Do Pigs Value Katastematic Pleasure? ( Summer 2022 K / K Discussion)

Quote from Godfrey

Just curious. I don't want to derail this thread!

I sent you a conversation regarding the homeostasis topic so we don't derail

And thanks! I'm enjoying the research

Quote from Kalosyni

I don't remember if there is an article or discussion you may have posted some time ago on "homeostasis"? Or if you can post a link to an earlier discussion?

I've mentioned it several places. Here's a search:

Search Results - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

You'll see me mention Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett and Dr. Anna Lembke in those search results.

Just so there's no confusion, homeostasis is not some idiosyncratic state that might appeal to introverts over extroverts. It is the well-functioning of one's body and mind when everything is in balance.

Here's the biological definition:

Homeostasis (article) | Human body systems | Khan Academy

Learn how organisms maintain homeostasis, or a stable internal environment.

www.khanacademy.org

As Khan says, homeostasis is "The tendency to maintain a stable, relatively constant internal environment."

Here's a PubMed paper:

Homeostasis: The Underappreciated and Far Too Often Ignored Central Organizing Principle of Physiology - PubMed

The grand challenge to physiology, as was first described in an essay published in the inaugural issue of Frontiers in Physiology in 2010, remains to integrate…

pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

"The health and vitality of the organism can be said to be the end result of homeostatic regulation. An understanding of normal physiology is not possible without an appreciation of this concept. Conversely, it follows that disruption of homeostatic mechanisms is what leads to disease, and effective therapy must be directed toward re-establishing these homeostatic conditions."

Homeostasis is not "mindfulness" or some "mystical" state, it is the foundational "health and vitality of the organism."

My take is becoming that this idea of biological homeostasis as the "health and vitality of the organism" is what Epicurus was referring to - generally - as katastematic pleasure. It is the underlying, foundational starting point of physical (aponia) and mental (ataraxia) health. If our body and mind are working properly and we are listening to our "feedback loops" of pleasure/pain, we can better *vary* our pleasure once we've achieved a homeostatic/katastematic foundation.

I wanted to address the title of Metrodorus's book that is cited by Clement of Alexandria.

The title in Greek is:

Περι του μειζονα ειναι την παρ' ἡμας αἰτιαν προς εὐδαιμονιαν της ἐκ των πραγματων

The "New Advent" English translation is:

On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects

I don't entirely agree with the translation choices made there, but they'll do well enough.

What I want to do is look at several key words that impact our current discussion on katastematic pleasure.

μειζονα = greater, larger (comparative degree of μεγας megas)

αἰτιαν = (accusative singular) cause (translated above as "source" evidently)

- - την παρ' ἡμας αἰτιαν = thε cause for us"

προς εὐδαιμονιαν = for eudaimonian (translated above (inadequately, IMHO) as "happiness"; personally I prefer "well-being" to connote or play on the eu + daimon origin of the word.)

πραγματων = (pragmaton, genitive plural of pragma). This is the important one.

Pragma has a number of definitions and connotations:

- deed, act, fact

- occurrence, matter, affair

- thing, concrete reality

- thing, creature

- thing of consequence or importance

- (in the plural) circumstances, affairs

- (in the plural, in bad sense) trouble, annoyance

- - της ἐκ των πραγματων "that which is from deeds/things/circumstances/etc."

Now, from Metrodorus's book, we get his quote asking "What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?"

This is consistent with the title from what I can see. That title is saying that we can be more confident of "the hope of [the] continuance" of pleasure which arises within us than that which arises from deeds/things/circumstances/etc. This seems to me to be consistent with the emphasis on autarkeia (self-reliance) elsewhere in the texts and that we don't have to rely on outside circumstances for our pleasure. Of course, we can vary our pleasures with our deeds and circumstances! But the pleasure that arises from within ourselves - katastematic pleasure, namely aponia and ataraxia - is always near at hand. We have complete control over that whereas our circumstances are not always under our control due to chance and outside factors.

Additionally, one of the definitions of pragma in LSJ is "deed, act, the concrete of πρᾶξις..."

Along those same lines, Πάθη (pathe) is something that happens to you, something that is experienced. LSJ: "what is done or happens to a person or thing, opp. πρᾶξις (praxis)"

The pathe are pleasure and pain. In this definition, the pathe are opposed to praxis. We always have the pathe to rely on. I'm still mulling over the significance of this point, but I think there's a significance there, too.

Quote from Kalosyni

The closest think that comes to me regarding "homeostasis" is Vatican Saying 11 - "For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied." And so this is pointing at something which is neither.

Here's some of my own commentary on VS11.

VS11 For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied.

τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

• τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων (gen) the greatest number of people (i.e., the majority of people)
• ἡσυχάζω (hesykhazo) I. to be still, keep quiet, be at rest, Aesch.; ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχάζειν the difficulty of finding rest, Thuc.:—often in part., ἡσυχάζων προσμένω Soph.; ἡσυχάσασα by resting from war, Thuc.
• νάρκη I. numbness, deadness, Lat. torpor, Ar.
• κῑνέω (κινούμενον middle/passive participle?)
  • to set in motion, move, remove
  • (grammar) to inflect
  • to meddle
  • to change, innovate
  • to begin, cause
  • to urge on, stir on
  • to arouse, exasperate, anger, taunt, abuse
  • (passive) to be moved, to stir, to move
• λύσσα I. rage, fury, esp. martial rage, Il. 2. after Hom. raging madness, raving, frenzy, Trag. II. canine madness, rabies, Xen. λύσσα, αττιξ λύττα, ἡ

So an alternative translation by Don: For the majority of people, to be at rest is to be bored stiff; but to be active is to be raving like a rabid dog.

To me it seems to be saying there needs to be a balance or that stillness is important and that most people don't recognize this. Plus they're just running around to appear important or just simply to do something, they can't be alone with their own thoughts… they're not self-reliant.

Additional note: In light of the current discussion over multiple threads on katastematic and kinetic pleasures, I find the words ἡσυχάζον (hēsykhazōn) and κινούμενον (kinoumenon) VERY indicative of the senses of katastematic and kinetic (in fact, kinoumenon is directly related to that word in Greek). I find their juxtaposition here very interesting.

I also see his "for most people" directly implying "but not for us (Epicureans)". He is setting up a contrast with the masses against the Epicureans, and, from my reading here, the Epicureans *value* ἡσυχάζον and κινούμενον and the Epicureans do NOT see them as numbness and "raving like a rabid dog," respectively.

In fact, hesykhias shows up in a PD14.

PD14 . “Although security on a human level is achieved up to a point by a power to resist and by prosperity, the security afforded by inner peace and withdrawing from the crowd is the purest.” White (2021)

Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τινὶ ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.

+ ἡσυχίας (hesykhias) "peace; silence, stillness"

+ + ἐκχορεύω (ekkhoreuo) "to break out (ἐκ-) of the chorus (χορεύω)"

I find reading the ἡσυχάζον in VS11 in light of the ἡσυχίας in PD14 , and vice versa, to be intriguing.

[ U416 ]

Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on Plato’s "Philebus," [p. 274 Stallb.]: Epicurus, referring to natural pleasure, says that it is katastematic.

Philo of Alexandria, Allegory of the Law, III.54, t. I [p. 118 Mang.]: ... to those who say that pleasure is katastematic.

I knew I'd hit a nerve with Cassius on this whole katastematic/kinetic topic. I'm still digging through all the posts from today, and I'll have to go back and read Nikolsky, G&T (not gin and tonic, unfortunately), et al. I'll have more to say over the next few days. Plus I'm digging into the original texts as well. *That's* the most important task in my opinion.

For the record, however, there is no doubt that Epicurus divided up pleasures into at least 2 different but related kinds. No matter what, we have to account for:

DL X.136. ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

And Epicurus, in his On Choices, says this, "For freedom from disturbance ("ataraxia") and freedom from suffering ("aponia") are katastematic pleasures, and joy and delight are viewed as kinetic and active." (trans. Inwood & Gerson)

Epicurus is quoted, directly dividing pleasures into at least 2 katastematic ones and at least 2 kinetic/active ones. He made the distinction. He used the terms. Note, however, that he is NOT quoted as putting them in a hierarchy that I can see, but the words are there.

Plus this is the passage directly before Epicurus's On Choices quote:

Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."

Metrodorus's quote is:

νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς.

Right there, again, is κίνησιν (kinēsin) and

καταστηματικῆς (katastēmatikēs).

Metrodorus is also quoted as saying (I'm paraphrasing, don't have it in front of me) that we can be more confident of the pleasures arising from states than from those of objects or activities outside of ourselves. To me, this points directly to the katastematic/kinetic debate plus seems to point to the importance of autarkeia/self-reliance.

So, even if by some chance Epicurus and Metrodorus were responding to criticism from another philosopher (and I don't think they were, but for the sake of conjecture), the two katastematic quotes show both Epicurus and Metrodorus accepted the terms and the categories as useful. We have to understand why, taking into account:

- All pleasure is good.

- The feelings are two: pleasure and pain.

Also for the record, I don't accept, as some academic commentators appear to, that ataraxia and aponia are "negative" or "not sensed". That makes no sense to me just because there's an a- "un-" prefix on the words. One can take pleasure in being in a state one can describe as being "undisturbed" or in a state one can describe as "pain-free." I simply don't accept that ataraxia and aponia are not "sensed."

Quote from Godfrey

I would say that it's a different quality of pleasure: quieter, more subtle

ἡσυχία (hēsykhia) "Stillness, rest, quiet" (see my other post where Epicurus uses this exact word).

Trivia: Hesychia was also "In Greek mythology, either the daemon personification of silence, a handmaiden of the god of sleep, Hypnos; or a mortal daughter of Thespius."

Quote from Cassius

Unfortunately i cannot agree even with this statement.

It sincerely confuses me as to how you or anyone can say that. It's not Diogenes Laertius (DL) "asserting" this or even paraphrasing it. He's quoting Epicurus's On Choices and Metrodorus's Timocrates. I'll go back and read Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky, of course, to refresh my memory of their arguments, but the ancient booktitles are there, and I think *that* has to be accounted for. If we start saying, "Oh, Epicurus didn't really write that in a book with that title!" we're on a Skeptical slippery slope as to what few ancient texts we have. The flip side of this is Cicero and his whole creation of the characters Villeius and Torquatus and being able to take creative liberties with their dialogue. Yes, we can be a little more skeptical and critical of his work. But DL makes a point of basically saying, "I'm not making this up. Here are their exact words from these books."

Quote from Cassius

Whatever Epicurus may have thought about K/K, those thoughts were not significant enough to make it into those key documents.

To that, I'd say "Bingo!" According to On Choices and other quoted material, Epicurus used the words katastematic and kinetic. Yes, I will continue to "assert" that. But *maybe* they weren't central to his philosophy because THEY'RE BOTH PLEASURES. He didn't see the need to belabor the point. He didn't put them in a hierarchy. He recognized that, sure, there are different kinds of pleasure. In fact, there are two general "species." But his philosophy stood on the assertion that PLEASURE is the Good to which everything else points. He then needed to demonstrate *how* to live pleasurably by making choices and rejections, etc. My take on the On Choices quote from Epicurus is (and I'll go ciceronian and put dialogue in his mouth):

Epicurus: "Sure, I'll agree with the general idea that there are katastematic and kinetic pleasures, but the important thing is that they're *both* pleasurable! You also have two hands. Do you lift heavy stones with only one hand? Of course not! In the same way, to have a pleasurable life you need to consider all pleasures as available to you, and choose among all pleasures prudently, making choices and rejections among them. There is a time for stillness, there is a time for dancing."

It's not Epicurus saying katastematic pleasures are the *only* Good or the *only* Telos, it's the ancient and modern commentators trying to paint him into a Platonic or Aristotlean corner. I'm seeing this through a Princess Bride lens with Epicurus saying to his critics and the academics on the word "katastematic": "I don't think it means what you think it means."

Quote from Cassius

what is hardly more than a footnote in DL assumes significance out of all proportion to anything else, and comes to be seized on so as to take the place of the core original point about pleasure in the first place.

Oh my, look at that. I think we might actually agree on that point.

In fact, let me copy the relevant passage from DLX.136 (emphasis added

Quote

He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest (καταστηματικὴν), but only that which consists in motion (κινήσει). Epicurus admits both ; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice (and Avoidance) are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

So, what is DL "asserting" here?

• Cyrenaics only include kinetic pleasures under their definition of pleasure.
• Epicurus includes BOTH kinetic and katastematic in his definition.
• Where does Epicurus say BOTH pleasures are included? In the following works:
  • On Choice and Avoidance
  • On the Ethical End
  • the first book of his work On Human Life
  • the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene
• Plus Metrodorus says both kinetic and katastematic pleasures are included in the Epicurean definition of Pleasure in Timocrates.
• Plus Diogenes (of Tarsus) says this in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta

There's no hierarchy asserted here. And the passage goes out of its way to say BOTH kinetic and katastematic pleasures are *included* in the Epicurean definition of pleasure in contrast to the Cyrenaics. And it cites *six* works that specifically make this point.

That's the kind of thing that needs to be accounted for: What's actually stated in the text.

PS. I should have also added that in addition to katastematic and kinetic pleasures, DL writes that Epicurus includes BOTH "pleasure of mind as well as of body." The Cyrenaics only included physical pleasure. So, those textual citations that DL cites appear to emphasize Epicurus included ALL pleasures: katastematic and kinetic, mental and physical, etc.

PPS. I'm wondering if Epicurus equated katastematic with mental and kinetic with physical? I'm not advocating that (yet), just raising the question.

Quote from Cassius

And I grant you it takes effort to get through the lengthy and detailed discussions in Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky but they WILL help on this issue.

Before I dig into them again:

A) Do they accept that Epicurus used the terms katastematic and kinetic, but those terms have been given undue importance by ancient and modern commentators?

B) Do they assert that Epicurus never used the words?

If B, I have strong objections to that argument.