Posts by Pacatus

Quote from Kalosyni

I brought up Maslow's heirarchy of needs which then led to my commenting that perhaps Epicurus had reached a sense of fulfilling his "self-actualization" through his study of physics

What if we reframed Maslow’s “needs” (re the chart below) as Epicurean desires? Which might fall under the category of (1) "natural and necessary,” which (if any) under (2) “natural but not necessary,” and which (if any) under (3) “unnatural” (Emily Austin’s “corrosive”)?

Just as a quick pass, I’d put the first three of Maslow’s levels under (1). I think I’d relegate at least the “status” part of the fourth level to (3).

And what if we simply replaced “self-acualization” and "fulfillment" with eudaimonia?

Really just thinking “out loud” here …

Some pains may be readily removable, some may not. Sometimes the distress caused by pain (or by focussing on the pain) can be relieved (or at least attenuated) by engaging in pleasurable activity (e.g. Epicurus on his deathbed).

Godfrey Thanks for making us aware of Oberg’s book. I’m nearly a third through it.Good stuff.

Cassius:

I don’t know if that word pleasure (and pain as well) scares people. Or if some adverse reaction stems from years of social enculturation and “programming” (e.g., from family, religion, education).* Or if they just don’t understand the breadth of Epicurus' application of those terms. Or maybe some people (especially in academia) feel easier parsing the Greek and Latin, almost as a deflection from “that word.”** (I recall Emily Austin having to battle with her publisher to get the word in the title of her book. And her introductory chapter on what pleasure is, is excellent.)

Maybe it just takes repetition, and that repetition coming at it from slightly different angles – I think that has been the case for me. And why I go back to reread such as Austin – I’ve read it all twice now (some things thrice), and will likely do so again. I still need that repetition at the basic level; maybe I get a slightly different “angle” on it each time. A process of absorption.

I doubt there are any “magic answers.” And I doubt – given the power and ubiquity of that aforementioned enculturation – we’ll ever be as popular as the Stoics.

Just my ramblings on the questions you raise. Just keep doin’ the good work.

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* I had to struggle with that a bit too, even though I had “intellectually” seen through at least most of it. Being here helped with that immensely (even if I’m a slow learner – or just innately stubborn ).

** I want to be very, very clear that I see none of the longstanding members here, who do deep research, do it for that reason! It, too, can be a pleasure – as well as valuable for all of us.

Cassius:

Many thanks for posting that essay by Elayne! I read it some years back, but what a pleasure to reread it – and a great reminder! (I actually just put the link on my wall as a reminder.)

Quote from Cassius

embracing pleasures of both types - pleasures of action or pleasures of state or whatever those words mean - and choosing among those pleasures by applying a a common sense analysis of whether they will bring us more pleasure or more pain.

This seems to me to be a balanced and common-sense approach.

I didn’t read the policy thread as forbidding any and all discussion of kinetic/katastematic pleasure (or aponia/atarxia). They’ve been batted around on here since I’ve been here – often helpfully.

But it seems as if the various arguments (using that word in a technical, not a pejorative sense) about trying to parse strict distinctions are unlikely to ever be settled to any general satisfaction.

But pleasure (broadly construed) as the guiding foundation – as opposed to, say, only ataraxia for the Pyrrhonians – and a common sense estimation of pleasure/pain outcomes, is settled (for Epicureans). And feelings of satisfaction or contentment are just also pleasures (and, perhaps contra Aronsen, as you’ve quoted her, I think the Cyrenaics would have seen them as “kinetic” as well).

As for duration: Is taking the time to enjoy the pleasure of tasting good food (instead of scarfing it down) necessarily of less duration than moments of satisfaction in between bites? Or perhaps a few moments of contentment after a meal – before delving into that novel you’ve been reading? And then perhaps taking a bit of time to rest your eyes between chapters? I suspect it’s all rather fluid – and that attempts to decide some relative “superiority” are generally misguided (e.g., the Cyrenaics on the one hand, and the Pyrrhonians on the other – Epicurus seems more balanced).

Kalosyni

I agree with you about exegesis itself. Nor do I disagree with your exegesis. Nor am I attempting any eisegesis on the texts.

I am simply saying that I personally cannot relate to the concept of blessedness (nor any kind of god-likeness) in my life. Even as I (I think) understand your explanation (exegesis), which I am not disputing. And I don’t believe that I, personally, am losing out on anything there.

Thank you for your patience.

Quote from Matteng

For this reason, Seneca elsewhere explains that whereas the goal of Epicureanism is “a mind immune to feeling”, this “unfeelingness” is actually the opposite of what the Stoics desire.

Wow! I've always had respect for Robertson as one of the better translators of Stoicism for the modern world. But that is so egregiously wrong. He clearly did not do his due diligence on that.

Quote from Cassius

It's a word that appears and has to be incorporated in reviewing texts

Yes, absolutely.

Kalosyni Thanks for that considered response.

I don’t fear death – or gods. Epicurean philosophy certainly has been a support for that. But I don’t believe in gods (supernatural or natural) – so, for me, whatever “godlike” might mean is a human (imaginative) projection; and is extremely variable according to culture, religion, philosophy, personal imaging. I don’t object to any of that; it can be useful. But it has no other meaning to me.

I think that Epicurus was probably a theological realist: he did believe there were gods, evidenced via prolepsis. I do not.

So, to the extent that “blessedness” (makarios) is related to god-likeness, it is (to me) a projection from human imagination: an ideal. (And imagination is a valid and powerful human resource! I’m a poet, remember? But it’s also a powerful resource for science, as I think Einstein said.) And even if not related to an idea of god-likeness, it’s still such a projection: as the kind of ideal (goal) we imagine (such as cooking the perfect meal) in order to progress. I affirm that kind of use as well.

But “blessedness” is not one that works for me either way. Perhaps I just don't understand it the way that those for whom it is helpful do. So, I just let it go (past tense there) – along with the gods.

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Addendum: I have a very large, framed print of Epicurus in the Garden by Genevra Catalano on the wall directly above my desk. That represents a kind of ideal (reminder) that I can contemplate, in my imagination. I have others.

Quote from Bryan

I may be misunderstanding or being overly-literal.

Maybe not being literal enough.

I think the important word in the quote is that “to” – as opposed to, say, “in” or “in spite of.” If Epicurus had adjusted himself “to” that world, he would have, for example, adopted (or at least pretended to adopt) the same superstitions as the general populace, especially as it was dangerous not to. He likely would not have counseled, or even thought of counseling lathe bios.

A lot of my upbringing – by family, church, school – was aimed exactly at molding (adjusting) one to fit in by accepting (adjusting yourself to) whatever “mother culture” wanted you to believe (or at least their version of it). And some people never lose that: it’s too risky (even psychologically) not to fit in – or they never escape the “programming.”

For me, trying to adjust myself to that (and I was successful for a long time) was hard, and the stress was detrimental to my physical health. Eventually, I opted out of trying to adjust myself to all that (the religion, the hypocrisy, the bigotry) – without becoming a hermit. I found ways.

And that’s how I read and understood that quote – immediately. But we all have different experiences …

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I wrote this before I read all the responses. I could have just replied with: "What Joshua said."

I have become more and more a “one day at a time” kind of guy. And although I might draw from other sources where it seems helpful, it is mostly Epicurean philosophy that helps me with that. I think of myself as “mostly Epicurean” – it’s what I keep coming back to. (My use of the word “eclectic” for myself a while back may have been ill-considered, at least in any broad philosophical sense.)

“It is not a sign of good health to be well adjusted to a sick society.”

-- Jiddu Krishnamurti

Quote from Kalosyni

You acquire a god-like tranquility, meaning your mind is completely peaceful and satisfied, having transcended regular human anxiety

This is exactly the kind of ideal (in the sense of ultimate goal or telos) I no longer entertain, let alone strive for – like Nirvana or Bodhi or “big Satori.” I just let that kind of thing go – relaxing from it, as it were.

Note: Speaking only for myself, not denigrating or dismissing anyone else’s quest or pursuit!

Don: Not intrepid. We've exchanged this before, but I use both terms when translating (mostly for myself) εὐδαιμονία: i.e. "happy well-being."

I know this has been discussed before, but I forget. What exactly do we mean by “blessedness” (in simple terms)? It seems to me something like “sainthood” (say, in the sense of Orthodox Christianity – not the Lutheran “sainthood of all believers”.)

It does not seem like something I strive for, or am much interested in. I just try to live a happier life – in terms of more pleasure (kinetic/katastematic), less pain (physical/mental) by my choices, one day at a time.

But maybe I misunderstand …

Sorry if this is an interruption of the discussion.

Quote from Don

That is why it was not the reader who was the addresser of the text, but the listener — he was listening to the text which was read to him

And there were learned scribes (often slaves) to whom letters and texts could be dictated, to be read aloud to recipients – serving a function akin to professional secretaries today, which you describe and which likely fit into the “highly skilled” slaves mentioned by Kalosyni.

For example, we have no writing attributed to the Stoic Epictetus; it was Arrian who wrote down the teachings that are incorporated in the Enchiridion and the Discourses. (Though Epictetus, before being freed, seems likely also have fit the category of a highly skilled – and literate – slave.

Also, the word “literate” is a relative term. I have no literacy in Greek, for example; I once was literate in differential calculus, but am no longer (have forgotten it all over years of disuse; I may be moderately literate in Epicurean philosophy, but far less literate than many on here (I wouldn’t refer to myself as a philosopher).

Quote from Don

We know that at least Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoikeus were literate:

Leontien and Themista also, according to accounts.

Quote from Cassius

We have to explain that when Epicurus was refering to gods he was referring to something supernatural

You meant "not supernatural," yes?

Quote from Cassius

We have to explain that when Epicurus referred to pleasure he meant all that is desirable, not just stimulation.

I get what you’re trying to say here, but aren’t all pleasures (and pains), physical and mental – stimulated by sense experience, αἴσθησῐς? As are πᾰ́θη and even προλήψεις? As are desires?

Pleasure includes everything and anything that “feels good” – even a self-righteous pat-on-the-back by a Stoic that thinks pleasure and virtue are dichotomous guides.

Quote from Cassius

I would be alert to the direction that some writers seem to take that tranquility does not only not "feel great" -- but that tranquility is not a "feeling" at all. That's how "they" (not referring here to Max) argue that tranquility is not a feeling at all.

Maybe “tranquillity” (which seems to be the dominant translation of ἀταραξία) is a translation subject to too much distortion, often taken as an unfeeling state. I think that Don and I have both used “equanimity” – but that seems to come up against your point here as well.

Since ταραχή is (an unpleasant) disturbance or unease in the mind (such as anxiety), it seems to clearly fall within Epicurus’ understanding of pain – in this case, mental as opposed to physical. Though it certainly can – and perhaps most often does – present somatically as well; in fact, I would suggest that the psyche/soma connection works both ways, and that physical pain can also cause ταραχή – which is why that is something that Epicurus deals with (contra, at least in terms of emphasis, the Cyrenaics).

For me, “serenity” seems more of a feeling state – of which, among its synonyms, Wordhippo includes “a mildly euphoric feeling” (albeit only after a pleasurable experience, which seems to me an unnecessary limitation). Or, perhaps, just “pleasant mind” – or even “enjoyable mind.” [Though ἀταραξία is rendered in the negative – so maybe just “untroubled.”]

I’m sure somebody here can come up with a better solution, so I’ll end this meandering with ??? ….