Why Pleasure as a Unified Whole is the Telos in Classical Epicurean Philosophy
Contemplations by Kalosyni
The correct understanding of Classical Epicurean philosophy begins with Epicurus's own declaration that pleasure is the telos, or ultimate goal, of human life. The Letter to Menoeceus states:
| "This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of a completely happy life. For we recognize it as the primary and innate good, we honor it in everything we accept or reject, and we achieve it if we judge every good thing by the standard of how that thing affects us". |
Yet many modern interpretations go on to obscure this central teaching by claiming that Epicurus divided pleasure into two unequal categories: kinetic pleasures, such as the pleasures of eating, friendship, and the senses, and katastematic pleasures, identified with freedom from bodily pain (aponia) and freedom from mental disturbance (ataraxia).
According to this two-fold modern interpretation of pleasure, katastematic pleasure is regarded as a higher and more valuable state, while ordinary kinetic pleasures are treated as secondary or merely instrumental. By elevating tranquil katastematic pleasure, many modern writers portray Epicurus as an advocate of minimalism, asceticism, or withdrawal from life, making his philosophy appear similar to Stoicism or Buddhism. In the process, the very word pleasure -- the term for which Epicurus was most famous in antiquity -- is left out and instead the Epicurean telos is stated as "tranquility" or "absence of pain." This interpretation fundamentally alters Epicurus's philosophy and misrepresents both Epicurus' teaching and the way the ancient Epicureans understood and practiced their philosophy.
Both Cicero's De Finibus and Diogenes Laertius give evidence that both of these types of pleasures are actually on equal footing -- neither source states that one kind of pleasure is superior to the other. Cicero's criticism is instead that Epicurus was being inconsistent by including both under the single name "pleasure." If Epicurus had truly believed that the absence of pain alone was the highest good, Cicero goes on to argue that he should have adopted the position of Hieronymus of Rhodes, who explicitly made freedom from pain the supreme goal while rejecting pleasure as such. Cicero clearly distinguishes Hieronymus from Epicurus, demonstrating that he understood Epicurus had not replaced pleasure with mere freedom from pain.
The modern scholarship of Gosling and Taylor also supports this, when they argue that the picture of two competing forms of pleasure is mistaken. Epicurus did not construct a hierarchy in which katastematic pleasure supersedes kinetic pleasure. Rather, pleasure is a single, unified good experienced in different ways. Freedom from pain is itself pleasurable, but it is not a separate or superior end that displaces the ordinary pleasures of living.
Understanding pleasure as the unified telos restores the coherence of Epicurean ethics. Epicurus did not advocate the rejection of life's pleasures in pursuit of an abstract state of tranquility. Instead, tranquility and freedom from pain are valuable because they are pleasurable conditions that contribute to a flourishing life. The goal remains pleasure itself, encompassing both active enjoyments and peaceful well-being. This interpretation is more faithful to the ancient texts and preserves the central doctrine that made Epicurean philosophy distinctive: pleasure, in all its forms, is the highest good and the proper end of human life.
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You can read a much longer article by Cassius on this same topic, here.