EΙ ΚATEΠΥΚΝΟΥTΟ ΠAΣA ΗΔΟΝΗ ΚAΙ ΧΡΟΝῼ ΚAΙ ΠEΡΙ ΟΛΟΝ TΟ AΘΡΟΙΣΜA ΥΠΗΡΧEΝ Η TA ΚΥΡΙΩTATA ΜEΡΗ TΗΣ ΦΥΣEΩΣ ΟΥΚ AΝ ΠΟTE ΔΙEΦEΡΟΝ AΛΛΗΛΩΝ AΙ ΗΔΟΝAΙ.
“If every pleasure were condensed, if one may so say, and if each lasted long, and affected the whole body, or the essential parts of it, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another.” Yonge (1853)
“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation, if this had gone on not only in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, the principal parts of man's nature, there would not have been any difference between one pleasure and another as, in fact, there now is.” Hicks (1910)
“If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,—if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is.” Hicks (1925)
“If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Bailey (1926)
“If every pleasure were alike condensed in duration and associated with the whole organism or the dominant parts of it, pleasures would never differ from one another." De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 235 (1954)
“If every pleasure were cumulative, and if this were the case both in time and in regard to the whole or the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would not differ from each other.” Geer (1964)
“If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)
“If every pleasure were condensed and existed for a long time throughout the entire organism or its most important parts, pleasures would never differ from one another.” O'Connor (1993)
“If every pleasure were condensed and were present, both in time and in the whole compound [body and soul] or in the most important parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ from one another.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)
“If every pleasure could be prolonged to endure in both body or mind, pleasures would never differ from one another.” Anderson (2004)
“If all pleasures could be added together consecutively with respect to space and duration, and across the entire span over which they had all existed, or at least across the principal parts of human nature <which are naturally susceptible to pleasures:> then, pleasures would not be different from each other in any respect.” Makridis (2005)
“If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.” Saint-Andre (2008)
“If all pleasures could be compressed in time and intensity, and were characteristic of the whole man or his more important aspects, the various pleasures would not differ from each other.” Strodach (2012)
“If all pleasure were condensed in space and time, and pervaded the whole aggregate, or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ, one from another.” Mensch (2018)
“If every pleasure were concentrated in place and time and affected our whole aggregate or the most important parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.” White (2021)
Please post detailed discussion of this and other doctrines in the Forum Thread dedicated to that doctrine: The Principal Doctrines
Comments 1