That's right, and it's not easy but what's the alternative? You can throw up your hands and not even try to get it right. That's what is advocated by Socrates and the radical skeptics who say it's never possible to be confident of anything. And what do you do then? - You give up studying nature and you retreat to wishful thinking about "virtue" - and let others make decisions for you.
That's a high price to pay to just to win a pat on the back from modern philosophers.
That's a high price to pay to just to win a pat on the back from modern philosophers.
Agreeing with your post, but I don't catch your meaning of this part.
That's a high price to pay to just to win a pat on the back from modern philosophers.
Agreeing with your post, but I don't catch your meaning of this part.
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My explanation for this applies to much of the reason that Dave and I appear to disagree - but I don't think we are really that far apart.
I would like to be proven wrong, but my own perception is that the problems posed by skepticism and how to unwind them are much deeper than what many seem to think.
Dave and I have a legal background and we are familiar with the position that "the law" requires finality. You can't go on debating who is right and who is wrong forever on legal matters, so you have to come up with a standard of proof and a mechanism for applying it. In the English-speaking countries that has generally been done by a jury system in which we have rules of evidence as to what types of evidence can even be submitted to a jury, which is held to have the ultimate authority to find the facts of a case. It is a major issue in legal theory as to whether juries should be allowed to be ultimate factfinders, or whether that should be delegated to "experts" in particular fields.
The English common law system has traditionally held that randomly selected "jurors of our peers" are best positioned to deliver justice, even though they are not "experts" in their fields. In fact, judges instruct jurors that even where "experts" are allowed to testify as to their opinions about a case, the jurors do not have to accept their opinions. The jurors are specifically allowed by our system of justice to accept or reject some or all or none of what an expert says.
And a large part of the reason for that rule is that it is almost always possible - depending on how much money you have to spend - to find an expert who will say almost anything. Trials turn into 'battles of experts" with highly-credentialed experts on totally opposite sides of almost every question. Our system of justice has traditionally held that we are not going to delegate final decisions to anyone but the "jury of our peers" because that is where we find the most common sense and the least prejudice.
This is as stated in Jefferson's letter to Peter Carr in referencing ploughmen vs professors:
Moral Philosophy. I think it lost time to attend lectures on this branch. He who made us would have been a pitiful bungler, if he had made the rules of our moral conduct a matter of science. For one man of science, there are thousands who are not. What would have become of them? Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his Nature, as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling; it is the true foundation of morality, and not the [beautiful], truth, &c., as fanciful writers have imagined. The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm. It is given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is given them in a greater or less degree. It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body. This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules. In this branch, therefore, read good books, because they will encourage, as well as direct your feelings. The writings of Sterne, particularly, form the best course of morality that ever was written. Besides these, read the books mentioned in the enclosed paper; and, above all things, lose no occasion of exercising your dispositions to be grateful, to be generous, to be charitable, to be humane, to be true, just, firm, orderly, courageous, &c. Consider every act of this kind, as an exercise which will strengthen your moral faculties & increase your worth.
Cassius I'm lost! Please see the quotes I attached below and bolded relevant parts. Looking at the beginning of Kalosyni 's post, below, then your reply, and your answer to my question to you for clarification has me lost. Especially the Jefferson quote.
Two points. As you noted I don't think we are far apart, if at all on almost everything. But I've lost the thread of what we are far apart on.
In your response to me, you quoted Thos. Jefferson; is he the modern philosopher you referred to and I asked about? I must not understand your train of thought. I was thinking perhaps you were referring to 20th century philosophers as being somehow out in left field.
Your referral to radical skeptics, has me confused again. Am I wrong to conclude that in your use of those two words, radical skeptics mean the philosophers of ancient Greece BCE? With respect, you seem to have a bone to pick with the skeptics of old and their influence on some. I believe I understand the battle of ideas between the school of Epicurus and the Skeptics with a capital S.
However, I'm not clear if you are referring to ancient Skepticism that has at best only a remote similarity to the modern scientific methods of finding truth only after experimental testing of any concepts of any nature until there is a consensus to rule-out or rule-in unproven opinion.
This points out how it is necessary, when you are first beginning an evaluation of truth, to be sure you have included all of your observations (as per the senses), and then also it is necessary to distinguish between various types of evidence and assign levels of trustworthiness onto each type (see PD22) - and it must be done correctly at the basic starting level or else your later observations will be made in error. And so we see that there are: 1) observations as per the senses, 2) conclusions that already exist through earlier opinions on the matter, 3) new inferences generated by the newest observations. All of these must be distinguished (one from another) and no conclusions should be stated as true until there are adequate observations which clearly confirm the conclusion.
PD.22: "We must consider both the real purpose, and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion." Bold added
That's right, and it's not easy but what's the alternative? You can throw up your hands and not even try to get it right. That's what is advocated by Socrates and the radical skeptics who say it's never possible to be confident of anything. And what do you do then? - You give up studying nature and you retreat to wishful thinking about "virtue" - and let others make decisions for you.
That's a high price to pay to just to win a pat on the back from modern philosophers.
Agreeing with your post, but I don't catch your meaning of this part.
I would like to be proven wrong, but my own perception is that the problems posed by skepticism and how to unwind them are much deeper than what many seem to think.
That's right, and it's not easy but what's the alternative? You can throw up your hands and not even try to get it right. That's what is advocated by Socrates and the radical skeptics who say it's never possible to be confident of anything. And what do you do then? - You give up studying nature and you retreat to wishful thinking about "virtue" - and let others make decisions for you.
That's a high price to pay to just to win a pat on the back from modern philosophers.
Here are some areas to compare and contrast, and perhaps if we place them in a table of comparison it would become more clear:
-----Ancient Skepticism vs modern notion of skepticism, vs aspects of "skepticism" in modern science vs Epicurean canonics, AND for each one what level of "feeling" of "knowing truth".
Is it possible that there were differing takes on the sense of knowing (and level of belief vs faith) within various groups of Epicureans (just like there were likely differing takes on mental vs physical pleasures)...it wouldn't be right to assume that all ancient Epicureans were "cookie cutter" exactly the same (thinking/believing exactly the same), because human beings are complex, and you can see now (in our modern studies) how we have the "minimalist" Epicureans and the "maximalist" Epicureans - so perhaps there was also some differences between levels of dogmatism (plus also levels of belief in the gods).
In your response to me, you quoted Thos. Jefferson; is he the modern philosopher you referred to and I asked about? I must not understand your train of thought. I was thinking perhaps you were referring to 20th century philosophers as being somehow out in left field.
I am definitely considering Jefferson, who embraced Epicurus in my view very accurately, as correct in most all of his statements on these issues. I have the most relevant of his statements relating to Epicurus here: https://newepicurean.com/jefferson/
And in general it's fair to say that I am speaking against the more modern philosphers, who seem in most cases to be in agreement with Socrates that nothing is really "knowable."
Your referral to radical skeptics, has me confused again. Am I wrong to conclude that in your use of those two words, radical skeptics mean the philosophers of ancient Greece BCE? With respect, you seem to have a bone to pick with the skeptics of old and their influence on some. I believe I understand the battle of ideas between the school of Epicurus and the Skeptics with a capital S.
"radical skeptics" is a term i use to describe anyone who claims that no knowledge of any kind is possible. This would include Socrates, although Socrates apparently was content with the contradiction that he was confident that he know nothing. This does NOT include all Greek philosophers BCE, as some taught specific doctrines. Yes it's bad to be wrong, as many of theme were in arguing things like it is impossible to walk across a room, but worse than being wrong is to take the position that it is impossible ever to be right about anything. As long as you have a standard to declare something to be "right," then you eventually have hope of being right. If you say that it's impossible to be "right" about anything, then you are in the position of the skeptics who Diogenes of Oinoanda criticized when saying that no one will ever seek the truth if they consider it impossible to find.
In general I agree that it is useful to distinguish the worst of the Skeptics with a capital "S", but unfortunately it's not sufficient to do that in many cases because the depth of this problem is not recognized in general conversation. Many people tend to think that ALL skepticism is "good" just like they thing ALL dogmatism is "bad," because they are aren't familiar with the depth of the issue.
We tend to attract here - as is our goal - people with an interest in philosophy but not deep training in it, and this becomes one of the most important initial questions to cover, which is why it's a constant topic of conversation,
However, I'm not clear if you are referring to ancient Skepticism that has at best only a remote similarity to the modern scientific methods of finding truth only after experimental testing of any concepts of any nature until there is a consensus to rule-out or rule-in unproven opinion.
The "until there is s a consensus" illustrates the problem of generic references to "modern science" and "the scientific method" and "experts" as if using those phrases actually means anything final. There are only particular experts and scientists and particular assertions of results using any method at any time. Consensus is not a logical goal, especially in ethics, and often is later decided to be wrong.
The Epicurean viewpoint was never the "consensus" view in the ancient world, and it will never be in the future. Yet it in my view it held and holds the correct answers as to the absence of (1) supernatural forces (2) life after death, (3) absolute standards of virtue. It also presents a practical and logical approach to having confidence in the best way to live in the absence of those fictions. Therefore Epicurus makes many statements to the effect that he prefers to speak and teach correctly rather than to be concerned about the praise and acceptance of the crowd.
The short answer is that I think Epicurus was all in favor of a generic attitude of questioning claims of authority, especially when those claims do not rest on evidence observable to the senses. But Epicurus was strongly against the conclusion that confidence in any conclusion is impossible. Epicurus makes conclusion after conclusion about many topics, but he never takes "because I or he or she said so" as a reasonable basis for those conclusions.
Yet it in my view it held and holds the correct answers as to the absence of (1) supernatural forces (2) life after death, (3) absolute standards of virtue. It also presents a practical and logical approach to having confidence in the best way to live in the absence of those fictions.
I get it, your view. I lean more to the side that says I don't believe any of those items are true because I have never seen evidence that they are true. Therefore, since I believe them all to be false, I'm not concerned about the amount of evidence I have to dig up to prove what Epicurus taught is true. If those who believe 1 to 3 above want to believe it, no harm is done to me. Now when it comes to organized religions that preach those items, I see the harm they have done with the power of the fear of disobedience.
The "until there is s a consensus" illustrates the problem of generic references to "modern science" and "the scientific method" and "experts" as if using those phrases actually means anything final. There are only particular experts and scientists and particular assertions of results using any method at any time. Consensus is not a logical goal, especially in ethics, and often is later decided to be wrong.
OK. But surely you don't have a problem with relying on expert opinion and consensus of experts on any specific issue when we as average people have zero ability to know about the topic. We all have to draw the line somewhere on what we believe is true, like your 1 to 3 above, and where we don't believe them to be true. We have to trust expert consensus on specific topics that are far beyond our knowledge when making important decisions. For example, I don't ingest anything that the experts say causes cancer in mice, even though I have no idea if it is possible I'll get cancer, too.
One last point that I think I have to make here. Science and the Scientific Method are distinctly different concepts in common usage and practical applications. Perhaps they are conflated as a result of poor educational systems or force of habit. Conflating the two invites confusion, in my opinion. Throughout the ages Science has eventually and always been shown to be wrong on any topic once better tested ideas came along. The Scientific Method invites and expects that we, as average people and experts in particular, examine any assertion to the best of our ability. This is how we determine whether something is true or false. And always our estimation is based on the best evidence available at the time.
You know, to say, " Consensus is not a logical goal, especially in ethics, and often is later decided to be wrong." is a hard one for me to agree on. Perhaps consensus is not a logical goal in ethics because how to live life well on a daily basis is not individually testable among diverse people. However, consensus on Epicurean general guidelines is testable, and I suggest we arrive at our belief in it by consensus through discussion among friends and comparative study.
