Welcome Max Duboff

Quote from Max DuBoff

I might disagree about exactly how much ataraxia is under our control--it's quite unclear, I'd say. Clearly there are some sources saying we can have it under many different circumstances; but PD 4 seems to imply that fatal pains might be pretty rough for a short time, and there's the evidence in DL 10 that not all circumstances can lead to a good life.

Ah, this might be a good way to get at why or how we might have a different perspective on this. My understanding of our control over our own ataraxia stems from my view of tranquility/ataraxia being (possibly) less expansive than you.

I maintain that ataraxia is best understood specifically as the state of mind engendered by the eradication of false/empty beliefs and the fears and anxiety they produce. Once those beliefs are totally eradicated from our minds, pulled up by the roots, they don't come back and the tranquility - literally the undisturbed state - is solid. The eradication of those fears and anxieties is final IF we've really understood and internalized at the gut level, asleep and awake, the understanding that the gods present no reason for fear, that death is nothing to us, that pleasure is the goal and should be the North Star by which we steer our little boat. Pleasure writ large as Epicurus defined it, which means we undergo some pain if we know there's pleasure on the other side of the pain.

If I remember, you include ALL fears and anxieties within ataraxia; which MAY be the case if it is understood that there is no reason for fear and anxiety IF we steer our boat by the goal of nature, which is pleasure. My understanding is that if one defines ataraxia/tranquility to be encompassing of every fear and anxiety, it has to be understood in that way.

I go back to Metrodorus, Fragment 5: "Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul/mind/psykhe but the sound state of the flesh (τὸ σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα), and the sure hope of its continuance?'" I take this to mean the entire body - body & mind - taken as a whole, the Good of the Mind is inextricably linked with the stable state of the body

PD4 does say that fatal pain is bad, but fatal physical pain is short (per Epicurus' writings) and we know from his example that eudaimonia is still possible under pain.

I'm curious to explore what you refer to when you mention "not all circumstances can lead to a good life." I certainly don't disagree, especially if you're referring to chasing after empty desires. We're not guaranteed a good life if we persist in empty desires, and we're not guaranteed a completely pain free life if we're mortal.

PS: I woke up with other ideas on how to explain my perspective on how much control we have over our own feeling of ataraxia. Martin Ferguson Smith's Oenoanda inscription is instructive in this (Formerly fr. 34 VI-VII, now separate fragment 38 I-II):

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states (κατασ̣τήμασι) and in actions (πράξεσιν); and let us first discuss states, keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions that disturb the soul are removed (τῶν ὀχλούντων τὴν ψυχὴν παθῶν ὑπεξαιρεθέντων), those that produce pleasure enter into it to take their place. Well, what are the disturbing emotions? (II) [They are] fears – of the gods, of death, and of [pains] – and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils (αἱ ῥί[ζαι] κακῶν π̣ά̣ντων), and, unless we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.

So, we need to cut those fears of gods, death, etc. at the root so they don't grow back. I find it interesting that VS79 has a negative related form of the word Diogenes uses here for troubles AND a word related to ataraxia for peace: VS79 He who is as peace within himself also causes no trouble for others. ὁ ἀτάραχος ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἀόχλητος. The "within himself" (ἑαυτῷ) also reminds me of the title of Metrodorus' book.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Max DuBoff

To be clear, though, I think Epicurus absolutely endorsed the claim that a good (i.e., blessed) life is a perfect/complete one. But that was a choice. And it's a choice that fits uncomfortably with hedonism. Personally, I'm very convinced that Epicurus was right about hedonism and right that the absence of pain is a pleasure. I'm less convinced he was right that a blessed life is a perfect/complete life.

Max in my case I like to build up from the earlier premises to the higher ones, so before we even get to the implications of PD3 and PD4 there is PD1 and PD2. Where do you land there? Do you agree or disagree with Epicurus that there are no supernatural gods, that gods do not reward friends and punish enemies, and that there is no existence after death? In my case, it is because I strongly agree with him on those first two doctrines that I find it inconceivable that - despite all his other statements about active pleasures - he would have held katastematic pleasures to be the only ones that contribute to a blessed life, as you are claiming.

Yes, I strongly agree with PD 1 and 2. How would that support your claim, though? What makes the gods blessed is that they're not troubled--i.e., they have katastematic pleasure. And the reason to be extra certain about the Epicurean view of death is so we don't think we'll suffer after death. So even there katastematic pleasure is forefront.

(And yep, meant to say NOT pleasure vs. ataraxia, thanks.

Thanks, Don, the above is fantastic. I've not really thought about that Metrodorus fragment, that's great--and it's very similar to Plutarch, Non Posse 1089d, which I have thought about much more. I've often been a bit unsure how to understand this claim. It's similar to PD 18 in establishing mental katastematic pleasure on the foundation of bodily katastematic pleasure. But, as Plutarch points out in Non Posse 1089e-f, that's an extremely unstable foundation for katastematic pleasure, both because lots of conditions disrupt bodily katastematic pleasure, and because it's possible for bodily katastematic pleasure to be disrupted at any time so we can't actually securely anticipate it (whereas we can anticipate mental katastematic pleasure more easily). (I have a paper in progress on that Plutarch argument.)

Your proposal about katastematic pleasure is very plausible. To be honest, I want to believe it, but (in addition to the problem in the last paragraph) I don't know how it can allow pleasure to be stable or to be a limit. The Diogenes of Oenoanda passage is helpful (and sounds like the end of the Letter to Herodotus). The question is just what's up with pain there. Epicurus does clearly care about bodily pain, and it's hard to eliminate the fear of that. So the challenge for your position (which I think is the most popular) is to explain what's stable about the state that results once we remove mental fears and anxieties. (I think I mentioned upthread that I think the best way to do this is to claim that bodily katastematic pleasure is only the fulfillment of needs, not the absence of other pains; but most people find this proposal wildly implausible.)