Posts by Pacatus

Kalosyni

I agree with you about exegesis itself. Nor do I disagree with your exegesis. Nor am I attempting any eisegesis on the texts.

I am simply saying that I personally cannot relate to the concept of blessedness (nor any kind of god-likeness) in my life. Even as I (I think) understand your explanation (exegesis), which I am not disputing. And I don’t believe that I, personally, am losing out on anything there.

Thank you for your patience.

Quote from Matteng

For this reason, Seneca elsewhere explains that whereas the goal of Epicureanism is “a mind immune to feeling”, this “unfeelingness” is actually the opposite of what the Stoics desire.

Wow! I've always had respect for Robertson as one of the better translators of Stoicism for the modern world. But that is so egregiously wrong. He clearly did not do his due diligence on that.

Quote from Cassius

It's a word that appears and has to be incorporated in reviewing texts

Yes, absolutely.

Kalosyni Thanks for that considered response.

I don’t fear death – or gods. Epicurean philosophy certainly has been a support for that. But I don’t believe in gods (supernatural or natural) – so, for me, whatever “godlike” might mean is a human (imaginative) projection; and is extremely variable according to culture, religion, philosophy, personal imaging. I don’t object to any of that; it can be useful. But it has no other meaning to me.

I think that Epicurus was probably a theological realist: he did believe there were gods, evidenced via prolepsis. I do not.

So, to the extent that “blessedness” (makarios) is related to god-likeness, it is (to me) a projection from human imagination: an ideal. (And imagination is a valid and powerful human resource! I’m a poet, remember? But it’s also a powerful resource for science, as I think Einstein said.) And even if not related to an idea of god-likeness, it’s still such a projection: as the kind of ideal (goal) we imagine (such as cooking the perfect meal) in order to progress. I affirm that kind of use as well.

But “blessedness” is not one that works for me either way. Perhaps I just don't understand it the way that those for whom it is helpful do. So, I just let it go (past tense there) – along with the gods.

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Addendum: I have a very large, framed print of Epicurus in the Garden by Genevra Catalano on the wall directly above my desk. That represents a kind of ideal (reminder) that I can contemplate, in my imagination. I have others.

I have become more and more a “one day at a time” kind of guy. And although I might draw from other sources where it seems helpful, it is mostly Epicurean philosophy that helps me with that. I think of myself as “mostly Epicurean” – it’s what I keep coming back to. (My use of the word “eclectic” for myself a while back may have been ill-considered, at least in any broad philosophical sense.)

Quote from Kalosyni

You acquire a god-like tranquility, meaning your mind is completely peaceful and satisfied, having transcended regular human anxiety

This is exactly the kind of ideal (in the sense of ultimate goal or telos) I no longer entertain, let alone strive for – like Nirvana or Bodhi or “big Satori.” I just let that kind of thing go – relaxing from it, as it were.

Note: Speaking only for myself, not denigrating or dismissing anyone else’s quest or pursuit!

Don: Not intrepid. We've exchanged this before, but I use both terms when translating (mostly for myself) εὐδαιμονία: i.e. "happy well-being."

I know this has been discussed before, but I forget. What exactly do we mean by “blessedness” (in simple terms)? It seems to me something like “sainthood” (say, in the sense of Orthodox Christianity – not the Lutheran “sainthood of all believers”.)

It does not seem like something I strive for, or am much interested in. I just try to live a happier life – in terms of more pleasure (kinetic/katastematic), less pain (physical/mental) by my choices, one day at a time.

But maybe I misunderstand …

Sorry if this is an interruption of the discussion.

Quote from Don

That is why it was not the reader who was the addresser of the text, but the listener — he was listening to the text which was read to him

And there were learned scribes (often slaves) to whom letters and texts could be dictated, to be read aloud to recipients – serving a function akin to professional secretaries today, which you describe and which likely fit into the “highly skilled” slaves mentioned by Kalosyni.

For example, we have no writing attributed to the Stoic Epictetus; it was Arrian who wrote down the teachings that are incorporated in the Enchiridion and the Discourses. (Though Epictetus, before being freed, seems likely also have fit the category of a highly skilled – and literate – slave.

Also, the word “literate” is a relative term. I have no literacy in Greek, for example; I once was literate in differential calculus, but am no longer (have forgotten it all over years of disuse; I may be moderately literate in Epicurean philosophy, but far less literate than many on here (I wouldn’t refer to myself as a philosopher).

Quote from Don

We know that at least Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoikeus were literate:

Leontien and Themista also, according to accounts.

Quote from Cassius

We have to explain that when Epicurus was refering to gods he was referring to something supernatural

You meant "not supernatural," yes?

Quote from Cassius

We have to explain that when Epicurus referred to pleasure he meant all that is desirable, not just stimulation.

I get what you’re trying to say here, but aren’t all pleasures (and pains), physical and mental – stimulated by sense experience, αἴσθησῐς? As are πᾰ́θη and even προλήψεις? As are desires?

Pleasure includes everything and anything that “feels good” – even a self-righteous pat-on-the-back by a Stoic that thinks pleasure and virtue are dichotomous guides.

Quote from Cassius

I would be alert to the direction that some writers seem to take that tranquility does not only not "feel great" -- but that tranquility is not a "feeling" at all. That's how "they" (not referring here to Max) argue that tranquility is not a feeling at all.

Maybe “tranquillity” (which seems to be the dominant translation of ἀταραξία) is a translation subject to too much distortion, often taken as an unfeeling state. I think that Don and I have both used “equanimity” – but that seems to come up against your point here as well.

Since ταραχή is (an unpleasant) disturbance or unease in the mind (such as anxiety), it seems to clearly fall within Epicurus’ understanding of pain – in this case, mental as opposed to physical. Though it certainly can – and perhaps most often does – present somatically as well; in fact, I would suggest that the psyche/soma connection works both ways, and that physical pain can also cause ταραχή – which is why that is something that Epicurus deals with (contra, at least in terms of emphasis, the Cyrenaics).

For me, “serenity” seems more of a feeling state – of which, among its synonyms, Wordhippo includes “a mildly euphoric feeling” (albeit only after a pleasurable experience, which seems to me an unnecessary limitation). Or, perhaps, just “pleasant mind” – or even “enjoyable mind.” [Though ἀταραξία is rendered in the negative – so maybe just “untroubled.”]

I’m sure somebody here can come up with a better solution, so I’ll end this meandering with ??? ….

Interesting: that’s very different from the main New Testament Greek word translated as “forgive” – ᾰ̓φῑ́ημῐ.

ἀφίημι - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

Another word, ἀπολύω, is used once in the NT (at Luke 6:37) as “forgive.” It is also used to mean “divorce.” ᾰ̓φῑ́ημῐ was also used by Paul in Cointhians 7:12 to mean “divorce.”

ἀπολύω - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

In another thread, about infinite regress needing to be terminated in the concept of a causal god, Cassius said: “While not exclusively Zeno-derived, various thinkers used infinite regress arguments to argue for a divine unmoved mover. Epicurus rejected the premise structure: he held that matter and motion are eternal and self-sufficient, requiring no external initiator. The infinite past of atomic motion is simply given — there is no logical compulsion to terminate a causal chain at a god.” [My italics]

This intrigued me, and I thought maybe it could be expanded to a discussion of infinitism in epistemology from an Epicurean perspective (if anyone’s interested).

There are generally three major epistemological schools: foundationalism, coherentism and infinitism. The latter is partly an attempt to eliminate defeat by elements of Agrippa’s Trilemma: infinite regress, circularity and arbitrary assertion.

Foundationalism is subject to logical criticism from infinite regress and arbitrary assertion/truncation.

Coherentism is subject to logical criticism from circularity and question-begging.

Infinitism accepts infinite regress as nonproblematic, and is not subject to the other two criticisms.

Agrippa’s Trilemma (part of Agrippa’s “five modes”) has been employed extensively by Pyrrhonian Skeptics (beginning with Sextus Empiricus). I’ve never really considered infinitism, but – stirred by Cassius’ remarks – I’m now wondering if it is a viable alternative from an Epicurean viewpoint.

Here is an article on epistemological infinitism: https://iep.utm.edu/inf-epis/

Just in terms of contemplation tools, I conjured up, over time, this virtual version of a Roman lararium (a home shrine). The central figure is my paternal grandmother, Mae, flanked by images of Epicurus (Mae is likely the most Epicurean person I’ve known, and somewhat of a personal hero to me). The face at the bottom left is my “fractured” self. The rest is symbols and phrases that have some personal connection/meaning – they might not all be strictly Epicurean, but I think they mostly are. It’s all in Latin except for the Ἡδονή - Ἁρμονία - Ἐὐδαιμονίᾱ formula. At the moment, I have it set as my wallpaper, so it's the first thing I see when I open my Chromebook.

Kalosyni : Thanks for this thread, and the prompting blog.

For me, these days, it's mostly how (a) to abide in some serenity and ease in the midst of all the turmoil in the world (some of which directly affects people I know), (b) while appreciating my AFHB*, and (c) finding ways to enjoy each day, one day at a time.

One of my strategies (Vivian’s too) is to limit our news feed, and to watch more sports instead. Also, I now am spending more time, especially in the afternoon, just reading.

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“Attention-Fluid, Hypertexting Brain” (my more affirming version of ADHD – especially rejecting that last D).

The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset develops his perspectivist view, at least implicitly (been too long since I read him), from the existentialist dictum “existence precedes essence” – i.e., we can only posit some “essence” of things (if we are so inclined) from the perspective and influence of our existential circumstances. (Which, to me, means that such an existential perspective depends on αἰσθήσεις and πᾰ́θη – and our interpretation of such, from that perspective.)

Saying that “I” cannot be detached from my existential circumstances, Ortega offered a simple formulation: “Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia.”

Quote from Todd

It is quite possible to arrive at this conclusion without any logical inconsistencies. For example, if you believe your telos to be removal of pain, then it would be perfectly consistent to see death as a shortcut to that end. In that case, death would not be merely a matter of indifference, but should actually be preferred over life, which will inevitably involve pain at times. The only inconsistency would be a failure to act on that conclusion.

In thinking on this from Todd, I recalled (from Kurt Lampe’s The Birth of Hedonism: The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life) that the same logic was attributed to a later Cyrenaic philosopher, Hegesias. Lampe refers to “Hegesias’ pessimism,” arguing: “I suggest that Hegesias is very far from resigning himself to pessimism. To the contrary, he positively embraces it as one aspect of a radical but coherent existential choice.”

Here is a summary from Wiki: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegesias_of_Cyrene

This seems much at odds with earlier Cyrenaic philosophy, e.g., that of Aristippus and Aristippus the Younger (the Metrodidact). Lampe comments: “It is odd, of course, for Hegesias to declare pleasure the only complete good and then to make ‘living neither painfully nor distressingly’ his comprehensive end. We would expect him to follow the Metrodidact in aiming to ‘live pleasantly.’ However, on this point Hegesias agrees—at least superficially—with the Cyrenaics’ critics.”

I certainly can’t see this as consistent with Epicurus.

Reminds a bit of Emily Austin’s questioning whether modern Stoics are actually – Stoics. (Though she wasn’t as harsh as Bates.)

One might take Epicurus’ arguments for a “realist” view of the gods as suggestive, rather than “dogmatic.” I don’t know if that’s too much of a wrenching of what he said, but he was, in part, deconstructing any sort of Platonic idealism throughout.

For myself – though I dislike the term – I would have to hold to the “idealist” view of the gods: viz., mental projections that may or may not be helpful (like visualizing pitching “the perfect game,” to borrow from sports psychology – although pitching a “perfect game” is possible in baseball ).

Note: I view prolepsis as a kind of intuitive construct from experiences.