Is gratitude a katastematic or kinetic pleasure?

Quote from Cassius

3 - Do any of these concepts (1) or (2) or (3) stand intrinsically or by some absolute standard as superior, hierarchically, to the other(s), such that they separately deserve to be considered to be the "ultimate pleasure" or "highest pleasure" or the "best pleasure" or "real pleasure" for all people at all times and at all places?

Dropping into the middle of this thread (no doubt my comment will be too many cooks stirring the pot, but anyway...) ...so these questions could be applied to kinetic and katastematic. Right now as I type this, I think I am currently in the process of experiencing kinetic pleasure, which is pleasurable but there is a sense that I can't be fully satisfied and a niggling feeling of a lack of completion (ever so slight agitation...hint: it involves eating something sweet). Where as katastematic pleasure has a deeper sense of fulfilment and a sense of being at peace (and at rest). So it is an inner felt experience that will be different for everyone depending on the situation, so there is no absolute regarding this. Life is one big mix of both kinetic and katastematic and that just how it is --- so why distinguish between the two?...because you are acknowledging the truth of your own subjective feelings and this will help you make better choices.

I like where I think burninglights is going with this.

One question to add into the mix of classifying pleasures into two types: how would a pleasure that doesn't fulfill a desire be classified? If active/passive, moving/still, fulfilling/fulfilled desires relate to k/k, where do pleasures like happening across a pleasant smelling flower, or feeling warm sunshine on a cool day fall in terms of k/k? I think of these as passive, moving (in that they're fleeting), and unrelated to desire. To me, these are kinetic, but I'm not sure how they relate to Cassius ' question 2:

Quote from Cassius

2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or being fulfilled?

burninglights is onto something again and I think I like where he's going!

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.

Quote from burninglights

“When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profilgates [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. (Men. 131).” This point is pretty clear, in my opinion.

This is a key statement. This is "clear," in my opinion, in relating to "katastematic pleasure," only if you previously and firmly have a position that "freedom from pain" is linked to katastematic pleasure.

If Epicurus is, as Torquatus asserts, using the term "freedom from pain" to be an exact synonym of "pleasure," then there is no necessity to read anything whatsoever into the statement in terms of "katastematic pleasure" other than that freedom from pain - which means any experience whatsoever that is not painful - "kinetic," "katastematic," or "supercalifragilistexpealidocius" is a pleasure.

That's the point Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor make at length -- there is no reason to read any presumptions about katastematic or kinetic whatsoever into the nature of "freedom from pain" other than that the term "freedom from pain" is interchangeable as a synonym for pleasure.

Every time we go down the road of saying "it's a particular TYPE of pleasure that really is important" then the red warning bells ought to be clanging full force. Pleasure is pleasurable because it is a feeling like snow is white and sugar is sweet. Once you start applying additional qualifiers to "what kind of pleasure you really want" then you've got a major logical dilemma. It's 100% logical to talk about choices and avoidance in terms of what kind of results that they bring, and I think that's where this discussion really goes. You choose and avoid your actions in terms of the total pleasure and pain that result. And yes mental pleasures are often (but not always) more easily in reach than mental ones. But that's not always true, nor does it mean that one type of pleasure is better than another.

Quote from burninglights

All this is to say that I think his point is that it’s ‘pleasure all the way down.’

With that I fully agree, and that takes us back to whether and how to pursue the K/K discussion in a way that doesn't take our eye off the ultimate objective, which is a life of "pleasure."

As to DL 10:137, that's a statement that's reflected in Torquatus at greater length in On Ends Book One XVII. I agree that in general it means that mental feelings are going to be more significant than "bodily" ones, but again that doesn't resolve anything as to katastematic and kinetic because those terms don't map straight to mental and bodily. So again we have a situation where it's clear and productive to observe that mental feelings can be used to overcome bodily pains, and that's graspable and easy to understand. But dividing them katastematically and kinetically is not at all the same observation.

XVII. And I will now explain in a few words the things which are inseparably connected with this sure and solid opinion.

There is no mistake with respect to the ends themselves of good and evil, that is to say, with respect to pleasure and pain; but men err in these points when they do not know what they are caused by. But we admit that the pleasures and pains of the mind are caused by the pleasures and pains of the body. Therefore I grant what you were saying just now, that if any philosophers of our school think differently (and I see that many men do so, but they are ignorant people) they must be convicted of error. But although pleasure of mind brings us joy, and pain causes us grief, it is still true that each of these feelings originates in the body, and is referred to the body; and it does not follow on that account that both the pleasures and pains of the mind are not much more important than those of the body. For with the body we are unable to feel anything which is not actually existent and present; but with our mind we feel things past and things to come. For although when we are suffering bodily pain, we are equally in pain in our minds, still a very great addition may be made to that if we believe that any endless and boundless evil is impending over us. And we may transfer this assertion to pleasure, so that that will be greater if we have no such fear.

This now is entirely evident, that the very greatest pleasure or annoyance of the mind contributes more to making life happy or miserable than either of these feelings can do if it is in the body for an equal length of time. But we do not agree that, if pleasure be taken away, grief follows immediately, unless by chance it happens that pain has succeeded and taken the place of pleasure; but, on the other hand, we affirm that men do rejoice at getting rid of pain even if no pleasure which can affect the senses succeeds. And from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is not to be in pain. But as we are roused by those good things which we are in expectation of, so we rejoice at those which we recollect. But foolish men are tortured by the recollection of past evils; wise men are delighted by the memory of past good things, which are thus renewed by the agreeable recollection. But there is a feeling implanted in us by which we [pg 119] bury adversity as it were in a perpetual oblivion, but dwell with pleasure and delight on the recollection of good fortune. But when with eager and attentive minds we dwell on what is past, the consequence is, that melancholy ensues, if the past has been unprosperous; but joy, if it has been fortunate.

Quote from Don

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.

But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.

But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?

Touché!

Back to the drawing board!

Quote from burninglights

128: The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the soul’s freedom of disturbances, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness.

Keywords

the health of the body

τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν (tēn tou somatos hygieian)

the soul’s freedom of disturbances

τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν (tēn (tēs psykhēs) ataraxian)

Quote from burninglights

131: When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profilgates [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.

but neither to be pained throughout the body

ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα (alla to mēte algein kata sōma)

nor to be troubled throughout the mind.

μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν·

(mēte tarattesthai kata psykhēn)

Quote from burninglights

what Plato calls pleasure, Epicurus calls kinetic pleasure, and what Plato calls the neutral state, Epicurus calls katastematic pleasure!

And that labeling would be important to emphasize IF we saw that Epicurus himself in his letters, or Lucretius in his poem, or Diogenes of Oinoanda on his wall were insisting on that labeling as a clear point. Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor says we don't see that, and that Lucretius and Epicurus and Diogenes of Oinoanda are all using the word "pleasure" as the best term to describe tightly integrated word referring to all possible types of pleasure.

As I see it the best argument that Epicurus did insist on that labeling is the list of articles that Diogenes Laertius cites. However contrary to that argument is Nikolsky's observation that Diogenes Laertius was writing as a cataloger who (just like we may be doing today) was looking at Epicurus with the expectation to apply these labels to Epicurus' framework - a framework that does not necessarily turn on "motion" at all.

Where I think we all agree is that it is very important to emphasize that the normal natural state is one of pleasure, even in the absence of active stimulation.

What we don't agree on, or at least I don't see us being sure of, is that the key issue in discussing this natural state involves "motion." Both "kinetic" and "katastematic" appear to focus on "motion" vs. "rest," while "Pleasure" entails both. And I'd be open to the idea too that "motion" and "rest" probably do not describe all the possible types of pleasure, and that whether "in motion" or "at rest" or "otherwise," any experience that is not painful falls under "pleasure."

Interesting discussion!

Quote from Cassius

I keep putting "temporarily" in brackets only because we all know that we'll get hungry and thirsty and want more pleasures every couple of hours so long as we continue to live. That observation doesn't matter to Epicurus, because he identifies *both* the state of acting to fulfill those desires, and the state of fulfillment, as pleasure, so the general condition of life is pleasure.

Using this example it seems to me that you could consider kinetic pleasure to be eating as well as relieving hunger and the temporary state of not being hungry. Katastematic pleasure would be the secure knowledge that you don't have to worry about where your next meal is coming from.

Referring to a prior point by burninglights , with this reading of k/k, katastematic pleasure doesn't necessarily arise from kinetic pleasures, particularly those of eating. It may involve pain and struggle to arrive at a point where you have the confidence that you don't have to worry about going hungry: activities such as planting crops, harvesting &c.

The actions that you might take to reduce this pain and struggle might include such things as cultivating a social order to provide a division of labor and a state of security. These two things would potentially provide additional pleasures such as friendship.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.

But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?

Just had to see how it was worded...

"On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them ; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus."

"Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. σὺ δ᾽ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παίδων Μητροδώρου."

***

gladness of mind

τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον (to kata psykhe khairon), lit. "the rejoicing throughout (my) mind"

χαῖρον is indeed related to the "kinesis/energeia" pleasure χαρα "joy"

To enjoy [+dative = something] = μνήμῃ (dative) "remembrance, memory"

So, τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ ... μνήμῃ "the enjoying throughout (my) mind... of the memory"

Quote from Cassius

And that labeling would be important to emphasize IF we saw that Epicurus himself in his letters, or Lucretius in his poem, or Diogenes of Oinoanda on his wall were insisting on that labeling as a clear point. Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor says we don't see that, and that Lucretius and Epicurus and Diogenes of Oinoanda are all using the word "pleasure" as the best term to describe tightly integrated word referring to all possible types of pleasure.

As I see it the best argument that Epicurus did insist on that labeling is the list of articles that Diogenes Laertius cites. However contrary to that argument is Nikolsky's observation that Diogenes Laertius was writing as a cataloger who (just like we may be doing today) was looking at Epicurus with the expectation to apply these labels to Epicurus' framework - a framework that does not necessarily turn on "motion" at all.

Diogenes Laertius is *citing* Epicurus himself when the term katastematic is quoted! (With editing added)

[136] Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει: ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν : : ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

[136] [Epicurus] differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest (καταστηματικὴν katastematiken), but only that which consists in motion (ἐν κινήσει en kinesei). Epicurus admits both ; also pleasure of mind as well as of body (ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος), as [Epicurus] states:

• in [Epicurus'] work On Choice and Avoidance
• and in [Epicurus'] On the Ethical End,
• and in [Epicurus'] first book of his work On Human Life
• and in [Epicurus'] epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene.
• So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta,
• and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."
• The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice [and Avoidance] are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

And, since we've noted pleasures of mind and body don't map directly into katastematic and kinetic; Diogenes Laertius states that, too:

Quote from Don

Epicurus admits both (pleasure which is a state of rest andconsists in motion).; ALSO pleasure of mind as well as of body,

Good call, burninglights

Just to confirm your suspicion, the letter begins:

Τὴν μακαρίαν... ἡμέραν

The blessed day ..

That μακαρίαν is the same word used in PD1 to describe the blessed state of the gods.

The more I think about (and we talk about) kinetic and katastematic pleasure, the more I am convinced that they are best described by example than by attempts at formulaic definition – and that descriptive definition ought to be treated only as aids to eliciting such experience in our personal lives (rather like the Zen concept of words as “fingers pointing to the moon”: let’s not get caught up worrying over the “fingers” – they are a useful, perhaps even necessary, pedagogical ploy, that’s all -- and enough).

A couple of illustrations:

1. I enjoy the kinetic pleasure of preparing and eating a meal (in terms of the aesthetic pleasure of preparing, the removal of hunger, and the gustatory pleasure of the taste – all of that). Afterward, I enjoy the lingering katastematic pleasure of satisfaction and contentment.

2. I enjoy the kinetic pleasure of a climactic sexual experience. Afterward, I bask in the lingering katastematic pleasure of contentment (often called “the afterglow”).

3. I enjoy the kinetic pleasure of a certain mental activity – such as playing a game of chess – and afterward enjoy the lingering memory (without necessarily trying to activate that memory: just letting it be).

Other than specific instances, I’d add a general feeling of good health and wellbeing as katãstema – as a lingering (more or less stable) background pathe of pleasure, no doubt the result of various kinetic pursuits of various pleasures.

At bottom, I think that hardline distinctions are not necessary – rather they can blend, one into the other. Anyway, that is the way I have come to think of it.