to do that. BUT be aware that if you're not caught right away, that doesn't mean your home free... Until the day you die. You want to live your life that way?

Maybe these two are The Tell-tale Heart Key Doctrines.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

If you're weighing the choice of whether or not you're going to commit an act contrary to the laws of the community in which you live, you're free to do that. BUT be aware that if you're not caught right away, that doesn't mean your home free... Until the day you die. You want to live your life that way?

I think you're correct. Of course the big picture includes the possibility of revolting (Cassius Longinus model) or leaving (which Epicurus did from Mytilene and Lampsacus, right?)

That even makes sense in the context of the KDs here: if you feel you can't abide by the contract of your community, you have the choice to oppose it (Does the pain of that makes it choice-worthy?) or find a new community and a new contract

Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1125. I believe it's supposed to be from Metrodorus's Letter to Timocrates.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…%3Asection%3D31

Oops, I missed that too! It looks like it's in both Non posse and Adv. Col.

Mea culpa!

Quote from Bryan

I find it helpful to keep the Macedonians/Diadochoi in mind. From one perspective, they were a constant source of abhorrent behavior and destruction. Many people found living underneath them to be humiliating and intolerable. There is no evidence that Epikouros ever even complained, as Metrodoros says "ΟΥΔΕΝ ΔΕΙ ΣΩΙΖΕΙΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΑΣ it is not our responsibility to save the country (Plutarch, Non Posse 1098 C)" Kolotes even dedicated his work to the Ptolemy family.

Thanks for posting this! I tend to forget about Plutarch. Looks like I need to go do some more reading!!

This seems to be a reminder to be aware of your limitations and not to be overwhelmed by trying to "save the country" unless this truly gives you pleasure, of course.

Before I dive into the last KDs on justice, I wanted to take a moment to review what is actually the connotation of the ancient Greek word translated as justice, right, etc: δίκαιος dikaios

Here the LSJ dictionary entry:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=di/kaios

Note that the basic meaning has to do with observing custom or rule, being well-ordered, abiding by the social rule, being civilized.

Speaking for myself, I have a cultural bias to think of justice - or better capital J Justice - or being Righteous had an abstract existence, some canonical measurements. This is less just than this because ABC parameters of the ultimate yardstick of justice are not met. Epicurus blows that idea out of the water. Using the word justice has sooo much cultural baggage in English.

Granted, the word took on similar connotations in Epicurus's day which is probably why he took so much of KDs to dispel that notion.

Please feel free to check out the LSJ entry and share any thoughts on what context we're dealing with using the English justice (and variants) to translate δίκαιος.

Quote from Cassius

Thanks for that link. This reminds me too of what is maybe a similar word "duty" and the Latin variant "officiis." I remember I spend a lot of time with Cicero's "De Officiis" when I first came across it. But I totally agree with this: "Using the word justice has sooo much cultural baggage in English."

Here's the officium entry (officiis is just the dative/ablative plural) from Lewis and Short:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=officium

Onto the next Key Doctrine (KD) concerning behavior that is δίκαιος:

KD 36: Κατὰ μὲν <τὸ> κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό, συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δή ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

From LSJ: κατὰ κοινόν, opp. κατ᾽ ἰδίαν, jointly, in common (κατ᾽ ἰδίαν in private; also, separately, apart) **Spoiler alert: we're going to see κατ᾽ ἰδίαν soon!

I'm going to use "civilized conduct" and similar terms to try to get away from the baggage of "justice" and "righteousness." Granted, it's not a 1-1 correspondence, but it may help us break out of our preconceived notions.

(μὲν) κατὰ κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό

"On the one hand, 'civilized conduct' is the same (τὸ αὐτό) for all in common (κατὰ κοινὸν)..."

...συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ·

paraphrase: "for it was something useful in communities brought together for mutual benefit [to neither harm nor be harmed]..."

Next clause...

(δὲ) κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δή ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

μὲν... δὲ... Remember that this combination of particles sets up a contrast between two phrases. The clunky but helpful "standard" is to think "On the one hand, X... On the other hand, Y..."

So:

(μὲν) κατὰ (τὸ) κοινὸν...

"On the one hand, jointly/in common...

(δὲ) κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον...

"On the other hand, in private or separately/apart; individually..."

Here ἴδιον (having to do with the private sphere; being set apart; individually) is contrasted with κοινόν (having to do with the public sphere; considered together in community) from the first phrase. This parallel writing style is reminiscent of Epicurus in his letter to Menoikeus.

This style can be seen also in...

πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό (clause 1)

"Civilized behavior is the same for all"

οὐ πᾶσι [συνέπεται] τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. (clause 2, οὐ πᾶσι "not all")

"Civilized behavior is not the same for all"

...which is lost of a translator decides to use "it is not.." or other paraphrases or pronouns.

κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δή ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

"On the other hand, with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, civilized behavior is not the same for all."

Looked at in this way, this KD is not that controversial. To judge an act as "civilized, well-ordered, conducive to mutual benefit, i.e., righteous", does it provide both parties with the benefit of not harming nor being harmed. That's what's common to all. How this is brought about can be different in time and place.

This is in keeping with Epicurus's philosophy of relativity and context. Note, this does NOT mean there is an ideal form of το δίκαιον. There is a contextual, mutually-beneficial series of actions that can be used as a guide to determining if an action or law meets certain criteria: two, in fact - (1) Are the parties protected from harm? (2) Are the parties prohibited from harming others? How these two criteria are achieved can be different in individual times and places, but the criteria stay the same since humans began gathering together in communities.

Onto KD 37 (Those is a long one!)

Τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, ἔχει τὸν τοῦ δικαίου χαρακτῆρα, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει. κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν.

Let's break this down:

KD 37: section 1

Τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, ἔχει τὸν τοῦ δικαίου χαρακτῆρα, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό. ...

"On the one hand, that which has been confirmed by evidence and observation to bring mutual advantage among companions has the qualities which identify 'civilized behavior' (justice), whether or not it is the same for everyone." ... (See KD 36)

That first word in this KD is very important, both to the meaning of this Doctrine and the philosophy as a whole: Το ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον "that which has been confirmed by evidence and observation; that which has been witnessed." That middle part -μαρτυρ- -martyr- is the origin of the English martyr which literally means "a witness (to what one believes)"

Moving on, after the μὲν... we expect to find the contrasting δὲ... Remember, these two must come second in the phrase but are translated as if they come first.

KD 37: section 2

ἐὰν δὲ νόμον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν ἔχει. ...

"On the other hand, let's say a law were to be enacted bringing results not in accord with what brings mutual advantage among companions, then it would not have the natural form or constitution of 'civilized behavior' (τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν)...

The natural form or constitution of 'civilized behavior' (τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσιν) as we've seen is (a) what brings mutual advantage to all parties involved, (b) protects parties from harm, and (c) prohibits parties from harming each other.

It's important to note that the subjunctive mood is used here. For some context on that:

https://ancientgreek.pressbooks.com/chapter/46/ Basically, the subjunctive is used to express hypotheticals. Cassius may say that that should be my favorite verbal mood I'm proposing here a shorthand way of emphasizing this as "Let's say that X happens..."

It may also be helpful to review the LSJ entry for φύσις (φύσιν) http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57:entry=fu/sis Again, I'm trying to disrupt the baggage of English "nature/natural."

KD 37: section 3

...κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ, ...

"And, let's say, if what brings advantage according to 'civilized behavior' (τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον) were to change and for a specific period of time, let's say, it fit our 'anticipation' (πρόληψις prolepsis) [of civilized behavior/justice],...

KD 37: section 4

... οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν.

"...there was nothing inferior about that for that period of time and it was 'civilized behavior' at least for those who are not confounded, greatly troubled, or much distressed by meaningless words (i.e., by a lot of blah-blah-blah) but who look into the circumstances and conditions."

συνταράττουσιν "confounded, greatly troubled, or much distressed" is an interesting word because it incorporates the stem that also gives rise to ataraxia: ταράσσω >> α-ταράσσω >> αταραξία. So, it's just not saying those who are confused by a lot of empty words but those who are confused and greatly troubled by them. And the goal is to live a pleasurable life not a life characterized by a troubled mind.

This again seems to emphasize the relative, contextual nature of the philosophy. There's no absolute. Look at the conditions and circumstances and use your prolepsis and your knowledge of the criteria of "civilized behavior" to determine if the changed circumstances allow for that specific law or action to be considered "righteous" or "civilized." I'm specifically thinking of Pres. Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War. Was it just? I'm not giving an answer, just posing the question.

So, to bring all our alternative translation together:

On the one hand, that which has been confirmed by evidence and observation to bring mutual advantage among companions has the qualities which identify 'civilized behavior', whether or not it is the same for everyone. On the other hand, let's say a law were to be enacted bringing results not in accord with what brings mutual advantage among companions, then it would not have the natural form or constitution of 'civilized behavior.' And, let's say, if what brings advantage according to 'civilized behavior' were to change and for a specific period of time, let's say, it fit our prolepsis of 'civilized behavior,' there was nothing inferior about that for that period of time and it was 'civilized behavior' at least for those who are not greatly confused and troubled by meaningless words but who look into the circumstances and conditions.